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
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A

COMMENTARY

ON THE

EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS,

WITH A

TRANSLATION AND VARIOUS EXCURSUS.

BY

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P R E F A C E .

I PUBLISH to the world the result of my labours upon the epistle to the Romans, with unfeigned diffidence, and with a trembling sense of the responsibility which I incur by so doing. This epistle has been the grand arena, if I may so express myself, on which theological combatants have been contending, ever since the third century; and perhaps still earlier. The turn which the apostle James has given to his discussion respecting justification, makes it probable, that even in his time there were some who abused the words of Paul, in his epistle to the Romans, concerning the doctrine of 'justification by faith without the deeds of law.' If so, then it would seem, that there has been no period since this epistle was written, in which its meaning has not been more or less a subject of contest.

How could this be otherwise, since it discusses the highest and most difficult of all the doctrines which pertain to the Christian system? Men must be more alike in their early education, their illumination, their habits of reasoning, and their theological convictions, than they have hitherto been; and they must love God and each other, better than they have ever yet done; not to differ in their interpretation of the epistle to the Romans. It strikes at the root of all human pride and vain glory; it aims even a deadly blow. And where a passionate attachment to these is rankling in the breast, how is it possible that this epistle should meet with a welcome reception, and the authority of its simple and obvious meaning be admitted? Even where the remains of such an attachment are still lurking within, and only now and then developing themselves, because the heart is in some measure unsanctified, there we cannot expect to find an unprejudiced interpretation of the writing in question. An epistle, which is as it were the very *Confession of Faith* that a true Christian is to make, must needs receive an interpretation more or less forced, on the part of all who are influenced by pride, by passion, by prejudice, by ill-directed early instruction, or by ignorance.

For these reasons, an interpreter of this epistle must expect opposition at the present day, let his views be what they may. Be he Calvinist, Arminian, Pelagian, Antinomian, Socinian, or of any other sect, it is in vain for him to think of escape. Paul is a writer too formidable to be acknowledged as an opponent. Hence, when he is interpreted so that the views of one party in any particular point

seem to be favoured, the others are very apt to unite in condemning the interpretation. Nothing will satisfy them, but to have such a writer explained as siding with them. Alas then for the interpreter! While he meets, perhaps, with the approbation of a few, he must of course expect the vehement dissent of many. He must make up his mind, therefore, before he publishes, to bear with all this, and to bear with it patiently and firmly; or else he had better abstain from publishing. It may appear to him as a very undesirable remuneration for painful and long-protracted labours; but it is one which others have been obliged to receive, and which he also must expect. The only offset for all the pain which this may occasion him, must be the hope, that his labours after all may do some good; and that, if they do not themselves on the whole directly advance the cause of truth, they may at least be the means of exciting others to make inquiries, which will result in the accomplishment of such an end.

For myself, I do not profess to be free from all prejudices of education and all attachment to system, in such a degree as to make it certain that my views may not sometimes be affected by them. Nor do I profess to be so illuminated in respect to divine things, and so skilled in the original language and criticism of the New Testament, as to be certain that all my conclusions respecting the meaning of the epistle before us, are correct. *Homo sum, et nihil ab hominibus me alienum puto.* When, therefore, I speak in the indicative mood, and say that this means thus and so, the reader will not understand that any thing more is intended, than that this is true in my opinion. To be always dealing in the conditional mode, and filling one's pages with *if, perhaps, probably, possibly, may it not, can it not, etc., etc.*, would be intolerable in such a writing as a commentary. Besides, it would represent the author himself as in a perpetual state of doubt or uncertainty. This I cannot truly say of myself. My convictions, for the most part, have become definite and full in respect to far the greater portion of the epistle to the Romans. To represent them otherwise, would be to misrepresent them.

But this does not imply, that I am insensible of the weakness of human nature, or of my exposedness to err. If I have any knowledge of my own heart, it is very far from such insensibility. After all, however, a man who is liable to err, may form opinions, and may be satisfied that they are correct. This all men do, and must do; and all which can be properly demanded of them is, that they should hold themselves open to conviction, whenever adequate reasons are offered to convince them of their errors.

In this position, I trust and believe, do I hold myself, as to the opinions advanced in the interpretations that follow. I can say truly, that there are no opinions advanced here, which have been hastily taken up. I have been long engaged in the exposition of the epistle to the Romans, and have studied it much more than any other part of the bible. I have taken an extensive range in consulting commentators ancient and modern, as well as exeges contained in theological essays and systems. This, however, I mention for one pur-

pose, and one only, viz., to shew that I have not come lightly to the responsible task of writing and publishing a commentary on the epistle under consideration; and that the opinions, therefore, which are advanced in it, are not the offspring of mere education or hasty conjecture.

Dissent, and probably contradiction, are almost of course to be expected. I may be permitted, however, respectfully to solicit those who may see fit to publish any thing of this nature, that they would investigate thoroughly, before they condemn what I have said. When they have so done, I shall value their opinion, however it may differ from my own. Aiming, as I trust I do, at the development of truth, I shall rejoice to find any of my errors corrected; for errors no doubt there are in my work; and if the correction be made in the spirit of love and Christian friendship, so much the more acceptable will it be. If it be made in a different spirit, and is still a real correction, I would fain hope for magnanimity enough to say: *Fas est ab hoste doceri.*

From some of those who have never deeply studied the epistle to the Romans, and who have a traditional and systematic exegesis which answers their purposes in an *a priori* way, I may probably expect, in regard to some things, vehement and unqualified dissent. Such, however, can hardly assert the right of demanding that my views should be accommodated to theirs; since we proceed, in our respective interpretations, on grounds so exceedingly diverse. I hope, therefore, that such will excuse me from any obligation to contend with their exegesis.

To those who may differ from me, after thorough research, I can only say: 'The field is open; as open for you as for me. You have the same right to publish your thoughts to the world, as I have to publish mine; and as good a right to defend your views, as I have to proffer mine. The result of doing this, if done with deep, attentive, protracted consideration, and in the spirit of kindness, cannot be otherwise than favourable to the interests of truth. I may not live to vindicate my own views where just, or to abandon the errors of which you might convince me; but others will live, who will do the one or the other for me, should it become necessary. The truth, at last, must and will prevail.'

I confess, frankly, that I do not expect, for this book, the favour of such as are truly *sectarians*. I have written it, so far as in my power, without any regard to sect or name. Doubtless my efforts have been imperfect; but so far as in me lay, the one only and simple inquiry with me has been: What did Paul mean to teach? What Calvin, or Augustine, or Edwards, or Arminius, or Grotius, or any other theologian or commentator has taught or said, has been with me only secondary and subordinate. No one is farther from disrespect to the great and good, than myself; but when explaining the Bible, to call no man *master*, and to bow to no system as such, are sacred principles with me. If I have not always adhered to them, it results from my imperfection; not from any conscious and allowed

design. Of course, all *party* men in theology, will probably find some things in the following pages with which they will not agree. How can it be otherwise? I have, to the utmost of my power, left their systems out of sight, and made it my constant and only effort, to follow simply the way in which the apostle seems to lead me. Such a course will be estimated differently from what it now is, when less attachment to system and party in theology, and more of simple-hearted love of the truth just as it stands in the Scripture, shall prevail in the churches.

My views of Rom. 5: 12—19, of 7: 5—25, and of 8: 28, seq., will no doubt be controverted. I have anticipated this; for who can help knowing, that these passages have, for time immemorial, been the great *πρόσκομμα καὶ σκάνδαλον* of theology? To hazard an interpretation here, and not to accompany it with reasons, would be justly deemed presumptuous. To give reasons, demands at least the appearance of *theologizing*. Whatever of this exists in the Commentary or the Excursus, is, I may say, involuntary on my part. It is inserted only to guard against being misunderstood, or else to support the interpretation which I have given. In order to do this, it is now and then necessary, to shew that a different interpretation is replete with difficulties, some of which are insurmountable.

Those who are disposed to find fault with what they may call my *theological* discussions, (brief and seldom as they are), would probably not make any objections to such discussions, had the result of them been accordant with their own views, or with those of the authors whom they highly esteem. But how can I be under obligation, to make wishes of this nature a rule to guide my interpretations, or my explanation and defence of them? I know of no precept in theory, nor any obligation from usage, which hinders an interpreter from reasoning upon the doctrines which the Scriptures appear to teach, or which they have been represented as teaching. How can it be one's duty, not to guard against the misrepresentation of his own views in respect to the meaning of Scripture, and not to defend those views by producing the arguments which appear to justify them?

Whatever the following pages contain, either of truth or error, they have been written under no ordinary sense of responsibility. The epistle itself must needs create such a feeling in the breast of every reflecting man, who undertakes to comment upon it; and in addition to this, I have been repeatedly interrupted in my labours by my state of health; and this, under circumstances which rendered it not improbable, that I should not live to see the completion of my work. The day of my account cannot be far distant; and in view of it, can I publish to the world what I do not seriously regard as being true? Can party purposes have any strong attractions for a man in such a condition? I hope and trust I can say, that the tribunal before which this and all other works are to be finally judged, appears to me a matter of immeasurably higher interest, than all the praise or blame which men can bestow.

May that omniscient and merciful Being, the God of love and

truth, forgive whatever of error may be in this book; and accept and bless to the good of his church, whatever of truth is explained or defended!

I should be ungrateful, if I should omit to mention my special obligations to some of the interpreters, who have laboured to explain the epistle to the Romans. Calvin, Grotius, J. A. Turretin, Flatt, and Tholuck, have been my favourite authors; although I have by no means confined my reading to these. Most of all am I indebted to the excellent book of Tholuck on this epistle. In particular, I have often relied on him, in my statements with respect to the opinions of other commentators, whom I had not at hand, or whom I did not think it important to consult myself, because I confided in his account of their views. But in all cases, where any considerable importance was attached to the opinion of this or that individual, and where it was in my power to consult, I have consulted for myself. Prof. Tholuck will easily perceive, also, if the following sheets should pass under his eye, that I am indebted to him for various classical quotations and allusions, and also for not a few valuable philological remarks, as well as views of the reasoning and argumentation of the apostle. He has my most unfeigned thanks, for all the aid which his excellent work has afforded me.

He will also perceive, that in some places I differ from him; I do this, as I trust, in the spirit of kindness and brotherly love. When I do differ, I always give my reasons for it. As I fully believe, that his only aim is to come to the knowledge and development of truth; so I trust he will put a candid estimate on the full and frank expression of my own views, where they differ from his. May our respective labours and inquiries help to promote the great object which we both have in view!

Throughout, I have adopted and expressed no views or opinions, without study; and none upon the *authority* of others. Those who read the following pages, will perceive, I apprehend, that while I have not neglected the study of other writers, I have not omitted to study and think for myself. In this way only can any advance be hoped for, in the all-important work of interpreting the Bible.

I have only to add, that the present work is designed, in a special manner, for *beginners* in the study of interpretation; and this fact will account for the occasional repetitions and particularity of illustration, which the reader will not unfrequently meet with, in his perusal of this volume. If all the young men in our country, who repair to theological Seminaries, or who devote themselves in any way to the study of sacred criticism, had been trained in early life to the study of the classics, on such grounds as are adopted in the Gymnasia of Europe, many a minute remark might be spared which is now made. The reader, who finds some things which are superfluous for himself, when he calls this to mind, will grant me pardon for being minute and particular. Commentary written in a *general* way, leaves only a general and indistinct impression. It is not my aim to accomplish merely such an end.

The more practised interpreter will not, for the most part, be displeased with being frequently reminded of principles in grammar and criticism, which are in themselves important, and which need, in our biblical studies, to be kept constantly before the mind.

I cannot close this preface, without expressing my obligations to Mr. Leonard Woods, jun., who has with great assiduity, perseverance, and kindness, assisted in the correction of the press, in nearly all the sheets of the present volume, and whose aid has been important to me, on account of the ability and accuracy with which it has been rendered.

MOSES STUART.

Theological Seminary; Andover, }
Sept. 1832. }

THE

EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

Introduction and Salutation.

1. **PAUL**, a servant of Jesus Christ, a chosen apostle, set apart for
2 the gospel of God, ¹ which he formerly published by his prophets in
3 the holy Scriptures, ¹ concerning his Son, (who was of the seed of
4 David as to the flesh, ¹ [and] was constituted the Son of God with
power as to his holy spiritual nature, after his resurrection from the
5 dead), Jesus Christ our Lord, ¹ (by whom we have received grace
and the office of an apostle, in order to promote the obedience of
6 faith among all nations, for his name's sake, ¹ among whom are ye
7 also, called of Jesus Christ), ¹ to all who are at Rome, beloved of
God, chosen saints; grace be unto you, and peace from God our
Father and the Lord Jesus Christ.

8 First, I thank my God, through Jesus Christ, on account of you
9 all, that your faith is spoken of in all the world. For God is my
witness, whom I truly serve in the gospel of his Son, how unceasing-
10 ly I make remembrance of you, ¹ always asking in my prayers,
that at some time or other, if possible before long, I may (God will-
11 ing) make a prosperous journey, and come to you. For I am desirous
to see you, in order to bestow on you some spiritual favour,
12 so that you may be confirmed. This is also [my desire], to be comforted
among you by the mutual faith both of you and me.

13 Moreover I would not have you ignorant, brethren, that I have often
purposed to come unto you, (but have been hindered until now),

that I might have some fruit among you, as also among other Gen-
14 tiles. I am a debtor to both Greeks and Barbarians, to both the
15 learned and the unlearned : such being the case, I am ready, ac-
cording to my ability, to preach the gospel even to you who are at
Rome.

Subjects of consideration proposed, which constitute the distinguishing traits of the gospel.

16 For I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ, since it is the pow-
er of God unto the salvation of every one that believeth ; to the Jew
17 first, and then to the Greek. For the justification which is of God,
is revealed by it, [justification] by faith, in order that we may be-
18 lieve ; as it is written : “ The just shall live by faith.” Moreover
the wrath of God from heaven is revealed against all ungodliness,
and unrighteousness of men who hinder the truth by unrighteous-
ness.

Universal depravity and guilt of the Gentiles.

19 Because that which might be known concerning God, is manifest
20 to them ; for God hath manifested it to them ; ¹ (for the invisible
things of him, since the creation of the world, are clearly seen by
the things which are made, even his eternal power and Godhead) ;
21 so that they are without excuse : because, when they knew God,
they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful, but became
vain in their imaginations, and their inconsiderate mind was dark-
22 ened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, ¹ and
23 exchanged the glory of the immortal God for an image like to mor-
24 tal man, and fowls, and four-footed beasts, and reptiles. Wherefore
God even gave them up, in the lusts of their hearts, to uncleanness,
25 to dishonour their own bodies among themselves ; who exchanged
the true God for a false one, and worshipped and served the crea-
26 ture more than the Creator, who is blessed forever, Amen ! On ac-
count of this, God gave them up to base passions ; for their women
27 changed their natural use into that which is against nature. And
in like manner also the males, leaving the natural use of the fe-
male, burned in their lust toward each other, males with males do-

ing that which is shameful, and receiving in themselves the reward
28 of their error which is due. And inasmuch as they did not like to re-
tain God in their knowledge, God gave them up to a reprobate mind,
29 to do those things which are base; being filled with all iniquity, un-
cleanness, malice, covetousness, mischief; full of envy, murder,
30 strife, deceit, malevolence; backbiters, open slanderers, haters of
God, railers, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to
31 parents, ¹ inconsiderate, covenant-breakers, destitute of natural af-
32 fection, implacable, unmerciful: who knowing the ordinance of God,
that they who do such things are worthy of death, not only do the
same things, but even bestow commendation on those who do them.

The Jews equally guilty with the Gentiles.

II. THEREFORE thou art without excuse, O man, whoever thou art
that condemnest; for in condemning another thou passest sentence
upon thyself, since thou who condemnest, doest the same things.
2 Now we know that the judgment of God is according to truth,
3 against those who do such things. Dost thou think then, O man,
who condemnest those that do such things, and doest the same, that
4 thou shalt escape the judgment of God? Or dost thou despise his
abounding goodness, and forbearance, and long suffering? not ac-
knowledging that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance,
5 ¹ but according to thy hard and impenitent heart, treasuring up for
thyself wrath in the day of wrath, when the righteous judgment of
6 God shall be revealed; who will render to every man according to
7 his works: to those who by patient continuance in well-doing seek
8 for glory and honour and immortality, eternal life; but to those
who are contentious and disobey the truth and obey unrighteous-
9 ness, indignation and wrath. Affliction and distress [shall be] upon
every soul of man that doeth evil, first of the Jew and then of the Greek;
10 but glory and honour and peace [shall be] to every one who doeth
11 good, first to the Jew and then to the Greek; (for with God there
12 is no respect of persons; since so many as have sinned without law
will perish without law, and so many as have sinned under the law

13 will be condemned by the law, ¹ because it is not those that hear
the law who are just with God, but those that obey the law who will
14 be justified ; for when the Gentiles who have no law, do in a natural
state such things as the law requireth, these being destitute of the
15 law, are a law to themselves ; who shew that the work which the
law requireth, is written upon their hearts, their conscience bearing
witness, and their thoughts alternately accusing or excusing) ; in the
16 day when God shall judge, the secret things of men by Jesus Christ,
according to my gospel.

17 If now thou art called a Jew, and dost rest upon the law, and
18 make thy boast of God, ¹ and art acquainted with [his] will, and
canst distinguish things which differ, being instructed by the law ;
19 thou art confident, too, of being thyself a guide to the blind, a light
20 to those who are in darkness, ¹ an instructor of the ignorant, a teach-
er of little children, one having the representation of true knowledge
21 in the law ; dost thou, then, who teachest another, not instruct thy-
25 self ? Dost thou who preachest against stealing, thyself steal ? ¹ Dost
thou who forbiddest to commit adultery, thyself commit adultery ?
Dost thou who abhorrest idols, thyself commit robbery in holy
23 things ? Dost thou who makest thy boast of the law, thyself dishon-
24 our God by transgressing the law ? “ For the name of God is
25 blasphemed by you among the Gentiles ; ” as it is written. Circum-
cision indeed is profitable, if thou dost obey the law ; but if thou
art a transgressor of the law, thy circumcision becometh uncircumci-
26 sion. If then he who is uncircumcised keep the precepts of the
27 law, shall not his uncircumcision be counted for circumcision ? Yea,
he who keepeth the law, in his natural uncircumcised state, will con-
demn thee, who, in possession of the Scriptures and a partaker of
28 circumcision, art a transgressor of the law. For he is not a Jew,
who is one outwardly ; nor is that which is outward, [merely] in the
29 flesh, circumcision. But he is a Jew, who is one inwardly ; and
circumcision is of the heart, spiritual not literal ; whose praise is not
of men, but of God.

Answer to some objections. Further confirmation of the depravity and guilt of the Jews.
General conclusion from the facts stated.

III. 'WHAT then is the advantage of the Jew? Or what the profit of circumcision?'

2 Much, in divers respects; the most important however is, that they were entrusted with the oracles of God.

3 'What then if some did not believe? Will their unbelief render the faithfulness of God of no effect?'

4 By no means; but let God be [counted] true, although every man [be counted] false; as it is written: "That thou mightest be justified when thou speakest, and overcome when thou judgest."

5 'But if our unrighteousness commend the righteousness of God, what shall we say? Is God unjust, who inflicteth punishment?'

6 (I speak after the manner of men). By no means; otherwise, how shall God judge the world?

7 'Still, if God's faithfulness to his word has, on account of my deceitfulness, abounded more unto his glory, why am I any longer condemned as a sinner?'

8 Shall we then [say], (as it is slanderously reported and as some affirm that we do say): Let us do evil that good may come? whose condemnation is just.

9 'What then? Have we any pre-eminence?' None at all; for we have already made the accusation against both Jews and Gen-
10 tiles, that they are all under sin. As it is written: "There is none
11 righteous, not even one; there is none who understandeth, there is
12 none who seeketh after God; all have gone out of the way, together
have they become corrupt; there is none who doeth good, not even
13 one. Their throat is an open sepulchre; with their tongues do
14 they deceive. The poison of asps is under their lips. ¹ Whose mouth
15 is full of cursing and bitterness. Their feet are swift to shed blood;
¹⁶ } destruction and misery attend their steps; ¹ the way of peace
¹⁷ }
18 they know not. There is no fear of God before their eyes.

19 Now we know that whatsoever things the law saith, it speaketh

to those who have the law ; so that every mouth must be stopped,
 20 and the whole world become guilty before God. Wherefore by
 works of law shall no flesh be justified before him ; for by law is the
 knowledge of sin.

Gratuitous Justification by Christ is the only way of salvation.

21 But now, the justification which is of God, without law, is re-
 vealed ; to which testimony is given by the law and the prophets ;
 22 a justification, moreover, which is of God by faith in Jesus Christ,
 [offered] to all and [bestowed] on all who believe ; for there is no
 23 distinction. For all have sinned and come short of the glory which
 24 God bestows, ¹ being justified freely by his grace through the re-
 25 demption which is in Christ Jesus ; whom God hath set forth as a
 propitiatory [sacrifice] by faith in his blood, in order to declare his
 justification with respect to the remission of sins formerly committed
 26 during the forbearance of God ; in order to declare his justification
 at the present time ; so that he might be just and yet the justifier of
 him that believeth in Jesus.

27 Where then is boasting ? It is excluded. By what law ? Of
 28 works ? Nay, but by the law of faith ; for we have come to the con-
 29 clusion, that a man is justified by faith, without works of law. Is he
 the God of the Jews only ? Is he not also of the Gentiles ? Yea, of
 30 the Gentiles also ; since it is one and the same God who will justify
 31 the circumcised by faith, and the uncircumcised by faith. Do we
 then make void the law, through faith ? By no means ; we confirm
 the law.

The Scriptures of the Old Test., i.e. the law, teach the doctrine of Justification by grace only.

IV. 'WHAT then shall we say that Abraham our father obtained, in
 respect to the flesh ?

2 [Much] ;* if, however, Abraham was justified by works, he hath
 3 ground for glorying ; but [this he hath] not before God. For
 what saith the Scripture ? " And Abraham believed God, and it

* Comp. 3: 1, 2.

4 was counted to him for righteousness." Now to him that worketh,
5 reward is not counted as a matter of grace, but as a debt ; but to
him who worketh not, but believeth on him who justifieth the un-
godly, his faith is counted for righteousness.

6 In like manner, also, David describeth the blessedness of the
7 man, to whom God imputeth righteousness without works : " Bless-
ed are they, whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are cov-
8 ered ; blessed is the man, to whom the Lord imputeth not iniqui-
ty."

9 ' [Cometh] this blessedness, then, upon those who are circum-
cised [only], or also upon the uncircumcised ? For we say, that
faith was counted to Abraham for righteousness.'

10 How then was it counted ? While he was in a state of circum-
cision, or of uncircumcision ? Not in a state of circumcision, but of
11 uncircumcision ? And he received the sign of circumcision, as a
seal of the righteousness by faith which [he possessed] in a state of
uncircumcision ; in order that he might be the father of all the
uncircumcised who believe, so that righteousness might be counted
12 to them ; and also the father of the circumcised, who are not only
of the circumcision, but walk in the steps of that faith which our
father Abraham had while in a state of uncircumcision.

13 For the promise was not made by law to Abraham or to his seed,
that he should be heir of the world ; but by the righteousness of faith.
14 If now they who are of the law, are heirs, faith is rendered of no
effect, and the promise is made void ; for the law is the occasion of
wrath, because where there is no law, there is no transgression.
16 On this account it was of faith, that it might be of grace, in order
that the promise might be sure to all the seed, not only to him who
is under the law, but to him who is of the faith of Abraham ;—who
17 is the father of us all, ¹ (according to what is written : " A father of
many nations have I made thee"), in the sight of God in whom he
believed, who giveth life to the dead, and calleth the things which
are not, as if they were.

18 [It was] he who, against hope, believed in hope that he should

become the father of many nations, (according to what had been
 19 said: "So shall thy seed be"); ¹ and being not weak in faith, he
 considered not his own body already dead (as he was about one hun-
 20 dred years of age), nor yet the deadness of Sarah's womb; neither
 did he through unbelief doubt the promise of God, but he was strong
 21 in faith, giving glory to God; yea, he was fully persuaded that what
 22 he had promised, he was also able to perform. Wherefore it was
 23 verily counted to him for righteousness. But it was not recorded
 merely for his sake, that it was counted to him; but also for our
 sake to whom it will be counted, to us who believe on him who
 24 raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead, ¹ who was delivered up on
 account of our offences, and was raised for the sake of our justifica-
 tion.

The Fruits of Justification, as to their certainty and extent.

V. **THEREFORE** being justified by faith, we have peace with God,
 2 through our Lord Jesus Christ; by whom also we have obtained
 access, through faith, unto this state of grace in which we stand,
 and rejoice in hope of the glory of God.
 3 And not only so, but we rejoice also in our afflictions; knowing
 4 that affliction produceth patience, ¹ and patience approbation, and
 5 approbation hope, ¹ and hope maketh not ashamed; for the love of
 God is shed abroad in our hearts, by the Holy Spirit which is given
 6 to us. For while we were yet without strength, Christ died in due
 7 time for the ungodly. Now scarcely for a just man will any one
 die; although for a good man some one, perhaps, might even ven-
 8 ture to die. But God commendeth his love to us, in that while we
 9 were yet sinners, Christ died for us. Much more, then, being now
 10 justified by his blood, shall we be saved from wrath by him. For if,
 when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death
 of his Son; much more, being reconciled, shall we be saved by his
 life.
 11 And not only so, but we also rejoice in God through our Lord
 Jesus Christ, by whom we have now obtained reconciliation.

12 In respect to this [I say], as by one man sin entered the world,
 and death by sin; and in like manner death came upon all men,
 13 because that all have sinned; (for until the law sin was in the
 14 world, although sin is not accounted of where there is no law; yet
 death reigned from Adam unto Moses, even over those who had not
 sinned in like manner as Adam transgressed; who is a type of him
 15 that was to come. But not as the offence, so the free gift also; for
 if by the offence of one the many died, much more has the grace of
 God and the gift which is by the grace of one man, Jesus Christ,
 16 abounded unto the many. Yea, not as [the condemnation] by one
 who sinned, is the free gift; for sentence was by one [offence] unto
 condemnation, but the free gift is unto justification from many of-
 17 fences. For if by the offence of one, death reigned on account of
 one [offence], much more shall they who receive abundance of
 grace and of the gift of justification, reign in life by one, Jesus
 18 Christ); therefore, as by one offence [sentence came] upon all men
 unto condemnation, so by the righteousness of one [sentence came]
 19 upon all men unto justification of life; for as by the disobedience of
 one man the many were constituted sinners, so by the obedience of
 one the many will be constituted righteous.

20 The law, moreover, was introduced, so that offence would
 21 abound; but where sin abounded, grace superabounded: so that,
 as sin reigned by death, in like manner grace also will reign by jus-
 tification unto eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord.

Gratuitous justification does not encourage men to sin, but restrains them from it.

VI. 'What shall we say then? Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound?'

2 By no means. How shall we, who are dead to sin, any longer
 3 live in it? Know ye not, that so many of us as have been baptized
 4 into Christ Jesus, have been baptized into his death? We then
 have been buried with him by baptism into his death; so that, as
 Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, in like
 5 manner we also should walk in newness of life. For if we have

become kindred with him by a death like his, then we shall be also
 6 by a resurrection ; knowing this, that our old man is crucified, as
 he was, that the body of sin might be destroyed, so that we should
 7 } no longer serve sin : for he who is dead, is freed from sin. If
 8 } now we are dead with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with
 9 him ; knowing that Christ, being raised from the dead, dieth no
 10 more, death hath no longer any dominion over him. For in that
 he died, he died once for all unto sin ; but in that he liveth, he
 11 liveth unto God. In like manner you also must account yourselves
 dead unto sin, but alive unto God through Jesus Christ.

12 Let not sin reign, then, in your mortal body, that ye should obey
 13 the lusts thereof ; neither proffer your members to sin as instru-
 ments of iniquity ; but proffer yourselves to God as alive from the
 dead, and your members to God as instruments of righteousness.
 14 For sin shall not have dominion over you : since ye are not under
 law, but under grace.

15 ‘ What then ? Shall we sin, because we are not under law, but
 under grace ?’

16 By no means. Know ye not, that to whomsoever ye proffer
 yourselves as servants ready to obey, ye are servants to him whom
 ye obey, whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto justifica-
 17 tion ? But thanks be to God, that ye were the servants of sin, but
 have become obedient from the heart to that model of doctrine in
 18 which ye have been instructed. Moreover being freed from sin, ye
 19 have become the servants of righteousness : (I speak in language
 usual to men, because of the weakness occasioned by your flesh).
 As then ye have proffered your members for servants to impurity
 and iniquity, in order to commit iniquity ; so now proffer your mem-
 20 bers to righteousness, in order to be holy. For when ye were the
 21 servants of sin, ye were free in respect to righteousness. What
 fruit had ye then, in those things of which ye are now ashamed ?
 22 for the end of those things is death. But now, being freed from
 sin, and having become servants to God, ye have fruit in respect to
 23 holiness, and in the end [ye will have] eternal life. For the wages

of sin is death; but the gift of God, eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord.

Those who are under law, cannot be freed from the power and penalty of sin.

VII. Know ye not, brethren, (for I speak to those who are acquainted with the law), that the law hath dominion over a man so long as he liveth? For the married woman is bound to her husband, so long as he liveth; but if her husband die, she is freed from the law of her husband. Therefore, if she marry another while her husband is living, she must be called an adulteress; but if her husband die, she is freed from the law, so that she will not become an adulteress by marrying another husband.

4 Thus, my brethren, ye also have become dead to the law by the body of Christ, in order that ye should be joined to another who is risen from the dead; so that we may bring forth fruit unto God. 5 For when we were in the flesh, our sinful passions which were by the law, wrought powerfully in our members to bring forth fruit unto 6 death; but now we are freed from the law by which we were held in bondage, inasmuch as we have become dead to it; so that we must serve [God] in newness of spirit, and not in the old and literal manner.

7 'What shall we say then? Is the law sin?'

By no means. Still, I had not known sin except by the law; for I had not known even inordinate desire, unless the law had said: 8 "Thou shalt not lust." But sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of inordinate desire; for without 9 the law sin is dead. For I was alive, once, without the law; but 10 when the commandment came, sin revived, ¹ but I died; yea, the commandment which was unto life, the very same was found to be 11 death to me. For sin taking occasion by the commandment deceived me, and by it slew me; wherefore the law is holy, and the commandment holy and just and good.

13 'Has then that which is good become death to me?'

By no means; but sin [becomes death], in order that it might

manifest itself; causing death to me by that which is good, so that
 14 sin (through the commandment) might be exceedingly sinful. For
 we know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold under sin.
 15 For that which I do, I approve not; since it is not what I de-
 16 sire which I do, but I do that which I hate. If now I do that which
 17 I desire not, I consent that the law is good. But now it is no longer
 18 I who do this, but sin which dwelleth in me. For I know that in me,
 that is in my flesh, there dwelleth no good thing; for to desire what
 19 is good, is easy for me, but to do it I find difficult. For the good
 which I desire, that I do not; but the evil which I desire not, that
 20 I do. Now if I do that which I desire not, it is no longer I who do
 21 it, but sin which dwelleth in me. I find, then, that it is a law to
 22 me, when desirous to do good, that evil is near to me. For I
 23 take pleasure in the law of God, as to the inner man; but I per-
 ceive another law in my members, warring against the law of my
 mind, and making me a captive to the law of sin which is in my
 24 members. Wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me from
 25 the body which causeth this death? I thank God, through Jesus
 Christ our Lord! Wherefore I, the same person, serve with my
 mind the law of God, but with my flesh the law of sin.

A state of grace delivers from the bondage and penalty of sin.

VIII. But now, there is no condemnation to those who are in Christ
 2 Jesus.* For the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus, hath freed
 3 me from the law of sin and death. For what the law could not ac-
 accomplish, in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own
 Son in the likeness of sinful flesh [accomplished], and [by an offer-
 4 ing] for sin condemned sin in the flesh; so that the precepts of the
 law might be fulfilled by us, who walk not according to the flesh,
 5 but according to the Spirit. For they who are according to the
 flesh, concern themselves with the things of the flesh; but they who
 6 are according to the Spirit, with the things of the Spirit. For the

* *Who walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit*, is probably spurious here, and is therefore omitted.

mind of the flesh is death ; but the mind of the Spirit is life and
 7 peace. Because the mind of the flesh is enmity against God ; for it
 8 is not subject to his law, nor indeed can it be. Those, then, who
 9 are in the flesh, cannot please God. Ye, however, are not in the
 flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwelleth in
 you. But if any one hath not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his.
 10 But if Christ be in you, the body indeed is mortified on account of
 11 sin, but the spirit liveth on account of righteousness. But if the
 Spirit of him who raised up Jesus from the dead, dwelleth in you,
 he who raised up Christ from the dead, will also quicken your mortal
 bodies by his Spirit which dwelleth in you.

12 Therefore, brethren, we are not debtors to the flesh, to live ac-
 13 cording to the flesh ; for if ye live according to the flesh, ye shall
 die ; but if, through the Spirit, ye mortify the deeds of the body, ye
 14 shall live. For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are
 15 the sons of God. For ye have not received a servile spirit, that ye
 should again be in fear ; but ye have received a filial spirit, by
 16 which we cry : Abba, Father ! The same Spirit beareth witness to
 17 our spirit, that we are children of God. But if children, then heirs ;
 heirs truly of God, and joint heirs with Christ, if so be that we suffer
 with him, in order that we may also be glorified with him.

Fruits of the grace and sanctification proffered in the gospel.

18 Moreover, I count not the sufferings of the present time as wor-
 19 thy of comparison with the glory which is to be revealed to us. For
 the earnest expectation of the creature is waiting for the manifesta-
 20 tion [of this glory] of the children of God. For the creature was
 21 made subject to frailty, (not of its own choice, but by him who put
 it in subjection), in hope that this same creature may be freed from
 the bondage of a perishing state, and [brought] into the glorious lib-
 22 erty of the children of God. For we know that all creatures sigh
 23 together and are in anguish, even to the present time. And not
 only so, but we who have the first fruits of the Spirit, even we our-
 selves groan within ourselves, waiting for [our] adoption as children,

- 24 the redemption of our bodies. For even we are saved [only] in hope. Now hope which is seen, is not hope; for what a man seeth,
25 how doth he still hope for it? But if we hope for that which we do not see, we patiently wait for it.
- 26 In like manner, also, the Spirit helpeth our infirmities; for we know not what we should pray for as we ought; the same Spirit, however, maketh intercession for us in sighs which cannot be uttered;
27 ed; but he who searcheth hearts, knoweth the mind of the Spirit, for he maketh intercession in behalf of the saints according to the will of God.
- 28 We know, moreover, that all things work together for good to those who love God, to those who are called according to his purpose.
29 For those whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he should be the
30 First-born among many brethren. Those also whom he predestinated, the same he likewise called; and those whom he called, the same he also justified; and those whom he justified, the same he also glorified.
- 31 What shall we say, then, concerning these things? If God be
32 for us, who is against us? Even he who spared not his own Son, but freely gave him up for us all—how shall he not also, with him,
33 freely give us all things? ¹ Who shall accuse the elect of God? It is God that justifieth; ¹ who is he that condemneth? It is Christ who died [for us]; yea rather, who is risen, and who is at the right hand
35 of God, and who intercedeth for us. Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall affliction, or anguish, or persecution, or famine,
36 or nakedness, or peril, or sword? (As it is written: “For thy sake are we continually exposed to death, we are counted as sheep for
37 the slaughter”). Nay, in all these things we are more than conquerors, through him who loved us. For I am persuaded, that neither death nor life, neither angels nor principalities, neither things
38 present nor future, nor powers, ¹ neither height nor depth, nor any other created thing, shall be able to separate us from the love of
39 God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.

God has a right to make those whom he chooses, to be partakers of his favour; and this right he has always exercised.

IX. I say the truth in Christ, I do not speak falsely, (as my conscience testifieth for me in the Holy Spirit,) ¹ that I have great sorrow and continual anguish in my heart. For I could wish even myself to be devoted to destruction by Christ, instead of my brethren, my kinsmen after the flesh; ¹ who are Israelites; to whom pertaineth the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the rites of service, and the promises; whose are the fathers; and from whom Christ [descended] in respect to the flesh, who is God over all, blessed forever, Amen!

6 However, it is not so that the word of God has been rendered void; for they are not all Israel, who are of Israel; ¹ neither are all the seed of Abraham children, ¹ but, "In Isaac shall thy seed be called;" that is, not the children of the flesh are the children of God, but the children of promise are counted for the seed. For the word of promise was thus: "According to this time will I come, and Sarah shall have a son."

10 And not only so, but Rebecca also, have conceived by one, Isaac our father, ¹ (for [the children] being not yet born, neither having done any thing good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works but of him that calleth), ¹ it was said to her: "The elder shall serve the younger;" ¹ as it is written: "Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated."

14 'What shall we say then? Is there unrighteousness with God?'

15 By no means; for he saith to Moses: "I will have mercy on whomsoever I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whomsoever I will have compassion." Therefore it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God who sheweth mercy. 17 For the Scripture saith to Pharaoh: "For this very purpose have I roused thee up, that I might show forth my power in thee, and declare my name in all the land." Therefore, on whom he will he hath mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth.

19 Thou wilt say then to me : Why doth he yet find fault, for who
20 hath resisted his will? Who then art thou, O man, that repliest
against God? Shall the thing formed say to him who formed it :
21 Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the
clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel to honour and another
22 to dishonour? What now if God, purposing to manifest his indigna-
tion and make known his power, endured with much long-suffering
23 the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction? And that he might make
known the riches of his glory toward the vessels of mercy which he
24 had before prepared for glory, ¹ [shewed mercy] even to us whom
25 he hath called, not only of the Jews but also of the Gentiles. As
he saith also in Hosea : “ I will call him who was not my people,
26 my people ; and her who was not my beloved, beloved. And it
shall come to pass, that in the place where it was said to them : ‘ Ye
are not my people,’ there shall they be called the sons of the living
God.”

27 Isaiah moreover says concerning Israel : “ Although the number
of the children of Israel be as the sand of the sea, only a remnant
28 shall be saved. For he will execute his word, [which] he hath de-
creed in righteousness ; for the Lord will execute his word decreed
29 concerning the land.” Yea, as Isaiah had before said : “ Except
the Lord of Sabaoth had left us a remnant, we should have been like
Sodom, we should have been made like to Gomorrah.”

30 ‘ What shall we say then? ’ That the Gentiles, who did not seek
after justification, have obtained justification, even that justifica-
31 tion which is by faith ; but Israel, who sought after a law of justifi-
32 cation, have not attained to a law of justification. Why? Because
[they sought] not by faith, but by works of law ; for they stumbled
33 at the stone of stumbling ; ¹ as it is written : “ Behold ! I lay in Zion
a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence ; but every one who be-
lieveth on him shall not be ashamed.”

The unbelief and rejection of the Jews, and the reception of the Gentiles through faith, are truly consistent with the declarations of the ancient Scriptures.

- X. BRETHREN, the kind desire of my heart and my prayer to God for
 2 them is, that they may be saved. For I bear them witness, that they
 3 have a zeal for God, but not according to knowledge. For being
 ignorant of the justification which is of God, and seeking to establish
 their own justification, they have not submitted themselves to the
 4 justification which is of God. For Christ is the end of the law, for
 justification to every one who believeth.
- 5 Now Moses thus describeth the justification which is of the law :
 6 “The man who doeth these things, shall live by them.” But justi-
 fication by faith speaketh in this manner: “Say not in thine heart,
 Who shall ascend into heaven?” that is, to bring down Christ; or,
 7 “Who shall descend into the abyss?” that is, to bring up Christ
 8 from the dead. But what saith it? “The word is near to thee, in
 thy mouth and in thy heart;” that is, the word of faith which we
 9 preach. For if thou shalt openly confess the Lord Jesus with thy
 mouth, and believe in thy heart that God raised him from the dead,
 10 thou shalt be saved; because with the heart man believeth unto
 justification, and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation.
 11 For the Scripture saith: “No one who believeth on him, shall be
 ashamed.”
- 12 There is, then, no difference between Jew and Greek; for there
 is the same Lord of all, who is rich [in mercy] unto all them that
 13 call upon him; since “every one who calleth on the name of the
 Lord, shall be saved.”
- 14 ‘How, then, shall they call on him in whom they have not be-
 lieved? And how shall they believe in him of whom they have not
 15 heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? ¹ And how
 shall they preach, except they be sent?’

Even so is it written: “How beautiful are the feet of those who
 16 publish salvation, who proclaim good tidings!” Yet all have not
 obeyed the gospel; for Isaiah saith: “Lord, who hath believed our
 report?”

17 'Faith, then, cometh by hearing; and hearing by the word of God.'

18 But I say, Have they not heard? Yea truly, "their sound hath gone forth into all the earth; their words to the ends of the world."

19 I say, moreover: Doth not Israel know? First Moses saith: "I will move you to jealousy by that which is no nation; I will excite

20 your indignation by a foolish people." But Isaiah is very bold, and saith: "I was found by those who sought me not; I made myself

21 manifest to those who did not inquire for me." But concerning Israel he saith: "All the day long, have I stretched out my hand to a disobedient and gainsaying people."

God has not cast away the Jews entirely and utterly. Some are now saved; and all will finally be converted, with the fulness of the Gentiles. God's dealings with them are unsearchable, but wise.

XI. 'I say then, hath God cast away his own people?'

2 By no means; for I myself am an Israelite, of the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Benjamin. God hath not cast away his people whom he foreknew. Know ye not what the Scripture saith in [the history of] Elijah, when he maketh intercession to God against

3 Israel? "Lord, they have killed thy prophets, and digged down thine altars; and I only am left, and they are seeking my life." But what saith the answer of God to him? "I have reserved for myself

5 seven thousand men, who have not bowed the knee to Baal." In like manner, now, there is also at the present time a remnant ac-

6 cording to the election of grace. But if it be of grace, then it is no more of works; otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, it is no more of grace; otherwise work is no more work.

7 'What then? That which Israel sought after, he hath not obtained.'

8 But the elect have obtained it; and the rest were blinded; ¹ as it is written: "God hath given them the spirit of slumber, eyes that

9 see not, and ears that hear not, even unto this day." David also saith: "Let their table become a snare to catch them, and an occa-

10 sion of falling, and a recompense to them. Let their eyes be dark-

ened so that they cannot see, and their back be always bowed down."

11 'I say then: Have they stumbled so as utterly to fall?'

By no means; but by their fall salvation [is come] to the Gen-
12 tiles, to provoke their emulation. If now their fall hath been the
riches of the world, and their degradation the riches of the Gentiles,
13 how much more their fulness! I say this, however, to you Gentiles,
(for inasmuch as I am truly an apostle of the Gentiles I do honour to
14 my office), ¹ so that, if possible, I may excite to emulation some of
my kinsmen after the flesh, and save some of them.

15 If then the casting away of them be the reconciliation of the world,
16 what shall the reception of them be, but life from the dead? If,
moreover, the first-fruits were holy, so shall the mass be; and if the
17 root be holy, so will be the branches. If, also, some of the branches
were broken off, and thou being a wild olive wert engrafted in their
18 stead, and made partaker of the root and fatness of the olive, ¹ glory
not over the branches; but if thou dost glory, thou dost not support
19 the root, but the root thee. Thou wilt say, then: 'The branches
20 were broken off, that I might be grafted in.' Be it so; they were
broken off by unbelief, and thou standest by faith; be not high-
21 minded, but fear; for if God spared not the natural branches, then
surely he will not spare thee.

22 Behold, then, the kindness and the severity of God! Severity to-
ward them who have fallen away; but kindness toward thee, provided
23 thou dost abide in his kindness, otherwise thou shalt be cut off. And
they also, unless they continue in unbelief, shall be grafted in; for
24 God is able again to graft them in. For if thou wert cut out from the
olive which was wild by nature, and wert grafted into the good olive,
contrary to thy nature; how much more shall the natural branches
be grafted into their own olive!

25 Moreover I would not have you ignorant, brethren, of this mystery,
(lest ye should be wise in your own conceit), that blindness has
come upon Israel in part, until the fulness of the Gentiles shall come
26 in. And then all Israel shall be saved; even as it is written: "A

deliverer shall come out of Zion, and shall turn away ungodliness
 27 from Jacob ;” ¹ also : “ This is my covenant with them, when I shall
 28 take away their sins.” In respect to the gospel, [they have become]
 enemies on your account ; but in respect to the election, [they are]
 29 beloved for their fathers’ sake. For the gifts and calling of God, he
 30 will not repent of. For as ye were formerly disobedient to God, but
 31 have now obtained mercy through their unbelief ; thus also they have
 now become disobedient, so that they may obtain mercy through the
 32 mercy shewn to you. For God hath given over all to unbelief, so
 that he might have mercy on all.

33 O the boundless riches and wisdom and knowledge of God ! How
 34 unsearchable are his counsels, and his ways past finding out ! For
 who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been his coun-
 35 sellor ? Or who hath first given him any thing, that he may be
 36 repaid ? For of him, and by him, and for him, are all things ; to
 him be glory for ever, Amen !

Exhortation to piety, humility, diligent improvement of gifts, kind sympathy, and benevolent
 feeling.

XII. I entreat you, therefore, by the tender mercies of God, to pre-
 sent your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God, which is
 2 your rational service. And be not conformed to this world ; but be
 ye transformed by the renewing of your mind, that ye may learn
 what the will of God is, even that which is good and acceptable and
 perfect.

3 I say, moreover, by the grace given to me, to every one among you,
 that he think not of himself more highly than he ought to think, but
 that he think modestly, according to the measure of faith which God
 4 hath imparted to him. For as in one body we have many members,
 5 but all the members have not the same office ; so we, being many,
 are one body in Christ, and are members one of another.

6 Having then gifts which differ according to the grace that is
 given us, whether prophecy, [let it be] according to the proportion
 7 of faith ; ¹ whether ministry, [let there be diligence] in ministration ;
 8 whether teaching, in instruction ; ¹ or exhorting, in exhortation.

Let the distributer [do his duty] with simplicity; the superintendent, with diligence; he who performs offices of compassion, with cheerfulness. Let benevolence be sincere; abhor that which is evil; cleave to that which is good.

10 As to brotherly love, [be] kindly affectionate one toward another; as to honour, give to each other the preference; ¹ as to diligence, be not slothful, be fervent in spirit, serving the Lord.

Rejoice in hope; be patient in affliction; persevere in prayer. ¹³ } Supply the wants of the saints; practise hospitality. Bless ¹⁴ } those who curse you; bless and curse not. Rejoice with those who rejoice; and weep with those who weep. Think mutually the same thing; do not regard high things, but suffer yourselves to be influenced by humble ones. Be not wise in your own conceit.

17 Render to no man evil for evil; seek after that which is good in the sight of all. If it be possible, so far as in you lieth, be at peace with all men. Avenge not yourselves, beloved; but give place to [divine] indignation; for it is written: "Retribution is mine, I will make it, saith the Lord." Therefore, "if thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink; for in so doing, thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head." Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good.

Exhortation to obey civil rulers, and to exhibit a kind and peaceable demeanor toward all men.

XIII. LET every soul be subject to the supreme magistracies; for there is no magistracy except by divine permission; and those which be, are ordained of God. So he that resisteth the magistracy, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they who resist, shall receive punishment for themselves. For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to evil ones; and wilt thou not stand in awe of the magistracy? Do good, and thou shalt have praise for it; for [the magistrate] is a servant of God for thy benefit. But if thou doest evil, fear; for he beareth the sword not in vain, since he is the minister of God, condemning to punishment the evil-doer. Therefore we ought to yield subjection, not only because of punishment, but for conscience' sake.

6 On the same account, moreover, we should also pay tribute; for
 7 they are God's ministers who attend to this matter. Render, there-
 fore, to all that which is due; tribute, to whom tribute; custom, to
 8 whom custom; fear, to whom fear; honour, to whom honour. Owe
 no man any thing, except to love one another; for he who loveth
 9 another, fulfilleth the law. For this [is the law]: "Thou shalt not
 commit adultery; thou shalt not kill; thou shalt not steal; thou shalt
 not covet;" and if there be any other command, it is summarily com-
 prehended in this precept, namely: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour
 10 as thyself." Love worketh no ill to its neighbour; love, then, is the
 fulfilling of the law.

11 And this [do], considering the time, that the hour is already
 come when we should awake out of sleep; for now is our salvation
 12 nearer than when we believed. The night is far spent, the day is
 at hand; let us put away then the works of darkness, and put on the
 13 armour of light. Let us walk in a becoming manner, as by day;
 not in revelling and drunkenness, not in chambering and wanton-
 14 ness, not in strife and bitter envy; ¹ but put ye on the Lord Jesus
 Christ, and make no provision for the flesh, in respect to its lusts.

Caution against making external rites and observances matters of division and contention among
 Christians.

XIV. HIM that is weak in faith receive with kindness, not so as to
 2 increase his scrupulous surmisings. One believeth that he may eat
 3 every thing; but he who is weak eateth herbs. Let not him who eat-
 eth, despise him who eateth not; nor him who eateth not, condemn
 4 him who eateth; for God hath accepted him. Who art thou, that
 condemnest the servant of another? By his own master he standeth
 or falleth; and he shall stand, for God is able to make him stand.
 5 One man esteemeth one day above another; but another esteemeth
 every day [alike]; let each one be fully persuaded in his own mind.
 6 He who regardeth the day, regardeth it to [the honouring of] the
 Lord; and he who regardeth not the day, for [the honouring] of the
 Lord he doth not regard it. Likewise he who eateth, eateth to
 [the honouring of] the Lord, for he giveth God thanks; and he

who eateth not, for [the honouring of] the Lord he eateth not,
7 and giveth God thanks. For no one of us liveth to himself; and no
8 one of us dieth to himself; for whether we live, we live to the Lord,
and whether we die we die to the Lord; whether we live, then, or
9 die, we are the Lord's. For Christ both died and revived for this
very purpose, that he might be Lord of the dead and of the living.

10 And thou, why dost thou condemn thy brother? And thou, too,
why dost thou despise thy brother? For we must all stand before
11 the judgment-seat of Christ. For it is written: "As I live, saith
the Lord, every knee shall bow to me, and every tongue shall con-
12 fess to God." Every one of us, therefore, must give an account of
himself to God.

13 Let us, then, no longer condemn one another; but rather let
us decide, not to put a stumbling-block or a cause of falling in the
14 way of a brother. I know, and am persuaded of the Lord Jesus,
that nothing is unclean in itself; but to him who deemeth any thing
15 to be unclean, it is unclean. Now if thy brother is grieved because
of meat, thou dost not demean thyself as benevolence requireth;
16 destroy not him by thy meat, for whom Christ died. Let not your
17 good, then, be evil spoken of; for the kingdom of God is not meat
and drink, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost.

18 Now he who serveth Christ, as to these things, is acceptable to
19 God and approved by men. Therefore let us strive after peace and
20 mutual edification. Destroy not the work of God on account of
meat. All [meats] are clean; yet they are hurtful to him, who eat-
21 eth so as to stumble thereby. It is good not to eat flesh, nor to drink
wine, nor [to do any thing] whereby thy brother stumbleth, or hath
22 cause of offence, or is made weak. Hast thou faith, keep it to thy-
self before God. Happy the man, who doth not condemn himself
23 in that which he alloweth! But he who doubteth, is condemned if
he eat, because it is not of faith; and every thing which is not of
faith, is sin.

Various exhortations to charity and kindness. Expression of the apostle's regard for the church at Rome, of his intention to visit them, and of his desire for an interest in their prayers.

XV. We, moreover, who are strong, ought to bear the infirmities of
 2 the weak, and not to please ourselves. Let each one of us please
 his neighbour, in respect to that which is good, unto edification.
 3 For Christ did not seek his own pleasure; but according to that
 which is written: "The reproaches of those who reproached thee,
 4 have fallen upon me," [so it was with him]. Now whatsoever
 things were written in ancient times, were written for our instruc-
 tion; that through patience, and the admonition of the Scriptures,
 we might obtain hope.

5 Now may the God who giveth patience and admonition, give to
 6 you mutual unity of sentiment, according to Christ Jesus; that
 with one mind and with one voice, ye may glorify God, even the
 Father of our Lord Jesus Christ!

7 Wherefore deal kindly with each other, even as Christ hath dealt
 kindly with you, unto the glory of God.

8 Now I say, that Jesus Christ became a minister of the circum-
 cision, on account of the truth of God, in order to confirm the prom-
 9 ises made to the fathers; also, that the Gentiles shall glorify God for
 his mercy; even as it is written: "Therefore will I celebrate thy
 10 praise among the Gentiles, and to thy name will I sing." And
 11 again he saith: "Rejoice, ye Gentiles, with his people." And
 again: "Praise the Lord, all ye Gentiles, and laud him all ye peo-
 12 ple." And again Isaiah saith: "There shall be a root of Jesse, and
 one shall arise to be a leader of the Gentiles; upon him shall the
 Gentiles place their hopes."

13 Now may the God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in
 believing, that you may abound in hope, through the influence of
 the Holy Spirit!

14 Moreover, I myself am well persuaded concerning you, my
 brethren, that ye are full of kindness, abounding in all knowledge,
 15 and able to admonish one another. I have also written to you the
 more boldly, brethren, when reminding you concerning some things,

16 because of the grace which is bestowed by God upon me, ¹ that I should be a minister of Jesus Christ to the Gentiles, performing the office of a priest in respect to the gospel of God, that the offering of the Gentiles might be acceptable, being purified by the Holy Spirit.

17 I have, then, cause of glorying in Christ Jesus, as to those things
18 which pertain to God; for I do not venture to mention any thing which Christ hath not wrought by me, in order to bring the Gentiles
19 to obedience, by word and by deed, ¹ by the power of signs and wonders, by the power of the Holy Spirit; so that from Jerusalem and around it, even to Illyricum, I have fully proclaimed the gospel of
20 Christ; and so also, that I was strongly desirous to preach the gospel, not where Christ was named, lest I should build on another
21 man's foundation, ¹ but in accordance with what is written: "They shall see to whom no declaration was made respecting him, and they who have not heard shall understand."

22 On this account I have been greatly hindered from coming to
23 you. But now, having no longer any place in these regions, and
24 being desirous for many years of making you a visit; whenever I may go into Spain, I hope, as I pass on, to see you, and to be sent on my way thither, when I am in part first satisfied with your com-
25 pany. But at present I am going to Jerusalem, to supply the wants
26 of the saints. For it hath seemed good to Macedonia and Achaia, to
27 make some contribution for the saints in poverty at Jerusalem. [I say] it hath seemed good; for verily they are their debtors; because if the Gentiles have shared in their spiritual things, they ought
28 surely to assist them in temporal things. Now when this duty shall have been performed, and this fruit secured to them, I shall pass
29 through the midst of you into Spain. And I know that when I come to you, I shall come with abundant blessings of the gospel of Christ.

30 Moreover I beseech you, brethren, by our Lord Jesus Christ, and by the love of the Spirit, that ye strive together for me, in your
31 prayers to God in my behalf, ¹ that I may be delivered from the unbelieving in Judea, and that my service for Jerusalem may be

32 acceptable to the saints ; [also] that I may come to you with joy (if
33 God will), and may be refreshed among you. The God of peace be
with you all, Amen !

Various salutations. Caution against divisions. Conclusion.

XVI. Now I commend to you Phebe our sister, who is a deaconess of
2 the church at Cenchrea, ¹ that ye may receive her as being in the
Lord, in a manner worthy of the saints, and give her assistance in
any thing where she may need it of you ; for she herself hath been
a helper of many, and especially of me.

3 Salute Priscilla and Aquila, my fellow labourers in Christ Jesus ;
4 ¹ (who exposed themselves to great danger in my behalf ; to whom
not only I myself am grateful, but even all the churches of the Gen-
5 tiles) ; ¹ and the church which is at their house. Salute Epenetus,
6 my beloved, who is the first fruit of Asia in Christ. Salute Mary,
7 who laboured much for us. Salute Andronicus and Junias, my
kinsmen and fellow-prisoners, who are of note among the apostles,
8 and who were before me in Christ. Salute Amplias, my beloved in
9 } the Lord. Salute Urbanus, our fellow labourer in Christ. Salute
10 }
11 them of the household of Aristobulus. Salute Herodian, my kins-
man. Salute them of the household of Narcissus, who are in the
12 Lord. Salute Tryphena and Tryphosa, who labour in the Lord.
13 Salute Persis the beloved, who laboured much in the Lord. ¹ Salute
14 Rufus, elect in the Lord, and his mother and mine. Salute Asyn-
critus, Phlegon, Hermas, Patrobas, Hermes, and the brethren with
15 them. Salute Philologus and Julius, Nereus and his sister, and
16 Olympas, and all the saints with them. Salute each other with a
holy kiss. All the churches of Christ salute you.

17 Moreover I beseech you, brethren, to beware of those who occa-
sion divisions and offences, contrary to the doctrine which ye have
18 learned. For such serve not the Lord Jesus Christ, but their own
appetite ; and by flattery and fair speeches, they beguile the minds
19 of the simple. For your obedience is known to all ; I rejoice, there-
fore, concerning you, and desire you to be wise in respect to that
20 which is good, but simple in respect to that which is evil. May the

God of peace shortly bruise Satan under your feet! The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you!

21 Timothy my fellow labourer, and Luke and Jason and Sosipater,
22 my kinsmen, salute you. (I Tertius who wrote this epistle, salute
23 you in the Lord). Gaius saluteth you, who is my host, and that of
the whole church. Erastus saluteth you, the chamberlain of the
24 city, and Quartus, a brother. The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ
be with you all, Amen!

25 Now unto him who is able to establish you, according to my
gospel, even the gospel of Jesus Christ; according to the revelation
26 of the mystery which was kept silent in ancient times, ¹ but is now
made manifest by the prophetic Scriptures, according to the com-
mand of the eternal God, [and] published to all nations for the sake
27 of obedience unto the faith;—to the only wise God, through Jesus
Christ, to whom be glory forever, Amen!



INTRODUCTION

TO THE

EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

§1. *Of the planting of the church at Romè.*

HISTORY affords no certain evidence respecting the individual who first preached the gospel at Rome. The Romish church indeed maintain, that Peter was the founder of the first Christian community in that city. Irenæus (adv. Hæreses III. 1), and Eusebius (Chron. ad ann. 2 Claudii), are the witnesses to whom the appeal is particularly made, in order to confirm this opinion. But although these fathers had undoubtedly heard such a tradition, and (as it appears by the passages above cited) gave credit to it, yet there is substantial reason for doubting the correctness of it. The statement of Eusebius implies, that Peter came to Rome in the second year of Claudius' reign, i. e. A. D. 43.* Jerome states, that Peter came to Rome in the second year of Claudius' reign, in order to counteract the influence of Simon Magus there; and that he resided in that city, and held the office of a bishop in it, for twenty-five years, i. e. until the last year of Nero's reign, in which he suffered martyrdom; De Viris illustr. c. I. But neither Eusebius, nor any of the most ancient ecclesiastical writers make mention of such a period. Whence Jerome obtained information respecting it, he does not tell us; and some leading critics among the Roman Catholics, e. g. Valesius, Pagi, Baluzius, and others, give no credit to this part of his narration.

That Peter visited Rome at some period of his life, before the close of Nero's reign, cannot well be doubted. Origen (in Euseb. Hist. Ecc. III. 1), and Dionysius of Corinth (flor. c. ann. 117) as related by Eusebius (II. 25), testify to this in such a manner, that it cannot well be rejected, without giving up the credibility of all ancient historical testimony of the like nature. Caius, a presbyter, at the commencement of the third century, mentions that he saw at Rome the graves of Paul and Peter; Euseb. Hist. Ecc. II. 25. The doubts of many Protestants relative to the fact that Peter visited Rome, and the assertions of Salmasius, Spanheim, and others, that this could not have been the case, appear to be without any solid foundation.

But that Peter did not go to Rome as bishop in the second year of Claudius' reign; nor indeed, before the epistle of Paul to the Romans was written; seems to be nearly or quite certain. (1) In Acts 12: 3, 4, we find an account of Peter's being imprisoned by Herod Agrippa, in the last year of this King's reign (comp. v. 23); and this year synchronizes with the *fourth* year of Claudius. Of course Peter was at Jerusalem,

* *Ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς Κλαυδίου βασιλείας*, sc. anno secundo; Euseb. Ecc. Hist. II. 14.

not at Rome, *after* the period when Jerome and Eusebius affirm that he went to Rome and resided there. (2) We find Peter at Jerusalem in the *ninth* (some say eleventh) year of Claudius; he being present at the council there, Acts 15: 6, seq. (3) Nothing is said in the book of Acts, or in the New Testament, respecting Peter's visiting Rome; and if he had done so, before the time at which the history in the book of Acts terminates, we can hardly suppose so important an occurrence would have escaped the notice of Luke. (4) Paul came as a prisoner to Rome, in the 7th year of Nero's reign, i. e. A. D. 60 (but some say in 62 or 63); on which occasion there is no mention, and there seems to have been among the Jews of that city no knowledge, of Peter, Acts 28: 17, seq. (5) Could Paul have addressed the Romans as he did in his epistle, if he had recognized them as disciples of Peter? Could he have written his whole epistle without once adverting to this fact? (6) If Peter was at Rome, when Paul wrote this epistle, how could the latter fail to send a salutation to him as well as to others?

So late, then, as A. D. 57 or 58, when the epistle to the Romans was probably written, it seems to be nearly certain, that Peter had not been at Rome. The flourishing and apparently numerous church there, must therefore have been gathered by some other person than Peter.

But who was this person? A question that cannot be answered with any certainty; although we may arrive at some probabilities respecting it. In the salutations which Paul sends to the church at Rome, he mentions (16: 7) Andronicus and Junias, as having been his *fellow-prisoners*, and as ἐπίσημοι ἐν τοῖς ἀποστόλοις, they having become Christians earlier than himself. What hinders the supposition, that one or both of these men, perhaps converts on the notable day of Pentecost (Acts 2: 10), and of high repute among the apostles themselves, may have first spread the knowledge of the gospel in the metropolis of the Roman empire, of which they were inhabitants, or in which they were at least residents? Rufus, also, a distinguished Christian, whose mother had shewn much kindness to Paul (Rom. 16: 13), may have been one of the founders, or at least fosterers, of the Roman church; possibly the same Rufus, whose father (a native of Cyrene) was compelled to bear the cross of Jesus, when on his way to Calvary, Mark 15: 21. Others, moreover, who are mentioned in Rom. xvi., may have been, and probably were, contributors to the work of establishing or building up the church at Rome. At all events there was opportunity for a very early establishment of it; inasmuch as we find persons from this city present at Jerusalem on the day of Pentecost, Acts 2: 10. We know, also, that Christians were scattered abroad, when the persecution of Stephen occurred; at first in Judea and Samaria, Acts 8: 1; afterwards to more distant regions, Acts 11: 19; and what hinders us from supposing that some of them may have come to Rome itself, preaching the gospel?

That the church at Rome was *early* planted, seems probable from the fame which it had acquired throughout the Christian world (Rom. 1: 8. 16: 19), when Paul wrote his epistle. That the persons concerned in the establishment of it were Paul's particular friends and acquaintances, with whom he had met and conferred, while preaching in Asia or in Greece,

appears very plain from the manner of the salutations in chap. xvi. 3—16. In respect to Aquila and Priscilla, we have a definite knowledge, from Acts 18: 1—3, 18, 26, and from what is said in Rom. 16: 3, 4. Others are called the *kinsmen* (*συγγενεῖς*) of Paul, viz. Andronicus and Junias, v. 7; Herodian, v. 11. Others again are called *ἀγαπητοί, συνεργοί, ἐκλεκτοί, κοπιῶντες ἐν τῷ κυρίῳ*, etc. Moreover, the manner in which Paul addresses the church at Rome, i. e. the plain, familiar, authoritative tone of the letter, shews that he considered himself as addressing those who were in effect his disciples, i. e. that they had probably been converted to Christianity under the preaching of his own particular friends and spiritual children. Hence, too, the frequent expressions of strong affection for the church at Rome, and of strong sympathy with them.

On the whole, although we have no definite history of the planting of the church at Rome, (excepting the one given by Jerome, which is not entitled to credit), yet we may consider it as quite probable, that some of the persons named in the salutation (16: 3—16), were entitled to the honour of having founded a church in the metropolis of the Roman empire.

§ 2. *Of the constituent parts of the church at Rome.*

Nothing can be clearer, than that a considerable portion of the church at Rome consisted of Jewish converts; see 2: 17—3: 19. 4: 1, 12. 7: 1—4, and chaps. ix.—xi. Nor is there any serious difficulty of a historical nature, in making out the probability of this. When Pompey overran Judea with a conquering army, about 63 years before the Christian era, he caused many captive Jews to be sent to Rome. There they were sold into slavery, as was usual in respect to captives taken in war. But their persevering and unconquerable determination to observe the Sabbath and to practise many of the Levitical rites and customs, gave their Roman masters so much trouble, that they chose to liberate them rather than to keep them. As there was a large body of persons so liberated, the government assigned them a place opposite Rome, across the Tiber, where they built a town which was principally inhabited by Jews. Here Philo found them, just before Paul's time; Legat. ad Caium. p. 1014 ed. Frankf. The reader who wishes for historical vouchers in respect to the number of Jews at Rome, during the apostolic age, may consult Joseph. Antiq. XVII. 14. XVIII. 5, ed. Cologn. Dio Cassius, XXXVI. p. 37. Suetonii vita Tiberii, cap. 36.

When the first impressions arising from the degradation of captivity and slavery began to wear away, the Roman citizens seem to have looked at the Jewish community with some degree of respect, or at least with not a little of curiosity. Whether it arose from the disgust which delicate females among the Romans felt for the obscene rites of heathenism which they were called to practise or to witness, or whether it sprung from a curiosity which is characteristic of the female sex, the fact was, that in Ovid's time (ob. A. D. 17), some of the most elegant and polished females thronged the Jewish assemblies. The poet, therefore, advises the young men of the city, if they wished to see a splendid collection of

its beauty, to go to the *sabbath day solemnities of the Syrian Jew*, "Cultaque Judaeo septima sacra Syro."

It is not strange, moreover, that some of these should become *σεβόμενοι* or proselytes; as Josephus relates of Fulvia *μία τῶν ἐν ἀξιώματι γυναικῶν*, i. e. a noble-woman. By degrees the men also, as was natural, began to frequent the assemblies of these once despised foreigners. Juvenal, at the close of the first century, pours out his contempt and indignation at this, in the following bitter words :

"Quidam sortiti metuentem Sabbata patrem,
Nil praeter nubes, et coeli Numen adorant;
Nec distare putant humanâ carne suillam,
Quâ pater abstinuit: mox et praeputia ponunt;
Romanas autem soliti contemnere leges,
Judaicum ediscunt, et servant, ac metuunt jus.
Tradidit arcano quodcumque volumine Moses."

I suppose the poet must here refer, however, to those who had a Roman mother and a Jewish father. In regard to 'Nil praeter nubes et coeli numen adorant,' I take it to refer to the fact, that the Jews had no temple at Rome, and that they addressed and worshipped God as dwelling in heaven, i. e. above the clouds; in both which respects they differed from the heathen.

Seneca also, (fl. A. D. 64), about the time when Paul wrote the epistle to the Romans, says, in a fragment preserved by Augustine (De Civit. Dei, VII. 11), that "so many Romans had received the Jewish [he means by this the *Christian*] religion, that *per omnes jam terras recepta sit, victi victoribus leges dederunt.*" Tacitus, in his Annals, likewise represents the "exitabilis superstitio" (Christian religion) as breaking out again after being repressed, and spreading *non modo per Judaeam, sed per urbem [Romam] etiam.*

When to these testimonies respecting the *Jews* at Rome, we add that of the epistle before us respecting *Gentile* converts, no doubt can be left that the church at Rome was made up of Gentiles as well as Jews. Let the reader compare Rom. 1: 16—32. 2: 6—11. 3: 9—19, 29. 9: 24, 30. 11: 13—25. 14: 1—15: 13, and no doubt can possibly remain in his mind relative to this point. The general strain of the whole epistle is such, as that it can best be accounted for by the supposition that the church at Rome consisted of both Jews and Gentiles, and that each party were endeavouring to propagate or to defend the peculiar views respecting certain points, which they respectively entertained. But of this, more in the sequel.

§ 3. *Of the time and place, when and where the epistle was written.*

We have a kind of stand-point here, with which the epistle itself furnishes us. It could not have been written before the decree of the emperor Claudius was published, by which the Jews were banished from the city of Rome. In Acts 18: 2, we have an account of Paul's first acquaintance with Aquila and Priscilla, who had *recently* quitted Rome and come to Corinth, because of the decree of Claudius banishing the Jews from the imperial city. Now as Paul salutes these same per-

sons, in Rom. 16: 3, 4, and speaks of them as having risked great dangers in his behalf, it follows, of course, that his epistle must have been written subsequent to the decree of Claudius; which was probably in A. D. 52, or as some say (improbably however) in A. D. 54.

It must probably have been written after the time when the first epistle to the Corinthians was written, which was during the last visit Paul made to Ephesus, and near the close of that visit, i. e. about A. D. 56. In Acts 18: 19, we are told that Paul left Aquila and Priscilla at Ephesus. After this he made another circuit through the churches of Palestine, Syria, and Asia Minor, (Acts 18: 20—23), and returned again to Ephesus, 19: 1. There he spent two years or more (19: 8—10); and near the close of this period, in writing to the Corinthians, he sends the salutation of Aquila and Priscilla who were still at Ephesus, 1 Cor. 16: 19. Now as Paul sends a salutation, in his epistle to the Romans, to Aquila and Priscilla at Rome, it would seem probable that it must have been written after he left Ephesus, and after they had removed from this city to the metropolis of the Roman empire.

Other circumstances concur, to render the matter still more definite. When Paul wrote his epistle, he was on the eve of departure to Jerusalem, whither he was going to carry the contributions of the churches in Macedonia and Achaia, Rom. 15: 25, 26. When he should have accomplished this, he intended to make them a visit at Rome, Rom. 15: 28, 29. In what part of his life, now, do we find the occurrence of these circumstances? Acts 19: 21, compared with 20: 1—4, gives us a narration of exactly the same thing. Paul, at the close of his last abode at Ephesus, purposing to make a charitable collection in Macedonia and Achaia, first sent on Timothy and Erastus to Macedonia in order to forward it there, (Acts 19: 22); afterwards he himself went into Achaia, passing through Macedonia, Acts 20: 1, 2. That he came, on this occasion, to the capital of Achaia, i. e. Corinth, there can be no reasonable doubt. Here most probably he abode three months (Acts 20: 3); and then set out on his contemplated journey to Jerusalem, where he was made a prisoner, and sent (A. D. 59 or 60) to Rome, in order to prosecute his appeal to Cesar. From a comparison of this account in the Acts, with Rom. 15: 25—29, it follows of course that the epistle to the Romans must have been written about A. D. 57; although some chronologists put it later. Counting the time which Paul's journey to Jerusalem must have occupied, and adding the two years of his detention as a prisoner at Cesarea (Acts 24: 27), and the time necessarily taken up in going to Rome, we must assign to the epistle to the Romans the date above given, on the supposition that Paul came to Rome (as is most probable) about the beginning of the year 60.

As to the PLACE where it was written, there can be no doubt. In 16: 1, Phebe, a deaconess of the church at Cenchrea, is commended to the Romish church, who probably either had charge of the epistle, or accompanied those who did carry it; and Cenchrea was the port of the city of Corinth, some seven or eight miles from that place. In 16: 23, Gaius is spoken of as *the host* of Paul, and this Gaius was baptized by Paul at Corinth, 1 Cor. 1: 14. Paul speaks also of Erastus, *the cham-*

berlain of the city, Rom. 16: 23. The city, then, was a well known one, i. e. the capital of Achaia; and moreover, we find this Erastus spoken of in 2 Tim. 4: 20, as abiding at Corinth.

From all these circumstances, we must conclude that the *place* of writing the epistle to the Romans was Corinth; and that the *time* was that in which Paul made his last visit there, and near the close of it, i. e. about the latter part of A. D. 57.

§ 4. *Of the genuineness of the Epistle.*

This has been so generally acknowledged at all times, and in all ages since it was written, (excepting the two last chapters which have recently been disputed,) that it seems to be unnecessary to make any quotations here from the early writers for the sake of proving it. It is true, indeed, that some early sects, viz. the Ebionites, Encratites, and Cerinthians rejected it; as appears from Irenaeus ad Haeres. I. 26. Epiphanius. Haeres. XXX. Hieronymus. in Matt. XII. 2. But as this seems to have been purely on *doctrinal* grounds, i. e. because they could not make the sentiments of Paul in this epistle to harmonize with their own views, it follows of course that no weight can be attached to their opinions. The question whether Paul wrote the epistle to the Romans, is of a *historical*, not of a doctrinal nature.

The reader who is curious to see an exhibition of early testimony respecting this epistle, may find it amply detailed in Lardner's *Credibility*; and in Schmidii *Historia et Vindiciae Canonis Sac.* etc. The circumstantial evidence which evinces its genuineness, he will find admirably exhibited in Paley's *Horae Paulinae*.

Those who do not possess the first two of these works, may consult Polycarp Epist. and Philipp. cap. 6; Clemens Rom. Ep. and Cor. cap. 35; both in Cotelerii *Patres Apostolici*. See also Theoph. ad Autolyt. I. 20. III. 14. Epist. Ecc. Vienn. et Lugd., in Euseb. *Hist. Ecc.* V. 1. Irenaeus cont. Haeres. III. 16. § 3. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* III. p. 457, and I. p. 117, edit. Sylburg. Tertull. adv. Praxeam, cap. 13; de Corona, cap. 6. Cypr. Ep. LXIX. It is needless to cite later testimonies.

§ 5. *Of the genuineness of chaps. XV. XVI.*

The genuineness of these chapters, at least as a part of the proper epistle to the Romans, has been called in question, and is still doubted by some. Heumann has advanced a peculiar hypothesis respecting chap. XVI. He thinks that the proper original epistle of Paul ends with chap. XI., and excludes from it all the hortatory part, i. e. chaps. XII.—XV. Chapter XVI., he supposes, was originally attached to the end of chapter XI.; and that the sequel of the epistle is a kind of post-script or second letter, added by Paul after some delay in transmitting the first letter. This hypothesis, indeed, does not really deny the genuineness of any part of the epistle; but it advances what seems to be very improbable. What could be more natural, than for Paul, after he had completed his doctrinal discussions, to caution the church at Rome against various evils to which he knew them to be particularly exposed?

Is not this his manner elsewhere? And does not the $\sigma\tilde{\upsilon}\nu$ (chap. xii. 1) necessarily import a connexion between the sequel and the preceding context? In a word, the whole theory is so gratuitous, that it does not seem to be entitled to any serious contradiction.

Semler, however, has advanced much further than Heumann. In his *Dissert. de dupl. appendice ep. Pauli ad Rom.*, he advances the supposition, 'that chap. xv. was not addressed to the Romans, but to those who had charge of Paul's epistle to them, which consisted of chap. i.—xiv., with the doxology in 16: 25—27.'

But let any one, now, without any reference to such a hypothesis, sit down and carefully read chap. xv., and I will venture to predict, that he will never once even think of its being addressed to any other persons, than those to whom the preceding part of the epistle is addressed. In particular; how can he help feeling that vs. 1—13 do very closely cohere with chap. xiv., as the $\sigma\phi\epsilon\lambda\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ at the beginning indicates? And in the remaining part of the chapter, what is there which is incongruous with the condition and relation of Paul in respect to his readers? Compare vs. 15, 23 with 1: 13; and also 15: 28 with Acts 19: 21, the latter of which passages shews the actual condition of Paul, when he wrote the epistle. I am entirely unable to see why Paul should have given personally to the bearers of his letter to the Romans, such hints as chap. xv. contains; nor can I imagine what inducement Semler had to suppose this. But,

Chap. xvi. is more exposed to attack; because it consists of matter in general which is easily dissociated from the rest of the epistle. If the whole of it be omitted, the epistle is still, in all important respects, the same; if it be retained, the matter added consists chiefly in the expression of personal civilities. Moreover, the concluding part of chap. xv. would make a very probable and analogical close of the epistle; in particular if the Ἀμήν at the close of v. 33 be retained.

Probably grounds such as these first occasioned doubts concerning the genuineness of this chapter in particular. Semler advances a supposition respecting it, which (I had almost said) none but a man of such visionary phantasies could have advanced. He supposes that all the persons to whom greetings are sent, in vs. 1—16, are those whom the bearers of the epistle expected to visit, on their way to Rome; and of course, that none of these were to be found in Rome itself. Consequently, according to him, this part of the epistle was a mere letter of commendation or introduction, designed for the bearers of the epistle, and not for the church at Rome.

According to this, then, the first stage of the journey of the letter-carriers was only to Cenchrea, some seven or eight miles from Corinth, to the house of Phebe. But the singularity of Paul's recommendation is, that instead of commending *them* to her hospitality, he commends her to the hospitality of those whom he addresses: $\sigma\nu\nu\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\eta\mu\iota$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ $\tilde{\upsilon}\mu\grave{\iota}\nu$ $\Phi\omicron\iota\beta\eta\nu$. . . $\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha$ $\alpha\tilde{\iota}\tau\eta\nu$ $\pi\rho\omicron\sigma\delta\acute{\epsilon}\xi\eta\sigma\theta\epsilon$ $\kappa.$ $\tau.$ $\lambda.$ Semler felt the incongruity of this, and referred $\pi\rho\omicron\sigma\delta\acute{\epsilon}\xi\eta\sigma\theta\epsilon$ to *receiving into communion*. Did Phebe then, living within a couple of hours' walk from Corinth, and famous as she was for being a $\pi\rho\omicron\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\tau\iota\varsigma$ $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\omega\tilde{\nu}$ (v. 2), need a written recommendation of Paul,

in order that the bearers of his letter might admit her to church communion? But besides this, the word *προσδέξασθε*, in such a connection, does not admit of such a sense. Comp. Phil. 2: 29, and also (as to general meaning) 3 John v. 6.

Thus much for the outset of this journey. Nor is the progress more fortunate. Aquila and Priscilla are next recommended to the letter-carriers. But the last which we know of them, before the writing of this letter, is that they are at Ephesus, Acts 18: 18, 19, 26. But Semler provides them with a house at *Corinth*; and this, probably, because it would not be very natural for those who were to travel westward toward Rome, to go some hundreds of miles eastward, i. e. to Ephesus, in order to get to the capital of the Roman empire. But how is the matter helped by this process? What have we now? A letter of introduction (so to speak) from Paul, directing his messengers to greet Priscilla and Aquila on their journey, while these same persons lived in the very town from which they started! Hug has well expressed his views of this matter. After speaking of the first stay of Aquila and Priscilla at Corinth (Acts 18: 2), and of a second at Ephesus (Acts 18: 18, 19), he thus proceeds: "Whence now this *third* or *Semlerian* house at Corinth, I know not," Einleit. II. p. 397. ed. 3. But, lastly, what are we to do with vs. 17—20, on the ground of Semler? Were the bearers of the letter so divided, as is there described; and was their obedience (*ὑπακοή*) so celebrated, as is there hinted? Above all, what is to be done with vs. 21—24? Would Paul send *written* salutations from those who were with him at Corinth, to the bearers of his epistle, who set out from the same place? Did they not confer with Paul himself, and did not his friends as well as himself see and converse with them? And what shall we say to v. 16, which directs Paul's messengers to *salute one another*?

But enough of this. Let us briefly examine some of the *external* evidences which Semler adduces, against the genuineness of chap. xvi.

(a) 'Marcion, as Origen testifies, excluded chaps. xv. xvi. from the epistle.'

But according to Ruffin's translation of Origen (the original here is lost), the words of this writer are: "Caput hoc [i. e. 16: 25—27], Marcion, a quo Scripturæ evangelicæ et apostolicæ *interpolatæ sunt*, de hac epistola *penitus abstulit*; et non solum hoc, sed et ab eo ubi scriptum est: 'Omne autem quod non ex fide est, peccatum est' [Rom. 14: 23], usque ad finem totius epistolæ, cuncta *dissecuit*." From this nothing more can be gathered, than that Marcion wholly omitted the doxology in 16: 25—27, and separated (*dissecuit*) chaps. xv. xvi. from the rest of the epistle. There is an evident distinction here, between *penitus abstulit* and *dissecuit*. This separation Marcion might make, as others have done, because of the diverse matter contained in these chapters. And even if Marcion omitted the whole, he stands convicted before the world of such notorious falsifications of the sacred writings, that it would weigh nothing.

(b) 'Euthalius, in his *Elenchus capitulorum*, leaves out chap. xvi.'

True; but Euthalius, in his *Elenchus*, mentions only those chapters which were publicly read; and chap. xvi. was usually omitted in the public reading of the epistle. That he did not acknowledge this chapter

as a part of the epistle, is altogether improbable; since, in reckoning the *στίχοι* of the whole epistle, he includes those of chap. xvi.

(c) 'Tertullian (cont. Marc. v. 13) cites Rom. 14: 10 thus: 'In clausula, tribunal Christi comminari Paulum.'

But what should hinder Tertullian from saying that chap. 14: 10 is in the *clausula*, i. e. closing part, of the epistle? Is it not in such a part? Can any thing be *satisfactorily* proved, moreover, by urging a sense of words strictly and logically exact, in such a writer as Tertullian?

As to any alleged discrepancy of manuscripts, with regard to a part of chap. xvi., I shall have occasion to notice this in the sequel.

But, very recently, another doubter in the genuineness of chap. xvi., of a more solid cast than Semler, has made his appearance. Schott, in his *Isagoge ad Nov. Test.*, recently published, in a note p. 248 seq., has assigned other, and perhaps better, reasons than those of Semler, for his doubts. Let us examine them.

(a) 'Paul salutes many persons, in 16: 5—15, as being at Rome, and in a very *familiar* way. How could he, who had never been at Rome (Rom. 1: 13), do this?'

The answer is, that several of these persons were his own kinsmen; see § 1 above. With all or most of them he had very probably met, in the course of his travels. Intercourse between the metropolis of the Roman empire and the large towns of the provinces, was very frequent; specially with Corinth the head-quarters of Achaia, and Ephesus of Asia Minor. And even if Paul had not seen all the persons whom he salutes, what is easier than to suppose that their character and standing were known to him, and therefore he sent them salutations? It is plainly a mistake, to suppose that none but personal acquaintances are saluted in the Pauline epistles.

(b) 'But Paul makes no mention of any of the persons here saluted as being at Rome, in his other epistles written there, e. g. in his epistle to the Ephesians, Colossians, Philippians, and Philemon.'

The answer is, that in only one of these (that to the Colossians), does he send any thing but a mere *general* salutation. Moreover, as all these epistles must have been written some two years and a half, and may have been written some four years, later than the epistle to the Romans, so the state of that church, exposed as it was continually to increase and decrease, may have greatly altered when he wrote the last named epistles; or the persons named in his epistle to the Romans, may have gone elsewhere in order to propagate the gospel; or they might have deceased; or it might be, that they did not happen to pay him a visit while he was writing the above named epistles, and so a greeting from them was not mentioned. A thing of this nature is so accidentally varied, that we cannot make any conclusions which are valid, either from this appearance or from that.

(c) 'Aquila and Priscilla are saluted as being at Rome. In Acts 18: 19, 26, we find their abode at Ephesus; and in Paul's last stay at Ephesus, when he wrote the first epistle to the Corinthians, we find them still there, 1 Cor. 16: 19.'

All this I concede. But since Aquila and Priscilla had, for some

time, been obliged to relinquish their abode at Rome, on account of the decree of Claudius, what is more natural than to suppose, that, so soon as might be, they would return to Rome, at least long enough to adjust their affairs there, which, it is more than probable, had been embarrassed by the decree of banishment?

(d) 'But 2 Tim. 4: 19, written at Rome, greets Priscilla and Aquila as residing at Ephesus.'

I grant it. But when was this written? Just before the final martyrdom of Paul (4: 6—8); i. e. probably some ten years after the epistle to the Romans was written, and also after the persecution by Nero had commenced. What difficulty now in the supposition, that Aquila and Priscilla had fled from Rome when this persecution broke out, and gone back to their former station at Ephesus, where they had spent several years? There Paul salutes them in 2 Tim. 4: 19.

Lastly, Professor Schott expresses his belief, that 'chap. xvi. is made up of fragments of some brief epistle of Paul's, written at Corinth and addressed to some church in Asia Minor, and added by mistake, *piece by piece* as it was discovered, to the epistle to the Romans. Vs. 1—16 compose the first fragment; vs. 17—20, the second; vs. 21—24, the third; vs. 25—27, the fourth.'

But what a series of *postulata* are here made out, without a syllable of historical evidence! Where is the evidence of the lost epistle to an anonymous church in Asia Minor? Where that it was lost, excepting a few scattered fragments which "*sensim sensimque deprehendebantur?*" And the conceit of adding all these fragments to the epistle to the Romans, which already had a good ending with chap. xv.; how should this have ever entered any one's head? Why add them to this epistle, rather than to some of Paul's shorter epistles? And then the persons themselves, named in chap. xvi.; what a singular phantasy it must have been in the compiler, to have supposed, that if they belonged to some church in Asia Minor, their names could be tacked on to the epistle written to the church at *Rome!* How can we admit such gratuitous and improbable hypotheses as these?

Nor can I admit what has frequently been said, in respect to chap. xvi., viz. that it is wholly unconnected with the preceding part of the epistle, and may be disjoined from it without injury to it. Thus much is true, indeed, viz. that salutations and expressions of Christian courtesy, are not doctrinal discussions nor practical precepts; in a word, the sixteenth chapter, which is principally made up of salutations, must of course be diverse from the preceding part of the epistle. But is it not equally true, that chaps. xii—xv. differ as much from the preceding ones, as chap. xvi. does from all the others? Is it proper, moreover, that Christian salutations should be exchanged, in epistles like that of Paul? This will not be denied. The force of such examples of kindness and courtesy and benevolent feeling, is scarcely less than that of direct precept; and in some respects it has evidently the advantage of precept, inasmuch as *practice* speaks louder than theory. Why, then, should the salutatory part of the epistle be thrown away? And would not rejecting it be an injury to the congruity and to the general good effect of the whole?

Nor is it correct to say, that there is not an evident relation and connexion of some part of chap. xvi. with what precedes, besides that which has just been mentioned. Let any one diligently consider the contents of vs. 17—20, and he will see plainly, that they refer to the divisions and erroneous sentiments which are the subject of particular discussion in chaps. xii.—xv. Let him compare 16: 19 with 1: 8, and he will see the same person expressing himself in the same circumstances. In a word, it would be truly wonderful, if the straggling fragments of an epistle, sent to some unknown church in Asia Minor, should fit the place of a conclusion to the epistle to the Romans so well as its present conclusion fits it.

Eichhorn (Einleit. in das N. Test.) has advanced a hypothesis still more fanciful, if possible, than that of Semler or Schott. Chap. xvi. 1—20 is, according to him, a letter of recommendation to the *Corinthian church*, which Paul wrote for Phebe, the deaconess mentioned in vs. 1, 2. This, after it had been read by them, she obtained again, carried it along with her to Rome; and because the church there were unwilling that any thing from the hand of Paul should perish, they tacked it on upon the epistle of Paul to them, so as to make out a conclusion for it!

Is it worth the pains to refute such criticism? Or rather, can the name of *criticism* be fairly given to such extravagant and incongruous suppositions? One is ready to ask: What sort of a church must it have been, in the metropolis of the world, and whose fame had gone abroad through the whole empire, that could deal thus with Paul's epistles? Why was not the letter of Phebe kept by itself, and published by itself, as well as John's letter to the "elect lady?" But this is only one among the numerous conceits, which are intermingled with the striking and instructive compositions of Eichhorn.

Finally, as no *internal* evidence can be made out, that chaps. xv. xvi. are spurious; so no *external* evidence of any considerable weight can be adduced in favour of this supposition. The manuscripts (with some variety as to the position of 16: 25—27, and with the omission of these verses in a few cases), are all on the side of the genuineness of these chapters; I mean, that all which are of any authority are so. Jerome (Comm. in Eph. 3: 5) mentions, that he knew of some manuscripts which omitted 16: 25—27; and Wetstein cites a Codex Latinus which does so. But in regard to all the rest of chaps. xv. xvi., it will not be contended that any authority from manuscripts, fathers, or versions, warrants us in suspecting them. Even as to Marcion himself, there is no certain evidence, as we have seen, that he rejected them. Why then should we reject them at the present time?

§ 6. *Different position in manuscripts of 16: 25—27.*

There is a difference among the Codices here, which it is very difficult to account for in a satisfactory manner. (1) In the Codex Alex., and in one hundred and six Codices minusc., these verses follow chap. 14. 23; and here Tholuck, Flatt, Griesbach, and others, place them. In most of the Greek fathers, also, and in the Syriac and Arabic versions, they occupy the same place.

This is the sum of the *external* evidence, in respect to this position of the verses in question. But in whatever way they may have been transferred thither, it seems difficult to avoid the feeling of incongruity as to such a position. It is an evident interruption of the tenor of the discourse. The *ὀφείλομεν δέ* of 15: 1, shows that it is a *continuation* of a preceding discourse; and so plainly does the matter of vs. 1—13 itself indicate. Nor am I able to persuade myself, that the matter at the close of chap. xiv. is of such a tenor, as entitles us to believe that Paul here breaks out into an animated doxology. Usually, it is only after the enunciation of some deep, sublime, soul-stirring truth, that he betakes himself to expressions of this nature *in medio cursu*. What is there in the discussion about eating meats or refraining from them, to move his soul to the sublime doxology contained in 16: 25—27? I must accord, therefore, with Knapp, who places these verses at the end of the epistle.

(2) A few manuscripts omit vs. 25—27.

Eichhorn, as usual, has built a singular castle in the air upon this fact. He accounts for all the varieties in the manuscripts in this way: (1) The original piece of parchment, on which Paul's epistle was written, was filled when the scribe came to 14: 23. He then took a small and separate piece of parchment, on one side of which he wrote the salutations in vs. 21—24; and on the other the doxology in vs. 25—27. But the letter not being immediately sent, the apostle made additions to it; first of chap. xv., and then of 16: 1—20. So then the epistle was sent to the church at Rome, on *four* separate pieces of manuscript. In copying this, some ended the epistle with 14: 23; others added to this the doxology in 16: 25—27; a third class copied as far as 14: 23, and then added the postscripts of the apostle (15: 1—16: 20), and finally the small leaf of parchment written with the body of the epistle, (which is the usual form of the epistle); while a fourth class, copying from these different copies, inserted the doxology both after 14: 23 and at the end of the whole epistle.

Sorry copyists, indeed, they must have been at Rome, to make such mistakes as these! One is ready to wonder, why the *additional* parchments were not joined on to the original one, in proper order, and not left in the form of Sybilline leaves; a thing which required nothing more than a little paste or glue, and a moment's attention. Then, supposing them to have been left separately, were there no marks added by the writer, to direct the reader's attention and perusal? Are important documents wont to be made out in such a negligent manner? But (what is directly to our present purpose) how came any copyist to imagine, that the letter ended with chap. 14: 23? Or why, as so many mistakes were made about the order of the small piece of parchment first added, were none made about the order of the two different postscripts, viz. 15: 1—33 and 16: 1—20?

I am grieved to add, that Griesbach, in attempting to account for the variation of manuscripts in regard to 16: 25—27, has advanced suppositions not less visionary and gratuitous than those of Eichhorn. This is the more to be wondered at, since Griesbach is not much prone

to phantasies of this nature. The reader of Eichhorn is not surprised to find such a conceit in him; for a critic, who could add on the last twenty-six chapters of the book of Isaiah (which he names Pseudo-Isaiah), to the genuine works of that prophet, because the copyist happened to have room to spare in his parchment, and wanted to fill it out (Einleit. in das A. Test. iii. p. 91. ed. 3d), may well be imagined not to be incapable of making suppositions like those above related.

But what if we, at the present day, are unable to account for the confusion of manuscripts, with regard to 16: 25—27? Will this oblige us to resort to suppositions altogether incredible in themselves?—To say the least, it should not induce us thus to do. We cannot, then,—at least until we come to the persuasion that parchment was as scarce and dear in ancient times as Eichhorn (so often as it suits his critical convenience) makes it, we cannot—admit a supposition which involves such an entire *ὑστερον πρότερον*, in a most solemn and important epistle of Paul. And even if we admit that parchment was so scarce and so dear, we are, after all, at our wit's end to know why the concluding piece was not joined on to the same roll which contained the rest of the epistle.

(3) Some manuscripts have 16: 25—27 both after 14: 23 and at the end. Of this further notice is taken, under the next head.

(4) With the *Textus Receptus*, which places these verses at the end, agree the Codex. Vat., three uncial Codices, some Codd. minusc., and the Latin fathers. With Knapp, Hug, and others, I am persuaded that this is their genuine place. What shall we say of *ἐγὼ Τέρτιος, ὁ γράψας τὴν ἐπιστολήν*, in 16: 22? Does it not of course imply, that it is near the close of the epistle, and that the epistle is *one*? And if so, then are chaps xv. xvi. a genuine and original part of it, as Bertholdt has well remarked, Einleit. vi. § 715.

‘But how can so many doxologies be accounted for?’ To which I answer, that no serious difficulty lies in the way of this. It is not natural to suppose, indeed it cannot well be supposed, that the apostle wrote the *whole* epistle in a single day, or at a single sitting. If, in the midst of his multiplied engagements and his short stay at Corinth, he was several days, or even weeks, in writing it, (which we may easily and probably suppose); then we can account for the various doxologies and apparent closes of the epistle, in chaps. xv. xvi. It is easy to believe, that 15: 33 was the first pause which was made, with the probable design, originally, of ending the epistle there. Afterwards, renewed and additional intelligence coming from Rome, with kind greetings of friends there, he was induced to add, in return, the greetings in 16: 1—16; to which he subjoined the warnings, and the apparent conclusion in vs. 17—20. The definiteness with which he here speaks of the divisions and erroneous sentiments in the church at Rome, in all probability had its origin in the very recent information which he had obtained from that city. Finally, before sending away his epistle, other Christians at Corinth, deeply interested in the affairs of the church at Rome, visited the apostle and desired him to express their salutations. This done, he adds, as usual, another kind wish and prayer for the church which he addresses, 16: 24. And then, in reading over and correcting the copy

which Tertius had made of the whole, Paul, at the close of all, subjoined the general doxology which is contained in vs. 25—27.

If you say: 'Here are almost as many suppositions as those of Eichhorn and Griesbach;' my reply is, that there are almost as many in respect to number, but still of a totally different character. Here the appeal is made to the internal state of the epistle itself, and to the probable and natural circumstances which accompany the writing of such a letter. Nothing stands in the way of believing the things just suggested to be altogether probable. But when all these phenomena are made to depend on odd pieces of parchment, and Sybilline leaves, strangely forwarded without juncture or order, and as strangely mistaken in the copying, how can we satisfy ourselves with such suggestions?

That the manuscripts differ so much, as to 16: 25—27, is indeed a striking circumstance in the critical history of the epistle to the Romans. But if any one will attentively reflect on the several apparent conclusions in the epistle, (15: 13, 23 and 16: 20, 24), he may easily be induced to believe, that the confusion in the manuscripts has arisen from this circumstance. Copyists supposed there must be some mistake, in having a conclusion in 16: 24, and then another superadded in vs. 25—27. It was natural for them to find a difficulty in this. Therefore, with the conviction that here was some mistake, they sought an earlier place for these verses; and they could find none which was not already occupied by something of the like nature, without going back to 14: 23. Here then some of them placed 16: 25—27, and others followed these copies. In the mean time, other copies continued to be taken after the original order of the epistle, and thus a discrepancy arose. Some copyists, perceiving this discrepancy, and also the fact that chaps. xv. xvi. contain so many formulas of conclusion, omitted 16: 25—27; while others finding these verses in some copies after 14: 23, and in others at the end of the epistle, copied them both. In this way we can easily account for all the discrepancies that exist, without resorting to any forced or unnatural suppositions. We may add to all this, moreover, the probability that the *public lections* of the epistle extended only to the end of chap. xiv.; to which it was altogether natural to add 16: 25—27 as a proper close; and that the practice of reading the epistle in this manner, gradually introduced the writing of manuscripts in the same way.

§ 7. *State of feeling and opinion in the church at Rome, when the epistle was written.*

That this church consisted of Jews and Gentiles, we have already seen; § 2 above. That many of the erroneous views which Paul combats in it, were such as the Hebrews were prone to cherish, there can be no doubt, on the part of any one well acquainted with the history of Jewish opinions. That grounds of dissension among its members existed in the church at Rome, we can hardly refuse to believe, when we consider the general tenor of the epistle. The national pride of the Jew; his attachment to the Mosaic institutes, and especially to the Levitical rites and distinctions of clean and unclean; his impatience of sub-

ordination in any respect to Gentiles; his unwillingness to believe that they could be admitted to equal privileges with the Jew, in the kingdom of the Messiah, and particularly without becoming proselytes to the Mosaic religion; his proneness to feel indignant at the government of heathen magistrates over him; all this lies on the face of the epistle, and cannot well be overlooked by any considerate and attentive reader.

On the other hand; the Gentiles disregarded the prejudices of the Jews, especially about circumcision, and meats and drinks, and holidays; they were wounded at the claim of superiority which the Jews seemed to make; and knowing that the great apostle to the Gentiles was an advocate for their equal rights and privileges, they no doubt engaged in contest with the Jews with an unyielding spirit. Such a state of things very naturally gave rise to discussions in the epistle to the Romans, and to all the cautions and precepts contained in the hortatory part of the epistle.

With this general view of the condition of the church before us, we need not be solicitous to determine whether the apostle had special and local objects in view, when he wrote it, or more general ones. My answer to this question would be, that he had both in view; i. e. he meant to establish some great and general principles of Christianity, and also to apply them to the state of the church at Rome. Nothing can be more natural than this supposition; and so Luther, Calvin, Melancthon, Bucer, Michaelis, Tholuck, and others, have for substance judged. That Paul intermingles with general truths, many things which are local, is almost a matter of course in an epistle to a particular church. The contents of the epistle itself, or a brief analysis and synopsis of the whole, I reserve for a separate statement.

BRIEF ANALYSIS

OF THE

CONTENTS OF THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

WERE I to select a motto, which would, in a single brief sentence, designate the substance of what this epistle contains, it should be taken from the apostle Paul himself:

ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ ἩΜΙΝ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΤΗΝ ΤΕ ΚΑΙ ἉΓΙΑΣΜΟΣ.

CHRIST OUR JUSTIFICATION AND SANCTIFICATION.

The first five chapters exhibit Christ, as the author and efficient cause of our justification.

After an appropriate and affectionate introduction (1: 1—16), the apostle proceeds to show, that the Gentiles have all transgressed against the law of God, which was written on their hearts, and that they indulged in a great variety of sins which they knew to be wrong, (1: 17—32). He next proceeds to shew, that the Jews are even more guilty still, inasmuch as they have sinned against more light and more distinguished privileges, (2: 1—3: 19). He now draws the conclusion from these premises, that justification by deeds of law, i. e. on the score of merit or on the ground of perfect obedience, is impossible; for inasmuch as all men have sinned against the law of God, all are under its condemnation, and therefore grace or mercy only can save them from perishing. This grace is vouchsafed only through Christ, and has been procured by his sufferings and death in behalf of sinners, (3: 20—31).

The Old Testament also teaches the same doctrine of gratuitous justification; and that this should be extended to Gentiles, as well as Jews, (4: 1—25).

The happy fruits of such a state of justification, peace with God, support and consolation in the midst of trials and sufferings, a hope which maketh not ashamed and never can be disappointed, are next described by the writer, (5: 1—11). And that it is perfectly proper and becoming on the part of God, to extend those blessings to all, both

Jews and Gentiles, is strikingly taught by an exhibition of the fact, that all have been made to share in the evils which flowed from the apostasy of our original progenitors, (5: 12—19). Even in those cases where sin has exhibited its greatest power, the grace of the gospel is made to triumph over it, (5: 20, 21).

Thus is CHRIST OUR JUSTIFICATION set forth by the apostle. He comes next to exhibit CHRIST OUR SANCTIFICATION. This important topic he introduces, by discussing the objection raised against the doctrine of gratuitous justification, viz. *that it tends to encourage sin*. He shows in the first place, from various considerations, the incongruity and impossibility of this, (6: 1—23). He then proceeds to contrast a state of grace, and the means and motives to holiness which it furnishes, with a legal state; and to show that in the latter, the sinner has no hope of maintaining a holy character, while in the former he is abundantly furnished with the means of doing it; consequently that a state of grace, so far from encouraging men to sin, affords them the only hope of their being able to subdue and mortify sin, (7: 1—8: 17).

The apostle then, as he had before done at the close of his discussion respecting justification (5: 1—11), goes on to shew the consolation which the gospel affords, under the various troubles of the present life, (8: 18—27); and in the sequel concludes, as in the former case, with exultation in the certainty of future and eternal glory to all who truly love God, (8: 28—39).

The part of the epistle properly *doctrinal*, concludes with the 8th chapter. Chapter ix. discusses the objections raised against the dealings of God with his creatures, when he makes some of them the distinguished subjects of his mercy, and passes by others. Chap. x. confirms still farther, by various considerations, and particularly by texts cited from the Old Testament, the idea that the Jews who remain in unbelief, are and must be cast off; and therefore that this is not new or strange doctrine. Chap. xi. continues to urge the same subject; but at the close, deduces from it the cheering consolation, that even the rejection of the Jews will be made a great blessing to the world, as it will be the occasion of salvation being sent to the Gentiles. And if their *rejection* be attended with consequences so important, then surely their *reception* again will fill the world with its happy fruits.

The rest of the epistle is *hortatory*; and adapted specially to warn the church at Rome against several errors, to which, in their circumstances, they were peculiarly exposed. First, they are exhorted to lay aside all pride, and envious distinctions, and claims to preference on the

ground of office, gifts, etc.; and to conduct themselves in a kind, affectionate, gentle, peaceable manner, (12: 1—21). Next, they are exhorted to a quiet and orderly demeanor in regard to the civil power, which the Jews were especially prone to contemn, (13: 1—7). The great law of love is to be regarded and obeyed toward all men, without or within the church, (13: 8—14).

Thirdly, the Gentile Christians are admonished to respect the scruples of their Jewish brethren, on the subject of eating meats offered to idols; and admonished that they have no right to interfere, either in this matter or in other things of the like tenor, (14: 1—15—7). On the other hand, the Jews are admonished, that their Gentile brethren have equal rights and privileges with themselves, under the gospel dispensation, (15: 8—13).

The writer then expresses his good hopes concerning them all; his kind and tender regard for them, and his purposes in respect to visiting them. Lastly, he subjoins the salutations of various Christians who were with him; cautions them against those who seek to make divisions among them; and concludes with a doxology.

Such is the brief sketch of the contents of the epistle before us; one which the reader will not fully understand and appreciate, until he has attentively studied the whole; but still, one to which he may recur, in order to satisfy himself of the relation which a particular part has to the whole. To gain this satisfaction, it is important that he should become well acquainted with the general scope and object of the whole epistle. The details of the respective parts, are given in the introductions to each; which are embodied with the commentary, although distinguished from it by the smaller type in which they are printed.

COMMENTARY ON THE ROMANS.

CHAPTER I. 1—16.

The introductory part of the epistle to the Romans, 1: 1—16, contains, (1) A salutation, vs. 1—7. (2) A brief declaration of some personal wishes and concerns, vs. 8—16.—The apostle, being a stranger in person to the church at Rome, begins his letter with exhibiting the nature of his office and of his relation to the church of God, v. 1. Having mentioned that he had been set apart for the service of God in the *gospel*, he hints, in passing, that this same *gospel* had been before announced by the ancient prophets, v. 2, and that it has respect to him, who was of the seed of David according to the flesh or in his humbler condition, but the exalted and powerful Son of God in the glorified state which succeeded his resurrection, vs. 3, 4. From him who had thus been constituted *Lord of all*, Paul avers that he had received such grace as made him one of Christ's devoted followers, and also the office of an apostle to the Gentiles, in order to promote the knowledge of a Saviour among them, v. 5; and inasmuch as the Romans were among these Gentiles, and were called to be heirs of the grace of life, v. 6, he addresses them, wishing them every needed spiritual and temporal blessing.

He next passes on to circumstances of a personal nature, which seem to prepare the way for the subsequent address that he is to make to them. He thanks God that their Christian faith is so distinguished as to become a matter of universal notice, v. 8; declares the strong desire which he had long cherished of paying them a visit, and that they had been the continual subject of his remembrance when coming before the throne of grace, vs. 9, 10; and alleges his wish not only to impart spiritual consolation and joy to them, but to receive the same from them, vs. 11, 12. He then repeats his declaration respecting the desire he had all along cherished of paying them a visit, and states the reasons why he had not fulfilled it, v. 13. He expresses a wish to preach among them as well as among other Gentiles, inasmuch as he considers himself under obligation to preach the *gospel* to all classes of men among the heathen, vs. 14, 15. Of this *gospel* he is not ashamed, knowing that by it the mighty power of God is manifested, in the salvation of both Jews and Greeks, v. 16.

Here the *introduction* properly ends; inasmuch as the next verse exhibits one great theme of the epistle, and is the subject which gives occasion to all the remarks which follow, to the end of chap. v.

The reader of Paul's writings cannot fail to remark, how different was the *mode* of writing epistles, in ancient times, from that which we now practice, with regard to some things pertaining to address, subscription, etc. Paul *prefixes* his name, instead of *subscribing* it at the end of his letters, as we now do. In the like way, and after his

example, the *letters missive*, etc., of churches to each other, are still drawn up among us.

(1) *Παῦλος*, probably a Roman and not a Hebrew name, i. e. *Paulus*; compare the name of the Roman deputy-praetor, Sergius Paulus, Acts 13: 7, who became a convert to Christianity through the instrumentality of Paul. The Hebrew name of this apostle was *שֶׁרְיָאס*, *Σαῦλος*; and he is first called *Παῦλος* in Acts 13: 9, immediately after the mention of Sergius Paulus. Hence many have thought, that *Παῦλος* is a name which the apostle took in honour of the deputy-praetor. The more natural explanation is, that *Παῦλος* was a second name of Roman origin, given him in accordance with the custom of the times. While the Jews were subjected to the power of the Seleucidae on the throne of Syria, it was very common among them to adopt a second name of Greek origin; e. g. *Jesus*, *Jason*; *Jehoiakim*, *Alkimos*, etc. So under the Roman power: *Dostai*, *Dositheus*; *Tarphin*, *Trypho*. A comparison of these will shew, that in general the second name bore some resemblance in sound to the first. So *Σαῦλος*, *Παῦλος*.

Δοῦλος means, in itself, *one devoted to the service of another, one who is subject to the will or control of another*. Of course it may import a station or condition which is in itself high or low, honorable or dishonorable, according to the state or rank of the master. A *servant* of a man, i. e. of any common man, is a *slave*; at least, the word in its *strict* sense would import this. But the *servants of a king*, are courtiers of the highest rank, who count this title a matter of honour. So *servants of God* is an appellation given to the prophets, Moses, Joshua, etc., Rom. 10: 7. 11: 18. 15: 3. Deut. 34: 5. Josh. 1: 1. Jer. 25: 4. Amos 3: 7; and in like manner, and for the same reason, the apostles and primitive preachers of the gospel are called *the servants of Christ*, Gal. 1: 10. Tit. 1: 1. James 1: 1. 2 Pet. 1: 1. Col. 4: 12. The sense of *δοῦλος* in the text before us, accords with this latter usage. The apostle means to call himself a *servant* of Christ in a special sense, as the context which follows clearly indicates. If this were not the case, *δοῦλος* might be understood as meaning simply a *worshipper* of Christ or of God, *one devoted to his service*; for in such a sense we find the word employed in 1 Pet. 2: 16. Eph. 6: 6. Rev. 7: 3. Luke 2: 29. Acts 4: 29. Ps. 113: 1. But in Rom. 1: 1, it is clear that *δοῦλος* means *one devoted to the special service of Christ in his gospel*; and it is therefore an *honorary* title, or rather, it indicates both the station and the devotedness of the person to whom it is applied.

Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ may mean, either that Christ has bestowed on him the office of *δοῦλος* which he holds, i. e. it may be *Genitivus auctoris*; or it may mean, that the apostle's business or object as *δοῦλος*, is to promote the cause of Christ, or to forward his work. The sequel shews that the former sense is the one here meant.

Κλητός, lit. *called*, but the meaning here is, *chosen, invited*, viz. chosen to take upon him the office of an apostle; see Acts 26: 17, where the *κλητός* here is expressed by *ἐξαιρούμενός σε*, *I have taken thee out of, I have selected thee from*. The word *κλητός* sometimes has the sense merely of *invited, bidden*; e. g. Matt. 20: 16. 22: 14. But in the writings of Paul, it is not used in the sense merely of *invited*, but always in the sense of *efficient calling*, as we say, i. e. it means not only that the person designated has been *invited* or *selected*, but that *he has accepted the invitation*; 1 Cor. 1: 1, 2. 1 Cor. 1: 24. Rom. 1: 6, 7. 8: 28; with which collate Gal. 1: 15. Jude v. 1. Heb. 3: 1. Rom. 11: 29. Eph. 4: 1.

Ἀφορισμένος . . . θεοῦ, lit. *separated or set apart for the gospel of God*, i. e. chosen or selected in order to proclaim or preach the gospel of God, viz. that gospel of which God is the author, *θεοῦ* being the *Genitivus auctoris*. The word *ἀφορισμένος* seems intended to be expegetical of *κλητός*, i. e. it expresses the same idea in different language. Hesychius explains *ἀφορισμένος* by *ἐκλελεγμένος, chosen, διακεκριμένος, selected*. In the same sense *ἀφορίσατε* occurs in Acts 13: 2. See the same sentiment in Gal. 1: 15. Jer. 1: 5. The meaning is, that God, who foreknows all things, did set him apart, choose, select him for the work of the gospel, even from the earliest period of his life, Gal. 1: 15. So it is said of Jeremiah, that he was set apart, selected, for the prophetic office even before he was formed in his mother's womb; by all which expressions is meant, that God knows all persons and events before they exist or take place, and that he has a definite object in view which he intends to accomplish by them.

Εἰς εὐαγγέλιον has the same sense as *εἰς τὸ εὐαγγελίσασθαι εὐαγγέλιον*, *in order to preach the gospel*. This method of using the Acc. (with the preposition *εἰς* prefixed) as a *nomen actionis*, is a frequent idiom of Paul's writings, and resembles the use of the Heb. Inf. (with a ב prefixed) as a *nomen actionis*. *Εὐαγγέλιον* itself is sometimes employed to denote *the preaching of the gospel*; e. g. 1 Cor. 4: 15. 9: 14.—*Εὐαγγέλιον θεοῦ* Chrysostom understands as meaning *the gospel concerning God*, viewing *θεοῦ* as *Genitivus objecti*. But this interpretation is plainly erroneous; for *the object* is supplied

in v. 3, viz. εὐαγγέλιον θεοῦ . . . περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ. Theophylact rightly explains the phrase: ὡς δωρηθὲν παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, [the gospel] as given by God. For the sentiment that the gospel is of God, and that Christ taught it as received from him, let the reader compare John 8: 28, 38. 5: 19, 30. 12: 49. 14: 10, 24. 17: 4—8.

(2) Ὁ προεπηγγέλματο . . . ἁγίαις, which he formerly, or in former times, declared or published by his prophets, in the holy Scriptures. In like manner, Paul, in his defence before Agrippa, says, that he had proclaimed nothing as a preacher of the gospel, which the prophets and Moses had not declared should take place, Acts 26: 22. That Christ and all his apostles believed and taught, that the Old Testament abounds in prophecies respecting him, there can be no doubt on the part of any one who attentively reads the New Testament.

Even the heathen of the apostle's time had become acquainted with the expectations of the Jews, in regard to the appearance of the Messiah; which expectations were excited and cherished in the Hebrews, by the perusal of their own ancient Scriptures. Thus Tacitus speaks of this subject: "Pluribus persuasio inerat, antiquis sacerdotum literis contineri, eo ipso tempore fore, ut valesceret Oriens, profectique Judaeâ rerum potirentur," Hist. V. 13. In the same manner Suetonius his cotemporary expresses himself: "Percrebuerat Oriente toto, vetus et constans opinio, esse in fatis ut eo tempore Judaeâ profecti rerum potirentur," in Vespas. c. 4. The first promises respecting the Messiah were merely of a general nature, unaccompanied by peculiar and characteristic declarations; e. g. Gen. 3: 15. 12: 3. 17: 4, 5. 49: 10. In later times, it was foretold that the expected King and Deliverer would be of the progeny of David, 2 Sam. 7: 16. Ps. 89: 35—37. In several Psalms, some traits of the life, office, character, and sufferings of this illustrious personage were given; viz. Psalms II. XVI. XXII. XLV. CX. etc.; still more graphically is the Messiah described in Is. LIII.; and individual occurrences in his history are given in later prophets, e. g. Zech. 9: 9. 11: 13. Mal. 3: 1, seq. 4: 2, seq. It has been observed, that Malachi's declaration in the last chapter of his prophecy, is homogeneous with the very first annunciation of the gospel in Mark 1: 2. Our English version of προεπηγγέλματο, promised afore, does not give the proper meaning of the word.

Ἐν γραφαῖς ἁγίαις, in the holy Scriptures. The Jews employed either γραφή the singular, or γραφαί the plural, indifferently. The first means the *corpus librorum sacrorum*; the second refers to the

same collection, as made up of several particular writings. The epithet *ἁγία* is given to *γραφαί*, because the Scriptures were regarded as worthy of all reverence, or because they were looked upon as being inspired by τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον.

(3) *Περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ*, respecting his Son. In sense, this clause is united to *εὐαγγέλιον θεοῦ* at the close of v. 1. It follows, therefore, that v. 2 is a *parenthetic* circumstance thrown in. But although this is the case, there is no more necessity here of actually inserting a parenthesis, than in many other cases where explanatory circumstances are added in the like way; nor, on the other hand, can there be any weighty objections made against inserting a parenthesis here (as I have done in the translation), inasmuch as the sense in reality implies one. Tholuck joins *περὶ κ.τ.λ.* with *προεπηγγείλατο*; but as this verb itself relates to *εὐαγγέλιον θεοῦ*, it seems more congruous to refer *περὶ κ.τ.λ.* to the same words.

Τοῦ γενομένου . . . σάρκα, who was born of the seed of David, in respect to the flesh. The verse itself is replete with difficulties; and especially so to one who is not familiarly conversant with the character of Paul's style. Tholuck strikingly compares the latter to the urgent force of waves, which swell one above another in continual succession. It is an obvious peculiarity of this apostle's style, that he abounds in what we should usually call parentheses. His mind appears to have been so glowing, and so full of ideas, that the expression of a single word seems often to call forth as it were a burst of thought respecting the import of that word, which hinders him from advancing in the sentence that he had begun, until he has given some vent to the feelings thus incidentally occasioned. The expression of these feelings, makes what I have named *parenthesis* above; although this may not always be designated as such, in our printed books. To illustrate what I mean, let us take the examples in the first paragraph of the epistle before us. When Paul (v. 1) had named the *εὐαγγέλιον θεοῦ*, which would recal to the minds of his readers the gospel that was then preached by himself and others, he immediately adds, in order to enforce on their minds a becoming idea of the dignity and excellence of this gospel, *ὃ προεπηγγείλατο διὰ τῶν προφητῶν αὐτοῦ ἐν γραφαῖς ἁγίαις*; after which he resumes his subject. But no sooner has he uttered the words *τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ*, than another burst of thought respecting the exalted personage thus named escapes him. First, this *Son* is *γενομένου . . . σάρκα*, a descendant of David, the most exalted king who ever occupied the

Jewish throne, even as to his humbler condition, or his human nature. Secondly, he is τοῦ ὀρισθέντος . . . νεκρῶν, i. e. he has been constituted or set forth as the Son of God, clothed with supreme dominion, in respect to his more exalted condition or his more exalted nature, after his resurrection from the dead. Having thus given vent to the feelings of reverence with which the mention of the Son of God had inspired him, he resumes his theme by the words Ἰησοῦ . . . ἡμῶν, which are in apposition with τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ in v. 3. The words τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν again suggest another train of thought, which the writer stops to utter, viz. δι' οὗ . . . Χριστοῦ, after which he resumes his theme, and finishes the sentence by πᾶσι τοῖς . . . Χριστοῦ, v. 7. The greater part, then, of this apparently involved sentence, might be included in parenthesis; and then the simple sentence would run thus: Παῦλος . . . ἀφωρισμένος εἰς εὐαγγέλιον θεοῦ περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ . . . Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν . . . πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν κ.τ.λ.

If the reader now will take special notice of this characteristic in the writings of Paul, it will help to unravel many a sentence, which would otherwise seem perplexed and perhaps even irrelevant. To understand well the writings of this apostle, something more than a knowledge of grammar and of words is necessary. We must be able to enter into the feelings and sympathies of the writer, and to trace his modes of thought and expression in cases that seem obscure, as well as in cases which are plain.

Γενομένου, descended, born.—Ἐκ σπέροματος, of the posterity, of the lineage.—Κατὰ σάρκα, in respect to his human nature, or in respect to his incarnate state, his fleshly existence. Σάρξ denotes literally *flesh*, i. e. the flesh of a living, animated being, in distinction from that of a dead one, which is κρέας. It denotes *body* also; not in the sense of σῶμα which has reference to the compacting of the whole of the parts into one mass, but in the sense of *body* as distinguished from mind, the *visible* part as distinguished from the *invisible* one. Hence it is very often used, both in the Old Testament and the New, for our *animal nature*, the *animal man* (so to speak). Frail, perishable man, also, and man with carnal appetites and passions, are often designated by it; as every lexicon will shew. As kindred with this, it often means *man as living in his present fleshly and dying or transitory state*, in distinction from another and different condition in a future world; so Gal. 2: 20. Phil. 1: 22, 24. Heb. 5: 7 applied to Christ. 1 Pet. 4: 2. 2 Cor. 10: 3. This I take to be the shade of

sense, which it has in the passage before us. Christ, as to his outward and transitory man, or as to his human nature or condition, descended from the royal progeny of David; and therefore, even in respect to his lower nature, he was of exalted origin. In other words, Christ, as to his incarnate condition, i. e. as to that nature which dwelt on earth (ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν, John 1: 14), and was capable of suffering and dying, was of regal descent.

Such was Christ even in his state of *humiliation*. But what was he in his exalted and glorified state? If, as to his fleshly or transitory nature and state, he was David's son, what was he in his exalted condition, his *pneumatic* state? The answer is, 'The Son of God;' and not simply this neither, for he was the Son of God while ἐν σαρκί but in his exalted state, he was the Son of God ἐν δυνάμει, i. e. he was "Lord over all," "Head over all things to his church, ἀρχὴ τῆς κτίσεως τοῦ θεοῦ."

Such I take to be the general idea of τοῦ ὁρισθέντος . . . ἀγιοσύνης. The illustration of particular words, is attended with no small difficulty.

(4) 'Ορισθέντος has been rendered *decreed, constituted, ordained*; so Clavius, Erasmus, Faber, and others. So also the oldest Latin interpreters, *qui prædestinatus est*; as appears from the Latin interpretation of Irenæus, III. 18, 32; from Rufin's version of Origen, and Hilary *De Trinitate*, VII. To the same purpose some recent interpreters have rendered ὁρισθέντος and this accords with the meaning of the word in Heb. 4: 7. Acts 11: 29. 2: 23. 10: 42. 17: 26, 31. Luke 22: 22; and these are all the instances in which it is used in the New Testament, excepting the case before us.

But this sense of the word is alleged, by some critics, not to accord with the design of the passage. In order to prove this, they suppose the passage (by way of illustration) to be construed thus: 'Ordnained to be the Son of God with power, κατὰ πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης, i. e. by the miraculous gifts which the Spirit conferred upon him, or by the miracles which the Spirit enabled him to perform;' and then ask, how the miraculous gifts or deeds of Jesus *ordained* or *constituted* him to be the Son of God? He possessed these gifts, or performed these miracles, as they justly aver, because he was the Son of God; he was not made so by the possession of his gifts or the performance of his deeds. Grotius, in order to relieve this difficulty with respect to ὁρισθέντος, construes the passage thus: 'The regal dignity of Jesus, as Son of God, was *predestinated* or *prefigured*, when he wrought signs

and wonders in his incarnate state.' But how *predestinating* or *constituting* can be made to mean *prefiguring*, I am not aware.

Others construe thus: 'Ordained to be the powerful Son of God, in his *pneumatic* condition [or state of exaltation], by his resurrection from the dead.' But in this case we are compelled to ask: How could his resurrection *decree* or *ordain* his exalted state? It might be the consequence of a decree that he should be exalted; it was so; but in what manner the resurrection could *ordain*, or *constitute*, or *decree* his exaltation, it would be difficult indeed to explain.

There is yet one other sense, however, in which the passage before us may be taken, viz. 'Constituted the Son of God with power, in his *pneumatic* condition, *after* his resurrection from the dead.' For although he was the Son of God *before* his resurrection, yet he was not the Son of God *ἐν δυνάμει*, in the sense here meant, until after his ascension to the right hand of the Majesty on high.

I hesitate between this sense, and the one given by Origen, Chrysostom, Cyril, Theodoret, Theophylact, Œcumenius, the Syriac version, and the great majority of modern critics; viz. *ὁρισθέντος· δευχθέντος, ἀποφθέντος, κριθέντος, ὁμολογηθέντος, shown, demonstrated, exhibited, declared*. Of this meaning of *ὀρίζω*, it is true, no example can be found in the New Testament, nor in the classics, which seems to be exactly in point. Passow gives no sense of this kind to *ὀρίζω*, in his lexicon. I find only one example (if indeed this be one) in the instances produced by Elsner, which will stand the test of scrutiny; this is: "A patron of what is just, *δικαστήν ὀρίζομεν γνήσιον, we call a true judge, or we declare to be a judge worthy of the name*." But even here, the sense of *deciding, determining, defining*, is altogether a good one for *ὀρίζομεν*; and this agrees with the usual meaning of the word. Still, as *ὀρίζω* (from *ὄρος*) means literally to *prescribe the boundaries or limits* of any thing, and thus, by defining it, to distinguish it from other things; so the secondary meaning given by Chrysostom, viz. *δευχθέντος, ἀποφθέντος, declared, shown*, is not an unnatural one, although destitute (so far as I can discover) of any definite *usus loquendi* to support it. The lexicon of Zonaras gives the same gloss to the word: *ὀρισθέντος· ἀποδειχθέντος, ἀποφανθέντος*.

It is a safe rule, not to adopt the sense of a word, which is not supported by the *usus loquendi*, when another meaning which is supported by it, can be given, that will make good sense. And in the case before us, it is as good sense to say, that 'Christ was *consti-*

tuted the Son of God with power, after his resurrection from the dead,' as to say, that 'Christ was *shown* to be the Son of God with power, after his resurrection from the dead.' For after the resurrection, he was advanced to an elevation which, as Messiah, he did not before possess; comp. Phil. 2: 9—11. Heb. 2: 9. 12: 2. Rev. 3: 21. Matt. 19: 28. Heb. 1: 3. Nay, I may say that the more energetic meaning of the word is to be found in *constituted*. As an instance of this nature exactly in point, see Acts 10: 42, where Christ is said so be ὁ ὄρισμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κριτῆς ζώντων καὶ νεκρῶν, *the constituted judge of the living and the dead*; an example quite in point as to the *sentiment*, as well as the language. See also the same sense of the word in Acts 17: 31, ὥρισε sc. κριτῆν, i. e. he [God] hath *constituted* him [Christ] the judge, etc.; comp. 17: 26, ὀρίσας . . . καιρούς.

If we should construe the phrase thus, as some do: 'Declared to be the Son of God with power, by the Holy Spirit, on account of (by) his resurrection from the dead;' one might then ask: How could the *resurrection* declare, in any special manner, that Christ was the Son of God? Was not Lazarus raised from the dead? Were not others raised from the dead, by Christ, by the apostles, by Elijah, and by the bones of Elisha? And yet was their resurrection proof, that they were the Sons of God? God did indeed prepare the way for universal dominion to be given to Christ, by raising him from the dead. To the like purpose is the apostle's assertion in Acts 17: 31. But how an event common to him, to Lazarus, and to many others, could of itself demonstrate him to be the Son of God ἐν δυνάμει—remains yet to be shewn.

These questions appear to me so forcible, that I must go back to the more simple and unembarrassed meaning: '*Constituted* the Son of God with power, in respect to his *pneumatic* state or condition, *after* his resurrection from the dead.' The sequel will exhibit additional considerations, in respect to this subject.

The phrase *υἱὸς θεοῦ* is still more difficult of interpretation. In order to be as brief as possible, I begin with the *generic* idea. *Υἱὸς θεοῦ* any rational being may be called, who is formed in the image of God, i. e. possesses by his gift a moral and intellectual nature like his own. The *original* idea of *υἱός*, is that of *derivation*. The *secondary* one (which is often employed), is that of *resemblance*. The third gradation of meaning is, that of being *regarded* or *treated as a son*, occupying the place of a son, viz. having distinguished

gifts, favours, or blessings bestowed on any one. To one or the other of these classes of meaning, may all the instances be traced, in which the phrase *son* or *sons of God* is applied, in the Old Testament or the New.

It is superfluous here to shew that *υἱός*, in its primary and literal sense, as applied to the relations of men, means *a masculine descendant* of any one; or that it means *offspring, posterity*, near or remote. In regard to the phrase *υἱὸς θεοῦ*, it is applied, (1) *To Adam*, as proceeding immediately from the hand of the Creator, Luke 3: 38. (2) *To those who are regenerated*, or born of the Spirit of God, John 1: 12, 13. Rom. 8: 15, 17. 1 John 3: 1, 2, et sæpe alibi. Connected with this, is the usage of calling all *true worshippers* of God his *sons*; e. g. Matt. 5: 9, 45. Luke 6: 35. 20: 36. Rom. 8: 14, 19. 2 Cor. 6: 18. Gal. 3: 26. Heb. 12: 6. Rev. 21: 7, et alibi. (3) The same appellation is sometimes given to *such as are treated with special kindness*; e. g. Rom. 9: 26. Hos 1: 10. 11: 1. Deut. 32: 5, 19. Is. 1: 2. 43: 6. Jer. 31: 9. 2 Cor. 6: 18. God, as the common father and benefactor of all men, good and bad, in reference to this relation, often calls himself a *father*, and styles them his *children*; "If I be a *father*, where is mine honour?" "I have nourished and brought up *children*, but they have rebelled against me." Moreover, as all men are made in his image, i. e. have an intellectual, rational, and moral nature like his own; on this account also they may be styled his children; but more specially does this apply to those who are *regenerated*, and in whom the image of God that had been in part defaced, is restored. (4) As bearing some resemblance to the Supreme Ruler of the universe in respect to authority, or as having office by his special favour, *kings* are sometimes named *sons of God*; e. g. Ps. 82: 6 (בְּנֵי אֱלֹהִים). 2 Sam. 7: 14. So in Homer, *διογενῆς βασιλεύς*, Ili. I. 279. II. 196. (5) *Angels* are called *sons of God*, for the like reason that men are, viz. because God is their creator and benefactor; and specially, because they bear a high resemblance to God; see Job 1: 6. 2: 1. 38: 7. Dan. 3: 25.

It is evident from inspecting these examples, that men and angels may be called *sons of God* for more than one reason; nay, that in some cases all the reasons for giving this appellation are united. E. g. a pious Israelite might be called a son of God, because God was his creator; because of the special favours and blessings bestowed upon him, i. e. because of his being treated as a son; because he was born again by the power of the Holy Spirit; and because he bore a special

resemblance to his heavenly father. For each or for any one of these reasons, it is obvious we might, agreeably to Scripture usage, call any one *a son* of God, who is truly pious; and for all of them combined, or for any part of them, we might in like manner bestow on him the same appellation. I mention this here, because it is of no small importance in rightly estimating the force of *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ*, as applied to Christ. We come now to consider this last phrase, as applied in this manner.

(a) It designates Jesus as produced in the womb of the virgin Mary, by the miraculous influence of the Holy Spirit, Luke 1: 32 (comp. Luke 3: 38). Perhaps the same sense belongs to it in Mark 1: 1. The words of the centurion, in Matt. 27: 54 and Mark 15: 39, seem, in the mouth of a Roman, to have the like sense, although perhaps it is not altogether the same.

(b) It means *Jesus as the constituted King or Messiah*. E. g. Matt. 16: 16. 26: 63. Mark 14: 61. Luke 22: 70. John 1: 49. 11: 27; and probably in Matt. 8: 29. 14: 33. Mark 3: 11. 5: 7. Luke 4: 41. 8: 28. John 1: 34. 6: 69. 9: 35. 10: 36. Acts 9: 20. 13: 33. Heb. 5: 5. In the like sense, the appellation *Son* is given to him, in the way of anticipation, by the ancient prophets who foretold his appearance; Ps. 2: 7. 89: 27. On the like ground, kings, as we have seen in No. 4, are called *sons of God*; Ps. 82: 6. 2 Sam. 7: 14.

(c) The most common use of the phrase *Son of God* as applied to the Messiah, is, to designate the high and mysterious relation which subsisted between him and God the Father, by virtue of which he was, in his complex person as *θεάνθρωπος*, the *ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτῆρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ πατρὸς*, Heb. 1: 3; the *εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου*, Col. 1: 15; the *εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ*, 2 Cor. 4: 4. In this respect, *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ* is rather a name of *nature* than of office, for it is predicated upon the high and glorious *εἰκὼν*, *resemblance, similitude*, which the Son exhibits of the Father, he being the *radiance* (*ἀπαύγασμα*) of his glory; so that what Jesus said to Philip is true, viz. "He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father," John 14: 9. "It hath pleased the Father, that in him all fulness should dwell," Col. 1: 19; even "all the fulness of the Godhead bodily," Col. 2: 9; and that high, yea divine honour should be paid to him, Phil. 2: 9—11. Rom. 14: 11. (comp. v. 9). Rev. 5: 13, 14. John 5: 23. Heb. 1: 6. As *Son*, Christ is lord and heir of all things, Heb. 1: 2, 3, 8. In particular, it would seem to be one design of the New Testament writers, in using the appellation *Son of God*, to convey the

idea of a most intimate connexion, love, and fellowship (so to speak), between him and the Father. Compare, in order to illustrate this idea, such texts as Matt. 11: 27. Luke 10: 22. John 1: 14, 18. Heb. 1: 5, seq. Matt. 3: 17. Luke 3: 22. 9: 35. Col. 1: 13. 2 Pet. 1: 17. Matt. 17: 5. Mark 1: 11. 9: 7. Compare, also, with these last texts, the parables in Matt. 21: 37, seq. 22: 2, seq. Mark 12: 6. Luke 20: 13; also John 8: 35, 36, and 10: 36. That God has given Christ the Spirit without measure, that he dwells in him *σωματικῶς*, that all counsels and secrets (so to speak) of the divine Nature are perfectly known to him, (John 1: 18. Matt. 11: 27. Luke 10: 22. John 6: 46. 7: 29. 8: 19. 14: 9, 10, 11, 20. 10: 15), seems to be suggested by the appellation *Son of God* as frequently bestowed; for so the texts referred to, and other like texts, would imply. In a word, similitude, affection, confidence, and most intimate connection, seem to be designated by the appellation *Son*, as applied to Christ. In this sense it is most frequent in the New Testament; although with Paul, the idea of *Messianic dignity* or *elevation* is more commonly designated by *Κύριος*.

But while I am fully satisfied that the term *Son of God* is oftentimes applied to Christ as a name of *nature*, as well as of office; yet I am as fully satisfied, that it is not applied to him considered simply as *divine*, or simply as *Logos*. It designates the *Θεάνθρωπος*, the *God-man*, i. e. the complex person of the Messiah, in distinction from his divine nature simply considered, or his *Logos* state or condition. The exceptions to this are only cases of such a nature, as shew that the appellation *Son of God* became, by usage, a kind of proper name, which might be applied either to his human nature, or to his divine one, as well as to his complex person. In just such a way proper names are commonly used; e. g. *Abraham* usually and properly means, the complex person of this individual consisting of soul and body. But when I say: 'Abraham is dead,' I mean the physical part only of Abraham is so; and when I say: 'Abraham is alive,' I mean that his immortal part only is so. So in regard to the name *Son of God*; when I say: 'The Son of God was crucified,' I mean that his mortal part was so; when I say: 'God sent his Son, the Son came out from the Father, he had glory with the Father before the world was,' etc., I mean, in such cases, that the divine nature of the Son became incarnate, that *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε . . . ἑαυτὸν ἐταπεινώσε* (Phil. 2: 7, 8), taking upon him the likeness of our nature. But when I say, with John, that "Jesus is the Son of God," and that "Jesus

Christ has come in the flesh," I mean to designate his complex person, the θεάνθρωπος, the θεὸς ἐν σαρκὶ φανερωθείς, the λόγος σὰρξ γενόμενος; and this is the case with most of the examples of the phrase in the New Testament; see Excursus I.

If I rightly understand the meaning of νιοῦ θεοῦ, it designates the *Messiah*, the *King of Israel*, the *Lord of all*, in the passage before us. Such was Christ constituted, after his resurrection from the dead, when he ascended to take his place at the right hand of the Majesty on high, and was made κληρονόμος πάντων. To express this idea with intensity, the writer adds:

Ἐν δυνάμει, i. e. Christ was now constituted the Son of God or the Messiah, possessed of δύναις or endowed with δυνάμεις. Before his resurrection, he appeared as "a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief," as "a root out of dry ground;" after it, he was clothed with supreme majesty and glory, and "all power in heaven and on earth was committed to him," Matt 28: 18. This last passage seems to present the key to the one before us.

I am aware that ἐν δυνάμει has been connected, by many expositors, with ὀρισθέντος, and regarded as an adverb signifying *potenter*, הַרְבֵּי, and so rendering intensive the participle just named, i. e. making the whole to mean *powerfully demonstrated*, or *shewn in a glorious or wonderful manner*, etc. That the Dative case of a noun joined with ἐν, may be employed *adverbially*, is indeed in accordance with the laws of the Greek language. But is it in accordance with probability, in this case, that ἐν δυνάμει qualifies ὀρισθέντος? It would seem to be a singular method indeed of expressing intensity. Why not put ἐν δυνάμει, in such a case, before ὀρισθέντος, in order to avoid an equivocal construction of the sentence? Then again, how singular the qualification of a word which signifies *to constitute*, or, if you please, *to shew*. How could one think of adding ἐν δυνάμει to augment the signification of such a kind of verb or participle? Why not choose ἀποφαίνω, ἐλέγχω, or some such word which is intense in itself? And further; where are the analogies in the New Testament? Δυνάμεις, as employed in general, is a qualification of a person, or thing, or an office, not of a verb; e. g. Acts 10: 38, God anointed Jesus of Nazareth πνεύματι ἁγίῳ καὶ δυνάμει. Rom. 15: 19, ἐν δυνάμει, *by the force of, by virtue of*; 1 Cor. 4: 20, 'the kingdom of God is ἐν δυνάμει' 1 Cor. 15: 43, 'the body is raised ἐν δυνάμει,' i. e. endowed with δύναις. 1 Thess. 1: 5, 'the gospel was not in word only, but ἐν δυνάμει' 2 Thess. 1: 11, 'the work of

faith ἐν δυνάμει' 2 Thess. 2: 9, ἐν πάσῃ δυνάμει, *endowed with various powers*. Once only do I find ἐν δυνάμει apparently qualifying a participle or verb, viz. Col. 1: 29, ἐνεργουμένη ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐν δυνάμει, *operating powerfully in me*. But here the participle has such a meaning as is plainly susceptible of intensity. Can we say that the same is the case with ὀρισθέντος? As we cannot, I must therefore believe that ἐν δυνάμει is designed to qualify υἱοῦ θεοῦ, in the manner before stated. I am the more inclined to this, when I see it to be affirmed in Matt. 24: 30. Mark 13: 26. Luke 21: 27, that 'the Son of Man shall come, to take vengeance on the unbelieving Jews, μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ δόξης' when the Saviour says of himself, after his resurrection, 'πάντα δύναιμις in heaven and earth is given to me,' Matt. 28: 18; when Peter speaks of 'having made known to those whom he addressed, the δύναμιν καὶ ἐξουσίαν of our Lord Jesus Christ,' 2 Pet. 1: 16; when the Son of Man represents himself, after his resurrection, as 'seated at the right hand τῆς δυνάμεως,' Matt. 26: 64. Mark 14: 62. Luke 22: 69; and when τὸ ζῳάτος is ascribed to the Lamb in Rev. 5: 13, and ἐξουσία in Rev. 12: 10. It does not seem to me, that there is any solid reason, why critics should any longer consider the application of ἐν δυνάμει, in our text, as doubtful, or as belonging to ὀρισθέντος.

Κατὰ πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης—like every other expression in this verse, is contested. Some translate, *by the Holy Spirit*; and some, *by a holy spirit*, i. e. divine and miraculous power. A third party construe πνεῦμα here, as designating the higher nature or condition of Christ, i. e. his *pneumatic* nature or condition, if I may so express it.

Schleusner, Flatt, Bengel, and others, find in ἀγιοσύνη a meaning designedly different from that of ἀγιότης or ἁγιασμός. Thus Bengel: "ἀγιότης sanctitas, ἁγιασμός sanctificatio, ἀγιοσύνη sanctimonia." But this seems to be imaginary; for even in Latin, sanctimonia and sanctitas differ only in form, not in sense. In Greek, as there is no difference between ἀγαθωσύνη and ἀγαθότης, so there appears to be none between ἀγιοσύνη and ἀγιότης. The Seventy use ἀγιοσύνη for עֲזָ, *strength*, in Ps. 96: 6 (95: 6); for עֲזָרָה in Ps. 97: 12 (96: 12); and for הִרְרָה in Ps. 145: 5 (144: 5). But as πνεῦμα, so often called πνεῦμα ἅγιον, is here joined with ἀγιοσύνης, I cannot doubt that the word ἀγιοσύνης is here employed in the place of the adjective ἅγιον, (like עֲזָרָה in הִרְרָה, i. e. *my holy mountain*). So the Gen. case of nouns is employed, in almost innumerable in-

stances. If we may conjecture a reason why the apostle here preferred *ἁγιοσύνης* to *ἅγιον*, we might say, that it was because he wished to avoid the dubious meaning which *ἅγιον* would seem to give to the passage, as the reader would more naturally refer this epithet to divine influence, or to the Holy Spirit.

But why should not one of the two first named senses of *ἁγιοσύνης* be adopted? I answer: Because there is *contra-distinction*, (not *antithesis* in the strict sense of the word, for it is *climax* here instead of *antithesis*), between *κατὰ σάρκα* and *κατὰ πνεῦμα*. Christ, *κατὰ σάρκα*, was a king of David's race; Christ, *κατὰ πνεῦμα*, was king in glory above, at the right hand of God. Such being the obvious meaning of the passage, I must reject the two first interpretations of *ἁγιοσύνης*, just mentioned. Those meanings are liable to serious objections; for if you say, that *κατὰ πνεῦμα* means *divine miraculous power*; then how, I ask, could this demonstrate that Christ was the Son of God, when he himself declares, that his disciples, after his death, shall do *greater* miracles than he had done? If you say that it means *the Holy Spirit*, as raising Christ from the dead (*ἐξ ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν*), then this is contrary to the analogy of the Scripture, which represents God the Father as raising up Christ from the dead, Rom. 6: 4. 8: 11. Acts 2: 24. 2 Cor. 13: 4. Besides, how could the being raised from the dead be proof, as Flatt intimates, of the divine nature of Christ, since Lazarus and many others had also been raised from the dead? But what is more than all, the evident *contra-distinction* between *κατὰ σάρκα* and *κατὰ πνεῦμα* is wholly laid aside, by either of those methods of interpretation; which of itself is adequate reason for rejecting them.

We come then to the third position, viz. that *πνεῦμα ἁγιοσύνης* designates Christ in his higher or *pneumatic* state or condition. But is this analogical? Is *πνεῦμα* elsewhere applied to Christ in the like way?

That *πνεῦμα* is applied directly to Christ, seems clear from 2 Cor. 3: 17, *ὁ κύριος [Χριστός] τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν* and in v. 18, *κυρίου πνεύματος*. The appellation *πνεῦμα* is probably applied to Christ here, as the bestower of *πνεῦμα*. Again, in Heb. 9: 14, Christ is said to have offered himself, in the heavenly temple, a spotless victim to God *διὰ πνεύματος αἰωνίου*, in his *everlasting pneumatic* or *glorified state*. This passage does not seem fairly susceptible of any other meaning, when one compares it with vs. 11, 12, which precede, and with the analogy of Scripture; *διά* here being *διά conditionis*.

In 1 Pet. 3: 18, the apostle speaking of Christ says, that he was

θανατωθεῖς μὲν σαρκί, ζωοποιηθεῖς δὲ πνεύματι where he apparently uses the very same *contra-distinction* which Paul makes use of in the verse before us. What can be the meaning of πνεῦμα, then, in such examples, if it be not the *pneumatic state* or *condition* or *nature* of the Saviour, i. e. his exalted and glorious state or nature? The word ζωοποιηθεῖς, as here used, seems not to indicate *restored to life*, (for in what sense can this be literally applied to the πνεῦμα of Christ, even if πνεῦμα mean nothing more than his human soul?) but *rendered happy, exalted to a state of glory*; comp. ch. 4: 1, where παθόντος is put for θανατωθεῖς in 3: 18, and is the antithesis of ζωοποιηθεῖς used in the sense just explained.

If I rightly comprehend the meaning of these expressions as applied to Christ, the sense of the whole clause on which I have been commenting, is: 'Of royal descent, even of David's lineage, as to his *incarnate state* (λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο); the Son of God clothed with supreme dominion, in his *pneumatic* i. e. exalted and glorified state.'

That both clauses, viz. that which describes his state κατὰ σάρκα, and that which describes his state κατὰ πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης, are designed to describe the *dignity* of the Saviour, seems altogether clear. Not *antithesis* then, but *climax* seems to be here intended. So, with Tholuck, I understand the passage; and I have interpreted it accordingly. I do not say that an ingenious critic can raise no difficulties with respect to this interpretation; but I cannot help thinking, that they are much less than attend any other method of exegesis which has yet been adopted.

Ἐξ ἀναστάσεως τῶν νεκρῶν is another contested phrase. Many have rendered ἐξ *by*. So Chrysostom; who deduces from our verse three proofs which were exhibited in order to shew the divine nature of Christ; viz. (1) Ἐν δυνάμει, i. e. the wonderful miracles which Christ wrought. (2) The gift of the Holy Spirit, κατὰ πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης. (3) The resurrection. The difficulty with his reasoning is, that in the same manner, prophets, apostles, and others, may be proved to be divine. There can indeed, be no doubt, that ἐκ (ἐξ) is, so far as this preposition is concerned, susceptible of such an interpretation. It is often used in the sense of *propter*, *ex*, and designates the *causa occasionalis*; e. g. John 4: 6, Jesus being wearied ἐκ τῆς ὁδοπορίας; Acts 28: 3. Rom. 5: 16. Rev. 8: 13; or it designates the *causa instrumentalis*, 1 Cor. 9: 14. 2 Cor. 7: 9. Rev. 3: 18. But, on the other hand, that ἐκ signifies *after*, *since*, in respect to time, is equally clear and certain; e. d. ἐκ κοιτίας μητρὸς, FROM

the time of one's birth; Matt. 19: 20, ἐκ νεότητος, FROM *early youth*; Luke 8: 27, ἐκ χρόνων ἰκανῶν, a *long time SINCE*; 23: 8. John 6: 64. 6: 66. 9: 1, 32. Acts 9: 33. 15: 21. 24: 10. Rev. 17: 11, ἐκ τῶν ἐπτά ἔστι, AFTER *the seven*; 2 Pet. 2: 8; comp. Sept. in Gen. 39: 10. Lev. 25: 50. Deut. 15: 20.—So in the classics; Arrian Exped. Alex. I. 26. 3. ἐκ νότων σκληρῶν, AFTER *vehement south winds*. III. 15. 13. V. 25. 3. Hist. Ind. 33. 5, ἐκ τοσῶνδε κακῶν, AFTER *so many evils*. Xenoph. Res Graecae, VI. ἐξ ἀρίστου, AFTER *dinner*. No doubt can be left, then, that ἐξ ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν may be rendered, AFTER *the resurrection from the dead*, or SINCE *his resurrection*, etc. So Luther, SINT *der Zeit er auferstanden ist*, SINCE *the time when he arose*.

Ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν, moreover, is one of those combinations of the Gen. case with a preceding noun, which express great latitude of construction. Here it is equivalent to ἀναστάσεως ἐκ νεκρῶν. Both phrases, viz. ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν and ἀνάστασις ἐκ νεκρῶν, are used by the New Testament writers; e. g. the first, in Matt. 22: 31. Acts 17: 32. 24: 21. 26: 23; and Paul limits himself to this same phraseology, e. g. 1 Cor. 15: 12, 13, 21, 42. Heb. 6: 2; the second, in Luke 20: 35. Acts 4: 2. I can perceive no difference whatever in their meaning. In regard to the latitude in which the Genitive is employed, in order to designate relations which might otherwise be expressed by a preposition, see Winer's N. Test. Gramm. § 30. ed. 3d.

The apostle having given his views respecting the dignity of Christ both κατὰ σάρκα and κατὰ πνεῦμα, (for distinction's sake I include his declaration in a parenthesis, in my version of the passage), he now resumes the theme mentioned at the beginning of v. 3, viz. τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, by adding the other usual appellatives of honour and office given to the Son; which are, Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν. Κύριος is a word of deep interest to Christians. Applied to Christ it properly denotes him as supreme Ruler or Lord, specially of his church. Matthew and Mark do not apply this title absolutely to Christ, except after his resurrection, Matt. 28: 6. Mark 16: 19, 20. But Luke, John, and Paul, apply it to him every where and often. With Paul the application seems to be in a manner exclusive. God the Father, or God absolutely considered, is named κύριος about thirty times, in the Old Testament passages which Paul cites; but elsewhere, with the exception of some four or five instances, Paul gives to Christ *exclusively* the title of κύριος or ὁ κύριος, in more than *two hundred and fifteen* instances; see Bib. Repos. I. 733, seq. The *article* makes

no difference in the meaning, inasmuch as the word is a kind of proper name by usage, is employed in like manner as one, and may therefore take or omit the article at the pleasure of the writer. See the Essay on the meaning of the word *κύριος*, in the *Bibl. Repos.* as above.

(5) *Δι' οὗ . . . ἀποστολήν*, by whom we have received grace and the office of an apostle. Chrysostom, Grotius, and others interpret this as though it meant *χάριον τῆς ἀποστολῆς*, the favour or privilege of the apostolic office; i. e. they construe the last words as a Hendiadys. Augustine, as quoted by Tholuck, seems to have hit the real meaning: "*Gratiam cum omnibus fidelibus accepit—apostolatum, non cum omnibus.*" I prefer to separate the meaning of the words. As to *χάρις*, comp. 1 Tim. 1: 12—14. As to *ἀποστολή*, comp. Acts 9: 15. 13: 2. 22: 21.

Εἰς ὑπακοήν πίστεως, on account of the obedience of faith. *Εἰς*, followed by an Acc., in almost innumerable instances designates the object or end for which any thing is, or is done. The idea here is, that the office of an apostle had been given to Paul, 'in order that (*εἰς*) he should further or promote obedience to the faith,' i. e. to the gospel; or (as we may construe *πίστεως*) *the obedience of faith*, viz. that which springs from *subjective* or *internal* faith. I prefer this latter sense, as being on the whole the most energetic.

Ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἔθνεσι, among all nations; see Bretschn. *Lex. ἔν.* No. 7, 2d edit. "*Ἐθνεσι* may be rendered *Gentiles* here, inasmuch as Paul was "the apostle of the Gentiles;" but the expression seems to be more general. He means to say, that he received the office of an apostle, in order that the gospel might be preached to all nations, to Gentiles as well as to Jews.

Ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ, for his name's sake, which means, *on his account*. But with what is this to be joined? Does the apostle mean to say, that he had received *χάριον καὶ ἀποστολήν* on his [Christ's] account; or does he join the latter expression with *εἰς ὑπακοήν πίστεως*, and thus designate the following sentiment, viz. that 'obedience springing from Christian faith may be promoted among all nations, so that Christ may be glorified?' In this latter way I should prefer to interpret it; and so Tholuck has done in his *Commentary*, as also Castalio and others.

(6) *Ἐν οἷς ἐστε καὶ ὑμεῖς*, among which [nations] are ye [Romans]. The writer means to say: 'Among those nations are ye, who have been won over to obey the Christian faith.' So the sequel:

κλητοὶ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, *the called of Jesus Christ*, i. e. the called who belong to Christ. Κλητός (see on the word under v. 1) means, by the usage of Paul, not only those to whom the *external* call of the gospel has been addressed, but those who have also been *internally* called; in other words, it designates *effectual calling*. My reason for supposing *Ἰ. Χριστοῦ* here to be a Genitive which designates *belonging to*, rather than a *Genitivus agentis* (in which case it would signify *of or by Christ*), is, that the usual idiom ascribes *the calling* of sinners to Christ as effected by the agency of the Father, or of the Holy Spirit. Κλητοὶ Ἰ. Χριστοῦ, according to the interpretation now given, would mean 'Christians effectually called.'

(7) Πᾶσι . . . θεοῦ, *to all who are at Rome, beloved of God*; i. e. to all these λέγω, γράφω, I say what follows in the sequel, viz. Χάρις ὑμῖν, etc. I am inclined to think, that in saying ἐν Ῥώμῃ, the apostle meant to include not only the Christians who habitually dwelt there, but also Christians from abroad, more or less of whom must have frequented that great city. Such was the concourse of Greeks there in Juvenal's time, that he calls it *Graecam urbem*. Christian foreigners who were in the city, no doubt would attend worship with the church which belonged there; so that the apostle might well address the whole body of those who joined in Christian worship.

Κλητοῖς ἀγίοις, *chosen saints, or saints effectually called*. So most editions and commentaries unite these words, making κλητοῖς an adjective qualifying ἀγίοις and so I have translated them. This may be correct, inasmuch as the apostle had just before called them κλητοὶ Ἰ. Χριστοῦ. If this union of the two words was intended by him, they mean as much as to say, *called or chosen to be holy, or to be consecrated to God, to be devoted to him*. In the mean time, it is evident that the words may be pointed thus, κλητοῖς, ἀγίοις, *to those who are called, who are devoted to Christ*. The sense is substantially the same, whichever way we choose to interpret the words.

As to the appellations, ἀγαπητοῖς θεοῦ, κλητοῖς ἀγίοις, the reader may compare the terms of honour and affection given to God's ancient people; in Ex. 19: 6. Deut. 33: 3. 32: 19; see also 1 Pet. 2: 9. 1 Tim. 3: 15. Phil. 2: 15. 1 John 3: 1, 2, 10. 5: 1.

Χάρις ὑμῖν sc. ἔστω, *may grace be imparted to you!* Χάρις I understand as meaning every Christian grace and virtue, which the Spirit of God imparts to the followers of Christ; divine favour in the most extensive sense, but specially in the sense of *spiritual blessings*. — Εὐρίηνη, like the Heb. עֲוָרָה, *happiness of every kind, peace with*

God and man, and so a state of quiet and happiness. The same word (עֲבָדָה) is used, down to the present hour, among the oriental nations who speak the Shemitish languages, as an appropriate expression in their formulas of greeting, or of signifying good wishes.

Πατὴρ ἡμῶν, i. e. the Father of all Christians, of you and me. So Christ has taught his disciples, when they approach God in prayer, to say *πάτερ ἡμῶν*.—*Κυρίου*, see under v. 4.

It should be remarked here, that in this prayer or wish, Paul seems to take it for granted, that the blessings for which he asks, come as really and truly (not to say as much) from the *Lord Jesus Christ*, as from *God our Father*. To the one, then, he addresses his prayer, as well as to the other.

The reader, in looking back on what he has now read, will find the whole paragraph exceedingly characteristic of the manner in which Paul often writes. With regard to the parenthetic explanations or remarks in vs. 3, 4, (see the remarks on the course of thought in these verses, under v. 3), we have seen that they were occasioned by the association of ideas in the writer's mind, which were connected with the mention of *τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ*. So in respect to vs. 5 and 6 again; they were evidently suggested to the mind by *τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν* in v. 4. Having expressed the thoughts which *κυρίου* thus spontaneously suggested, the writer again resumes the direct address or salutation which he was making: *πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν κ.τ.λ.* The words necessarily connected in the paragraph stand thus: *περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ . . . Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν . . . πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν Ῥώμῃ κ. τ. λ.*; so that the whole *seven* verses make but one sentence, which is grammatically connected together. In this are *three* parentheses, if we count *ὁ προεπηγγέλατο διὰ τῶν προφητῶν αὐτοῦ ἐν γραφαῖς ἀγίας* as one; which we may do. This is an unusual number, even for Paul, in one sentence. Yet the characteristic of style developed by it is often to be seen, more or less, in the works of this distinguished apostle.

(8) The apostle now proceeds to the expression of his kind feelings and wishes toward the church at Rome, in order to prepare the way, as it was natural for him to do, to be the more kindly listened to by them. *Πρῶτον*, in the first place, first of all, viz. before I speak of other things. It does not here mean first in point of importance, but first in the order of time.—*Μέν* Bretschneider (Lex.) considers as here placed *absolutely*, i. e. without its usual corresponding *δέ*; for he says: “No *δεύτερον* follows,” i. e. no additional clause connected with

δέ. But in this I think he is mistaken. For the apostle, after two paragraphs in his usual manner, which begin with γάρ (illustrating and confirming first what he had said in v. 8, and then what he had said in v. 10), proceeds to the δεύτερον of his declarations in v. 13, viz. οὐ θέλω δὲ ὑμᾶς κ. τ. λ. That is, *first*, the apostle thanks God for their faith, etc.; and *secondly*, he is desirous to tell them how much he has longed to pay them a visit, etc.

Τῷ θεῷ μου, *my God*; the Christian religion which teaches us to say πάτερ ἡμῶν, allows us to say, θεός μου.—Διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, *per Christum, auxilio Christi, interventu Christi*, i. e. through, by, or in consequence of, what Christ has done or effected; in other words, *Deo gratias ago respectu vestrum omnium, ut Christo adjuvante fides vestra etc.* All that had been done among them to promote a true and saving belief, the apostle attributes to what Christ had caused or effected. But whether he means to designate what he had done for them by his sufferings and death, or by sending his Spirit, does not certainly appear. In either sense, the passage will convey a meaning both true and important.

Ἐπὶ πάντων ὑμῶν, *on account of you all*; not *for you* in this sense, viz. in your room or stead.—Πίστις ὑμῶν, *your Christian belief, your faith in the gospel*.—Ὁλοῦ τοῦ κόσμου, i. e. throughout the Roman empire. Κόσμος and οἰκουμένη are frequently used in a *limited* sense, like the עולם and עולם of the Hebrews. Nothing is more natural than to suppose, that the faith of the church at Rome might have been widely known or reported, in consequence of that great city being frequented by strangers from all parts of the empire.

(9) Μάρτυς γάρ . . . θεός, *for God is my witness. Gár explicantis et confirmantis*; i. e. the apostle unfolds and confirms, in the following sentence, the evidence of his strong sympathies with them, and of his gratitude to God on their account. The reason why he here makes the appeal to God seems to be, that he being a stranger in person to the church at Rome, they might otherwise think his expressions to be merely those of common civility.

Ὡς λατρεύω . . . αὐτοῦ, *whom I serve with my soul* [sincerely] *in the gospel of his Son.* Ἐν τῷ πνεύματι μου I understand as designating *sincerity*, i. e. *real, internal, spiritual devotedness*, in distinction from what is merely external or apparent. The apostle means to say, that he was sincerely and really devoted to the cause which he professed to love and to promote; comp. Phil. 3: 3. 2 Tim. 1: 3. Eph. 6: 6. Rom. 2: 28, 29.

Ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, by the preaching of the gospel which has respect to his Son, or by the preaching of the gospel of which his Son is the author, and which he taught me.—Ὡς ἀδιαλείπτως . . . ποιῶμαι, how unceasingly I make remembrance of you. This shews the intense zeal which the apostle cherished for the welfare of the Christian churches; for if he thus constantly interceded with God for the church at Rome, which he had never visited, we cannot suppose that he forgot other churches which he had been the instrument of establishing. How different a phase would the Christian church speedily assume, if all its ministers were now actuated with the same degree of zeal which Paul exhibited!

(10) Πάντοτε . . . δεόμενος, *always making supplication in my prayers*; which is confirming what he had said before, ἀδιαλείπτως μνησθῆναι ὑμῶν ποιῶμαι, and at the same time pointing out the manner in which he made this μνησθῆναι, viz. in his supplications before God.

Εἴπως . . . ὑμᾶς, [that] *at some time or other, if possible before long, I may (God willing) make a prosperous journey, and come to pay you a visit.* Εἴπως expresses a degree of uncertainty which hung over the future, in the writer's own mind, i. e. it means *perhaps, if possible*, if in some way, if by any means. Ἡδη, followed by the Future, means *mox, brevi, by and by, soon, before long*. Ποτέ, *aliquando, tandem, at last, at some time or other, at some future period*; (πότε, with the accent on the penult, means *when*). Both the words ἦδη and ποτέ, have often nearly the same meaning when connected with a future tense. They may be here rendered thus: ποτέ, *at last, at some time or other, or at some future period*; ἦδη, *mox, before long*; so in the version, where I have given to each word its own particular and appropriate meaning.

Εὐδοῦθῆσομαι means, *to make a pleasant or prosperous journey*. A journey to Rome, which the apostle so ardently longed to visit, would in itself of course have been a *pleasant* one.—Ἐν τῷ θελήματι τοῦ θεοῦ, i. e. *Deo volente*. Grotius renders the passage very happily: "Si forte Dei voluntas felicitatem mihi indulgeat ad vos veniendi."

(11) Γάρο, in this verse, precedes a sentence designed to illustrate and confirm the declaration which Paul had just made, viz. that he felt a deep interest for the church at Rome, and hoped yet to enjoy the pleasure of visiting them.—Ἰνα τι . . . πνευματικόν, *that I may impart to you some spiritual favour or gift*. Bengel, Michaelis, and

others, interpret χάρισμα πνευματικόν as meaning *miraculous gift*, such as the apostles sometimes imparted by the imposition of hands. Augustine understands by the same words, *the love of one's neighbour*, supposing that the Jewish Christians at Rome were deficient in this virtue. But in v. 12, the apostle expresses his expectation of receiving on his part a benefit like to that which he bestows on them; so that both of these methods of explanation seem to be fairly out of question. What he expected *from* them, was συμπαρακληθῆναι . . . διὰ τῆς ἐν ἀλλήλοις πίστεως: consequently this was what he expected to do *for* them, viz. to encourage, animate, and strengthen them in their Christian profession and virtues.

So the latter part of our verse: εἰς τὸ στηριχθῆναι ἡμᾶς, *that you may be confirmed*, viz. in the manner stated above. Nor does it follow, that the apostle viewed the church at Rome as weak in faith, because he says this; unless we say that he was himself weak in faith, because he expects the like advantage of confirmation from his intercourse with them. Faith that is strong, and Christian virtue that is conspicuous, are capable of becoming still more so; and therefore expressions of this nature are never applied amiss, even to Christians of the highest order. The apostle "did not as yet count himself to have attained" all that elevation of Christian character of which he was capable, and which it was his duty to attain; Phil. 3: 13, seq.

(12) Τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ, *that is, id est*, prefixed to an *epexegetis*, or an ἐπανόρθωσις (*correction*), as the Greeks named explanatory clauses of such a nature as that which now follows. The apostle, lest the meaning of the preceding declaration might be misconstrued, adds (in v. 12) the more full expression of his sentiment. He does not mean to assert, that the consequence of his visiting Rome would be merely their confirmation in the Christian faith, and so the advantage be all on their side; but he expects himself to be spiritually benefited by such a visit; and this he fully expresses in v. 12. The remark of Calvin on this passage is very striking and just: "See with what gentleness a pious soul will demean itself! It refuses not to seek confirmation even from mere beginners in knowledge. Nor does the apostle use any dissimulation here; for there is none so poor in the church of Christ, that he cannot make some addition of importance to our stores. We, unhappily, are hindered by pride from availing ourselves properly of such an advantage." How very different is the spirit and tenor of this remark from that of Erasmus, who calls the expression of the apostle, *pia vafrities et sancta adulatio!*

Συμπαρακληθῆναι . . . ἐμοῦ, *to be comforted among you by the mutual faith both of you and me.* Παρακληθῆναι, in Attic Greek, means *to call, to invite, to exhort.* But in Hellenistic Greek, it not only means *to exhort*, but specially to address one in such a way as to administer comfort, encouragement, hope, resolution, etc. I have rendered the word *comfort*, only because I cannot find any English word which will convey the full sense of the original.—'Εν, *among*; and so, oftentimes; see the lexicons.—'Εν ἀλλήλοις, placed between the article and its noun, is of course employed in the manner of an *adjective*, i. e. it means *mutual*.—Τμῶν τε καὶ ἐμοῦ is simply a repetition of the idea conveyed by ἐν ἀλλήλοις. This repetition denotes the strong desire which the apostle entertained, to be understood by the church at Rome as saying, that he expected good from them, as well as hoped that they might receive good from him.

(13) The apostle had already signified his desire to visit Rome, vs. 10, 11. But here he proceeds to shew how *definitely* and *frequently* he had cherished such a desire; which gives intensity to the whole representation.

Οὐ θέλω δὲ . . . ὑμῶν, *moreover I am desirous, brethren, to have you know, that I have often purposed to come to you.* Δέ in this passage I regard as corresponding to μέν in v. 8, and so making the τὸ δεύτερον or *apodosis* of the apostle's discourse. Οὐ θέλω ὑμῶν ἀγνοεῖν is the same in sense as θέλω ὑμῶν γινώσκειν; but the first form of expression (in a negative way), is what the Greeks called *λιότης*, i. e. a softer or milder form of expression than direct affirmation.

Πολλάκις προεθέμην, *I have often purposed.* How often, or for how long a time, we have no means of ascertaining. But one thing is clear from this, and many other like passages, viz. that the apostles were not *uniformly* and *always* guided in *all* their thoughts, desires, and purposes, by an infallible Spirit of inspiration. Had this been the case, how could Paul have *often* purposed that which never came to pass? Those who plead for such a *uniform* inspiration, may seem to be zealous for the honour of the apostles and founders of Christianity; but they do in fact cherish a mistaken zeal. For if we once admit, that the apostles were *uniformly* inspired in *all* which they purposed, said, or did; then we are constrained of course to admit, that men acting under the influence of inspiration, may purpose that which will never come to pass or be done; may say that which is hasty or incorrect, Acts 23: 3; or do that which the gospel disap-

proves, Gal. 2: 13, 14. But when this is once fully admitted, it makes nothing for the credit due to any man, to affirm that he is *inspired*; for what is that inspiration to be accounted of, which, even during its continuance, does not guard the subject of it from mistake or error? Consequently those who maintain the *uniform* inspiration of the apostles, and yet admit (as they are compelled to do) their errors in purpose, word, and action, do in effect obscure the glory of inspiration, by reducing inspired and uninspired men to the same level.

To my own mind nothing appears more certain, than that inspiration in any respect whatever, was not *abiding* and *uniform* with the apostles or any of the primitive Christians. To God's only and well beloved Son, and to him only, was it given to have the Spirit ἀμετροῶς or οὐ ἐκ μέτρον, John 3: 34. All others on whom was bestowed the precious gift of inspiration, enjoyed it only ἐκ μέτρον. The consequence of this was, that Jesus "knew no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth;" but all his followers, in so far as they were left without the special and miraculous guidance of the Spirit, committed more or less of error.

This view of the subject frees it from many and most formidable difficulties. It assigns to the Saviour the *pre-eminence* which is justly due. It accounts for the mistakes and errors of his apostles. At the same time, it does not detract, in the least degree, from the certainty and validity of the apostolic sayings and doings, when these ministers of the gospel were under the special influence of the Spirit of God.

Καὶ ἐκωλύθην . . . δεῦρο, *but have been hindered until now.*—Καί, *although* or *but*; Bretschn. Lex. καί III: "ex Hebraismo καί est particula adversativa, *sed, vero, at;*" of which he gives many examples. The well known power of ἦ to stand before a *disjunctive* clause, throws light on this usage, which, to say the least, is very unfrequent in classic Greek.

"ἵνα τινὰ . . . ἔθνησιν, *that I might have some fruit even among you, as also among other Gentiles*; i. e. that I might see my labours to promote the gospel crowned with success even at Rome, the capital of the world, as well as in all other places where I have preached.

(14) "Ἐλλησί τε . . . εἰμί, *I am indebted both to Greeks and Barbarians, to the learned and the ignorant*; i. e. ὀφειλέτης εἰμί εὐαγγελίσεσθαι, *I am under obligation to preach the gospel.* In classic usage, βάρβαροι means *all who spoke a language foreign to the Greek.* Of course, the Romans themselves, by this usage, would be named βάρβαροι: and so Philo constantly names them; and Plautus

himself calls the Latin language *barbara lingua*, and Italy *barbaria*. But here the question with the apostle is not in respect to language, but only in regard to circumstances and condition of knowledge. "Ἕλλησι, then, seems to be equivalent to σοφοῖς, and βαρβάροις to ἀνοήτοις. Considered in this way, "Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις mean *the polished and unpolished, or the learned and ignorant, or (to use the idiom of the present day) 'the civilized and the savage.'*

Σοφοῖς τε καὶ ἀνοήτοις should be regarded here as characterizing the *state of knowledge*, rather than the real attributes or faculties of men thus designated. *Learned and unlearned*, is the rendering *ad sensum*.

Tholuck finds much difficulty in the οὕτω of the clause which follows; and after discussing it at some length, comes to the conclusion, that the apostle has here "fallen out of his construction," inasmuch as the nature of his sentence requires that καθώς should be placed before "Ἕλλησι, in order to make out the comparison. But I do not feel this difficulty. Surely οὕτω or οὕτως often stands alone, without a preceding καθώς or ὡσπερ; as any one may see by opening a lexicon or concordance. Οὕτω is often employed in this way, in the sense of *similiter, simili modo, eodem modo, in the like way, in such a way, in a similar manner, in the same manner*. Thus in Matt. 5: 16. 7: 17. 18: 14. Mark 13: 29. 14: 59. Luke 14: 33, et saepe alibi. What hinders, now, that we should understand it, in the verse before us, in the same way? 'I am under obligation,' says the apostle, 'to preach the gospel [for εὐαγγελίσασθαι is implied in the first clause] to the learned and the unlearned.' What then? 'In the like manner (οὕτως), i. e. being under a similar obligation, or circumstances being thus (οὕτω ὀφειλέτης ὢν), I am ready (τὸ κατ' ἐμὲ πρόθυμον) to preach the gospel even to you who are at Rome.' If the reader does not think that the above references go so far as to give to οὕτω the sense here assigned it, viz. *matters being thus, or circumstances being thus or being in this condition*, he may turn to John 4: 6, where it is said: "Jesus being weary on account of his journeying, ἐκαθέζετο οὕτως ἐπὶ τῇ πηγῇ," *he sat down in this condition upon the well*, namely, in a state of weariness. All the attempts that I have seen, to give οὕτως any other sense here, seem to be in vain. Compare also Rev. 3: 16, "I would thou wert either cold or hot! Οὕτως, [i. e. the matter being thus, or since thou art neither cold nor hot, as the writer goes on to explain], I will spue thee out of my mouth." So in the text before us, οὕτω, 'the matter being thus, viz. it being

true that I am under obligation to preach to all classes of men, I am ready to preach at Rome;’ or, ‘since I am bound in duty to preach to all, *in accordance with this* (οὕτω) I am ready to preach the gospel at Rome.’ If καθὼς were placed before “Ἑλλησι, as Tholuck and others judge it should be, the sentiment would be thus: ‘In proportion to my obligation to preach to all men, is my readiness to preach at Rome;’ a sentiment which, although doubtless true, does not seem to me to be the one which the apostle means here to convey. It is more simple to understand him as saying: ‘Since I am bound to preach to all, in accordance with this obligation I am ready to preach even at Rome (καὶ ὑμῖν), formidable and difficult as the task may seem to be.’ Comp. 1 Cor. 9: 16.

Τὸ κατ’ ἐμὲ πρόθυμον, lit. [there is] *a readiness in respect to myself*, q. d. I am ready, the same as ἐγὼ πρόθυμον ἔχω. Or it may be interpreted in this way: ‘There is a readiness so far as it respects me,’ namely, to the extent of my ability, so far as it depends on me; meaning to intimate, that the actual disposal of the matter is to be wholly committed to God. As to τὸ πρόθυμον (an adjective of the neuter gender) being used for a *noun*, nothing is more common than for the Greeks to employ adjectives in this way.

Καὶ ὑμῖν has an emphasis in it, i. e. *even to you*, at Rome, the metropolis of the world. In other words: ‘I shun not to preach the gospel any where; to the most learned and critical, as well as to the most unlearned and unskilled in judging.’ Ἐν, *at*; and so often times before nouns of *place*.

(16) Οὐ γὰρ . . . Χριστοῦ, *for I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ*; which contains a reason or ground of his readiness to preach it, which he had just before asserted. He gloried in the gospel; in fact he gloried in nothing else. Although Christ crucified was “to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks foolishness,” he shunned not to preach it on this account, but was willing even in presence of the learned and the sophists at Rome, to proclaim the truth as it is in Jesus.

The reading τοῦ Χριστοῦ is marked by Knapp as wanting an adequate support, and is rejected by Griesbach. In respect to the sense of the passage, its insertion or rejection will make no important difference. If retained, τοῦ Χριστοῦ must be construed as *Genitivus objecti*, i. e. the gospel respecting Christ, or of which Christ is the object.

Here ends the first or salutatory part of the epistle. The remainder

of v. 16 (with vs. 17, 18) constitutes the leading subject or theme of the epistle; which the writer here as it were formally proposes, and which he then proceeds to confirm, illustrate, and fortify.

CHAP. I. 16—18.

These three verses contain four propositions, which lie at the basis of all that may be appropriately called the *gospel of Christ*. (1) To gospel truth is imparted a divine energy, in saving the souls of men. (2) Those only can be saved by it, who believe it and put their confidence in it. (3) The pardon of sin, or the justification which God will bestow only on sinners who believe in Christ, is revealed from heaven, and proposed to all men for their reception. (4) From the same source a revelation is made, that the unbelieving and ungodly will be the subjects of divine indignation and punishment. The apostle does not proceed formally and in order to illustrate and establish these propositions separately and successively; but now one part of these respective truths, and now another, comes into view as he proceeds, and the whole is fully developed by him in the course of the epistle.

Δύναμις γὰρ . . . πιστεύοντι, for it is the power of God, unto the salvation of every one who believes; i. e. it is made the efficacious instrument, by which God promotes or accomplishes the salvation of all believers. *Δύναμις θεοῦ* means, that by it God exerts his power; it is powerful through the energy which he imparts, and so it is called his power. It is mighty *εἰς σωτηρίαν*, to the salvation, i. e. to the accomplishment or attainment of salvation. *Εἰς* with the Accusative is, in a multitude of cases, used in the like manner.—*Παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι*, *Dativus commodi*; the gospel brings salvation to every believer, or it is the means of imparting it to him.

Ἰουδαίῳ . . . Ἑλληνι, to the Jew first, and then to the Greek, or and also to the Greek. In proclaiming the gospel, the primitive preachers of it themselves being Jews, were directed first to proclaim the offers of mercy through a Saviour to the Jews, wherever they went, and then to the Gentiles; which was the order usually followed, and to which the clause before us seems to advert. That the *πρῶτον* here merely relates to the *order* in which the gospel was proposed, and not to any substantial preference of the Jew over the Greek, the sequel of this epistle most abundantly shows. So Chrysostom: *τάξιώς ἐστι πρῶτον*, i. e. *πρῶτον* relates merely to *order*.

(17) *Δικαιοσύνη γὰρ θεοῦ*. The *γὰρ* is *γὰρ illustrantis*, as the lexicographers say. In the preceding verse the apostle has said, that the gospel is, through divine power accompanying it, an efficacious instrument of salvation *παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι*, to every believer. On

this last expression an emphasis is to be laid; inasmuch as the great object of Paul, in the epistle before us, is to shew that salvation is *gratuitously* bestowed on the *believer* in Christ, but never conferred in any case on the ground of merit. The design of v. 17 is to suggest, that *faith* or *belief* is the appointed means or condition of justification, i. e. of obtaining pardoning mercy with God; that the Old Testament Scriptures confirm this idea; and consequently, that salvation is granted to *believers*, and to them only: all which goes to illustrate and establish the affirmation in v. 16. It is in this way that *γάρο* connects the fine and delicate shades of thought and processes of reasoning, in the Greek language; a circumstance which has, unhappily for the criticism of the New Testament, been quite too much overlooked by the great body of interpreters.

Δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is a phrase among the most important which the New Testament contains, and fundamental in the right interpretation of the epistle before us. To obtain a definite and precise view of its meaning, we must betake ourselves, in the first place, to the verb *δικαιώω* for from the meanings which this verb conveys, come nearly all the shades of meaning that belong to *δικαιοσύνη* and *δικαιώσεις*, so often employed (especially the former) in the writings of Paul.

The Greek sense of the verb *δικαιώω*, differs in one respect from the corresponding Hebrew verb *קָדַשׁ*; for this (in Kal) means *to be just, to be innocent, to be upright*, and also *to justify one's self, to be justified*, thus having the sense of either a *neuter* or *passive* verb. In the active voice, *δικαιώω* in Greek has only an active sense, and is used in pretty exact correspondence with the forms *קָדַשׁ* and *הִקְדִּישׁ* (Piel and Hiphil) of the Hebrews, i. e. it means, *to declare just, to pronounce just, to justify*, i. e. to treat as just; consequently, as intimately connected with this, *to pardon, to acquit from accusation, to free from the consequences of sin or transgression, to set free from a deserved penalty*. This last class of meanings is the one in which Paul usually employs this word. As a *locus classicus* to vindicate this meaning, we may appeal to Rom. 8: 33, 'Who shall accuse the elect of God? It is God *ὁ δικαιῶν, who acquits them*,' viz. of all accusation, or *who liberates them* from the penal consequences of transgression. Exactly in the same way is it said, in Prov. 17: 15, 'He who *justifieth* (*מְקַדְּשֵׁי*) the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, even they both are an abomination to the Lord.' So in Ex. 23: 7, 'I will *not justify* (*לֹא אֶקְדֹּשׁ*) the wicked.' In the same manner Is. 5: 23 speaks: 'Who *justify* the wicked (*מְקַדְּשֵׁי הַרְשָׁעִים*) for a reward.' In these

and all such cases, the meaning of the word *justify* is altogether plain; viz. it signifies *to acquit, to free from the penal consequences of guilt, to pronounce just*, i. e. to absolve from punishment, it being directly the *opposite* of condemning or subjecting to the consequences of a penalty.

In this sense Paul very often employs the verb; e. g. Rom. 5: 1, *δικαιωθέντες, being freed from punishment, being acquitted, being pardoned, . . . εὐχόμενοι ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸν θεόν.* Rom. 5: 9, *δικαιωθέντες, being acquitted, pardoned . . . σωθησόμεθα δι' αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς*, which salvation is the opposite of being subjected to punishment, or of *not* being justified. In Gal. 2: 16, 17, *δικαιῶ* is four times employed in the sense of *absolved, acquitted, or treated as just*, i. e. freed from penalty and admitted to a state of reward. So Gal. 3: 8, 11. 3: 24. 5: 4. Tit. 3: 7. In Rom. 4: 5, *τὸν δικαιῶντα τὸν ἄσεβῆ* is plainly susceptible of no other than the above interpretation; for those who are ungodly, can never be made *innocent* in the strict and literal sense of this word, they can only be *treated as innocent*, i. e. absolved from the condemnation of the law, pardoned, delivered from the penalty threatened against sin. That the idea of *pardon, or remission of the penalty threatened by the divine law*, is the one substantially conveyed by *δικαιῶ* and *δικαιοσύνη*, as generally employed in the writings of Paul, is most evident from Rom. 4: 6, 7; where the blessedness of the man to whom the Lord imputes *δικαιοσύνη*, i. e. reckons, counts, treats as *δικαιος*, is thus described: "Blessed are they whose iniquities *are forgiven*, and whose sins *are covered*; blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputes not sin," i. e. whom he does not treat or punish as a sinner. This is a fundamental explanation of the whole subject, so far as the present class of meanings attached to *δικαιῶ* and *δικαιοσύνη*, is concerned.

In the same sense we have the word *δικαιῶ* in Rom. 3: 24, 26, 28, 30. 4: 2, et al. saepe. So Acts 13: 38, 39. Luke 18: 14. Comp. Sept. in Gen. 38: 26. Job 33: 32. Is. 43: 26.

The way is now open for an easy and intelligible explanation of the nouns, which stand intimately and etymologically connected with the verb *δικαιῶ*. These are three, viz. *δικαιοσύνη, δικαίωμα,* and *δικαίωσις*, all employed occasionally in the very same sense, viz. that of *justification*, i. e. acquittal, pardon, freeing from condemnation, accepting and treating as righteous. All three of these nouns are employed occasionally by the Seventy, in rendering the Hebrew word *צדקה*; which I mention merely to shew that the *usus loquendi* could employ

all of them in the same sense; e. g. *δικαιοσύνη* for *צדקה* in Prov. 16: 11. 17: 23. Is. 61: 8. Ezek. 18: 17, 19, 21, etc.; *δικαίωμα* for *צדקה*, Ex. 21: 1, 9, 31. 24: 3, et sæpissime; *δικαίωσις* for *צדקה*, Lev. 24: 22.

In like manner all three of these nouns are employed in Paul's epistles; e. g. *δικαίωμα* in the sense of *pardon, justification*, Rom. 5: 16, where it stands as the antithesis of *κατάκριμα*; *δικαίωσις* in Rom. 4: 25, where it plainly means *justification*; and so in Rom. 5: 18, where it is the antithesis of *κατάκριμα*.

But the word *δικαιοσύνη* is the *usual* one employed by Paul to designate gospel-justification, i. e. the pardoning of sin, and accepting and treating as righteous. So we find this word plainly employed, in Rom. 3: 21, 22 (comp. v. 24), 25, 26. 4: 11, 13. 5: 17, 21. 9: 30, 31. 10: 3, 4, 5, 6, 10. 2 Cor. 5: 21 (abstract for concrete). Phil. 3: 6, 9. Heb. 11: 7, et alibi sæpe.

With these facts before us, we now return to our text. *Δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* seems very plainly to have the same meaning that it has in Rom. 3: 21, and in the other passages just referred to in this epistle, viz. the *justification* or *pardoning mercy* bestowed on sinners who are under the curse of the divine law. In this sense it is allied to the Hebrew *חַסְדִּים*, which often means *kindness, benignity, favour, deliverance from evil*; e. g. Is. 45: 8, 24. 46: 13. 48: 18. 51: 6, 8. 54: 17. 56: 1, and often in the Psalms.

The reader must be careful to note, however, that the *simple idea of pardon*, unattended by any thing else, i. e. the mere deliverance from punishment, is not all which is comprised in the meaning of *δικαίωω* and *δικαιοσύνη*. The idea is more fully expressed by *accepting and treating as righteous*. Now when this is done by a benefactor, he does not stop with the simple remission of punishment, but he bestows happiness in the same manner as though the offender had been altogether obedient. As there are but two stations allotted for the human race, i. e. heaven or hell; so those who are delivered from the latter, must be advanced to the former.

All is now plain. *Δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* is the *justification which God bestows, or the justification of which God is the author*. *Θεοῦ* is the *Genitivus auctoris*; as in innumerable cases elsewhere. This is made altogether clear, by comparing Rom. 3: 21—24; and indeed the whole tenor of the discussion in the epistle to the Romans, seems imperiously to demand this sense.

We may now judge what we should think of the exegesis, which

explains *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, in this passage, as meaning *God's attribute of justice*. The *δικαιοσύνη* here in question, is that which is *εἰς σωτηρίαν παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι* but is God's *justice*, which must of course *pass sentence of condemnation* on all sinners, the attribute which is revealed in the gospel as *saving* them? Besides, the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* of v. 17, is in direct antithesis with the *ὀργή θεοῦ* of v. 18, which inflicts punishment; how then can the first mean simple justice, which must condemn offenders?

Chrysostom and Schœtgen explain *δικαιοσύνη* as meaning *goodness*. We have seen above, that *ἡ δικαιοσύνη* often has such a meaning. In a generic sense, this mode of interpreting would not be wide of the mark. The objection to it here is, that it is not so *specific* as *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* was by the writer designed to be.

Tholuck, after rejecting the two last named interpretations, proposes another which seems to me inadmissible. His exegesis is thus: "In the gospel, the way is made known of perfectly fulfilling the law, as God requires." But how would this place v. 17 in antithesis with v. 18? Such an antithesis is clearly designed by the writer. In v. 18 the sentiment is: 'The gospel discloses the punishment of all sin, viz. all which is persevered in. In v. 17, therefore, we have the sentiment, that the gospel reveals the way of escape from punishment, i. e. reveals pardon to the believer in Jesus.

Then why should we adopt a sense of *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* here, which must be dropped, for the most part, in the remainder of the epistle? At least, if it be retained, it makes the modes of expression so involved and contorted and difficult, that one knows not how to admit it. I do not deny that *δικαιοσύνη* sometimes means *righteousness*, in the sense of piety, or obedience to the divine law; but here, and in the like passages, it seems to me very plain, that it conveys the idea of *pardon*, of *accepting and treating as righteous*. So Flatt, and many other distinguished commentators.

That *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ . . . ἐκ πίστεως* had a direct reference, in the writer's mind, to liberation from punishment, and the obtaining of salvation, is perfectly clear from the quotation which he immediately makes from the Old Testament, in order to sanction the sentiment which he had uttered, viz. *δικαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται*, *he who is just*, i. e. he who is accepted or regarded as *δικαιος*, *shall obtain life*, i. e. shall be happy by faith (not by merit). Such then is the *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, that it bestows unmerited favour on perishing sinners; not on those who have fulfilled the law, (for who has done this?) but on those who believe in Jesus; comp. Rom. 4: 3—5.

Such a *δικαιοσύνη* is revealed *in* or *by* the gospel, *ἐν αὐτῷ ἀποκαλύπτεται* for *αὐτῷ* refers to τὸ εὐαγγέλιον in v. 16. The apostle does not mean to say, that nothing respecting such a faith was before revealed; for he appeals immediately to the Old Testament Scriptures, in order to confirm the sentiment which he had just uttered. But the gospel, in the first place, makes such a revelation one of its most prominent features; and therefore, secondly, justification by faith is revealed in it more fully and explicitly than it ever had been before. In the same way, life and immortality are said to be brought to light by the gospel, 2. Tim. 1: 10.

Ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, a controverted, and (by reason of its connection) very difficult phrase. The main question is, whether *ἐκ πίστεως* is to be joined with *δικαιοσύνη*, or whether it belongs in sense to *εἰς πίστιν*, so that *ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν* would make a kind of *climactic* expression, which would be equivalent to the following phrase, viz. 'from a lower to a higher degree of faith.' In this latter way Theophylact understood it; for he says, *οὐ γὰρ ἀρκεῖ τῷ πρώτῳ πιστεῦσαι, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς εἰσαγωγικῆς πίστεως δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἀναβαίνειν εἰς τὴν τελειότεραν πίστιν* i. e. 'our first belief is not sufficient, but we must ascend from our inceptive faith to a more perfect degree of it.' So Clemens Alex. (Strom. V. 1): *Κοινὴ πίστις καθάπερ θεμέλιος, καθὼς ὁ κύριος λέγει, ἡ πίστις σου σέσωκέ σε*, i. e. 'a common faith is as it were a foundation, as Christ said: Thy faith hath saved thee.' He then goes on to say, that 'a *τελεία πίστις* is one which can remove mountains; on which account the apostles themselves made this request: Lord, we believe, help thou our unbelief.'

Tholuck approves of this exegesis; and it is substantially the same as that which has been defended by Melancthon, Beza, Calov, Le Clerc, and many others. But three difficulties seem to lie in the way of admitting it; the first, that it does not appear at all to answer the exigency of the passage; the second, that the analogy of Paul's epistles is against it; the third, that the context is evidently repugnant to it.

(a) *The exigency of the passage.* The exegesis in question would make Paul's main *thesis* to be this: 'The justification which God bestows, (or, according to Tholuck, the fulfilling of the law), is revealed in the gospel, from a lower degree of faith to a higher,' i. e. (as I suppose is meant) it is so revealed as that men are required to advance from a lower degree of faith to a higher one. This would indeed be a most singular mode of expressing such a sentiment; one

of the last which the usual method of thinking and expression can well be supposed to devise. One might expect, if this idea is intended to be contained in the passage, that the writer would have said: *Δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀποκαλύπτεται ἵνα προβαίνωμεν* (or *προβῶμεν*) *ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν* or at least that some mode of expression like this would have been employed. But if the sense be not, that justification is so revealed by the gospel as that men are required to advance from a lower to a higher degree of faith, then, after all, *ἐκ πίστεως* must be joined in effect with *δικαιοσύνη*, and we must say: 'The justification which is *ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν*, is revealed, etc.' But to such a junction Tholuck objects, on account of the separation of *ἐκ πίστεως* from *δικαιοσύνη*. A word on this subject, in the sequel.

I have said that this sentiment does not fit the *exigency of the passage*; and my reason for saying this is, that it represents the apostle, not as proposing the grand theme of gratuitous justification (which is evidently the main subject of his epistle), but as proposing the *climactic* nature of the faith connected with justification, as his great topic. How can this well be imagined, by a considerate reader of his epistle?

(b) *It is against the analogy of homogeneous passages*; e. g. Rom. 3: 22, *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ διὰ πίστεως* (altogether of the same tenor as *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ . . . ἐκ πίστεως* in our verse); Rom. 3: 30, *ὅς δικαιοῦσει . . . ἐκ πίστεως, καὶ . . . διὰ πίστεως* Rom. 4: 11, *σφραγίδα τῆς δικαιοσύνης τῆς πίστεως* Rom. 4: 13, *διὰ δικαιοσύνης πίστεως* Rom. 5: 1, *δικαιωθέντες ἐκ πίστεως* Rom. 9: 30, *τὰ ἔθνη . . . κατέλαβε . . . δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ πίστεως* Rom. 9: 32, *ὅτι οὐκ [Ἰσραὴλ ἦν διώκων δικαιοσύνην] ἐκ πίστεως* Rom. 10: 6, *ἡ δὲ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνη* and so in the other epistles of Paul, e. g. Gal. 2 16, [*δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος*] *διὰ πίστεως* Gal. 3: 8, *ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοῦ τὰ ἔθνη ὁ θεός* Gal. 3: 11, *ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται* (a quotation); Gal. 3: 24, *ἵνα ἐκ πίστεως δικαιωθῶμεν* Gal. 5: 5, *ἐκ πίστεως ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης ἀπεκδεχόμεθα* Phil. 3: 9, *δικαιοσύνην . . . τὴν διὰ πίστεως* Heb. 11: 7, *τῆς κατὰ πίστιν δικαιοσύνης* et alibi sæpe. These are enough to show what Paul (I had almost said every where and always) presents to our view, in respect to the subject of justification. Can there be any good reason to apprehend, that in proposing the *theme* of his whole epistle, he should not propose the same *justification by faith* of which he afterwards so amply treats?

'But,' it is replied, 'how could Paul separate *ἐκ πίστεως* so far from *δικαιοσύνη*, if he meant that the former should qualify the lat-

ter? I answer, it was because *δικαιοσύνη*, as here employed, has already a noun in the Genitive (*θεοῦ*) connected with it. The writer could not say, *ἢ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, (which would, I believe, be without a parallel); nor was it apposite to say, *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ ἐκ πίστεως*, because the writer was hastening to say, that God's appointed method of justification *was revealed* in the gospel. When this idea, which was uppermost in his mind (because he had just said that *he was not ashamed of the gospel*), was fully announced, the writer proceeds immediately to specify more particularly the *δικαιοσύνη* in question. It is a *δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως* in accordance with which he has, in almost numberless examples, elsewhere made declarations.

The easiest and most direct solution is, to suppose *δικαιοσύνη* to be repeated here immediately before *ἐκ πίστεως*. The sentence would then run thus: *Δικαιοσύνη γὰρ θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀποκαλύπτεται, [δικαιοσύνη] ἐκ πίστεως κ.τ.λ.* In this way, *ἐκ πίστεως* is *epexegetical* merely of what precedes. The idea conveyed by *δικαιοσύνη* is resumed by the mind, and it is made still more definite by this adjunct.

(c) That this is the real sentiment and design of the apostle, seems quite clear from the context, i. e. from the quotation which he forthwith makes, in order to confirm what he had said, viz. *ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται*. Does not *δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως* clearly and unavoidably correspond with the *δικαιοσύνη . . . ἐκ πίστεως* which immediately precedes?

I merely add, that Flatt, Bengel, Hammond, and others, interpret the passage in the same way as I have done. The more I study the passage, the more difficulty I feel in construing it as meaning, *is revealed from faith to faith*. What can be the meaning of *is revealed from faith*? And if *ἐκ πίστεως* does not qualify *ἀποκαλύπτεται*, then it must qualify *δικαιοσύνη* in which case the meaning that I have given seems nearly certain.

In respect to the thing itself, viz. *justification by faith*, faith designates the *modus in quo*, or the *instrument by which*; not the *causa causans seu efficiens*, i. e. not either the meritorious or efficient cause or ground of forgiveness. Every where the apostle represents Christ as this cause. But faith (so to speak) is a *conditio sine qua non*; it is a taking hold of the blessings proffered by the gospel, although it is by no means the cause or ground of their being offered. If the readers of this epistle will keep in mind these simple and obvious truths,

it will save them much perplexity. *Justification by faith*, is an expression designed to point out *gratuitous justification* (Rom. 4: 16), in distinction from that which is by merit, i. e. by *deeds of law*, or entire obedience to the precepts of the law. The word *faith* used in this phrase, is designed to shew, that the justification which we are now considering can be conferred only on *believers*, and that it is to be distinguished from *δικαιοσύνη ἐξ ἔργων*, i. e. meritorious justification. It is not designed to shew that faith is, in any sense, the meritorious or procuring cause or ground of justification.

Εἰς πίστιν, in order to be believed, for belief. Such a use of the Acc. with *εἰς* is exceedingly frequent in Paul's epistles. It is equivalent to the Infinitive mode with the article before it; e. g. in v. 5 above, *εἰς ὑπακοήν* = *εἰς τὸ ὑπακουθῆναι* so in v. 16, *εἰς σωτηρίαν* = *εἰς τὸ σωθῆναι*, et sic al. saepe. The reason why the apostle adds *εἰς πίστιν* seems to be, because he had said, *εἰς σωτηρίαν παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι*. In accordance with this he here says, that *gratuitous justification* (*δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως*) is revealed, so that all, both Jews and Greeks (*Ἰουδαίῳ τε προῶτον καὶ Ἕλληνι*), may believe and be saved; i. e. they can be saved through belief, and in this way only.

If *ἐκ πίστεως* is to be attached to *ἀποκαλύπτεται*, I should think the sentiment must be, that the gospel is revealed by means of faith, i. e. by means of those who have faith in Christ, and in order to promote faith; thus making a kind of *paronomasia*, to which the writings of Paul are by no means a stranger. But I can not apprehend this to be the true sentiment.

Καθὼς γέγραπται, in accordance with what is written, agreeably to what is written, viz. in the Scriptures. The Talmudists very often appeal to Scripture in the like way, by the formulas *הַיְיָנוּ דְּבַרְהַב*, as it is written; *הַיְיָנוּ הַיְיָ דְּבַרְהַב*, according to that which is written; or *הַיְיָנוּ דְּבַרְהַב הַיְיָנוּ דְּבַרְהַב*, as the Scripture says. It is not necessary to suppose, in all cases of this nature, that the writer who makes such an appeal, regards the passage which he quotes as *prediction*. Plainly this is not always the case with the writers of the New Testament; as nearly all commentators now concede. Compare, for example, Acts 28: 25, seq. Rom. 8: 36. 9: 33. 10: 5. 11: 26. 14: 11, etc. Such being the case, it is not necessary that we should interpret the passage which follows (Hab. 2: 4), as having been originally designed to describe *gospel justification by faith*; for plainly the connection in which it stands does not admit of this *specific* meaning. But then it involves the

same *principle* as that for which the apostle is contending, viz. that 'the means of safety is confidence or trust in the divine declarations.' The prophet Habakkuk sees, in prophetic vision, "troublesome times" coming upon Judea; and he exclaims, צדיק בִּאֱמֻנָתוֹ יִחְיֶה, ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται, *the pious man shall be saved by his confidence or faith*, viz. in God. It was not, then, by relying on his own merit or desert, that safety could be had; it was to be obtained only in the way of believing and trusting the divine declarations. Now the very same *principle* of action was concerned in so doing at that time, which is concerned with the faith and salvation of the gospel. Of course the apostle might appeal to this declaration of Habakkuk, as serving to confirm the *principle* for which he contended.

Dr. Knapp and many others join ἐκ πίστεως with δίκαιος, and then translate the passage thus: *The just by faith, shall live*; i. e. he who possesses faith, shall be happy. The sentiment is true; but it does not comport, I apprehend, with the design of Habakkuk, who must have written בִּאֱמֻנָהּ if he intended this, and not (as he has done) בִּצְדִיקוֹתָיו.

If it be viewed as a simple illustration of a general principle, all difficulty about the quotation vanishes. As the Israelite, in the time of Habakkuk, was to be saved from evil by *faith* as an instrument; so Jew and Gentile are now to be saved *by faith* as an instrument. What real difficulty can there be, in such a comparison as this?

To the whole I subjoin the brief comment which J. A. Turretin has so strikingly given, in his *Prælectiones* on the epistle to the Romans: "Apostolus noster, ubi agit de justificatione et salute hominum, sæpe vocat *justitiam Dei* eam justificationis rationem quam Deus hominibus commonstrat, et cujus ope eos ad salutem ducit." Again: "*Justitia Dei* . . . est ipsamet hominis justificatio, seu modus quo potest justus haberi apud Deum, et salutis particeps fieri;"—a definition of which one may almost say: *Omne tulit punctum*.

Turretin has, indeed, construed ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν nearly as Tholuck has done. But the *usus loquendi* of Paul in such constructions is decidedly against him; e. g. Rom. 6: 19, 'Since ye have yielded your members as servants of impurity, καὶ τῇ ἀνομίᾳ εἰς ἀνομίαν, and to iniquity for the commission of wickedness, so should ye yield your members as servants τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ εἰς ἀγιασμόν, unto righteousness in order that ye may practice holiness;' 2 Cor. 2: 16, '[The gospel is] to some ὁσμὴ θανάτου εἰς θάνατον, and to others,

ὄσμη ζώης εἰς ζώην, *a savour of death to the causing of death, and a savour of life to the causing of life.* In these and all such cases, the Accusative with εἰς before it denotes the *end* or *object* to which the thing that had just been named tends. So must it be, then, in our text; the [δικαιοσύνη] ἐκ πίστεως is revealed or declared to the world εἰς πίστιν, i. e. in order that it may be received or believed.

(18) Ἀποκαλύπτεται γὰρ . . . ἀνθρώπων, *for the wrath of God from heaven, is revealed against all ungodliness and unrighteousness.* The γὰρ here seems to connect the verse with v. 16. The apostle first declares that he is not ashamed of the gospel of Christ; why? Because, (1) It reveals the way of pardon for sinners who believe in Christ. (2) It shews the fearful doom of those who remain in their sins, and refuse to believe. The gospel of Christ, therefore, on both these accounts, is a proper subject of the deepest interest with those who preach it, and who have indeed no reason to be ashamed of it as a trifling or indifferent matter, like some of the speculations of science falsely so called. In this view, vs. 17 and 18 both stand in a similar relation to v. 16, inasmuch as both constitute distinct parts of the illustration or confirmation of this verse; which the ἀποκαλύπτεται γὰρ in both plainly intimates. Flatt refers γὰρ in v. 18, to δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ in v. 17; but how can v. 18 be a reason or ground of the declaration in v. 17?

Ὁργὴ θεοῦ, literally *the wrath of God, divine indignation*, or (to use a softer phraseology) *God's displeasure*. That the phrase is *anthropopathic* (i. e. is used ἀνθρωποπαθῶς), will be doubted by no one who has just views of the divine Being. It is impossible to unite with the idea of complete perfection, the idea of anger in the sense in which we cherish that passion; for with us it is a source of misery as well as sin. To neither of these effects of anger can we properly suppose the divine Being to be exposed. His *anger*, then, can be only that feeling or affection in him, which moves him to look on sin with disapprobation, and to punish it when connected with impenitence. We must not, even in imagination, connect this in the remotest manner with *revenge*; which is only and always a *malignant* passion. But vengeance, even among men, is seldom sought for against those whom we know to be perfectly impotent, in respect to thwarting any of our designs and purposes. Now as all men, and all creation, can never endanger any one interest (if I may so speak) of the divine Being, or defeat a single purpose; so we cannot even imagine a motive for revenge, on ordinary grounds. Still less can we suppose the case to

be of this nature, when we reflect that God is infinite in wisdom, power, and *goodness*. This constrains us to understand such phrases as ὁργή θεοῦ, ἐκδίκησις θεοῦ, κ.τ.λ. as *anthropopathic*, i. e. as speaking of God after the manner of men. It would be quite as well (nay, much better), to say that when the Bible attributes *hands, eyes, arms*, etc. to God, the words which it employs should be literally understood, as to say that when it attributes *anger* and *vengeance* to him, it is to be literally understood. But if we so construe the Scriptures, in this latter case, we represent God as a malignant Being, and class him among the demons; whereas by attributing to him *hands, eyes*, etc., we only commit the sin of *anthropomorphism*.

The lexicons make ὁργή to signify *punishment*. By way of consequence, indeed, punishment is *implied*. But ὁργή θεοῦ is a more fearful phrase, understood in the sense of divine displeasure or indignation, and more pregnant with awful meaning if so rendered, than it is if we give to it simply the sense of *κόλασις*, as so many critics and lexicographers have done.

Ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ, another *locus vexatus*. Is it to be joined with θεοῦ or should we refer it back to ἀποκαλύπτεται, and construe it as implying the method in which the divine displeasure is made known? The latter way is the one which almost all commentators have chosen, although there is almost an endless diversity among them as to the meaning of ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ. E. g. (1) The *heavens* declare the glory of God, and so point men naturally to his worship, and by consequence warn them to forsake sin. (2) Storm, tempest, hail, thunder, lightning, etc., *from heaven*, declare the wrath of God against sin. (3) Christ will be revealed *from heaven*, at the last judgment, to punish sin; so Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Limborch, etc. (4) Judgments which come from God, who is in heaven, testify against sin; so Origen, Cyrill, Beza, Calvin, Bengel, etc. (5) In consequence of an appointment of heaven, the divine displeasure against sin is testified by conscience in every breast. (6) The displeasure of God against sin is revealed, through divine appointment, or by the arrangement of the supreme Being.

This last interpretation I think to be nearly right. But the *usus loquendi* (which seems unaccountably to have been overlooked here), enables us to be more explicit. In Heb. 12: 25 the apostle says: "If they escaped not who rejected τὸν ἐπὶ γῆς . . . χροματίζοντα, *him who on earth* [at mount Sinai] *warned them*, much more shall we not escape, if we reject τὸν ἀπ' οὐρανῶν [χροματίζοντα], *him* [who warn-

eth us] *from heaven*;" comp. Mark 1: 11, where a voice ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν says: "This is my beloved Son," etc. Now if such phraseology be compared with Matt. 5: 45, τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν τοῦ ἐν οὐρανοῖς 6: 1, πατὴρ . . . ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς 6: 9, πᾶτερ ἡμῶν ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, et al. sæpe, it would seem sufficiently plain, that *God coming from heaven* where he dwells, or *God belonging to heaven*, is intended to be designated by the phrase θεοῦ ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ. That ἀπό, in a multitude of cases, is put before a noun of *place*, in order to designate that one belongs to it, scarcely needs to be suggested; e. g. Matt. 2: 1. 4: 25. Mark 8: 11. Luke 21: 11. 2 Thess. 1: 7. John 1: 45. Acts 2: 5. 15: 19. 28: 21, et al. sæpe. The sentiment I take to be this: 'The God of heaven, i. e. God supreme, omnipotent, has revealed, in the gospel, his displeasure against sin, as well as his readiness to pardon believers.'

I cannot agree with those who refer ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ to the designation of a method of testifying displeasure against sin, which is foreign to the gospel, or at least not connected with it. The ἀποκαλύπτεται here, as well as in v. 17, seems evidently to refer to the *gospel* as mentioned in v. 16; and the connection of γὰρ in both cases in vs. 17, 18, renders this plainer and more imperious still.

I am aware that my exegesis of ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ differs from the more usual one; but I trust it will be seen, that the *usus loquendi* plainly contributes to support it.

Ἀσέβειαν, *impiety*, towards God, (from α privative and σέβομαι, *to worship*), and ἀδικίαν, *injustice*, *unrighteousness* toward men.

Τῶν τὴν . . . κατεχόντων, *who keep back or hinder the truth by iniquity*. So the verb κατέχη most naturally means; comp. Luke 4: 42. Philem. v. 13. 2 Thess. 2: 6, 7. It also means *to hold firmly*, *to grasp hold of*, *to take possession of and retain*, etc., as may be seen in the lexicons; but these meanings do not fit well here. Theophylact explains κατεχόντων by καλύπτειν, σκοτίζειν. The meaning seems to be: 'Who hinder the progress or obstruct the power of truth, in themselves or others.'

But of what truth? Ἀλήθεια cannot here mean the *gospel*; because the writer goes on immediately to say, that the light of nature sufficed to teach the heathen better than to restrain the ἀλήθεια in question. Ἀλήθεια is here, then, that truth which the light of nature taught, respecting *the eternal power and Godhead* of the Creator. When the apostle says in v. 18, τῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατεχόντων, in his own mind he singles out of the ἀνθρώπων (*all men*)

whom he had just mentioned, the heathen or Gentiles, whose vicious state he immediately proceeds to declare. This is the theme for the remainder of the first chapter.

Ἐν ἀδικίᾳ means *by iniquity*, *ἐν* standing before the *instrument*, as usual. To fill out v. 18 completely, the reader must supply, in his own mind, [ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἀσέβειαν καὶ ἀδικίαν] τῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν κ.τ.λ.

CHAP. I. 19—32.

The apostle, having intended in his own mind to designate the heathen or Gentiles, by mentioning those 'who hinder the truth through unrighteousness,' now proceeds to illustrate and confirm his charge against them. God, says he, has disclosed in the works of creation his eternal power and Godhead; and this so clearly, that they are without excuse for failing to recognize it, vs. 19, 20. And since they might have known him, but were ungrateful, and refused to glorify him, and darkened their minds by vain and foolish disputations; since they represented the eternal God to be like mortal man, and even like the brutes which perish; God gave them up to their own base and degrading lusts, who thus rendered to the creature the honour that was due to the Creator, vs. 21—25. Yea, he gave them up to the vile and unnatural passions which they cherished, vs. 26, 27; to a reprobate mind, and consequently to all the various sins which they practise, vs. 29, 30; and these they not only commit themselves, although they know them to be worthy of death, i. e. of condemnation on the part of the divine lawgiver, but they encourage others by their approbation to commit the like offences.

Such being the state of facts in regard to the heathen world, it follows, of course, that they *justly* lie under the condemning sentence of the divine law. It is not the object of the apostle, to prove that every individual heathen is guilty of each and all the sins which he enumerates; much less does he intend even to intimate that there are not other sins, besides those which he enumerates, of which the Gentiles are guilty. It is quite plain, that those which he does mention, are to be regarded merely in the light of a *specimen*. Nor will the charges which he here makes, prove that every individual of the Gentile world was, at the moment when he was writing, guilty of all the things preferred against the heathen. If we suppose that there might then have been some virtuous heathen, (a supposition apparently favoured by Rom. 2: 14), such must have abstained from the habitual practice of the vices named, and from others like them. But it suffices for the apostle's purpose, to shew that they once had been guilty of them; which of course was to shew their absolute need of salvation by a Redeemer, i. e. by gratuitous pardon procured through him. The case is the same here, as that which is presented in chap. 11. 11., where a charge of universal guilt is brought against the Jews. Certainly this was not designed to prove that there then existed no pious Jews, who were not liable to such charge in its full extent, at the moment when the apostle was writing. Enough that they had all, at some time or other, committed sin. Nay, it was of course true to *some* extent, even of the pious, at the time when Paul was writing, that they daily committed sin in some form or other; and the same was also true of pious Gentiles, if indeed there were any such. *All men*, then, were guilty before God; although all men might not practise the particular vices which the apostle named, when he was writing. It matters not, for his purpose, to prove this. All who could sin, had sinned, and did then sin, in some way or other; and this is now, and always has been true. Of course all have fallen under the condemnation of the divine law, and salva-

tion by the grace proffered in the gospel, is the only salvation which is possible for them.

The question *when* men *begin* to sin, it is not the object of the apostle here to discuss. Nor is it even the *degree* of their depravity, which it is his main design to illustrate and prove. The *universality* of it is the main point; and it is all which is essential to his argument. To this universality Paul admits of no exception; but then we are of course to understand this, of those who are capable of sinning. It is thus that we interpret in other cases. For example; when it is said: "He that believeth not, shall be damned," we interpret this of those who are capable of believing, and do not extend it beyond them. With the question, *when* individuals are capable of believing or of sinning, I repeat it, Paul does not here concern himself. Neither mere infancy, nor entire idiotism, is the object of his present consideration. He is plainly speaking of such, and only of such, as are capable of sinning; and these, one and all, he avers to be sinners, in a greater or less degree. Such being the fact, it follows, that as "the soul which sinneth must die," so, if there be any reprieve from this sentence, it must be obtained only by pardoning mercy through a Redeemer.

I add merely, that the clause *τῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατεχόντων*, properly belongs to that division of the discourse which we are now to examine; but the connection of it with the general proposition in the preceding part of v. 18, is made so intimate by the present grammatical structure, that I deemed it best not to disjoin them in the commentary.

(19) But how is it to be made out, that the heathen keep back the truth respecting the only living and true God, by their unrighteousness? I answer, by shewing that to all men is made, in the works of nature, a revelation so plain of the eternal power and Godhead of Jehovah, that nothing but a wilful and sinful perversion of the light which they enjoy, can lead them to deny this great truth. So the apostle: *Διότι . . . αὐτοῖς*, *because that which might be known concerning God, was manifest to them. Διότι* stands before a clause which assigns a reason, why the heathen *hinder the truth by iniquity*. The amount of the illustration which follows is, (1) That the truth was knowable. (2) That nothing but base and evil passions kept men from acknowledging and obeying it.

Τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, literally *the knowledge of God, or that concerning God which is knowable or known*. The neuter adjective is used for a noun, in accordance with a well-known and common Greek idiom. The meaning, *that which is knowable*, which is here assigned to *τὸ γνωστὸν*, is the best; and that *τὸ γνωστὸν* may be thus rendered, we can have no doubt, when we compare *τὸ νοητὸν intelligible*, *τὸ αἰσθητὸν quod perceptum sit*, *τὸ ἀόρατον quod non visum sit*, i. e. invisible, etc. Ernesti denies that *γνωστὸν* can be rendered, *that which is to be known*, or *that which is knowable* (N. Theol. Biblioth. X. 630); and this has been greatly contested among critics. Buttmann (Gramm. § 92. Anm. 3) seems to have decided this point, however, beyond any reasonable doubt. He says, indeed, that *verbals*

in -τός frequently correspond to the Latin participles in -tus; so πλεκτός *stricken*, στρεπτός *perverted*, ποιητός *made*, *factus*, etc. But "more commonly," he adds, "they have the sense of *possibility*, like the Latin adjectives in -ilis, or the German ones in -bar; as στρεπτός *versatilis*, ὁρατός *visibilis*, ἀκουστός *audibilis*." This appears more fully when ἐστὶ is joined with these adjectives or verbals; e. g. βιωτόν ἐστι, *one can live*, (*quasi* 'it is live-able'); τοῖς οὐκ ἐξιτόν ἐστι, *they cannot go out*, (*quasi* 'to them it is not go-able'). It is strange, indeed, that this should so long and so often have been called in question; especially as Plato frequently uses the very word under examination, in connection with δοξαστόν, e. g. τὸ γνωστόν καὶ τὸ δοξαστόν, *that which is knowable and that which is supposeable*, de Repub. Lib. v.

Τοῦ θεοῦ, *concerning God*, θεοῦ being *Genitivus objecti*, as grammarians say. For a correct and extended statement of the latitude of the Genitive, in regard to the many various relations which it expresses, see Winer's *Gramm. N. Test.* § 30, ed. 3. Examples in point are Matt. 13: 18, παραβολὴ τοῦ σπείροντος, *the parable concerning the sower*; 1 Cor. 1: 18, ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ σταυροῦ, *the declaration concerning the cross*. So λόγος τινός, *a report concerning any one*, Xen. *Cyrop.* vi. 3. 10. viii. 5. 28. *Comp.* Luke 6: 12. Rom. 13: 3. John 17: 2. Heb. 9: 8, et alibi.

Ἐν αὐτοῖς may be construed *among them*. So ἐν often means; e. g. Matt. 2: 6, ἐν τοῖς ἡγεμόσιν, *among the leaders*; Luke 1: 1, ἐν ἡμῖν, *among us*; Rom. 1: 6, ἐν οἷς, *among whom*; Rom. 11: 17. 1 Cor. 3: 18, etc. The sense would then be: 'What may be known [by the light of nature] concerning God, was manifest among them,' i. e. in the midst of them, or before their eyes. If any prefer, however, to render ἐν αὐτοῖς as they would the simple Dative αὐτοῖς, viz. *to them*, examples of such a use may be found; e. g. 1 Cor. 14: 11. Matt. 17: 22. Luke 23: 31. 12: 8, and perhaps Acts 4: 12. 1 Cor. 2: 6. 2 Cor. 4: 3. But the former method of construction is plainly the more certain and simple one. Tholuck prefers to render ἐν αὐτοῖς *in them*, and interprets it as referring to their *moral sense*, by which they may come to discern and judge of the evidences of divine power and Godhead. To me it seems, that the expression φανερόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς is clearly and fully explained by the very next clause, added by the writer for the sake of explanation, viz. ὁ θεὸς γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐφανερώσῃ. Here αὐτοῖς seems to be used plainly in the sense of ἐν αὐτοῖς in the preceding clause, i. e. in the sense of *to them* or *among them*.

The γὰρ in ὁ θεὸς γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐφανέρωσε is γὰρ *confirmantis*.

(20) Τὰ γὰρ . . . καὶ θειότης, may be regarded as a *parenthetic* explanation. The γὰρ here is also γὰρ *confirmantis vel illustrantis*, and has special relation to the clause or assertion immediately preceding, i. e. it stands before an assertion designed to illustrate and confirm this.

Τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ, for the invisible things of him, i. e. of God. Ἀόρατα means those attributes or qualities of the divine Being, which are not the subjects of physical notice, i. e. are not disclosed to any of our corporeal senses. Of course the expression refers to such attributes as belong to the nature of God, considered as a spirit.

Ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου, since the creation of the world, or since the world was created. That ἀπό may be rendered *since*, scarcely needs proof; e. g. ἀπὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, ἀπὸ τῆς ὥρας ἐκείνης, etc.; see Lex. in verbum. With equal propriety, so far as the *usus loquendi* is concerned, might it be rendered *by, by means of*, a sense which ἀπό very frequently has. But the reason why it should not be here rendered in this latter way, is, that ποιήμασι designates the means *by* which. By τὰ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ . . . καθορᾶται, the writer means to say, that *ever since* the world was created, the evidences of eternal power and Godhead have been visible; which indeed must be as true, as that they are now visible.

Τοῖς ποιήμασι, *by the things which are made*, i. e. by the natural creation. Ποιήμασι might be rendered *by his operations*, inasmuch as nouns ending in the neuter -μα not unfrequently have the same meaning as those which end in -σις: e. g. δικαίωμα, δικαιοσύνη, justification. If it were thus rendered, the sense would be, that the operations of God in the world of nature, continually bear testimony respecting him. This is not only true, but a truth scarcely less striking, as it now appears to us through the medium of astronomy, natural philosophy, and physiology, than that which is developed by *creative* power. Nevertheless, as the discoveries of modern science were unknown to the heathen, so it seems most congruous here to explain ποιήμασι by *things made, the natural creation*, which the heathen, in common with all others, were continually reminded of by their external senses.

The due result of serious notice is, that τὰ ἀόρατα τοῦ θεοῦ may be νοούμενα, *apprehended by the mind, understood*. Νοούμενα καθόραται means, *are distinctly seen, are intelligibly perceived*, i. e. they are so, or may be so, by the aid of the things which have been

made. In other words; God's *invisible* attributes, at least some of them, are made *visible*, i. e. made the object of clear and distinct apprehension, by reason of the natural creation. So the Psalmist: "The heavens declare the glory of God; the firmament sheweth forth the work of his hands. Day unto day uttereth speech, night unto night sheweth knowledge," Ps. 19: 1, 2.

But what are the *attributes of God* which are thus plainly discernible by his works? The answer is, ἡ τε αἰδῖος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θεϊότης, *both or even his eternal power and Godhead*. Δύναμις must here have special reference to the *creative power* of God; and this seems to be called αἰδῖος, because it must have been possessed antecedently to the creation of the world, or before time began. Still, although δημιουργία (*creative power*), as Theodoret says, is here specially meant, I apprehend that the sense of δύναμις is not restricted to this. He who had power to *create*, must of course be supposed to have power to wield and govern.

Θεϊότης is distinguished by Tholuck and others, from Θεότης· for they represent the latter as signifying *the Divinity* or *the divine Nature*, while the former is represented as meaning *the complexity of the divine attributes, the sum or substance of divine qualities*. I can not find any good ground, however, for such a distinction. Θεότης is the *abstract* derivate from θεός· and from this latter word is formed the *concrete* or *adjective* derivate θεῖος, *divine*. τὸ θεῖον of course means *divinity*; and from this comes another regular abstract noun, θεϊότης, with the same signification. So Passow: θεϊότης, Göttlichkeit, göttliche Natur, i. e. *divinity, divine nature*. He then adds: "In particular, divine greatness, power, excellence, eminence, etc.;" i. e. θεϊότης designates the *divinity*, with special reference to these qualities—the identical manner in which the word is employed in our text. The same lexicographer defines θεότης, *the Godhead, the divine Being, divine excellence*. In the same sense, viz. that of Godhead, Divinity, is τὸ θεῖον plainly used in Acts 17: 29. So θεϊότης in Wisd. 18: 9. So Clemens Alex. (Strom. V. 10), τὸ μὴ φθίρεισθαι, θεϊότητος μετέχειν ἐστὶ, *not to perish, is to be a partaker of Godhead or Divinity*.

If θεϊότης be interpreted here as a word designating "the sum of *all* the divine attributes," we must regard *natural theology* as equally extensive with that which is revealed, so far as the great doctrines respecting the Godhead are concerned. Did the apostle mean to assert this? I trust not. I must understand θεϊότης, then, as

designating *Divinity, divine Nature, divine excellence* or *supremacy*, i. e. such a station and condition and nature, as make the Being who holds and possesses them to be truly divine or God. *Eternal power* and *supremacy* or *exaltation* appear, then, to be those qualities or attributes of the divine Being, which the works of creation are said by the apostle to disclose. And when examined by the eye of philosophy and reason, the evidence appears to be of the very same nature which he has here designated. At all events, the heathen never have made out any very definite and explicit views of God as holy and hating sin; not to speak of other attributes, of which they have had quite imperfect and unsatisfactory views.

On this deeply interesting subject, viz. the disclosures of the natural world in respect to the Creator, Aristotle has said an exceedingly striking thing (*De Mundo*, c. 6), *πάση θνητῇ γίσει γερόμενος ἀθεώρητος, ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων θεωρεῖται ὁ θεός*, *God, who is invisible to every mortal being, is seen by his works*. Comp. also a striking passage of the like tenor, in *Wisd.* 13: 1—5.

Εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἀναπολογήτους, so that they are without excuse. *Εἰς τὸ*, followed by an *Inf.*, is often used in the same manner as *ὅστε* e. g. *Luke* 5: 17. *Rom.* 4: 18. 7: 4, 5. 12: 3. *Εἰς τὸ κ.τ.λ.* is joined in sense with *ὁ θεὸς γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐφανερώσε*, (the first clause in v. 20 being a parenthesis); i. e. 'God has exhibited, in his works, such evidences of his eternal power and Godhead, that those are without any excuse *who hinder the truth by reason of their iniquity.*' That the apostle means to characterize the heathen by all this, is clear from the sequel.

(21) *Διότι γινόντες τὸν θεόν*, because that having known God. The *διότι* here stands as co-ordinate with that in v. 19. Verses 19, 20 assign the *first* ground or proof of the assertion, that the heathen keep back the truth by unrighteousness; the substance of which is, that the truth is so plainly forced upon them by the works of creation, that they could not deny it, except on the ground of being influenced by sinful passions. Verse 21 gives the *second* ground of the assertion that the heathen keep back the truth, viz. that with all their opportunities to know and acknowledge the true God, they became corrupt, debased, and devoted to idolatry. On this second ground the apostle dwells, amplifying and confirming it in vs. 22—25.

Γινόντες here is employed in a sense that comports with the meaning of *τὸ γνωστόν* in v. 19, i. e. *having opportunity to know, being furnished with the means of knowing, having the knowledge of God plainly set before them.*

Οὐχ ὡς . . . ἠὐχαρίσθησαν, *they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful*; i. e. they paid him not the honour due to him as the Creator and Governor of all things, nor were they thankful for the blessings which he bestowed upon them.

Ἄλλ' ἐματαιώθησαν . . . αὐτῶν, *but indulged foolish imaginations or vain thoughts*. So we may render the passage, if we follow the more common meaning of *ματαιόω*, which not unfrequently corresponds to the Hebrew לְסַפֵּי, לְסַפֵּי, *insipide, stulte agere*. The Vulgate renders *ἐματαιώθησαν* by *evanuerant*, and Erasmus by *frustrati sunt*; and to the like purpose many critics have interpreted it. But the evident intention of the writer seems here to be, to describe a state of mind or feeling, not to express the result of it.—*Διαλογισμοῖς* may be translated *thoughts, reasonings, or disputations*; for the word has each of these senses. The first seems the most appropriate here, on account of the clause which immediately follows, and which shews that *the state of the interior man* is designed to be described. It should be noted, moreover, that *διαλογισμός*, as meaning *thought or imagination*, is commonly taken *in malam partem*, i. e. as designating *bad thoughts, evil imaginations*, e. g. Matt. 15: 19. Mark 7: 21. Is. 59: 7 (Sept.) 1 Cor. 3: 20.

If we construe the words before us in this way, the sense will be: 'They foolishly or inconsiderately indulged evil imaginations,' i. e. base and degrading views respecting the nature and attributes of God, and the honour due to him; as the sequel (vs. 22—25) shews, particularly v. 23.

But there is another sense of the expression before us, which I am strongly tempted to adopt. The Hebrew לְבַהֲלָה, *vanitas, ματαιότης, μάταια*, as is well known, is often employed to designate idols and idolatry. Hence *μάταια* is frequently employed by the Septuagint to designate idols; e. g. 2 K. 17: 15. Jer. 2: 5. 8: 19. Amos 2: 4. 1 K. 16: 13, etc. So also in the New Testament, Acts 14: 15. From this usage, as one might naturally conclude, the verb *ματαιόω* (which means literally *μὰ τὰ ιο ν facere vel fieri*) sometimes means *to be devoted to μάταια*, i. e. to idols; e. g. 2 K. 17: 15. Jer. 2: 5, *ἐματαιώθησαν, they became devoted to idolatry, or to vanities* (which is the same thing). The phrase in our verse is plainly susceptible of the like rendering, viz. *In their evil imaginations or by reason of their wicked devices, they became devoted to idolatry, or devoted to vanities* (which has the same meaning).

But on the whole, it is safer perhaps to regard the clause before

us as a kind of parallel with the one which follows; in which case, the first asserts that the heathen foolishly indulged in wicked devices, and the second, that in consequence of this, their inconsiderate minds became darkened. The clause under examination will then be of the like tenor with v. 22.

Καὶ ἐσκοτίσθη . . . καρδία, and their inconsiderate mind was darkened. Καρδία, like the Hebrew לֵב , very often means *animus, intellectus, the mind*; which latter is here plainly its meaning.— Ἀσύνετος means *stolidus, insipiens, or imprudens*, which latter word means, *wanting in consideration and foresight*. I hesitate between this meaning, and that of *stolidus* in the sense of the Hebrew לַבְיָא , i. e. *impious, wicked*. The καρδία which had foolishly indulged evil imaginations respecting God, may be truly characterized either as *inconsiderate*, or as *impious*. On the whole, the latter seems to convey rather the most energetic meaning; but the former accords better with the idea, that the second clause (now under examination) is parallel with the clause which precedes it.

It will be observed by the attentive reader, that the apostle here represents *the darkening of the mind* to be a consequence of the wicked imaginations which the heathen had indulged. Men had once a right knowledge of the true God; they all had opportunity to be acquainted with his true attributes. But in this condition, they chose foolishly to indulge in wicked devices and imaginations; and in consequence of this, they lost even what light they possessed, ἐσκοτίσθη ἡ ἀσύνετος αὐτῶν καρδία.

(22) Φάσκοντες . . . ἐμωράνθησαν, *professing themselves to be wise, they became fools*. The antithesis of the sentiment here is strong. The pretensions of many heathen philosophers to *wisdom*, is well known. From these sprung the names, φιλόσοφοι, φιλοσοφία, σοφοί, σοφισταί, etc. Φάσκω means *to declare, to affirm*; which, in the present case, means the same as to profess. So the Greeks used φάσκω e. g. οἱ φιλοσοφεῖν φάσκοντες, *those who profess to philosophize*. To the same purpose Cicero says: "Qui se sapientes esse profitentur," Quæstt. Tusc. I. 9.

(23) Καὶ ἠλλάξαν . . . ἐρπειῶν, and exchanged the glory of the immortal God, for an image like to mortal man, and fowls, and quadrupeds, and reptiles. Ἦν δοξαν τοῦ ἀθάνατου θεοῦ means, *the majesty and excellence of the eternal God, or the glorious and eternal God*. In ἠλλάξαν . . . ἐν ὁμοίωματι, the Dative with ἐν before it follows the verb. In such cases the usual construction is, to

put the simple Dative after the verb, i. e. the Dative of the noun designating the thing *for* which another is exchanged; e. g. Lev. 27: 10, οὐκ ἀλλάξει . . . καλὸν πονηροῦ. Ibid. ἀλλάξη . . . κτήνος κτήνει. Lev. 27: 33. Ex. 13: 13. The classic writers usually say, ἀλλάσσειν τί τινος, or τί ἀντί τινος, but sometimes ἀλλάσσειν τί τι. I find no construction like this in v. 23, except in Ps. 105: 20, where ἀλλάξαντο τῆν δόξαν αὐτοῦ ἐν ὁμοιώματι μύσχου occurs. Tholuck says that ἐν ὁμοιώματι stands for εἰς ὁμοίωμα, and he construes it here as meaning *the transmuting of one thing into another*, i. e. making out of one thing something different from it. But this is not the common use of ἀλλάσσω, in cases like ours; although the verb occasionally admits of this sense, (see v. 26 below, where, however, the Accusative with εἰς is employed). But usually it means, *to commute one thing for another*, (not to transmute one thing *into* another). Nor can it be the design of Paul to say, that the heathen changed the glorious and immortal God into an image of perishable man and animals, (for how could they do this?) but to say that they exchanged the former (as an object of worship) for the latter; which is the exact state of the case.

Such being the fact, both as to the sense of the passage, and the more usual construction of the verb ἀλλάσσω, I must regard ἐν ὁμοιώματι here as of the same import and design as the simple Dative would be, unattended with the preposition; of which examples are not wanting in the New Testament, and which Ps. 105: 20 confirms.

Ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνοσ is like the Hebrew מַצֵּבֹת תְּהִלָּה, *the resemblance of the image*, i. e. an image *resembling* or *like unto*. Φθαροῦ is designed as the antithesis of ἀφ θάοτου, and means *frail, perishable, mortal*.

Πετεινῶν κ.τ.λ. How extensively such idolatry as is here described, has been and still is practised among the heathen, is too well known to need any formal proof in the present case. Juvenal (Sat. xv.) has drawn an admirable picture of Egyptian superstitions. The following lines are sufficiently graphic:

“ Quis nescit . . . qualia demens
 Ægyptus portenta colat? Crocodilon adorat.
 Pars hæc; illa pavit saturam serpentibus Ibim.

Oppida tota canem venerantur, nemo Dianam.”

And after saying that they worshipped various productions of the earth, and even culinary vegetables, he exclaims:

“ O sanctas gentes, quibus hæc nascuntur in hortis
 Numina!”

Comp. Ps. cxv. 135: 15, seq. Is. 44: 9—17, where is a most vivid description, in some of its traits not unlike to the hints in Horace, Lib. I. Sat. 8.

(24) Such was the impiety and folly of the heathen. Even their philosophers and learned men could not be exempted from a part of the charges here brought against the Gentiles. On account of such sins, God even gave them up to their own lusts; *διὸ καὶ παρέδωκεν . . . ἀκαθαρσίαν, wherefore God even gave them up, in the lusts of their hearts, to impurity*; i. e. God gave them over to the pursuit of their lusts, and to the dreadful consequences which follow such a course, because they were so desperately bent upon the pursuit of these objects, and would hearken to none of the instructions which the book of nature communicated. The imputation is, that in apostatizing from the true God, and betaking themselves to the worship of idols, they had, at the same time, become the devoted slaves of lust; which indeed seems here also, by implication, to be assigned as the reason or ground of their apostasy. Every one knows, moreover, that among almost all the various forms of heathenism, impurity has been either a direct or indirect service in its pretended religious duties. Witness the shocking law among the Babylonians, that every woman should prostitute herself, at least once, before the shrine of their Venus. It is needless to say, that the worshippers of Venus in Greece and Rome, practised such rites; or that the *mysterics* of heathenism, of which Paul says, "it is a shame even to speak," allowed a still greater latitude of indulgence. Nor is it necessary to describe the obscene and bloody rites practised in Hindoostan, in the South Sea and the Sandwich Islands, and generally among the heathen. Polytheism and idolatry have nearly always been a religion of obscenity and blood. This the apostle plainly intimates; for after saying that men had substituted idols for the only living and true God, he immediately subjoins: 'Wherefore God gave up them to pursue their lusts, who were so eager in pursuit of them.' This of course is taking it for granted, that in plunging into polytheism and idolatry, they had at the same time plunged deep into the mire of impurity. How well such a representation accords with fact, the history of heathenism will testify most abundantly. It lies on the face of almost every page, written in characters 'which he who runneth may read.'

Παρέδωκε, gave up, gave over, i. e. left them to pursue their own desires, without checking them by such restraints as he usually imposes on those who are not hardened and obstinate offenders. It

seems here neither to denote an active 'plunging into sin,' on the one hand; nor a 'mere inactive letting alone,' on the other; but a withholding, by way of just retribution for their offences, such restraints as I have just described.

'*Ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις*, in their lusts, i. e. God gave up them, [being] in their lusts, εἰς ἀκαθαρσίαν κ. τ. λ. But most critics construe ἔν here as meaning *by* in the sense of *on account of*, *by means of*. The sense is good, indeed, when rendered in this way, and the *usus loquendi* above exception; see Bretschn. Lex. ἔν. No. 6. ed. 2nd. But I prefer to render it in the following way, viz. *God gave up them* [ὄντες being] *in their lusts*, etc., i. e. them who were filled with lust, he gave up to the pursuit of it, he abandoned them to the perverse desires of their own hearts and to the consequences which would follow. In this way ἔν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῶν καρδιῶν becomes equivalent to an adjective qualifying αὐτούς. Of a usage like this in respect to the Dative with ἔν before it, the New Testament affords most ample proofs; e. g. Luke 4: 32, ἔν ἐξουσίᾳ ἣν ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ, *his word was powerful*; Rev. 1: 10, ἐγενόμην ἐν πνεύματι, *I was inspired*; John 16: 25, ἐν παροιμίαις λαλεῖν, *to speak parabolically*; John 5: 5, ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ ἔχων, *being weak*; Rom. 16: 7, οἱ γεγόνασιν ἐν Χριστῷ, *who became Christians*; and thus very often, as may be seen in Bretschn. Lex. ἔν. No. 5. 'Ἐν employed in this way, may be called ἔν conditionis, inasmuch as the noun before which it stands, serves to designate *condition, habitude, relation*. 'Ἐν thus employed agrees with the so called π predicate of the Hebrews, i. e. π prefixed to a noun which is employed in the sense of an adjective.

Εἰς ἀκαθαρσίαν, *to the practice of impurity*, where εἰς before the Accusative denotes, as usual, *the object for which* any thing is or is done. The sense is the same as εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν τὴν ἀκαθαρσίαν.

Τοῦ ἀτιμάζεσθαι . . . ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, *to dishonour their own bodies among themselves, or mutually to dishonour their own bodies*. Τοῦ ἀτιμάζεσθαι is constructed after παρέδωκε implied. This kind of Infinitive (viz. the Infinitive with τοῦ before it), has, until recently, been reckoned an imitation of the Hebrew Infinitive with הֵ. But Winer (N. Test. Gramm. § 45. 4, ed. 3d) has shown abundantly that it is no Hebraism, but is very common in the Greek classics. The older critics used to solve this form of the Infinitive (where τοῦ intimates *design, object, end*), by supplying ἕνεκα or χάριν before it. Winer constructs τοῦ ἀτιμάζεσθαι, in the present case, by making it the

Genitive after ἀκαθαρσίαν. I prefer the other method, which makes the clause *epexegetical*.

In respect to the *fact of dishonouring their own bodies*, i. e. subjecting themselves to base and degrading lusts, we shall see more in the sequel.

Ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, *among themselves*. For this frequent sense of ἐν, see Bretschn. Lex. ἐν. 1. 6.

(25) A repetition of the idea contained in v. 23— καὶ ἥλλαξαν κ. τ. λ., but with some additions. Οἵτινες μετήλλαξαν . . . ψεύδει, *who exchanged the true God for a false one*. Ἀλήθειαν τοῦ θεοῦ = τὸν ἀληθινὸν θεόν. More usually it is the *latter* of two nouns which is employed as an adjective in order to qualify the former: but sometimes the first noun performs the office of an adjective; compare Heb. Gramm. § 440. b. Both ἀλήθειαν and ψεύδει are examples of the *abstract* for the *concrete*; ψεύδει corresponding to the Hebrew בִּצְרָף, נִיֶּזֶץ, רִצְצֵץ, which are so often employed to designate idols. In regard to μετήλλαξαν . . . ἐν τῷ ψεύδει, see on ἥλλαξαν . . . ἐν ὁμοιωμάτι in v. 23.

Καὶ ἐσεβάσθησαν . . . κτίσαντα, *and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator*. Σεβάζομαι signifies *to venerate, to worship*, and designates the state of mind in the worshipper. The aorists passive often have the sense of the Middle voice, and so, therefore, not unfrequently have an active sense, as here. Λατρῆνω designates either internal worship (see v. 9 above), or external. Here, as it is joined with σεβάζομαι, it more naturally designates the *external* rites of the heathen religion.—Τῇ κτίσει, *the creature, created things*; see the close of v. 23.—Παρά, *more than, above*; compare Luke 3: 13. Heb. 1: 4. 3: 3. 9: 23. 11: 4, etc.; and see Bretschn. Lex. παρά III. 2. e.

Ὁς ἐστίν . . . ἀμήν, *who is blessed forever, Amen*. Doxologies of this nature are not unusual in the writings of Paul; see Gal. 1: 5. Rom. 9: 5. 2 Cor. 11: 31. The Jewish Rabbies, from time immemorial, have been accustomed to add a doxology of the like nature, whenever they had occasion to utter any thing which might seem reproachful to God. The Mohammedans have borrowed this custom from them, and practise it to a great extent. Tholuck mentions an Arabic manuscript in the library at Berlin, which contains an account of heresies in respect to Islamism; and so often as the writer has occasion to name a new heretical sect, he immediately adds: 'God be exalted above all which they say!'—Εὐλογητός means, *worthy of praise, deserving to be extolled*.

Ἀμήν, the usual response of the Hebrew solemn assemblies to the words or precepts of the law, when read; see Deut. 27: 15—26. The Hebrew אָמֵן means, *verum, certum, ratum sit*, i. e. *ita sit*; which is the usual sense of *ἀμήν* in the New Testament, as in Rom. 9: 5. 11: 36. Gal. 1: 5. Eph. 3: 21, et al. sæpe. As to the custom of public religious assemblies in respect to using this word, see 1 Cor. 14: 16. It is to be understood as the solemn expression of assent to what has been said, and approbation of it, on the part of those who use it.

(26) As v. 25 is a repetition and amplification of the sentiment in v. 23; so vs. 26, 27, are a repetition and amplification of the sentiment in v. 24. There is the same connection in both cases; e. g. after asserting the idolatry of the heathen in v. 25, the apostle proceeds (as in v. 24) to say: *Διὰ τοῦτο κ. τ. λ.*, i. e. because they became idolaters and polytheists, God gave them up to the vile passions which they indulged in this species of worship.—*Διὰ τοῦτο . . . ἀτιμίας*, on account of this [their idolatry], God gave them up to base passions. For the sense of *παρέδωκεν ὁ θεός*, see v. 24.—*Πάθη ἀτιμίας*, base passions, where *ἀτιμίας* (the latter of two nouns in regimen) holds the place of an adjective, agreeably to common usage; see the remarks on v. 25.

Αἱ τε γὰρ . . . γυναῖκες, for their women exchanged their natural usage, into that which is unnatural or against nature. *Παρά* frequently has the sense here assigned; as may be seen in the lexicons. *Τὴν φυσικὴν χρῆσιν* means *usus venereus*. But whether the apostle refers here to the Greek *τριβάδες* or *ἐταιρίστριαι*, or to those who were guilty of prostituting themselves in the vile and unnatural manner mentioned in v. 27, it would be difficult to determine, and is unnecessary. Those who wish to trace evidences of the facts alluded to, may consult Seneca, Ep. 95. Martial. Epigr. I. 90. Athenæus, Deipnos. 13. p. 605. Tholuck on the State of the heathen World, in Neander's *Denkwürdigkeiten*, I. p. 143 seq., and in the *Biblical Repository*, vol. II.

(27) *Ὁμοίως τε καὶ . . . ἀλλήλοις*, in like manner, also, the males, leaving the natural use of the female, burned in their lust toward each other. Literally *ὁμοίως τε καὶ* may be rendered, *moreover in like manner too*. *Τέ καὶ* is often employed in enumerating particulars, in order to designate an intimate connection between them. This it signifies in a more emphatic manner than *καὶ* simply; and in this respect, the Greek *τέ* answers well to the Lat. *que*. *Τέ* is employed rather to annex clauses than words, and in this respect differs

from καί at the same time τέ is more commonly connected only with clauses which are not necessary to complete the sentence in itself, but are exegetical, i. e. serve for confirmation, illustration, amplification, etc.

The evidences of the fact here stated by the apostle, are too numerous and prominent among the heathen writers, to need even a reference to them. Virgil himself, the *chaste* Virgil, as he has been often called, has a *Corydon amabat Alexin*, without seeming to feel the necessity of a blush for it. Such a fact sets the whole matter in open day. That at Athens and Rome παιδεραστία was a very common and habitual thing, needs no proof to one who has read the Greek and Latin classics, especially the amatory poets, to any considerable extent. Plutarch tells us that Solon practised it; and Diogenes Laertius says the same of the Stoic Zeno. Need we be surprised, then, if the same horrible vice was frequent in the more barbarous parts of Greece and of the Roman empire? Would God that nations called Christian were not reproachable with it; and that the great cities of the old world (possibly of the new also), did not exhibit examples of it, almost as flagrant as those of Greece and Rome!

Ἄρσενες . . . κατεργαζόμενοι, *males with males doing that which is shameful.* A further description of what the writer means, so as to leave no doubt about the design of the preceding affirmation.

Καὶ τὴν . . . ἀπολαμβάνοντες, *and receiving in themselves the reward which is due to their error.* The apostle doubtless means, here, the evil consequences both physical and moral, which followed the practices on which he is animadverting. In respect to the first, their bodies were weakened, their health impaired, and premature old age came on both in a mental and physical respect. With regard to the second, what else could be expected from those who sunk themselves far below the brute creation, but that their moral sense would be degraded, their conscience "seared with a hot iron," and all the finer feelings and delicate sensibilities of life utterly extinguished? No example in the whole brute creation can be produced, which resembles the degradation of the παιδερασταί and it follows, by an immutable law of a sin-hating God which is impressed on the very nature of all moral beings, that degradation and shame should result from the gratification of viler than beastly appetites. The despots, princes, and rich men of the East, who practise polygamy and keep extensive harems, are usually *superannuated* by the time they are *forty* years of age; how much more might this be naturally expected, as to the offenders mentioned in the verse under examination?

(28) Καὶ καθὼς . . . ἐν ἐπιγνώσει, and *inasmuch as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge*. Δοκιμάζω usually means *to try, prove, examine*, etc. But a secondary sense of the word is, *to approve, to choose*; like to δόκιμος, *approved, acceptable, agreeable*, etc. The apostle means here to say, that the heathen voluntarily rejected the knowledge of the true God, which, to a certain and important extent, they might have gathered from the book of nature so widely spread open before them.—Ἐχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει is altogether equivalent to ἐπιγνώσκουσιν.

Παρέδωκεν . . . νοῦν, *God gave them up to a reprobate mind*. See on v. 24 for παρέδωκεν.—Ἄδόκιμος is the negative or antithesis of δόκιμος and therefore means *reprobate, that which is to be rejected, unapproved*. Beza has rendered this adjective as though it had a neuter active sense, *a mind incapable of judging*. But the *usus loquendi* will not bear this; although adjectives in -ιμος sometimes have an active sense; see Butt. ausführl. Sprachl. 2 Abth. p. 341. The meaning here of ἄδόκιμον νοῦν is, *wicked or vile mind*, which is deserving of condemnation or execration.

Ποιεῖν τὰ μὴ καθήκοντα, *to do those things which are disgraceful*; i. e. which are indecorous, shameful. God, in his righteous judgment, abandoned those who practised such vices, to the legitimate consequences of their own passions and conduct.

(29) Πεπληρωμένους, *filled, full of, abounding in*. The construction, if completed, would be, [παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς] πεπληρωμένους κ. τ. λ. so that πεπληρωμένους agrees with αὐτοὺς in the preceding verse. It is here followed by the Dative of the succeeding nouns; and so in some other cases; see Wahl's Lex. under πληρόω. The Genitive is more common after verbs of *abounding*.

Ἄδικία is a generic word here, *iniquity, sin*, which comprehends all the particular vices that are afterwards named.—Πορνεία is omitted in some manuscripts, and in some it is placed after πονηρία. The enumeration seems quite incomplete without it; as it is a sin which most of all was universal among the heathen. In the New Testament, the word πορνεία has an extended sense, comprehending *all illicit intercourse*, whether fornication, adultery, incest, or any other *venus illicita*. See Bretsch. Lex. on the word.

Πονηρία, *malice*, i. e. *versuta et fallax nocendi ratio*, as Grotius defines it. *Malice* is a wicked desire or intention of doing harm to others, in a fraudulent and deceitful manner.—Πλεονεξία, *covetousness*. Where luxury abounds, and devotedness to sinful pleasures,

there a thirst for gold will also reign, because it is necessary to supply the means of pleasure. Petronius strikingly represents Rome as covetous of the wealth of other nations, in the following manner :

. . . . Si quis sinus abditus ultra,
Si qua foret tellus quæ fulvum mitteret aurum,
Hostis erat, fatisque in tristia bella paratis
Qærebantur opes.

Κακία, among the Greeks, was the antithesis of *ἀρετή*, when taken in a *generic* sense. But when taken (as here) in a *limited* one, it means *the habit of doing mischief or harm to others* in any way. It differs from *πονηρία*, *malice*, inasmuch as that more particularly designates a state of mind, and the craftiness by which the purposes, it forms are to be executed. *Κακία* is any kind of injurious treatment.

Μεσιτούς is of the same meaning as *πεπληρωμένους*; but it seems to be introduced here merely for the sake of varying the construction of so many nouns. As it governs the Genitive, so the Genitive here follows it, and this makes a variety in the construction. The ellipsis is as before, [*παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς*] *μεσιτούς* κ. τ. λ.—*Φθόνος*, *envy*, seems to be natural to the human breast. It exists at all times and in all places, where one part of the community is, or is thought to be, more happy or distinguished than another. This passion was in the highest degree predominant at Rome.—*Φόνος*, *murder or manslaughter*, both public and private, legalized and forbidden, was exceedingly frequent at Rome; e. g. the gladiatorial fights, the destruction of slaves, the executions by the Roman emperor's orders, and deaths by poison, assassination, etc.—*Ἔρις* of course followed on in such a train.—*Δόλος* is strikingly exemplified by a verse of Juvenal: "Quid Romæ faciem? Mentiri nescio," Sat. III. 41.—*Κακοήθεια* means *malevolence*, particularly that species of it which perverts the words and actions of another, and puts a wrong construction on them in order to gratify a love of mischief, when it was easy and proper to put a good construction upon them. It differs *specifically*, therefore, from *πονηρία*.

(30) *Ψιθυριστής* means *a slanderer in secret*.—*Κατάλαλος*, *a slanderer in public*.—*Θεοστυγείς*, *haters of God*. Grotius says, it should be written *θεοστυγεις*, i. e. with the tone or accent on the penult, in order to have an *active* sense. But this is not necessary; for Suidas defines *θεοστυγείς* (oxytone) by *οἱ ὑπὸ θεοῦ μισούμενοι, καὶ οἱ θεὸν μισοῦντες*. In the same manner Passow gives the meaning of the word. That the *active* sense is here required, the

context clearly shews; inasmuch as the vices of men are here designated, not the punishment of them.—'Υβριστής, *reproachful*, i. e. lacerating others by slanderous, abusive, passionate declarations.—'Υπερηγάνους, *proud*, i. e. looking with disdain upon others, and thinking highly of themselves.—'Αλαζόνας, *boasters*, i. e. glorying in that which does not belong to them, whether wealth, learning, talents, or any thing else.—'Εφευρετὰς κακῶν, *inventors of evil things*. This doubtless refers to the inventions in luxuries, vices, etc., which were constantly taking place in the great cities of ancient times, where there was a competition in pleasures among the wealthy.—'Ιουεῖσιν ἀπειθεῖς, *disobedient to parents*; a vice exceedingly common among the heathen, multitudes of whom cast out their parents, when they are old, to perish from hunger, or cold, or by the wild beasts. The Accusative cases throughout this and the following verse, are all governed by παρέδωκεν ὁ θεός, brought forward from v. 28, in the mind of the writer, and to be supplied by the reader.

(31) Ἀσυνέτους, *inconsiderate or foolish*; compare vs. 21, 22.—'Ασυνθέτους, *covenant-breakers, perfidious*.—'Αστόργους, *destitute of natural affection*. The writer probably refers here, to the usual practices among the heathen of exposing young children to perish, when the parents had more of them than they thought themselves able to maintain, or had such as they did not wish to take the trouble of bringing up. Tertullian (in Apologetico) repeats this accusation against them in a tremendous manner: “. . . qui natos sibi liberos enecant . . . crudelius in aqua spiritum extorquetis, aut frigori et fami et canibus exponitis.”—'Ασπόνδους, *implacable, qui pactum non admittit*. Some manuscripts omit the word; but its authority does not seem fairly to be doubtful. This is a well-known trait of the heathen character, exemplified in a most striking manner by the *Aborigines* of this country.—'Ανελεήμονας, *destitute of compassion, unmerciful*. What, for example, are or were the provisions made for the poor and suffering, among the heathen?

(32) Οἴτινες . . . ἐπιγνώοντες, *who knowing the ordinance of God*. 'Επιγνώοντες is here to be taken in the like sense with γγόντες in v. 21; see the remarks on this. In Rom. 2: 14, 15, Paul asserts that 'the heathen who have no written law (revelation), are a law to themselves, for they give evidence that the requisitions of the divine law are written upon their hearts.' He refers, of course, in these and the like expressions, to leading and principal traits of moral duty. So in our text, when he speaks of the Gentiles as *knowing*

God, he means, that the disclosures made respecting God in the works of nature, and respecting the duties which he demanded of them in their own consciences or moral sense, were of such a kind as fairly to give them an opportunity of knowing something respecting the great outlines of duty, and of rendering them inexcusable for neglecting it.

Τὸ δίκαιωμα, *statute, ordinance, precept*. The Seventy employ it often, in order to translate the Hebrew קִיָּה, טַעֲוִיָּה, מִצְוָה. The use of δίκαιωμα in such a way, seems to be quite *Hellenistic*. Suidas, however, defines it thus: δικαιώματα νόμος, ἐντολαί. Clear cases of usage in such a sense, are 1 Macc. 1: 13, ποιεῖν τὰ δικαιώματα τῶν ἔθνων· and Test. XII. Patriarch., ποιεῖν τὰ δικαιώματα κυρίου, καὶ ὑπακούειν ἐντολὰς θεοῦ, Fabric. Cod. Pseudep. I. 603.

What the δίκαιωμα or קִיָּה is, which the heathen knew or might have known, is now declared, viz. ὅτι οἱ . . . εἰσὶν, *that they who do such things* [such as he had just been mentioning], *are worthy of death*. As the affirmation here has respect to those who did not enjoy the knowledge of a written revelation, so *death* can hardly be taken in the full and exact *scriptural* sense of the word; (on this sense, see the remarks on Rom. 5: 12). It must, however, be taken in a sense strictly analogous with this, viz. as meaning *punishment, misery, suffering*. The very nature of the term implies this. That the word θανάτου is *figuratively*, not literally employed here, is sufficiently plain from an inspection of the catalogue of vices which the apostle had just named. Surely he does not mean to say, that *all* of these deserved capital punishment from the civil magistrate, in the *literal* sense; and that this was a case so plain, that the heathen themselves clearly recognized it.

A certain degree of vitiosity is manifested, by the commission of crimes or the practice of wickedness; in some cases a very high degree. But still, in many cases crimes are the result of a sudden *impetus* of passion and temptation, in the midst of which men abandon reflection. It requires therefore, in the main, a higher degree of depravity coolly to applaud and deliberately to justify and encourage wickedness already committed or to be committed, than it does to commit it in the moment of excitement. Hence the apostle considers this as the very climax of all the charges which he had to bring against the heathen, that they not only plunged into acts of wickedness, but had given their more deliberate approbation to such doings. Οὐ μόνον . . . πράσσοσι, *not only do the same things, but even*

commend those who do them. It is often the case, that wicked men, whose consciences have been enlightened, speak reproachfully of others who practise such vices as they themselves indulge in. Few profligate parents, for example, are willing that their children should sustain the same character with themselves. But when we find, as in some cases we may do, such parents encouraging and applauding their children in acts of wickedness, we justly consider it as evidence of the very highest kind of depravity.

It is of such depravity as this, that the apostle accuses the heathen. And justly; for even their philosophers and the best educated among them, stood chargeable with such an accusation. For example; both the Epicureans and the Stoics allowed and defended παιδεραστία and incest, numbering these horrid crimes among the ἀδιάφορα, *things indifferent*. Aristotle and Cicero justify revenge. Aristotle (Polit. I. 8) represents war upon barbarous nations, to be nothing more than a species of *hunting*, and altogether justifiable. The same writer justifies forcible abortion, Polit. VII. 16. Other philosophers represent virtue and vice as the mere creatures of statute and arbitrary custom; or (to use the words of Justin) they maintain, μηδὲν εἶναι ἀρετὴν μηδὲ κακίαν, δόξη δὲ μόνον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἢ ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ταῦτα ἡγισθῆναι, *that there is nothing either virtuous or vicious, but that things are made good or evil merely by the force of opinion*.

This is sufficient to justify the declaration of the apostle; for if philosophers thought and reasoned thus, what must the common people have done, who were more exclusively led by their appetites and passions? The picture is indeed a dreadful one; it is truly revolting in every sense of the word. But that it is just, nay, that it actually comes short of the real state of things, particularly on the score of impurity and cruelty, there cannot be the least doubt in any man, who is acquainted with the ancient state of the heathen world, and of Rome in particular. Poets, philosophers, and historians, have confirmed the words of Paul; and the relics of ancient cities in Italy, (in pictures, carvings, statues, etc.)—cities destroyed near the time when the apostle lived, bear most ample testimony to what he has said of their lasciviousness and shameless profligacy. One has only to add, with the deepest distress, that in many of the great cities of countries

called Christian, there is fearful reason to believe, that there are abominations practised in various respects, which even exceed any inventions of heathen depravity. How often is one obliged to exclaim, with the apostle, *παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεός!* The evidence of this lies in more than beastly degradation.

It has frequently been asked, whether the apostle intended here to draw a picture of the philosophers and sophists, or only of the common people; whether he meant to say that *all* the heathen were guilty of the vices which he names, or only a part of them, etc. The answer to these questions has in part been given above; and as to the rest, it seems not to be difficult. It is sufficiently plain, I trust, from the very nature of the case, as has been already stated, that Paul does not mean to assert of every individual among the heathen, that he stood chargeable with each and every crime here specified. This is impossible. He means only to say, that these and the like vices (for surely they were guilty of many others), were notorious and common among the heathen; and that every individual capable of sinning, philosophers and common people, stood chargeable, in a greater or less degree, with some of them. In this way he makes out a part of his main proposition, viz. that *all men are under sin*; consequently, that *all are in a lost condition or in a state of condemnation*. These declarations being established, it follows of course, that *all men need a Saviour, and can be delivered from the curse of the divine law, only by means of atoning blood which procures gratuitous pardon for them*.

That the apostle has been here describing the *heathen*, is clear from vs. 20—23, where all that is said applies in its proper force only to them.

That the heathen had a *moral sense*, is clear from Rom. 2: 14, 15. One may even suppose it to be probable that some of them did, to a certain extent, obey this internal law; at least, we may well suppose that they *could* obey it. This seems to be implied in Rom. 2: 26, and perhaps in Acts 10: 35. It is on this basis, that the apostle grounds his charge of guilt against them. They *knew*, at least they might have known, that what they did was against the law of nature, against their *consciences*, against their internal persuasion with respect to right and wrong. Consequently they were verily guilty in the sight of God; not for transgressing the precepts of a revelation never made known to them, but for violating a law that was within them, and shutting their eyes against the testimony of the natural

world. Most clearly and fully does the apostle recognize and teach all this, Rom. 2: 12—16, 26, 27. No one, therefore, can accuse God of injustice, because he blames and condemns the heathen; for he makes the law which was known to them the measure of their blame and condemnation (Rom. 2: 12, seq.), and not a revelation with which they were not acquainted.

When this subject, therefore, is contemplated in its full and proper light, it becomes clear, that neither the accusations of the apostle, nor the deductions which he makes from them, are subject to any just exception. Thus far his argument is good, and conclusive. It is clear that the Gentiles need a Saviour; it is equally clear that they need gratuitous justification, and that they must perish without such a provision for them. It remains then to be seen, whether the same things can be established with respect to the Jews.

On the method of establishing the declaration which the apostle makes concerning the depravity of the Gentiles, it may be proper here to add a single remark. He goes into no formal *argument*. In the passage which we have been considering, he does not even appeal, (as he sometimes does, Tit. 1: 12), to the testimony of their own writers. The ground of this must be, that the facts were plain, palpable; well known, and acknowledged by all. To mention them merely, was to establish his allegation; the appeal being made to the certain knowledge of every reader. In particular, he was well assured that the Jewish part of his readers would call in question none of the allegations, which he made in relation to the vices of the Gentiles. There was no need, therefore, of any more formal proof, on the present occasion. A plain statement of the case was sufficient. We shall see that the writer occupies more time, and makes greater effort, to confirm his declarations respecting the Jews.

CHAP. II. 1—29.

The apostle, having thus concluded his short but very significant view of the *heathen* world, now turns to address his own nation, the Jews, in order to shew them that they stood in need of the mercy proffered by the gospel, as really and as much as the Gentiles. But this he does not proceed to do at once, and by direct address. He first prepares the way by illustrating and enforcing the general proposition, that all who have a knowledge of what is right, and approve of it, but yet sin against it, are guilty; and as really so as those who are so blinded as not to see the loveliness and excellence of virtue, and who at the same time transgress its precepts. This he does in vs. 1—10; in which, although he had the Jews constantly in mind, he still advances only general

propositions, applicable in common to them and to others; thus preparing the way, with great skill and judgment, for a more effectual charge to be made specifically against the Jews, in the sequel of his discourse. Such a view of his discourse will render easy the solution of the agitated question: Whom does Paul address in vs. 1—8? Le Clerc supposes that he addresses the heathen philosophers; but Chrysostom, Theodoret, Grotius, and others, that he addresses heathen magistrates. It seems quite plain, at least to my mind, that he directly addresses neither the one or the other of these here, nor any other particular class of men; but that he employs *general* propositions only, in the verses before us; and this, merely for the sake of preparing the way to convince the Jews, and to shew that they too, as well as the Gentiles, are in a state of condemnation. In v. 11 he first commences the direct attack (if so it may be called) upon the Jews, and continues it, more or less directly, to chap. 3: 19.

The words of Turretin (Expos. Epist. Pauli ad Rom. in cap. II.) are so much to my purpose, that I cannot forbear quoting them. "Postquam ostendisset apostolus epistolæ suæ capite primo, Gentes ex propriis operibus justificari non potuisse, eo quod deploratissimus eorum status esset; idem jam Judæis capite II. demonstrare aggreditur. Verum id facit dextre nec mediocri solertia, statim ne nominatis quidem Judæis, positisque generalibus principiis, quorum veritatem et equitatem negare non poterant; quo facto, sensim eorum mentionem injicit; tandemque directe eos compellat, vividaque et pathetica oratione eorum conscientiam pungit, facitque ut de propriis peccatis volentes nolatione convincantur. Et in his quidem omnibus, deprimit supercilium Judæorum, qui cæteras gentes summo contemptu habebant, iisque se longe meliores et Deo acceptiores gloriabantur. At vero, non negatis Judæorum ad cognitionem quod adinet prærogativis, ostendit eos, ad mores quod spectat, quæ pars est religionis longe præcipua, Gentibus haud quaquam meliores fuisse, proindeque Dei judicio et damnationi haud minus obnoxios fore."

So far as the contents of the present chapter then are concerned, we have, in vs. 1—8, the general considerations already named; in vs. 9—16, the apostle shews that the Jews must be accountable to God, as really and truly, for the manner in which they treat the precepts contained in the Scriptures, as the heathen are for the manner in which they demean themselves with respect to the law of nature; and that each must be judged, at last, according to the means of grace and improvement which he has enjoyed.

In vs. 17—29, he advances still farther, and makes a direct reference to the Jew alone. He shews here, that those who sin against higher degrees of knowledge imparted by revelation, must be more guilty than those who have offended merely against the laws of nature; i. e. he plainly teaches the doctrine, that guilt is proportioned to the light and love that have been manifested, and yet been abused. The very precedence in knowledge, of which the Jews were so proud and so prone to boast, the apostle declares to be a ground of greater condemnation, in case those who possessed it sinned against it; a doctrine consonant as truly with reason and conscience, as it is with the declarations of the Scriptures; compare John 3: 19, 15: 22—24. 9: 41.

(1) *Αὐτὸ* . . . *ἄξιον*, therefore thou art without excuse, O man, every one that condemneth, or whosoever thou art that condemnest.—*Αὐτὸ* here has been made the subject of much discussion. The point of difficulty respecting it is, to shew how it stands connected as an *illative* particle, with the preceding discourse. As it is made up of *διὰ* and *ὄ*, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the word is, in its own proper nature, *illative*. To my own mind, the connection appears to be thus: 'Since it will be conceded, that those who know the ordi-

nances of God against such vices as have been named, and still practise them, and applaud others for doing so, are worthy of punishment; it follows (*διό, therefore*), that all who are so enlightened as to disapprove of such crimes, and who still commit them, are even yet more worthy of punishment.' The apostle here takes the ground, that those who were so enlightened and instructed by revelation, as to condemn the vices in question, would of course sin against motives of a higher kind than those which the heathen enjoyed who were possessed of less light. It must be conceded, indeed, that *συνευδοξοῦσσι* in 1: 32 is designed to aggravate the description of the guilt which the heathen incurred, (and in fact it does so); yet it will not follow, that the sin of these heathen would not have been still greater, had they enjoyed such light from revelation, as would have led them fully to condemn those very sins in their own consciences, while they yet practised them. The main point in the discourse here, seems to stand connected principally with the greater or less light as to duty. The heathen with less light, went so far in vice as even to approve and applaud it, as well as to practise it; the Jew with more light, was led irresistibly as it were to condemn such sins, but with all this light, and against all the remonstrances of his conscience, he violated the same precepts which the heathen violated. Now what the apostle would say, is, that he who sins while he possesses light enough to condemn the vice which he practises, is really and truly guilty, as well as he who sins while approving it. He takes it for granted that his readers will concede the point which he has asserted respecting the guilt of the heathen; hence he draws the inference (*διό*), that on the like grounds they must condemn every one, who, like the Jew, sins against the voice of his conscience and against his better knowledge.

In like manner Flatt (Comm. über d. Römer) makes out the connection of *διό* here: "*Διό, because* thou knowest τὸ δίκαιωμα τοῦ θεοῦ' because thou knowest, that according to the divine decision they are worthy of punishment who practise such vices; because thou thyself dost acknowledge this *δικαίωμα θεοῦ*' so thou canst not excuse thyself for committing the like sins."

As to *ναῖς ὁ κρίνων*, the proposition made by it is indeed *general*; but this is plainly a matter of intention on the part of the writer. He means to include the Jews in it; but at the same time, he commences his remarks on them in this general way, for the very purpose of approaching gradually and in an inoffensive manner, the ultimate point which he has in view.

Ἐν ᾧ γὰρ . . . κατακρίνεις, for in respect to the same thing [which] thou condemnest in another, thou passest sentence of condemnation upon thyself; or, in condemning another, thou passest sentence on thyself.—*Ἐν ᾧ*, in respect to, with reference to; it may be translated, because that, inasmuch as, like the Hebrew *בְּאֲשֶׁר*. The latter method would represent the apostle as saying: ‘For the very act of condemning another, is passing sentence upon thyself.’ I prefer the former method, which represents him as saying: ‘Thou who condemnest, dost pass sentence on thyself in respect to the very point which is the subject of condemnation;’ i. e. thou who condemnest the practice of the vices just named, dost thyself practise the very same vices, and so dost come under thine own condemnation. That *κρίνω* has oftentimes the same sense as *κατακρίνω*, every good lexicon will shew. Such is clearly the case here; compare Matt. 7: 1. Luke 6: 37. Rom. 14: 3, 4, 10, 13, 22. 1 Cor. 4: 5. Col. 2: 16.

The *γὰρ* in this clause is *γὰρ illustrantis vel confirmantis*; for the sentiments which follow are designed to show, that *πᾶς ὁ κρίνων* is *inexcusable*, inasmuch as he stands chargeable himself with the very crimes which he censures in others.

Τὰ γὰρ . . . ὁ κρίνων, since thou who condemnest, doest the same things. The apostle asserts this, and leaves it to the conscience of his readers to bear witness to the truth of it, and to make the application. He has not yet named the Jews; and therefore the charge is only *implied*, not expressed. As in the case where the woman taken in adultery was brought before the Saviour, and he said to her accusers: “He that is without sin, let him cast the first stone,” and they all withdrew because of conscious guilt; so here, the apostle says: ‘Every one who condemns the heathen for the crimes specified, [he was well aware that the Jews did this with a loud voice], condemns himself, because he is guilty of the like vices.’ How is this shown? Not by any arguments or testimonies; for Paul knew that these were unnecessary. He knew that the consciences of his readers would at once bear witness to the truth of his allegations. Therefore he leaves it to their consciences. But still, external testimony to the facts alleged is not wanting. That the Jews of this period were grossly corrupt, is certain from the accusations which Jesus so often brought against them, as recorded in the Gospels. We may make the appeal to Josephus also, and in particular to the description which he gives of Herod and his courtiers.

The *γὰρ* in the present clause is also inserted, because this

clause is designed to confirm the preceding one, and to show *how* he who judged did condemn himself.

(2) *Οἶδαμεν δὲ . . . πρῶσσοιτας*, *now we know that the judgment of God is according to truth, against those who do such things.* *Κρίμα θεοῦ* means, sentence of condemnation on the part of God, *θεοῦ* being *Genitivus auctoris*.—*Κατὰ ἀλήθειαν* may be construed in various ways; viz. (1) It may be taken (as usual in the classics) for *truly, verily*; i. e. just in the same sense as *ὕτως, ἀληθῶς*. This would make a good sense in our verse; but not the best. (2) It may mean the same as *κατὰ δικαιοσύνην, agreeably to justice*, inasmuch as *ἀλήθεια* often means *vera religionis doctrina, vera atque salutaris doctrina*, etc. So Beza, Tholuck, and others. (3) A better sense still seems to be, *agreeably to the real state of things, in accordance with truth* as it respects the real character sustained by each individual. The sentiment then is: ‘Think not to escape the judgment of God, thou who condemnest the vices of the heathen, and yet dost thyself practise them; whatever thy claims to the divine favour on account of thy birth or thy spiritual advantages may be, remember that the judgment of God will be according to the true state of the case, according to the real character which thou dost sustain.’ I prefer this method of interpretation, as it renders the verse more significant, while the *usus loquendi* is fully retained.

Τὰ τοιαῦτα, *such things*, viz. such as he had just been mentioning. Observe that the apostle does not accuse the *πᾶς ὁ κρινων* here of the very same things in all respects, (as *αὐτά* in the preceding verse might at first view appear to intimate); but he speaks of him who condemns, as doing *τὰ τοιαῦτα*. Nor is it to be understood by this, that every individual among the Jews, or even that any one, was chargeable with each and every vice which he had named. Enough that any one or more of these vices might be justly charged on all. And even if it could be said, that there might be individuals who gave no *external* proofs to men that they were guilty of any of these vices; there certainly were none who were not more or less guilty, in the sense in which our Saviour declares in his Sermon on the Mount that men may be guilty of murder and adultery, i. e. *spiritually, internally, mentally*.

(3) *Λογίζῃ δὲ . . . θεοῦ*, *dost thou think, then, O man, who condemnest those that do such things, and doest the very same things, that thou shalt escape the judgment of God?* *Αἰ*, says Flatt, appears to stand for *οὐν* but why, he has not shewn. Bretschneider has better

explained it, in his lexicon: "*Ad* *addit vim interrogationi.*" This is exactly the case here. It seems to me, that the apostle does not mean to say, *therefore*, etc.; and accordingly, I do not take v. 3d to be properly *illative*. The nearest translation which we can give in English, is *then* used as an intensive; which is a common use of it in such a connection as that before us, i. e. *addit vim interrogationi.*

The point in the verse appears to be as follows: 'Thou, who condemnest others for vicious indulgences and still dost thyself practise the same, dost thou suppose, that while they cannot escape thy condemning sentence, thou canst escape the sentence of him who is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity?' Well has Chrysostom paraphrased it: τὸ σὸν οὐκ ἐξέφυγες κρίμα, καὶ τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ διαφεύξῃ; *thou hast not escaped thine own condemnation; and shalt thou escape that of God?*

(4) Ἡ τοῦ καταφρονεῖς, or *dost thou despise his abounding goodness, and forbearance, and long-suffering?* The word πλοῦτος is often employed by Paul, in order to designate *abundance, copiousness*; e. g. Eph. 1:7. 2:7. 1:18. 3:16. Rom. 9:23. 11:33, et alibi. The Seventy frequently employ it to translate חַמְדָּה and חֵן. Here πλούτου supplies the place of an adjective, and means *abundant* or *abounding*; comp. Heb. Gramm. § 440. b.

Χρησιότιτος, *kindness, benignity.* Ἀνοχῆς, literally *holding in*, i. e. checking or restraining indignation, forbearing to manifest displeasure against sin.—Μακροθυμίας, *longanimity*, מְדַבֵּר אֵת, *slowness to anger, forbearance to punish.* Both words (ἀνοχῆς and μακροθυμίας) are here of nearly the same import, and serve, as synonyms thus placed usually do, to give *intensity* to the expression. The meaning is, as if the apostle had said: 'Despise thou his abounding kindness, and distinguished forbearance to punish?'

Καταφρονέω means *to treat with contempt*, either by word or by deed. The apostle means to say here, that all the distinguished goodness which the ὁ κρίνων enjoyed, in consequence of his superior light, was *practically* neglected and contemned by him, inasmuch as he plunged into the same vices which the ignorant heathen practised.

Ἀγνοῶν ἄγει, *not acknowledging that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance.* Ἀγνοῶν in the sense of *not recognizing* or *acknowledging.* Γινώσκω and the Hebrew יָדָע often mean, *to recognize, to acknowledge*; as may be seen in the lexicons.—Τὸ χρηστόν, i. q. χρηστότης, by a common usage of the Greek tongue;

compare τὸ γνωστόν in 1: 19.—*ἄγει*, leads; but as verbs often designate a tendency towards the action which they usually designate, as well as the specific action itself, so here the *tendency* or *fitness* to accomplish the end is designated; compare John 5: 21, *ἐγείρει*, has the power or faculty to raise up; *ζωοποιεῖ*, has the power of giving life; Rom. 1: 21, *γνόντες*, having opportunity to know. The sentiment is, that the goodness of God which the ὁ κρινῶν enjoys in a peculiar manner, is intended to teach him gratitude for his blessings, and of course sorrow (*μετάνοιαν*) for his offences in respect to that course of conduct which such a principle would dictate. Let the reader compare, for the sake of deeply impressing on his mind so important and striking a sentiment, the passages in 2 Pet. 3: 9. Ezek. 18: 23, 32. 33: 11.

(5) Κατὰ δὲ . . . καρδίαν, but according to thine obstinacy and impenitent heart, or according to thy hard and impenitent heart. Δέ naturally connects sentences or clauses which are more or less *antithetic*. Verse 5 expresses antithesis to the acknowledging of the goodness of God, etc.; which the offender is bound to do, but he takes a contrary course. *Σκληροῦτης* means *insensibility* of heart or mind, a state in which one is not duly affected by considerations presented to his mind.—*Ἀμετανόητον καρδίαν* means a heart not so affected as to sorrow for sin, by the goodness of God which is designed to produce such an effect. It is by such spiritual insensibility or stupidity, that the sinner is aggravating his condemnation; so the next clause.

Θησαυρίζεις . . . τοῦ θυοῦ, thou art treasuring up for thyself wrath in the day of wrath, when the righteous judgment of God shall be revealed. *Θησαυρίζεις*, to treasure up, i. e. to lay up in store, to accumulate, to increase.—*Σεαυτῷ*, for thyself, *Dativus incommodi* (as grammarians say); compare Rom. 13: 2. Matt. 23: 31.—*Ὀργήν*, wrath, includes also the *punishment* which is the natural consequence of wrath. A *day of punishment* is called, in the Old Testament, יוֹם נִדְּוֹתָי, יוֹם זַעַם, יוֹם יְהוָה, יוֹם הַיָּהוָה, i. e. a day when the displeasure of Jehovah is manifested.

Ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὀργῆς, i. e. ὀργήν [τὴν ἐσομένην] ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὀργῆς, indignation that will be shewn or executed in the day of indignation or punishment.—*Καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως καὶ δικαιοκρισίας* may be taken as a *Hendiadys*, and rendered of *revealed righteous judgment*. The meaning is: 'When God's righteous judgment shall be revealed, i. e. in the great day of judgment.' Griesbach omits the second *καὶ* which makes the reading more facile.

(6) "Ὁς ἀποδώσει . . . αὐτοῦ, *who will render to every man according to his works*; i. e. who will make retribution to every man, according to the tenor of his conduct. The sequel shews what distinction the supreme Judge will make, between men of different characters.—"Ἔργα means here, as often elsewhere, all the developments which a man makes of himself, whether by *outward* or *inward* actions; compare John 6: 27. Rev. 14: 13. 22: 12. The word is, indeed, more commonly used to designate *something done externally*; but it is by no means confined to this sense. Thus ἔργα νόμου means, *any works which the law demands*; ἔργα θεοῦ means, *such works as God requires*; and in cases of this nature it will not be said, I trust, that God and his law do not require any thing but *external* works.

(7) Τοῖς μὲν . . . αἰώνιον, *to those who by patient continuance or perseverance in well doing, seek for glory and honour and immortality, or immortal glory and honour, [he will render] eternal life or happiness*.—Ἰπομενήν means *perseverance* or *patient continuance*.—Κατά, before the Accusative, frequently designates the *modus* in which any thing is done, or the state and condition in which it is; e. g. κατὰ τάξιν, κατὰ ζῆλον, κατὰ γνώσιν, etc.—Ἔργου here has the epithet ἀγαθοῦ, in order to distinguish it from the generic ἔργα used in the preceding verse.

Δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν is cumulative or intensive; i. e. it expresses happiness or glory of the highest kind. We may translate the phrase thus: *immortal glory and honour*, making ἀφθαρσίαν an adjective to the other nouns; or we may render it, *glorious and honourable immortality, or honourable and immortal glory*. I prefer the first. The idea is indeed substantially the same in all; but all do not seem equally congruous, as to the method of expression. The joining of τιμὴν and δόξαν, in order to express *intensity*, is agreeable to a usage which is frequent in the New Testament; e. g. 1 Tim. 1: 17. Heb. 2: 7, 9. 2 Pet. 1: 17. Apoc. 4: 9, 11. So the Hebrew יהוה ויהוה.

The μὲν at the beginning of the verse is the μὲν προτάσεως, i. e. μὲν designating the *protasis* in a sentence; the ἀπόδοσις here is v. 8, which commences with δέ *apodotic*, i. e. marking the apodosis, and standing as the counter-part of μὲν in v. 7.

(8) Τοῖς δὲ ἐξ ἐριθείας, *but to those who are contentious*. Ἐκ (ἐξ) before the Genitive of a noun, is often employed as an adjective in designating some particular description of persons or things.

Thus ὁ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ = οὐράνιος· ἡ ἐκ φύσεως, *natural*; τὸν ἐκ πίστεως, *credens*; ὁ ἐξ ὑμῶν, *yours*; οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς, *the circumcised*; so the classical οἱ ἐκ στοᾶς, etc. The apostle means here to designate those who contend against God, or rebel against him. The Seventy use ἐρεθίζω in order to translate פָּרַח, Deut. 21: 20. 31: 27. What it means, moreover, is explained in the next clause by ἀπειθοῦσι.

Καὶ ἀπειθοῦσι . . . ἀδικία, *and are disobedient to the truth, but obedient to unrighteousness*. Here (in a subordinate member of the *apodosis* of the sentence begun in verse 7) is a second μέν *protatic* and δέ *apodotic*. The contrast of the two respective clauses in which they stand, is made very plain by ἀπειθοῦσι and πειθομένοις. The exact expression of this μέν and δέ, cannot be made out by any translation which the English language will permit. We have no words capable of designating such nice shades of relation as μέν and δέ signify here, and in like cases; shades very plain and palpable, indeed, to the practised critic in Greek, but such an one is still left without the power of expressing them in his own vernacular language. I have not in this case attempted an exact translation, for the reason just mentioned. The nearest to the original that I am able to come, is by the following version: *And those who disobey indeed the truth, but obey unrighteousness*. How imperfect an exhibition this is of the nicer colouring of the Greek expression, every one must feel who has “*διὰ τὴν ἕξιν τὰ αἰσθητήρια γεγυμνασμένα πρὸς διάκρισιν.*”

Ἀληθεία here means *true doctrine*. As the proposition of the apostle is *general* here, i. e. as it respects all, whether Jews or Gentiles, who disobey the precepts of religion and morality, so ἀληθεία must be taken in a latitude that embraces the truths of both natural and revealed religion. On the other hand ἀδικία means *that which is unrighteous, that which the truth forbids*, it being here (as in 1: 18) the antithesis of ἀληθεία.

Ὀργὴ καὶ θυμός, *indignation and wrath*. Ammonius says, θυμός μὲν ἐστὶ πρόσκαιρος, ὀργὴ δὲ πολυχρόνιος μνησικακία, i. e. θυμός *is of short duration, but ὀργὴ is a long-continued remembrance of evil*. I apprehend, however, that in the case before us, the expression is merely *intensive*; which (as usual) is effected by the accumulation of synonymous terms. In respect to the construction of these nouns in the Nominative case, it is an evident departure from the structure in the preceding verse, where ζῶν αἰώνιον is in the

Accusative governed by ἀποδώσει understood. Here ὄργη καὶ θυμός are the Nominative to ἔσονται implied. Such departures in the latter portion of a sentence, from a construction employed in the former part of it, grammarians call ἀνακόλυθον· which means, that a construction begun, is not followed up or completed in the like manner.

(9) Θλίψις καὶ στενοχωρία are words which correspond to ὄργη καὶ θυμός, and designate the effects of the latter. The meaning is, *intense anguish, great suffering*. It is evident, at first sight, that the 9th verse is a repetition of the general sentiment contained in v. 8; while the 10th verse repeats the sentiment of v. 7. This repetition, however, is evidently introduced with the design of making a *specific* application, and of shewing definitely whom the apostle means to include in what he had said.

The construction in v. 8th is here followed; inasmuch as ἔσονται is plainly implied after θλίψις καὶ στενοχωρία. These two words, used in the way of expressing *intensity*, are often joined by classic writers; and so in Hebrew we have קָרָב וְצָרָה.

Ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀνθρώπου, [great distress shall be] upon every soul of man, i. e. upon every man. In Hebrew, the soul of the righteous, of the wicked, of the poor, of the rich, of the hungry, of the thirsty, etc., means the righteous, the wicked, etc. So here, *the soul of man* means *man*.—Ἰουδαίου . . . Ἕλληνας, *first of the Jew, and then of the Greek*; i. e. the Jew, to whom a revelation has been imparted, shall be judged and punished first in order, because he sustains a peculiar relation to revealed truth which calls for this; compare 1: 16. Here the apostle comes out, and openly shews, that what he had been thus far saying only in *general* terms, is applicable to *Jews* as well as to *Greeks*.

(10) Δόξα δὲ . . . Ἕλλησι, *but glory and honour and peace to every one who doeth good, first to the Jew and then to the Greek*. That is, both threatenings and rewards are held out to Jews and Greeks, in the same manner and on the same condition. With God there is no προσωποληψία. This verse is a repetition of v. 7, with the addition of Ἰουδαίου τε πρῶτον καὶ Ἕλληνας. But here εὐρίνη is substituted for ἀφθαρσίαν there. We might translate, *but happiness glorious and honourable*, etc. The meaning of the whole is plain. *Intensity* of description or affirmation is intended.

(11) Οὐ γὰρ . . . θεῶ, *for with God there is no partiality, or no respect of persons*. The Hebrew עֵינַי אֵלֶיךָ means, *to deal partially, to look not at things but at persons*, and pass sentence accord-

ingly. The phrases *πρόσωπον λαμβάνειν* or *βλέπειν*, and also *προσωποληψία*, are entirely Hebraistic in their origin; the classic writers never employ them. The apostle here explicitly declares, that there is no difference in regard to the application of the general principle which he had laid down, the Jew as well as the Greek being the proper subject of it. The *γάρο* at the beginning of the verse is *γάρο confirmantis*.

(12) A confirmation or explanation of what he had said in the preceding verse; for if God judges every man according to the advantages which he has enjoyed, then there is no *partiality* in his proceedings; and that he does, the present verse explicitly declares.

"Ὅσοι γὰρ . . . ἀπολοῦνται, *since as many as have sinned without a revelation, shall perish without a revelation.* Νόμος, like the Hebrew תורה, often means *the Scriptures, the revealed law*; e. g. Matt. 12: 5. 22: 36. Luke 10: 26. John 8: 5, 17. 1 Cor 14: 21. Gal. 3: 10. Matt. 5: 18. Luke 16: 17. John 7: 49, et alibi. Here most plainly it means *the revealed law, revelation, or the Scriptures*; for v. 15 asserts directly that the heathen were not destitute of *all law*, but only of an *express revelation*. The classical sense of ἀνόμως would be *unlawfully*, = *παράνομως*. But plainly this meaning is here out of question.

Ἀνόμως ἀπολοῦνται means, that when adjudged to be punished, they shall not be tried by the precepts of a revealed law, with which they have never been acquainted; but by the precepts of the law of nature, which were written on their own hearts; see v. 15.

Καὶ ὅσοι . . . κριθήσονται, *and so many as have sinned under revelation, will be condemned by revelation.* Here νόμος is employed in the sense pointed out in the preceding paragraphs. Ἐν νόμῳ—with *ἐν conditionis*, as we may call it; for ἐν is often put before nouns designating the state, condition, or relation of persons or things; see Bretschn. Lex. ἐν, No. 5. The sentiment is, that those who enjoyed the light of revelation (as the Jews had done), would be condemned by the same revelation, in case they had been transgressors.

(13) This declaration is followed by another which is designed to illustrate and confirm it, and which is therefore introduced with another *γάρο*, (*γάρο illustrantis et confirmantis*). Οὐ γὰρ . . . δικαιώθησονται, *for not those who hear the law are just with God, but those who obey the law shall be justified*; i. e. not those to whom a revelation has been imparted, and who hear it read, are counted as righteous by their Maker and Judge, but those who obey the law shall

be counted righteous. The apostle here speaks of *οἱ ἀκούοντες τοῦ νόμου*, because the Jews were accustomed to *hear* the Scriptures read in public, but many of them did not individually possess copies of the sacred volume which they could read. The sentiment is: 'Not those who merely enjoy the external privilege of a revelation have any just claim to divine approbation; it is only those who obey the precepts of such a revelation, who have any ground to expect this.'

(14) To this sentiment the apostle seems to have anticipated that objections would be made. He goes on to solve them, or rather to prevent them by anticipation. He had said, that the *doers* of the law would be justified. It was natural for the Jew to reply and say: 'The Gentiles have no revelation; and therefore this statement cannot be applied to them, or this supposition cannot be made in relation to them.' The answer to this is, that the Gentiles have a law as really and truly as the Jews, although it is not written on parchment, but on the tablets of their hearts. Flatt refers vs. 14, 15 back to v. 12, and thinks that *ὅταν γὰρ κ. τ. λ.* in v. 14 stands as co-ordinate with *οὐ γὰρ κ. τ. λ.* in v. 13. But Tholuck and Turretin construe the *ὅταν γὰρ κ. τ. λ.*, as I have done.

An objection to this has often been made, viz. that in this way we may represent the apostle as affirming, that there were some of the heathen who did so obey the law as to be just before God. But this is a mistake. The apostle no more represents the heathen as actually attaining to this justification here, than he represents the Jew as attaining to it in v. 13. Surely he does not mean to say in v. 13, that there are any Jews who are actually *ποιηταὶ τοῦ νόμου* in the sense which he attaches to this phrase; compare chap. 3: 19, 20, 23, 27, 30, 31. He is merely illustrating a *principle*, in both cases. The Jew expected justification on account of his external advantages. 'No,' says the apostle, 'this is impossible; nothing but *entire* obedience to the divine law will procure justification for you, so long as you stand merely on your own ground. And here the heathen may make the like claims. If you say that a heathen man has no law, because he has no revelation; still I must insist that he is in as good a condition to attain justification, as you Jews are; for although he has no Scripture, (and in this respect, no law), yet he has an *internal* revelation inscribed on his heart, which is a rule of life to him, and which, if perfectly obeyed, would confer justification on him, as well and as truly as entire obedience to the *written* law could confer it upon you. The principle is the same in both cases. You can claim no pre-eminence in this respect.'

It is plain, then, that the apostle is only *laying down* or *illustrating a principle here*, NOT *relating a historical fact*; and this being duly apprehended, all difficulty about the sentiment of the passage is removed. Certainly there is no more difficulty in v. 14, than must arise in regard to the *ποιηταὶ τοῦ νόμου* of v. 13. The writer means to say neither more nor less, than that *the Gentiles may have the same kind of claims to be justified before God as the Jews*, (which of course has an important bearing on v. 11); but, as the sequel shews most fully, *neither Jew nor Gentile has any claim at all, since both have violated the law under which they have lived.*

Φύσει . . . ποιῆ, do in their natural state such things as revelation requires. *Φύσις*, in a classical sense, means *the nature* or *natural state* of a thing, *the natural condition* of any thing; just in the same way as we use the word *nature*, in our own language; e. g. the Greeks said, *ὁ κατὰ φύσιν θάνατος*, *natural death*; *ὁ κατὰ φύσιν πατήρ*, *natural father*; *φύσιν ἔχει γένεσθαι*, *it naturally happens*, etc. In the verse before us, *φύσει* is equivalent to *τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα* i. e. it means those who were acquainted with only the precepts of natural religion, and were destitute of a special revelation. In respect to the Dative case (*φύσει*), it is the common method to which the Greeks have recourse, in order to express the state or condition of any thing; i. e. *Dativus conditionis*.

Οὗτοι . . . εἰσι νόμος, *these having no law, are a law unto themselves*. The construction is changed, when *οὗτοι* (masc. gender) is employed; which is *constructio ad sensum*, *ἄνθρωποι* being understood. What is meant by *ἑαυτοῖς εἰσι νόμος*, is explained in the following verse.

(15) *Οἵτινες . . . αὐτῶν*, *who show that the work which the law requires, is written upon their hearts*. *Οἵτινες* refers to the Gentiles. — *Τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου*, *the work or duty of the law*, i. e. which the law demands. So, plainly, this much controverted passage should be rendered, if we compare it with other phrases of the like tenor; e. g. 1 Thess. 1: 3, *ἔργον τῆς πίστεως*, *work such as faith demands*; 2 Thess. 1: 11, *ἔργον πίστεως*, *such work as faith requires*; John 6: 28, 'What shall we do that we may perform *τὰ ἔργα τοῦ θεοῦ*, *such works as God requires*; to which the answer is (v. 29), *τὸ ἔργον τοῦ θεοῦ*, *the work which God requires*, is, that ye should believe, etc.; John 9: 4, *τὰ ἔργα τοῦ πέμψαντός με*, *works enjoined by him who sent me*; 2 Tim. 4: 5, *ἔργον εὐαγγελιστοῦ*, *duty which the evangelical office demands*; et sic alibi. With these plain cases of usage before

us, there is no need of endeavouring to prove, (with Palairer, Wolf, Schleusner, and others), that ἔργον is here merely *periphrastic*, i. e. that ἔργον τοῦ νόμου means the same as νόμος. That such a *usus loquendi* is not unknown to the Greeks, may indeed be shewn; e. g. τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἔργον, ἔνιοί φασιν, ἀπὸ βαρβάρων ἄρξαι, *philosophy (some say) took its rise from barbarians*. The *periphrastic* use of χροῖμα and πράγμα, in this way, is well known. But it is wholly unnecessary to have resort to this, when the expression ἔργον νόμου can be so easily explained without it. It means plainly, *such work or duty as the law requires*.

This, i. e. precept enjoining this, is written on the hearts or minds of the Gentiles. Γραπτόν is of course to be understood figuratively; and the idea conveyed by the whole expression is, that the great precepts of moral duty are deeply impressed on our moral nature, and co-exist with it, even when it is unenlightened by special revelation.—Καρδιά, like the Hebrew כֹּחַ, very often stands for *mind* as well as *heart*. Γραπτόν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις is used as the antithesis of γραπτόν ἐν πλαξὶ λιθίναις, which characterized the revealed law of Moses; 2 Cor. 3: 3.

What was meant by the expression just considered, the apostle goes on to shew, by adding two expegetical clauses. Συμμαρτυρούσης αὐτῶν τῆς συνειδήσεως, *their conscience bearing witness*, viz. τῷ αὐτῷ, *to it*, to the same ἔργον νόμου. That is, the evidence that what the law of God requires is inscribed on the minds of the heathen, is the testimony of their consciences to such moral precepts. Some understand συμμαρτυρούσης as meaning, that the conscience bears testimony *in conjunction* with the heart or mind. But I apprehend this not to be the meaning of Paul. Compound verbs, like συμμαρτυρέω, not unfrequently have the same sense as the simple forms. So in respect to συμμαρτυρέω, an undoubted instance of such usage occurs in Rom. 9: 1. And in our text, *written in their hearts*, or *minds* is explained by adding, *the conscience bearing testimony*, viz. to the precepts in question. This is the evidence that these precepts are engraved upon the minds of natural men. The apostle does not mean to say, that there are two testimonies, one of the mind, and another of the conscience; but that the conscience testifies to the fact which he had alleged in regard to the mind.

The apostle now adds a second confirmation of the fact, that the demands of the moral law are inscribed on the heart of men in a state of nature; viz. καὶ μεταξὺ . . . ἀπολογουμένων, *their thoughts alter-*

nately accusing or excusing them. Μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων, between each other, at mutual intervals, alternately, i. e. in succession, first one kind of thoughts, i. e. approbation; then another kind, i. e. disapprobation.—Λογισμός means *ratiocination, judgment, reflection*. It designates a more deliberate act of the mind than a mere ἐνθύμημα or ἐνθύμησις.—Κατηγορούντων, *accusing*, in case the actions were bad; ἀπολογουμένων, *defending*, in case they were good. After each of these participles, ἑαυτούς or ἄνθρωπον is implied.

The meaning of this clause is not, as has frequently been supposed, that one man blames or applauds another, or that men mutually blame and applaud one another, (although the fact itself is true); but that in the thoughts or judgment of the same individual, approbation or condemnation exists, according to the tenor of the actions which pass in review before him. Thus the voice of conscience, which proceeds from a moral feeling of dislike or approbation, and the judgment of the mind when it examines the nature of actions, unite in testifying, that what the moral law of God requires, is impressed in some good measure on the hearts even of the heathen.

Those commit a great mistake, then, who deny that men can have any sense of moral duty or obligation, without a knowledge of the Scriptures. The apostle's argument, in order to convince the Gentiles of sin, rests on a basis entirely different from this. And if it be alleged, that in this way the necessity of a revelation is superseded; I answer, not at all. The knowledge of some points of moral duty, or the power to acquire such knowledge, is one thing; a disposition to obey the precepts of natural religion, is another. The latter can be affirmed of few indeed, among the heathen of any age or nation. Again; faculties adapted to discover the path of duty, are one thing; the use of them so as effectually to do this, is another. The former the apostle asserts; the latter he denies. And justly; for after all, what have the heathen done and said, which renders the gospel in any measure unnecessary? Little indeed; in some respects we may say: Nothing. What authority had their precepts over them? And how was it with them as to doubts and difficulties about some of the plainest principles of morality? Their minds were blinded by their passions. Hence the voice within them was not listened to; but this does not prove that God left himself without sufficient witness among them. The apostle most plainly and fully asserts that he did not.

(16) 'Ἐν ἡμέρᾳ . . . ἀνθρώπων, in the day when God shall judge the secret things of men. But with what must we connect ἔν ἡμέρᾳ? Most commentators have said: 'With κριθήσονται in v. 12, making vs. 13, 14, 15, a parenthesis.' So Grotius, Limborch, Wolf, Knapp, Griesbach, Winer, and others. This would then compare, as to construction, with Rom. 1: 2—6. 5: 13—18, and many other passages in Paul's epistles.

Others, as Beza and Heumann, join ἔν ἡμέρᾳ with δικαιωθήσονται at the end of v. 13, and make vs. 14, 15, a parenthesis.

Bengel and Chr. Schmidt join ἔν ἡμέρᾳ with ἐνδείκνυνται in v. 15, making the sentiment to be, that in the day of judgment it will appear manifest to all, that men's consciences have testified in favour of the law of God, etc.

Somewhat different in sense from this, is the exegesis of Jerome, Theodoret, Chrysostom, Theophylact, Œcumenius, Calvin, Erasmus, and others; viz. that ἔν ἡμέρᾳ stands connected immediately with the participles κατηγορούντων and ἀπολογουμένων which makes the passage to mean, that in the judgment day, the consciences of the heathen will accuse them of all that Paul has charged upon them. Several of these commentators, however, think that Paul means only to say, that *a fortiori* their consciences will then accuse them; without meaning to say, that they do not accuse them in the present life.

To this last interpretation Tholuck seems to accede. But I cannot accord with this exegesis, because the object of the writer, in vs. 13—15, seems plainly to be merely a justification or confirmation of what he had said in v. 12, viz. that the heathen who had *no revelation*, still had a *law* which they were bound to obey, and by which they must be judged. How does Paul establish this? By an appeal to the fact that they have a conscience or a moral sense, and that they pass judgment of a moral nature upon their own actions. To say that this conscience and moral sense will be developed at the judgment day, is saying what is not sufficiently apposite to his purpose. At the judgment-day, the heathen will be tried by what? By the law under which they were placed, and under which they acted, in the present life. What was this law? That of conscience or moral sense. Then the *accusing* and *excusing*, which are appealed to as evidence of this moral sense, are exercised in the present world; i. e. its exercise *here* must of course be appealed to in order to sustain the apostle's argument, by which he designs to establish their present guilt.

For these reasons I must accede to the prevailing opinion among critics, viz. that ἐν ἡμέρᾳ is either to be joined with κριθήσονται in v. 12, and that vs. 13—15 are a *parenthetic* explanation or confirmation of v. 12; or (which I think preferable) make vs. 11—15 *parenthetic*, and unite v. 16, ἐν ἡμέρᾳ κ. τ. λ., with v. 11.

Τὰ κρυπτά augments the force of the affirmation: 'God will not only bring into judgment the *external* actions of men, but all their *secret* thoughts, desires, and affections.' Tholuck understands it as referring to the secret judgment of the mind or conscience, mentioned in the preceding verse, and makes the sense to be, that God will bring into *open* judgment, all the *secret* judgments of the mind. But does this accord with the nature of the case? It is not the moral judgment of the mind, when it accords with the decisions of the divine law (as is here supposed), which the apostle means to represent as judged by God; for these are not matters of punishment, when they are correct; but it is the secret wickedness of men, as well as their open vices, that will make the final judgment a time of awful terror. That such a view of the subject is here intended, seems to me quite plain; and so Turretin, Flatt, and most others. To the very same purpose Paul speaks in 1 Cor. 4: 5, where he represents the day of judgment as the time, when God will bring to light τὰ κρυπτά τοῦ σκότους . . . καὶ τὰς βουλὰς τῶν καρδιῶν.

Κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιόν μου, according to the gospel which I preach; compare 2 Tim. 2: 8. 1 Cor. 15: 1. Some have understood this of a *written* gospel of the apostle; but without any good critical or historical evidence.

Διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, by Jesus Christ. Compare Acts 17: 31. John 5: 27, 22. 17: 2. Acts 10: 42.

By affirming that God will judge τὰ κρυπτά according to his *gospel*, Paul seems to intimate, that a judgment-day is not plainly revealed by the light of nature; or at least, that the *extent* of the sentence which will be passed at that time, is not understood by the heathen. Notions of reward and punishment, in some form or other, belong to almost all the systems of heathenism; but such explicit views of a judgment-day as the gospel gives, are no where else to be found.

As the *secrets* of all hearts are to be revealed and judged, in the great day of trial, what but *Omniscience* is capable of passing sentence? To God alone is ascribed the power and prerogative of searching the heart; see 1 Sam. 16: 7. 1 Chron. 28: 9. 29: 17. Ps. 7: 9. Jer. 11:

20. 17: 10. Rom. 8: 27. To Christ the same power is ascribed in Acts 1: 24. Rev. 2: 23, besides the present passage. How can the Supreme Judge of all the human race be less than *omniscient*? How can he do *full* and *impartial* justice, with any knowledge short of *omniscience*?

(17) The attentive reader cannot help observing the skill and address, which Paul exhibits in this chapter. His object is, to shew that his kinsmen the Jews are equally guilty with the Gentiles, or even more so; and consequently that salvation by grace is the only salvation which is possible for them. But knowing the proud and selfish feelings which the Jews possessed, in regard to this subject, he does not assail them at once, but gradually, and with great address. In vs. 1—8 of the present chapter, he discusses the subject on general grounds, bringing forward considerations applicable either to Jew or Gentile, but not once naming either. In vs. 9—16 he makes the application of these considerations to both, and shews why both are to be considered as transgressors of the divine law, the one having sinned against the revelation contained in the Scriptures, the other against that which the book of nature discloses.

But he has not yet done with the subject. Guilt is proportioned to light and love abused. He ventures therefore, in the next place, to prefer a heavier charge against the Jews, than he had done against the Gentiles. He takes them on their own ground; admitting, for the sake of argument, all the claims to pre-eminence which they were accustomed to advance; and then he shews that these only increase their guilt so much the more, in case of disobedience.

Εἰ δὲ . . . ἐπνομαΐην, if now thou art surnamed Jew. The reading *ιδέ*, (from which comes our English version *behold*), is found in very few manuscripts, and is of no good authority. The only difficulty with *εἰ δὲ* is, that it makes a *πρώτασις*, to which there seems, at first view, to be no corresponding *ἀπόδοσις*. However, this is not in reality the case; for vs. 21 seq. make in substance an *apodosis*. The relation between the two parts stands thus: 'If now thou art called a Jew, etc., i. e. if thou dost in fact enjoy a high pre-eminence as to privileges, . . . still thou dost transgress the very law which thou teachest, and of which thou dost make thy boast.'

Ἰουδαῖος, a name of honour, much coveted by the Jews; comp. Gal. 2: 15. Phil. 3: 5. Rev. 2: 9.—*Ἐπνομαΐην*, more formal and solemn than *ὀνομαΐην*. It is appropriate also; inasmuch as *Ἰουδαῖος* is a *surname*, which may be added to the individual name of every Hebrew.

Ἐπαναπαύῃ τῷ νόμῳ, *thou reatest upon the law, or thou leanest upon the law.* Ἐπαναπαύω corresponds to the Hebrew יָשַׁב, *to lean upon, to restore, to prop up one's self by*; see in the Sept. 2 K. 7: 2, 17, ἐπανεπαύετο τῇ χειρὶ αὐτοῦ. This verb is also used in the sense of *adhering to*; see 1 Macc. 8: 12. Either meaning gives a good sense in the verse before us. I prefer the first, as being the more usual sense of the word, and altogether apposite. The Jew *leaned upon* the law, as defending his claims to precedence and to acceptance with God.—Νόμῳ of course means here the *Mosaic law*, or the *Jewish Scriptures*.

Καὶ . . . θεῶ, *and gloriest in God*; i. e. dost claim to thyself honour or glory, because Jehovah, the only living and true God, is thy God; compare Deut. 4: 7. Ps. 147: 19, 20. 2 Sam. 7: 23. It was on this account, that the Jew felt himself so far elevated above the Gentile, that he disdained all comparison with him. As to the construction of καυχᾶσαι with ἐν and the Dative case, see Wahl on the word.

(18) Καὶ . . . διαφέροντα, *and art acquainted with [his] will, and canst distinguish things that differ.* Γινώσκεις, *knowest, art acquainted with*, designates what the Jews were accustomed to say of themselves; or if viewed simply as a declaration of the apostle, the meaning is: 'Thou hast the means of knowing, thou art instructed in.' Τὸ θέλημα, *his will*; where almost all the commentators say that αὐτοῦ or τοῦ θεοῦ is to be supplied after θέλημα. But this is unnecessary; for, as is well known, the article frequently has the sense of a pronoun; see Middleton on the Greek article, chap. I. § 3. E. g. Acts 17: 28, τοῦ γὰρ γένος ἔσμεν, *for we are of his γένος*.

Δοκιμάζεις may mean, either to *distinguish*, or to *approve*; the word having both these meanings in the New Testament and in the classics. So διαφέροντα may mean, *things that differ*, or *things that excel*; the *usus loquendi* in both senses being equally certain. Tholuck explains the phrase as meaning: 'Thou approvest the things which are excellent.' I prefer the other sense, because the idea of *knowledge* or *instruction* is the one here intended to be urged; as is plain from the sequel. Such being the case, *to distinguish things that differ* is more characteristic of this, than the other rendering, and therefore more appropriate. *Things that differ*, are virtue and vice, i. e. lawful and unlawful, praiseworthy and base things.

Κατεχόμενος ἐκ τοῦ νόμου, *being instructed by the law*; i. e. being taught or enlightened by the Scriptures.

(19) *Πέποιθάς τε . . . σκότει*, and thou art confident that thou thyself art a guide of the blind, a light to those who are in darkness. This is figurative language, designed to shew, in a strong light, the claims to superiority over the Gentiles, which were made by the Jews. *A guide to the blind* signifies one who is an instructor by means of superior knowledge; i. e. an instructor of those who are in a state of gross ignorance, viz. the Gentiles; see Matt. 15: 14.—*Φῶς τῶν ἐν σκότει*, the same idea by the use of another figure. Compare Is. 49: 6. Luke 2: 32. John 1: 8, 9, 4, 5, respecting the signification of the word *light*. *Σκότος* here, as often elsewhere, designates a state of ignorance.

(20) *Παιδευτήν . . . νηπίων*, an instructor of the ignorant, a teacher of little children. "*Ἀφρων* means one who has not mental skill or consideration; secondarily, an ignorant person.—*Νηπίων* of course here means, children of such an age as that they may receive instruction. I have therefore rendered it *little children*, in preference to *babes*, which naturally designates those not sufficiently mature for instruction.

"*Ἐχοντα . . . ἐν τῷ νόμῳ*, having the delineation of true knowledge in the Scriptures. *Μόρφωσιν* may be used in a bad or good sense. In a bad sense it occurs in 2 Tim. 3: 5, where *the form* (*μόρφωσιν*) of godliness is opposed to the power of it, i. e. hypocritical pretences to piety are opposed to the real exercise of it. But the verb *μορφόω* is used in a good sense, in Gal. 4: 19, 'until Christ *μορφωθῆ* be formed in you.' The synonyme of *μόρφωσις*, viz. *ὑποτύπωσις*, is used in a good sense 2 Tim. 1: 13, 'hold fast *ὑποτύπωσις* of sound doctrine,' etc. *Μόρφωσις* means *form, external appearance; also delineation, sketch*, i. e. imitated form. I understand it in the good sense, i. e. as meaning *delineation*, in our verse, because the apostle is enumerating the supposed, or rather the acknowledged, advantages of the Jews. One of these was, that *true knowledge*, (in distinction from the philosophy falsely so called of the Greeks), was in their possession, or at least in their power.

Τῆς γνώσεως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, of true knowledge; a Hendiadys, in which the latter noun qualifies the former. The meaning of the whole is: 'Est tibi vera sapientia in lege adumbrata.'

(21) *Ὁ οὖν . . . διδάσκεις*; dost thou, then, who teachest others, not instruct thyself? This forms the apodosis to the protasis which commenced with *εἰ δέ* in v. 17. Argumentum ad hominem; for it is as much as to say: 'Thou pridest thyself in thy superior knowledge,

and requirest all others to sit at thy feet in the humble capacity of learners; making these lofty professions, art thou thyself ignorant of what thou professest to know? The apostle implies by this, that many of the Jews were criminally ignorant.

‘Ο κηρούστων . . . κλέπτεις; *thou who proclaimest that [men] must not steal, dost thou steal?* Dost thou practise the very vice, against which thou dost so loudly protest?

(22) ‘Ο λέγων . . . μοιχεύεις; *thou who forbiddest to commit adultery, dost thou commit adultery?* A crime very common among the Jews; for even the Talmud accuses some of the most celebrated Rabbies of this vice.

‘Ο βδελυσσόμενος . . . ἱεροσυλεῖς; *dost thou who abhorrest idols, commit robbery in sacred things?* Since the Babylonish captivity, the Jews have always expressed the greatest abhorrence of idolatry. But still, the real criminality of idolatry consists in taking from the only living and true God that which belongs to him, and bestowing it upon something which is worthless and vain. Now the Jews, who were prone to keep back tithes and offerings (Mal. 1: 8, 12, 13, 14. 3: 10. Mark 7: 11), by so doing robbed God of that which was due to him, notwithstanding they professed a great abhorrence of this. I apprehend, however, that the word ἱεροσυλεῖς is here used in a wider extent than this interpretation simply considered would imply; viz. in the latitude of designating every kind of act which denies to God his sovereign honours and claims.

The exegesis of this word, which assigns to it a *literal* sense, viz. that of *committing sacrilege*, i. e. of robbing the temples of idols, and converting their riches to individual use, (contrary to the precept in Deut. 7: 25), is wanting in respect to a *historical* basis for its support. When and where were the Jews accustomed to act in this manner? Yet Chrysostom, Theophylact, Le Clerc, Koppe, and others, have defended this interpretation.

(23) ‘Ὅς ἐν . . . ἀτιμάζεις; *thou, who gloriest in the law, by the transgression of the law dost thou dishonour God?* For the construction of *καυχᾶσαι ἐν νόμῳ*, see on v. 17. As God was the author of the law, or supreme legislator, so the transgression of it was a dishonouring of him, a contemning or setting light by his authority. For the form of *καυχᾶσαι* (second pers. sing. pres. Middle voice), see Buttman's Gram. § 93. III. 1. 2. Winer's N. Test. Gram. § 13. 2. b; and comp. in Matt. 5. 36. 8: 2. Mark 1: 40. 9: 22. Luke 16: 25. 1 Cor. 4: 7. Rom. 11: 18, the like forms. The ending -άσαι for

the second person singular, is the ancient one, out of which the usual ending is made by contraction and dropping the σ.

(24) *Τὸ γὰρ . . . γέγραπται*, for the name of God is blasphemed by you, or on your account, among the Gentiles; as it is written. *Γὰρ confirmantis*.—*Δι' ὑμῶν* may mean, by you as authors or agents; like *ζῶ δια τὸν πατέρα, vivo, Patre vitæ meæ auctore*, John. 6: 57. So *ζήσεται δι' ἐμέ*, *ibid.*, et sic alibi; see Bretschn. Lex. *διά*, II. 1. *Δι' ὑμῶν* may also mean, on your account, i. e. you being the cause or ground of the blasphemy in question. The latter would, at first, seem to be the most probable meaning here; and this accords with the general usage of *διά*; yet the apostle appears to have had in his mind Ezek. 36: 23, where the charge is made against the Jews themselves, of profaning God's name among the Gentiles. The passage in Is. 52: 5 does not seem apposite, (although this is usually referred to as the one which is here quoted); for in this last passage, the Jews are not represented as criminal; it is the *heathen* who blaspheme the name of Jehovah, (so I understand *בְּלִי-הַיְהוָה שָׁמַר מִמְּנֵהוּ*), because he permitted the Jews to be led away captive. On the contrary, in Ezek. 36: 23, the Jews themselves are guilty of the crime alleged. And the like sense is demanded in the verse before us.

As to *ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι*, it is merely *circumstantial*. It appears to be cited here, because it stands connected in the original Hebrew with the rest of the sentiment. The fact that the Jews themselves dishonour the name of God, is that which the apostle means to declare; not where they do so, nor whom they may occasion to do so. The apostle does not cite the passage in order to *prove* (in the proper sense of this word) the allegation which he had made; but merely to *illustrate* and *confirm* it. It is as much as to say: 'I bring no new charge against you; the same thing in substance was said, long ago, by one of your own prophets.'

(25) *Περὶ τομῆς . . . πράσσεις*, *circumcision indeed is profitable, if thou dost obey the law*. *Μέν* here belongs to the *protasis*; the apodosis of which commences with *ἐὰν δέ*. Of *γὰρ* we may say: *Orationi continuandæ inservit*; but here the formula *μὲν γὰρ* is *concessive* as well as *continuative*; it is as much as to say: 'I grant, indeed, that there is some truth in what you allege, viz. that circumcision is of advantage, or is a privilege.' *Περὶ τομῆς*, *circumcision*, includes the idea of being a member of the Jewish commonwealth, and entitled to all the external privileges of the same. The *sign* here stands for the thing signified. 'I grant,' says the apostle, 'that

the privileges attached to being a Jew are important, provided any one obeys the law by which the Jews are bound, so that he thereby becomes entitled to the blessings promised only to the obedient.'

'*Ἐὰν δὲ . . . γένοιεν*, but if thou becomest a transgressor of the law, thy circumcision becomes uncircumcision; i. e. if thou dost not obey the law, then the privileges to which thou art entitled as a Jew, will not save thee; thou wilt not be considered or treated as any better than an uncircumcised person, i. e. a Gentile or heathen man. In a word, not external privileges or pre-eminence, in themselves considered, but the use which is made of them, entitles any one to divine approbation or favour.

How much the Jews attributed to circumcision, is strikingly illustrated in a passage of the Talmud (Shemoth Rabba, sect. 19. fol. 118): "Said Rabbi Berachias, When heretical, apostate, and impious Jews say: 'We cannot go down to hell because we are circumcised;' what does the blessed God do? He sends his angel, et præputia eorum attrahit, ut ipsi preputiati [uncircumcised] in infernum descendant."

(26) '*Ἐὰν οὖν . . . φυλάσῃ*, if then the uncircumcised keep the precepts of the law. *Ἀκροβυστία*, abstract for concrete, as exhibited in the translation.—*δικαιώματα*, precepts, מִצְוֹת.

Οὐχὶ ἢ . . . λογισθήσεται, shall not his uncircumcision be counted for circumcision? That is, shall not he, in a heathen state, be accepted as readily as a Jew who obeys in a state of circumcision? In other words: Neither circumcision, nor the want of it, determines our deserts in the view of our Maker and Judge; but a spirit of filial obedience. "If ye love me, ye will keep my commandments."—*Εἰς περιτομήν* is after the Hebrew analogy, which puts ה before a noun designating that into which another thing has been changed, or which it has become, e. g. אֲנָשִׁים הָיָה, *be men*, 1 Sam. 4: 9; 'Jehovah made the rib אִשָּׁה, *a woman*, Gen. 2: 22.

(27) *Καὶ κρινεῖ . . . τελοῦσα*, yea, he who keeps the law in his natural uncircumcised state, shall condemn. *Καὶ affirmantis*. *Ἐκ φύσεως* coming between the article and its following noun, takes of course the place of an adjective. *Φύσις* plainly means here, what we call *a state of nature*, in distinction from a state in which a revelation is enjoyed. The apostle states here, and in the preceding verse, *a principle* for illustration merely; he does not aver, that what he describes is matter of *historical fact*; for this would contradict the whole tenor and object of his reasoning in general, which is to shew

that *all men without exception have sinned*, and therefore that all without exception must be saved by grace through faith in Christ, and can be saved only in this way. The efforts to prove from such passages as the present, that there have been heathen who kept the whole law of God, are surely fruitless. The main argument of the apostle himself falls to the ground, if this be once admitted. It seems quite plain, that the whole is merely a *supposed case*; supposed for the sake of illustrating a principle; and in the process of argumentation, nothing is more common than this.

Σὲ τὸν . . . νόμον, [condemn] *thee who art a transgressor of the law, although enlightened by the Scriptures, and a partaker of circumcision.* Διὰ γράμματος καὶ περιτομῆς, here coming between the article τὸν and its corresponding noun παραβάτην, evidently perform the office of *adjectives* qualifying παραβάτην. The διὰ here is *dià conditionis vel statús*, if I may so speak. Διὰ is not unfrequently placed before nouns which designate *state* or *condition*; e. g. Rom. 4: 11, those who believe δι' ἀκροβυστίας, *in an uncircumcised state*; 2 Cor. 2: 4, I have written this διὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, *in a state of much weeping*; 2 Cor. 5: 10, that every one may receive τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, [according to] *the things done in a bodily state*; Heb. 9: 12. 2 Pet. 1: 3. 1 John 5: 6; see Bretschn. Lex. διὰ, I. 2. c. The idea intended to be conveyed by the apostle, is quite plain; viz. 'If a Gentile should do what the law requires, would not this shew that you are worthy of condemnation who transgress the law, although you enjoy the light of revelation and the privileges which a state of circumcision confers?'

(28) Οὐ γὰρ . . . ἐστίν, *for he is not a Jew, who is one externally*; i. e. he who is descended from Abraham, is circumcised, and enjoys the privileges of a written revelation, is not a Jew in the important and spiritual sense of this word; he is merely an *external* (not an internal) Jew. The grammatical construction completed without any ellipsis, would be, ὁ ἐν τῷ φανεροῦ [Ἰουδαῖος], οὐκ Ἰουδαῖός ἐστιν.

Οὐδὲ ἡ ἐν . . . περιτομή, *nor is that which is external*, [merely] *in the flesh, circumcision*; i. e. that is not circumcision in its high and true sense, which is merely external, which pertains merely to the flesh. The sentence filled out would read thus: οὐδὲ ἡ ἐν τῷ φανεροῦ [περιτομή], ἐν σαρκὶ [περιτομή], περιτομή [ἐστι], i. e. true περιτομή.

(29) Ἄλλ' ὁ ἐν . . . Ἰουδαῖος, *but he who is a Jew in the hidden part*, i. e. who is spiritually or internally a Jew, such an one only

deserves the appellation Ἰουδαῖος. The clause filled out would stand thus: ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ Ἰουδαῖος, [Ἰουδαῖός ἐστιν]; which latter clause the mind of the writer supplied from the first part of v. 28.

Καὶ περιτομή . . . γράμματι, and the circumcision of the heart, a spiritual not a literal one, [is the true circumcision.] There is the same ellipsis here, as in the preceding clause, περιτομή ἐστίν being understood after οὐ γράμματι. The words πνεύματι οὐ γράμματι, Cæcumenius, Grotius, and most interpreters construe as referring to the Holy Spirit and to the precepts of the law; i. e. circumcision of the heart wrought by the operation of the Holy Spirit, not by following merely the literal precepts of the law. The sense is good, and the doctrine true; but I apprehend that the writer here uses πνεύματι and γράμματι merely as adjectives or adverbs to characterize more graphically the περιτομή καρδίας which he had just mentioned.

Οὗ ὁ ἔπαινος . . . Θεοῦ, whose praise is not of men, but of God; that is, the praise of the Jew, who is truly a Jew after the hidden or internal man, is not of men, but of God. "Man looketh on the outward appearance, but God looketh on the heart." The Jews considered it as a great privilege and a ground of high pre-eminence over others, that they were descended from Abraham, were circumcised, and were entrusted with the Scriptures. 'All this,' says the apostle, 'does not entitle them, in the least degree, to the praise of God. The state of the heart, in the internal man, is what he considers; and this alone is of any real moral value in his sight.' 'You,' says he, 'who are nothing more than *external* Jews, are not Jews in the high and noble sense which will make you to be heirs of the grace of life or of the promises of God. You have, because of your external privileges, no pre-eminence over the heathen, on the score of *moral accountability*. All men, in regard to such an accountability, stand on a level; for each will be judged according to the law under which he acted; the Gentiles, by the law of nature; the Jews, by revelation.'

CHAP. III. 1—20.

Nothing was more natural than for the Jew, who had conceived the most exalted notions of the advantages to which he was entitled from his external privileges, to feel strong objections to such a representation of the apostle, as reduced Jews and Gentiles to a level in a *moral* respect. It was to be expected that the Jew would indignantly ask, (and so the apostle represents him as asking): 'Of what advantage then can Judaism be, provided you make a correct representation of the case?' v. 1. To this the apostle replies in v. 2, stating that the benefit of more light was conferred by such a privilege. But the Jew, not satisfied with a claim to pre-eminence of this kind, further inquires, how the apostle's views could be reconciled with God's fidelity to the promises which he had made to the Jews, v. 3. The apostle replies, that this fidelity must not for a moment be called in question, but that we must adopt the sentiment of David (Ps. 51: 4) in regard to this, v. 4. The Jew, still dissatisfied, urges further questions, by which he intends to hedge up the apostle's way: 'If the sins of the Jewish nation serve to render more conspicuous the justice of God, is it not unjust that he should punish us?' v. 5. Not at all, replies the apostle; for on the same ground you might object to the truth, that God will judge the world, and of course punish the wicked; for his justice will in this be displayed in such a way as to redound to his glory, v. 6. The Jew, still dissatisfied, asks: 'If God's faithfulness becomes more conspicuous by my unfaithfulness, why should I be condemned?' v. 7. To this the apostle replies, that he might just as well say: 'Let us do evil that good may come;' which in fact some did charge him with saying, but they deserved condemnation for so doing, v. 8.

The Jew again asks, with evident disappointment: 'How then have we Jews any pre-eminence over the Gentiles?' To which the apostle replies: You have none, in respect to the matter that I am discussing. All are sinners. Your own Scriptures do abundantly bear testimony that your nation are transgressors, as well as the heathen. Prophets of different ages have borne testimony to this point; and testimony which conveys charges of the most aggravated nature, vs. 10—18. Now as what is thus said in the Scriptures was plainly said concerning the Jews, it follows, that your own sacred books bear testimony to the same doctrine which I affirm to be true. Consequently the whole world, Jews and Gentiles, are guilty before God, v. 19. It follows from this, that salvation in any other way than by gratuitous pardon through Christ, is altogether impossible, v. 20.

(1) *Τὶ οὖν . . . Ἰουδαίου*; *what advantage then hath the Jew?* or, *what pre-eminence hath the Jew?*—*Οὖν*, then, is very often joined with *τι* in interrogatives. It signifies as much as to say: 'Allowing what you affirm, then how can this or that take place; or, how can it be so or so?' etc.—*Περισσόν* signifies *that which exceeds or abounds, precedence, præstantia*. Sentiment: 'If what you say be true, then how is the Jew in any better condition than the Gentile, or what pre-eminence has he over him?'

^α*Ἡ τίς . . . περιτομῆς*, or *what is the advantage of circumcision, or what is the use of circumcision?* That is, if the Jew is subject to the same condemning sentence as the Gentile, of what use is the rite of circumcision, and the relation in which it places him to the people of God?

(2) Πολύ . . . τρόπον, *much* [advantage] *in many respects*, or *in every respect*. Rendered in this latter way, πάντα would refer of course to something in the preceding context; and *every respect* would mean, every one already touched upon, e. g. in 2: 17—23. Literally interpreted, πάντα must mean *in all respects*. But the real sense of the phrase here is better given by the translation, *in various or many respects, in a variety of ways*.

Πρωτον μὲν γὰρ . . . θεοῦ, *the principal one however, is, that they were entrusted with the oracles of God*. Beza renders πρωτον, *primarium illud est quod*. But Tholuck takes the μὲν which follows πρωτον, to be the μὲν of a *protasis*, to which indeed no apodosis succeeds. He says, that 'it agrees well with the fire of Paul's mind, to regard him as having forgotten what was to follow, or to have considered the *first thing* here suggested as adequate to his purpose, without suggesting any more.' But I must at least feel greater necessity than I see here, before I can adopt such a solution. Πρωτον clearly means, in some cases, *imprimis, maxime omnium, particularly, specially, most of all*; e. g. Matt. 6: 33. Luke 12: 1. 2 Pet. 1: 20. 3: 3. 1 Tim. 2: 1. In these cases, it does not signify *first* in such a sense as implies a *second* in order, but *first* as most eminent, or as the most important thing; like the Hebrew רַאשִׁיָּה, e. g. רַאשִׁיָּה גְּדִיָּה, the most distinguished of nations, Num. 24: 20. Amos 6: 6. —Tholuck further suggests, that μὲν renders it probable that a *protasis* is here intended, although he does not think this decisive. And truly it is not decisive; for μὲν is not unfrequently used *absolutely*, i. e. without any δέ following, both in the classical writers and in the books of the New Testament; e. g. Rom. 11: 13. 2 Cor. 12: 12. 1 Thess. 2: 18. Rom. 7: 12. 10: 1, where "explicationi inservit;" and so μὲν γὰρ in Acts 28: 22. 2 Cor. 9: 1. 11: 4. Heb. 6: 16. 7: 18; μὲν οὖν, Acts 26: 9. 1 Cor. 6: 4, 7, et alibi. Μὲν γὰρ, in cases such as those just cited, seems evidently designed to answer the place of the Latin *quidem, equidem*, i. e. to give *intensity* to a declaration; and μὲν may in such cases be called *μὲν intensivum*, or *μὲν concessivum*, viz. implying that what is asserted, is supposed to be conceded; or at least that the speaker thinks it plainly ought to be conceded.

So in the case before us, μὲν γὰρ implies, that the principal advantage [πρωτον] of the Jew, it must be conceded, lay in his superior illumination on account of having the gift of a revelation bestowed upon him. We may translate (ad sensum) thus: 'The most important advantage, as you must concede, is, that,' etc.; or,

'The most important advantage, indeed, is,' etc.; both having substantially the same sense.

"Οτι . . . θεοῦ is not to be construed by taking λόγια as a Nominative, for it is the Accusative after ἐπιστεύθησαν. It is a principle in the Greek language, that where a verb in its *active* voice governs the Accusative of a *thing* and the Dative of a *person*, the Accusative is retained after a verb of the *passive* voice. Such is the case with πιστεύω· see Luke 16: 11. John 2: 24; compare for the passive voice, 1 Cor. 9: 17. Gal. 2: 7. 1 Thess. 2: 4. 1 Tim. 1: 11. Tit. 1: 3. So frequently in the classics; see Wahl's Lex. in verb. Winer's N. Test. Gramm. § 40. 1. ed. 3d.

Λόγια, oracles, like the רַב־דָּבָר of the Hebrews, means any kind of divine response or communication, *effatum divinum*.

In regard to the sentiment itself, it is as much as to say, that more light and better spiritual advantages were bestowed upon the Jews, than upon the Gentiles. Access to the Scriptures would give more light; and in consequence of the state in which revelation placed them, to them were made the first offers of the gospel.

(3) *Τι γάρ; what then?* The usual mode of asking questions, γάρ being very often joined with an interrogation. It seems to be γάρ *intensivum*, in most of such cases; as Acts 16: 37, οὐ γάρ, *not at all*, 2 Tim. 2: 7. Job 6: 8. Phil. 1: 18. In the present case, γάρ seems to have a reference to what had been said in the preceding verse. The course of thought appears to be thus: 'What then shall we say to this, viz. to that which I am now going to suggest?' That is: 'Allowing what you have said to be true, then if some of the Jews were unfaithful, as you intimate, would not this detract from the veracity of the divine promises?'

Εἰ ἠπίστησαν . . . καταργήσει; *if some were unfaithful, will their unfaithfulness render void the faithfulness of God?* That is, if some of the Jews have apostatized, and are in no better condition than the heathen, how will this consist with the fidelity of God as to his promises made to the Jewish nation?—Ἠπίστησαν is from ἀπιστέω· which comes again from ἄπιστος, *unfaithful*, (πιστός often means *faithful*). Ἀπιστέω, therefore, means *not to be πιστός*, i. q. *to be unfaithful, treacherous*, etc. The meaning is: If the Jews disregarded, i. e. would not receive and obey, divine revelation, etc.—Πίστις, *fidelity, faithfulness in keeping promises*; compare Matt. 23: 23, and perhaps Gal. 5: 22. 1 Tim. 1: 5, 19. Rev. 2: 19. 13: 10.

Μὴ γένοιτο, *hoc minime eveniat!* *Let not this be supposed; or*

not at all, by no means! Optative of *γίνομαι* joined with a negative. This should be included in v. 4. The Hebrew לֹא־יִשְׁתַּחֲוֶה corresponds to this.

(4) *Γινώσθω δὲ . . . ψεύστης*, but let God be accounted true, although every man be impeached of falsehood. *Ἀληθής* means *veracious, faithful to his word or promise*.—*Ψεύστης* is the opposite of *ἀληθής*. The meaning is: Let God be regarded as faithful, although all men should thereby be deemed guilty of unfaithfulness; i. e. much more becoming and proper is it, that men should impute unfaithfulness to themselves, than to God.

To confirm the pious sentiment which he had just uttered, the apostle appeals to an expression of David (Ps. 51: 7), where, in signifying his penitence in view of his past transgressions, he says (Sept. Ps. 50: 4): “Against thee only have I sinned, and done this evil in thy sight, ὅπως ἂν . . . κληρονομήσω σε, so that thou mayest be justified when thou speakest, or in thy words (בְּדַבְרֶיךָ), and be clear when thou judgest or condemnest.” The Psalmist means to say, that as he had sinned in a grievous manner against God, so God is to be justified altogether, when he reproveth him for his sin, and pronounces against it the sentence of condemnation. The like use would Paul make of the sentiment contained in these words. ‘Let us not,’ says he, ‘attempt to justify ourselves, when we are accused of being unfaithful; but let us justify God in all respects, when he condemns our conduct and vindicates his own.’

Ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σου means, *when thou utterest reproof or condemnation*; i. e. the connection in which it stands, of necessity gives it such a turn.—*Νικήσῃς*, *mightest overcome*, Heb. תְּנַצֵּחַ , *mightest be pure*, i. e. mightest be adjudged to be pure, held to be guiltless or faultless. He who, in a judicial contest, was adjudged to be *pure or guiltless*, of course was the victor; and on this account the Septuagint *νικήσῃς* (adopted by the apostle) is a translation of the Hebrew *ad sensum*, although not *ad verbum*.

Ἐν τῷ κληρονομήσει σε, Flatt and others construe as being in the *passive voice*. But the sense does not require it; or rather, it does not seem to me to admit it. The Hebrew runs thus; $\text{בְּדַבְרֶיךָ . . . תְּנַצֵּחַ}$, *when thou speakest . . . when thou judgest*. So *κλῆρονομῶμαι* in the *middle voice*, means not only *to strive with, to plead*, etc., but also *to judge, prove, decide, condemn*, etc.; see Passow, *κλῆρω*, b. 4—6. There is no difficulty, therefore, in following the literal sense of the Hebrew, by rendering *κλῆρονομῶμαι* as belonging to the *middle voice*.

Sentiment: 'Whenever God speaks by way of reproving or condemning men, let him be accounted altogether just, and let him be fully vindicated.'

(5) *Εἰ δὲ . . . συνίστησι*, but if our unrighteousness commend the righteousness of God. *Δέ* "addit vim interrogationi, et usurpatur præsertim interrogatione repetitâ," Bretschn. Lex. δέ. 3. b. The sense of *δέ* is plainly *adversative* here.—*Ἄδικία* is here the *generic* appellation of sin, for which a *specific* name (*ἄπιστία*) was employed in v. 3, and *ψεύσμα* is used in v. 7. In like manner, the *δικαιοσύνη* in v. 5, which is a *generic* appellation, is expressed by a *specific* one (*πίστις*) in v. 3, and by *ἀλήθεια* in v. 7. The idea is *substantially* the same, which is designated by these respectively corresponding appellations. *Fidelity, uprightness, integrity*, are designated by *πίστις, δικαιοσύνην*, and *ἀλήθεια* while *ἄπιστία, ἄδικία*, and *ψεύσματι*, designate *unfaithfulness, want of uprightness, and false dealing*. All of these terms have more or less reference to the *ברית*, *covenant or compact* (so to speak), which existed between God and his ancient people. But in the present verse, they are to be taken in a sense somewhat more enlarged.

Δικαιοσύνην θεοῦ does not here mean, (as it does in most cases where it is used in this epistle), the *justification which is of God*; it designates the *divine justice*, as the context clearly shews. For here the apostle (or the objector) is speaking of that attribute of God, *which is concerned with the judging and punishing of offenders*. Of course, the *retributive justice* of God must be understood by *δικαιοσύνην θεοῦ*.

Συνίστησι, sets off to advantage, shews forth, renders conspicuous. — *Τί ἔροῦμεν*; what shall we say? That is, how can we persevere in maintaining, that the unbelieving part of the Jewish nation will be cast off, so long as even their very unbelief will be instrumental in setting off to more advantage, or in rendering more conspicuous, the retributive justice of God, and so of causing the more glory to his name? The equivalent of *τί ἔροῦμεν*, is common in the Rabbinic writings, where it runs thus: *מַאי מְאִי אֵיכָבָד לְמִימְרָא*, *quid est dicendum*? This is usually expressed by the abbreviation *מֵאָד*.

Μὴ ἄδικος . . . ὀργήν; is God unjust, who inflicts punishment? If the interrogation were here made by *μὴ οὐ*, is not, etc., the solution of the sentence would be easy. But *μὴ* corresponds to the Latin *num, ne*, and asks a question to which a *negative* answer is usually expected as a matter of course. The Attics employed it, however,

with somewhat greater liberty, and in cases where a negative answer did not of course follow. On the contrary, οὐ is used in an interrogation, where an affirmative answer is of course expected. For an example of both cases: *Μὴ δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο εἶναι εὐήθης; Does this seem to you foolish?* Ans. no. *Οὐ καὶ καλὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν; Is not a good thing something excellent?* Ans. yes. We cannot translate, therefore, as Turretin and many others have done: *Nonne injustus Deus, dum infert iram?* i. e. is not God unjust, etc.? This would indeed make the sentiment more easy and intelligible, when viewed as coming from the objector; for that it is to be attributed to him, appears from the sequel, *κατ' ἄνθρωπον λέγω*. After all, however, nearly the same sentiment comes out of the passage in another way. The objector asks: *Τί ἐροῦμεν;* If now we suppose him to continue his interrogation, as plainly he does, we may then fill up the ellipsis in the next clause thus: *Μὴ [ἐροῦμεν ὅτι] ὁ θεὸς κ. τ. λ.* The intimation is this: 'Shall we say, then, as according to your suggestions we must necessarily be led to say, that God is unjust who inflicts punishment?' The answer of course is, No. Or (to use other words): 'Must we come to this, viz. that we should find it to be necessary to tax God with injustice, when he punishes?' For to such a conclusion (as the objector means to intimate), the principles of the apostle seem to lead.

As to the immediate occasion of such a question, on the part of the objector, the sentiment of the preceding verse seems to have furnished it. God, says the apostle, is to be justified in his condemning; yea, he is altogether to be vindicated in it, even if all men are by him found guilty of unfaithful and treacherous dealing. 'But,' replies the objector, 'on your ground we may go on and say, that glory redounds to God because of such dealing on the part of men; for this gives opportunity for God to display his justice to greater advantage than it could otherwise have been displayed. Why not, now, carry these considerations forward, and come to the result to which they would naturally lead? Why not conclude, that God is unjust when he inflicts punishment? For this would seem to be a necessary consequence, if it be true that his justice is displayed to the greatest advantage by reason of the wickedness of men, and he thus gets to himself the more honour and glory.'

Tholuck attributes *μη ὁ θεὸς κ. τ. λ.* to the apostle himself, as an answer to the preceding question. But the *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω*

and the *μη γένοιτο* which follow, seem to me clearly to decide against this.

Κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω, I speak after the manner of men; i. e. I speak as men are often accustomed to do. The expression itself is general; but the class of men whom the writer has in his mind here, are plainly the objectors to his doctrine. The expression κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω may mean: I speak more humano, i. e. in such a manner as is intelligible to men, in such language as men may comprehend; so ἀνθρώπινον λέγω, in Rom. 6: 19; and κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω, in Gal. 3: 15. In the sense first attributed to the phrase, the Greek and Latin writers often use the like expression; e. g. Aristoph. Ranæ, v. 1090, ὃν χρῆ φράζειν ἀνθρωπεῶς, which one must describe in a way that is usual among men; Athen. Deipnos. Tom. III. Lib. IX. 29, ἀνθρωπινῶς λαλεῖν, to speak like other folks. So Cicero: hominum more dicere, de Div. II. 64. In like manner the Rabbins, when they wish to express what is commonly understood or affirmed by men in general, say: כְּמִנְיָן אֲמַרְנָא, as men usually affirm or say.

(6) *Μη γένοιτο, by no means.* This is the *negative* answer, given by the apostle to the question: *Μη ἄδικος κ. τ. λ.*

Ἐπεὶ πῶς . . . κόσμον; otherwise, how shall God judge the world? i. e. if it is not to be denied that God is unjust, or if we must concede that he is unjust, then how shall we admit the doctrine of a future or general judgment?—Ἐπεὶ, otherwise; comp. Rom. 11: 6, 22. 1 Cor. 5: 10. 7: 14. 14: 16. 15: 29. Heb. 10: 2, et alibi. The question, 'How shall God judge the world?' is founded on the concessions or established opinion of the Jews respecting a judgment-day, which were well known to the apostle. The expression implies as much as to say: 'You Jews concede that there will be a time of judgment, when God will punish the wicked and reward the righteous. But how can this be, if your objections have any force? The retributive justice of God will be rendered conspicuous, when the wicked shall be condemned and punished, and God will be glorified thereby, just as in the present case; if this then be a reason why God should not punish, it is a reason why there should be no judgment; and in order to be consistent, you must deny this also.'

In this way we see, that the argument of the apostle is in a manner *ad hominem*, being founded on the concessions and established opinion of the Jews; which, however, in this instance, was in itself a well founded and correct opinion.

(7) *Εἰ γὰρ αὐτοῦ*, still, if the truth of God has abounded the more unto his glory, on account of my false dealing. Tholuck understands these to be the words of the apostle. To me they appear very plainly to be words which he attributes to the objector. The *γὰρ* at the beginning of the verse, points to a connection with v. 5, and denotes a *continuance* of the same theme, and is *γὰρ confirmantis*, i. e. it is placed before a sentence by which the objector endeavors to fortify his own opinion. This *γὰρ* does not so naturally attach itself to v. 6. As to *ἀλήθεια* and *ψεύσματος*, see on v. 5. *Ἀλήθεια* here means, God's *faithful dealings* with his people, both in his threats and promises; *ψεύσματος* means, their *unfaithfulness* as to his covenant, their false and treacherous dealings in respect to their vows and obligations. Sentiment: 'If the veracity and faithfulness of God are rendered more conspicuous, and this unto his own glory, by the false and deceitful conduct of his covenant people, why, etc.'

Τί ἔστι κρίνομαι; then why am I still condemned as a sinner? That is, why should I suffer punishment on account of that very thing which has contributed to the glory of God, inasmuch as it has occasioned the greater display of his perfections?

(8) *Καὶ μὴ ἀγαθά*; shall we then [say], (as it is slanderously reported, and as some affirm that we do say): Let us do evil that good may come? As *μὴ* is interrogative here, it cannot be rendered (as in our English version), *not*. *Μὴ* is connected with *ἔροῦμεν* or *λέγομεν* understood, as appears from the following clause with *ὅτι*. The answer of the apostle, is by a question which strongly implies disapprobation of the sentiment in the preceding clause: 'Why then may we not speak out and say: Let us do evil that good may come? as some do actually, although slanderously, accuse us of saying.' "*Οτι*, when the verse is thus explained, may be regarded as a particle marking *cited words*, (for so it is often used, in all parts of the New Testament), viz. the words *ποιήσωμεν κ. τ. λ.* Or the whole may be construed thus: *Shall we say, then, that we may do evil*, etc.

Βλασφημούμεθα, literally *we are slanderously reported*, viz. it is slanderously reported that we say, etc. In the paragraph above, I have rendered *ad sensum* rather than *ad literam*.

The occasion given for the enemies of the gospel thus to slander Paul and others, was, that he preached the doctrine, that God would be glorified by the display of his justice in the condemnation of

sinners, and that where sin abounded, grace did much more abound; doctrines easily abused by a carnal mind, but which contain truths awful and delightful. Would God that the abuse of them might have never extended beyond the apostolic age!

⁷ Ὡν τὸ κρίμα ἐνδικόν ἐστι, *whose condemnation is just*. He means, that the condemnation of those who falsely attributed such doctrines to the apostles and other preachers, was just; in other words, that their offence was of such a nature as that it deserved punishment.

(9) *Τί οὖν*; *What then?* The question is by the objector; and οὖν, in such a connection, implies as much as to say: 'What now can be gathered from all this?'

Προεχόμεθα; *Have we [Jews] any preference?* That is, allowing all that you have said to be true, what preference now can we assign to the Jews? Have they any ground at all for a claim of superiority?

Οὐ πάντως. *none at all*; i. e. none as it respects the great point in debate, viz. whether all men are sinners before God, and under the condemning sentence of his law. So the latter part of the verse leads us to explain the sentiment; and a comparison with vs. 1, 2 above, will oblige us thus to interpret it; for superiority of another kind, i. e. in external advantages, is there directly asserted of the Jews, by the apostle himself.

Προηγουσάμεθα . . . εἶναι, *for we have already made the charge against both Jews and Gentiles, that they are all under sin*. I cannot find, in the best lexicons, any evidence that *προαιτιάομαι* means *to prove*. *Αἰτία*, is *accusation, cause, ground, reason*; hence the verb *αἰτιάομαι* means, *to accuse, to shew cause, etc.*; generally in a *bad* sense, implying the support of a charge against any one. The apostle means to say, that having already advanced the charge against Jews and Gentiles of being sinners without exception, and of standing in need of the mercy proffered by the gospel, of course he cannot now concede, that the Jews have any exemption from this charge, or any ground of preference to the Gentiles, so far as the matter of justification is concerned.

ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν means, *under the power or control of sin*, subject to its dominion.

(10) *Καθὼς γέγραπται κ. τ. λ.* What is the object of this appeal? Evidently it is to illustrate and confirm the point now in debate. And what then is this point? Why plainly, that the Jews have no prefer-

ence over the Gentiles, so far as their guilt and inability to justify themselves are concerned. The apostle had just said, (in answer to the question put by a Jew, Have we any pre-eminence?) *Οὐ πάντως*. Why not? Because he had already involved the Jews, as well as the Gentiles, in the charge of universal guilt; therefore both were in the same condition, with respect to their need of a Saviour. What then is the object of further proof or illustration here? Surely it must be the point in question, viz. Whether in fact the Jews, equally with the Gentiles, lie under the imputation of guilt before God. The quotations then have special reference to the Jews. So Chrysostom, Calvin, Grotius, Tholuck, Flatt, and others. So v. 19 obliges us to construe the quotations in question.

The quotations are taken from various parts of the Hebrew Scriptures; and mostly in the words of the Septuagint. The general strain and object of them is to shew, that charges of guilt were made in ancient times against the Jews, of a nature not less aggravated than the charges now made by the apostle. The Jew could make no reply to this, so long as he allowed the full weight and authority of the Old Testament. The apostle, then, in adducing such charges from it, says in effect: 'You cannot accuse me of making strange and novel charges against you. Your own Scriptures are filled with charges of the like nature.'

That such is the general object of the quotations which follow, there seems to me no good reason to doubt. Certainly some of the passages adduced have not an *unlimited* signification, applicable to men of all times and all nations; at least they have not such a meaning in the Old Testament, in the connection in which they stand. Nothing can be more certain than that the writers of most of them are not treating of the question, whether *all* men are depraved; but are advancing charges against the unbelieving and impious part of the Jewish nation. Now what characterized unbelieving Jews of old, may still be affirmed of them, i. e. of all who reject a Saviour. This must proceed from wickedness of heart; and therefore the apostle may apply to all who are guilty of it, those descriptions of wicked Jews which the Old Testament exhibits.

Such seems to be the plain and obvious method of interpreting the quotations before us. I am well aware, that they have not unfrequently been understood and explained in a different way, viz. as having a *direct* bearing on the *universal* depravity of the human race. The context both in vs. 9 and 19 shews, however, that such an

assumption is not well grounded, and that the citations have respect to the apostle's argument in regard to the moral condition of all unbelieving Jews. I say *unbelieving* Jews; for it is not to his purpose to shew that such as believe and are already justified, are still under the condemning sentence of the law; nor could this be said without contradicting what he frequently asserts, in the sequel of this epistle.

In the way in which I interpret the quotations that follow, there is no difficulty with respect to the explanation of them, as they stand in the Old Testament. But in the other method, which makes them *universal* propositions, and makes the original authors to speak directly to the point of *universal* depravity, the difficulty of exegesis is insurmountable. Several of the passages, as they stand in the Old Testament, must have absolute violence done to them, in order to make them speak in this manner. This, in itself, is a strong reason for suspecting such an interpretation; and when united with the other reasons named, seems to be amply sufficient to justify us in rejecting it.

We proceed to consider each of the quotations separately. "Οὐκ οὐκ . . . εἷς, is a quotation *ad sensum* of Ps. 14: 1; where the Hebrew has אֵין עֵשָׂה טוֹב; and the Septuagint, οὐκ ἔστι ποιῶν χρηστότητα, οὐκ ἔστιν ἕως ἐνός. In Ps. LIII. (a repetition of Ps. XIV.), the Septuagint has simply, οὐκ ἔστι ποιῶν ἀγαθόν· while the Hebrew is the same as above. It would seem, therefore, that the apostle had his eye or his mind upon Ps. XIV., when he made the quotation before us; and that he has varied from the *diction*, but followed the *sense* of the original. Instead of saying, *there is none that doeth good*, he says, *there is none righteous*; (*idem per alia verba*). The οὐδέ εἷς of our text, evidently corresponds to the Septuagint, οὐκ ἔστιν ἕως ἐνός.

(11) Οὐκ ἔστιν στυγίων . . . θεόν, corresponds to the Hebrew הַיֵּשׁ בְּמַשְׁכִּיל דְרַשׁ אֶת-אֱלֹהִים, *whether there is any one who understandeth, who seeketh after God*, Ps. 14: 2. The question in the Hebrew implies a *negative*; and a simple negative is made by Paul, who says, οὐκ ἔστιν κ. τ. λ. The Septuagint runs literally: *Εἰ ἔστι στυγίων ἢ ἐκζητῶν τὸν θεόν*. Paul has cited *ad sensum*, and nearly *ad verbum*.

(12) Πάντες . . . ἐνός, cited exactly from the Septuagint version of Ps. 14: 3. The Hebrew runs thus:

הַכֹּל סָר יַחְדָּו בְּאַלְחֵי
אֵין עֵשָׂה טוֹב
אֵין בָּם אֶחָד

Whether all have gone out of the way, and together become corrupt?

None doeth good,

Not even one.

Paul omits, as the Septuagint also does, the interrogatory sense of the first clause, made by כִּבְדִּי (which is co-ordinate with שִׁבְדִּי in the preceding verse), and renders simply: Πάντες ἐξέκλιναν· altogether *ad sensum*.

The word συνιῶν in v. 11 means, *to have an enlightened knowledge*, viz. of God and duty.—Ὁ ἐκζητῶν (Heb. שִׁבְדִּי) means, *to worship God, to seek him in acts of devotion, meditation, etc., to be a devoted worshipper*.—Ἐξέκλιναν in v. 11 means, *have departed from the right way, from the paths of piety and happiness*.—Ἡχρειώθησαν, *have become corrupt*, literally *have become unprofitable or useless*. But as the meaning is here a *moral* one, the first rendering is the most appropriate.

In regard to the *original* meaning of these quotations, there seems not to be much room for dispute. Who is it of whom the Psalmist is speaking? It is נְבִלִים, ὁ ἄφρων, as v. 1 determines. But are *all* men without exception ἄφρωνες? Whatever may be the fact, yet it is not here asserted; for in v. 4, the *workers of iniquity* are expressly distinguished from *my people*. In v. 5, the *generation of the righteous* is distinguished from the workers of iniquity. It is plain, then, that the Psalmist is here describing two parties among the Hebrews; the one wicked, yea altogether corrupt; the other righteous, i. e. belonging to the true people of God.

The application of this passage by the apostle is plain. All unbelievers, all who put not their trust in Christ, are of the same character with those wicked persons whom the Psalmist describes.

(13) Τάφος . . . ἐδολιοῦσαν, verbatim with the Septuagint version of Ps. 5: 10 (5: 9); which runs thus in the Hebrew:

קָבֵר פְּתוּחַ גְּרָנִים
לְשׁוֹנָם יַחַ לִיקוּן

An open sepulchre is their throats; with their tongues do they flatter, or speak deceitful things. Sentiment: 'As from the sepulchre issues forth an offensive and pestilential vapour; so from the mouths of slanderous persons issue noisome and pestilential words.—Ἐδολιοῦσαν, *speaking deceit, deceive*. The form of the word is the Alexandrine or Bæotian -σαν instead of -ν, which is frequent in the Imperf. and 2nd Aorist; e. g. ἐλάβοσαν, ἐμάθοσαν, etc., for ἐλαβον, ἔμαθον, etc. Ἐδολιοῦσαν stands for ἐδολίου, Imperfect active.

The context in Ps. v. shews, that *the workers* of iniquity there mentioned are the party opposed to David. Those who opposed the *Son of David*, are characterized by Paul in a similar manner.

Ἰὸς ἀσπίδων ὑπὸ τὰ χεῖλη αὐτῶν, accords verbatim with the Septuagint version of a part of Ps. 140: 4 (140: 3). The Hebrew runs thus: יְחַמָּה עַבְשׁוֹב תַּחַת שְׂפִתֵימֵי, *the poison of asps, or of the adder, is under their lips*; i. e. their words are like poison, they utter the poisonous breath of slander. The phrase before us gives intensity to the preceding description; all of which, however, is not intended to designate merely some specific kind of slander, but the sinful exercise of *the tongue*, which (as James expresses it) is πῦρ, ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας, 3: 6.

Here again, the persons characterized are the enemies of David. What was said of them may be applied, as the apostle here intimates by the quotation, to all those who refused submission to 'David's Lord that sat upon his throne.'

(14) Ὡς τὸ . . . γέμει, runs thus in the Septuagint: Οὗ ἀρῶς τὸ στόμα αὐτοῦ γέμει καὶ πικρίας, which corresponds exactly to the Hebrew in Ps. 10: 7, מְרִמֹּה וּמְרִמָּה פִּיהוּ מְלֵא גְמֵי, 'excepting that *oû* is added by the Seventy. The apostle has quoted exactly *ad sensum*, the suffix pronoun in פִּיהוּ being *generic* and indicating a real *plurality*, which Paul expresses by ὧν.

The violent and embittered enemies of David, (or of the Psalmist, if David be not the author of Ps. x.), are here characterized. The application is the same as before.

Πικρίας is used to translate the Hebrew מְרִמֹּה, which literally signifies *fraud, deceit*. But as *false accusations* are here meant, which tend to destroy reputation and confidence, and proceed from *bitterness* of spirit, so πικρία (*bitterness*) is employed to characterize them, it being used *ad sensum* in a general way.

(15—17) Ὁξεῖς . . . ἔγνωσαν, abridged from Is. 59: 7, 8. The Septuagint and Hebrew run thus:

Οἱ πόδες αὐτῶν ἐπὶ πονηρίαν
τρέχουσι, ταχινοὶ ἐκχέαι αἷμα,
καὶ οἱ διαλογισμοὶ αὐτῶν διαλο-
γισμοὶ ἀπὸ φόνων· σύντριμμα
καὶ ταλαιπωρία ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς
αὐτῶν, καὶ ὁδὸν εἰρήνης οὐκ
οἶδασιν.

בְּגֵיבֵיכֶם לָרַע יִרְצוּ וַיִּמְתְּרוּ לְשֹׁפֵךְ
דָּם נֶקֶד מִחֲשֵׁבֹתֵיהֶם מִחֲשֵׁבוֹת אֶת
שׂוֹד וְשֹׁבֵר בְּמִסְלוֹתָם: דְּרֹךְ שָׁלוֹם
לֹא יָדְעוּ:

Here the expressions are altogether of a *general* nature, as they stand in the prophet, and plainly characterize a great part of the Jewish nation in the time of the writer; compare Is. 59: 2, 4, 9—15. Of course this is still more directly to the apostle's purpose, than the preceding quotations. These correspond with his intention, in the way of *implication*; but the present quotation corresponds in the way of *direct analogy*.

An inspection of the *original* will disclose how much the apostle has abridged it, in his quotation. Also in quoting, he has substituted ὄξεις for ταχινοῦ in the Septuagint; then passing by a whole clause, viz. "their thoughts are thoughts of evil," he quotes the rest verbatim. Both the Seventy and Paul omit the Hebrew קָרָן, viz. in מִן קָרָן, *innocent blood*.—*Εκχέαι*, 1 Aor. Inf., comes from ἐκχέω, Fut. ἐκχεύσω (in the New Testament ἐκχεῶ), 1 Aor. ἐξέχεα after the manner of verbs in λ, μ, ν, ρ. A few verbs in Greek follow this method of forming the first aorist; see Buttmann, Gramm. § 87. Note 1.

Sentiment: 'They are ready and swift to engage in crimes of the highest degree; *destruction and misery attend their steps*, i. e. wherever they go, they spread destruction and misery around them. The way of happiness they take no knowledge of, or they give no heed to what concerns their own true welfare, or that of others.'

(18) Οὐκ ἔστι . . . αὐτῶν, is exactly quoted from the Septuagint, and corresponds to the Hebrew, excepting the final αὐτῶν, which in the Hebrew and Septuagint is in the *singular* number. But then it is the singular *generic*, and so corresponds exactly in sense to the plural αὐτῶν of the apostle. The Hebrew original is in Ps. 36: 1, and it runs thus: עֲנִי לִפְנֵי עֵינָיו אֵין פֶּחַח וְאֵין יִרְאָה, *there is no fear of God before his eyes*; i. e. he has no reverence for God, no fear of offending him which puts any effectual restraint upon his wickedness.

(19) Οἶδαμεν δὲ . . . λαλεῖ· now we know that whatsoever things the law saith, it addresses to those who have the law; i. e. we know that whatever the Old Testament Scriptures say, when they speak in the manner now exhibited, they address it to those who are in possession of these Scriptures, viz. to the Jews.—*Δέ* continuativum, *nunc*, German *nun*, English *now* in the sense of a *continuative*. Τοῖς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, *those who have a revelation, ἐν conditionis*; compare on ἐν under chap. I. 24.

The object of the apostle is to shew, that the Jews can in no way avoid the force of what is here said. It was originally addressed to

the Jews, in a direct manner. What he has quoted was indeed spoken at different times, to different classes of persons, and uttered by various individuals. But still the *principle* is the same. *Jews* are addressed; and Jews are accused in the very same manner, i. e. with equal force, by their own prophets whose authority is acknowledged, as they were accused by Paul. The *principle* then by which such an accusation is to be supported, is thus established. As to the actual application of this, and the *facts* respecting the conduct and character of the Jews in the apostle's time; all the writings of the New Testament, of Josephus, and others, and the direct assertions of Paul in this epistle, go to shew that no injustice at all was done to them in the present case.

It is this principle, viz. that in consistence with the fidelity of God to his promises, and consistently with the ancient Scriptures, the Jews might be charged with wickedness even of a gross character, and such as brought them as truly under the curse of the divine law as the polluted heathen were under it,—it is this, which the apostle has in view to establish by all his quotations; and this he does entirely establish. When thus understood, there remains no important difficulty respecting the quotations. He did not need these, in order to settle the question about the depravity of the Gentiles. The Jews would reluctate only against the truth of the charges made against themselves. The character of the heathen was too palpable to be denied. That of the Jews, indeed, was scarcely less so; but still, they themselves expected to escape divine justice, on the ground of being God's *chosen people*. All expectation of this nature is overturned, by the declarations and arguments of the apostle, in chap. II. III. of this epistle.

Such as undertake to prove *universal* depravity directly from the texts here quoted, appear to mistake the nature of the apostle's argument, and to overlook the design of his quotations. It is impossible to make the passages in the Old Testament, as they there stand, to be *universal* in their meaning, without doing violence to the fundamental laws of interpretation. And surely there is no need of doing thus. The whole strain of the apostle's argument at large, goes to establish universal depravity; I mean the universal depravity of all who are *out of Christ*, and are capable of sinning. The doctrine is safe, without doing violence to any obvious principles of exegesis; which we never can do with safety. I need scarcely add, that Flatt, Tholuck, and all enlightened commentators of the present day, so far as

I know, agree in substance with the interpretation which I have now given.

"ἵνα πᾶν . . . θεῶ, so that every mouth must be stopped, and the whole world become guilty before God. Πᾶν στόμα φραγῆ, i. e. every man, all men whether Jews or Gentiles, must be convicted of sin, and be unable to produce any thing to justify their conduct; compare Job 5: 16. Ps. 107: 42.—'Υπόδικος, reus, sons, guilty, deserving of condemnation.

But how extensive is the conclusion here? I answer, (1) It extends to *all* who are out of Christ. I draw this conclusion, not so much from the mere forms of expression, such as πᾶν στόμα and πᾶς ὁ κόσμος, as I do from the nature and object of the apostle's argument. What is this? Plainly his design is, to shew that there is but *one* method of acceptance with God now possible; and this is in the way of gratuitous pardon or justification. But why is this necessary in *all* cases? The answer is: Because all have sinned. Certainly, if those who do not believe in Christ, can be pardoned only for his sake, this is because they are sinners and have need of pardon on the ground of simple mercy. Consequently *all* who are out of Christ, as they cannot be justified by the deeds of the law, are sinners.

But (2) All who are in Christ, i. e. are justified, have once been sinners, and do still commit more or less sin, for which pardoning mercy becomes necessary. Once they were among the impenitent and unregenerate. What the apostle asserts, then, in our text, of *all* men, need not be limited, and should not indeed be limited, merely to those who are out of Christ at any particular time, but may be extended to all who were ever out of him.

That this is a *bona fide* application of the principle which he here contends for, is clear from his own commentary on this doctrine in chap. iv. For what does he say there? He shews, that even Abraham and David, as well as the grossest sinners, were justified only in a *gratuitous way*, being utterly unable to obtain the divine approbation on the ground of perfect obedience. What is the inference from all this? Plainly, that all men are sinners, and that none therefore can be saved by their own merits. So does v. 20 virtually declare; so, explicitly, says v. 23.

In form, the argument of Paul extends only to those who are *out of Christ*; but as this has once been the condition of all men without exception, so in *substance* it embraces all men without exception, who

“by nature are children of wrath, being children of disobedience;” for “that which is born of the flesh, is flesh.”

I cannot forbear to add, that it seems to me a wrong view of the apostle's meaning in vs. 10—19, which regards him as labouring to prove directly the universality of men's depravity, merely by the argument which these texts afford. Paul has other sources of proof, besides that of argument; for if he himself was an *inspired* apostle, then surely his own declarations respecting the state of the heathen or Jews, were to be credited on just the same grounds as those of the ancient Psalmist and of the Prophets. Why not? And then, why should we be solicitous to shew that every thing in Paul's epistle is established by *argumentation*? Had the apostle no other way of establishing truth, except by argumentation? Are not his own declarations, I repeat it, as weighty and credible as those of the ancient prophets? If so, then we need not be anxious to retain the argument as a *direct* one, in vs. 10—19. Enough that it *illustrates* and *confirms* the PRINCIPLE which the apostle asserts, and for which he contends. The argument from this principle is irresistible, when we once concede that Christ is the only Saviour of all men without exception; for this cannot be true, unless all men without exception are sinners. Of course I mean, all who are capable of sinning.

(20) Διότι . . . ἀντιοῦ, *wherefore by works of law shall no flesh be justified before him.* Διότι, an abridgement of διὰ τοῦτο ὅτι, *on account of, because that, therefore, wherefore*; so it often means, at the beginning of a conclusion deduced from preceding premises; e. g. Acts 17: 31. Rom. 1: 21. 8: 7. 1 Pet. 2: 6.

Ἔργων νόμου, *works of law*, i. e. such works as law requires; just as ἔργα θεοῦ means, such works as God requires or approves; and so ἔργα τοῦ Ἀβραάμ, John 8: 39; τὰ ἔργα τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν [τοῦ διαβόλου], John 8: 14; τὰ ἔργα τῶν Νικολαιτῶν, Rev. 2: 6; and so ἔργα τῆς πόρνῆς—τῆς σαρκός—τοῦ διαβόλου—τῆς πίστεως, etc. etc. From these, and a multitude of other examples which every good lexicon and every concordance will supply, it appears entirely plain that ἔργα and ἔργον, followed by a Genitive which qualifies it, mean something to be effected or done, which is agreeable to the command, desire, nature, etc. of the thing which is designated by that Genitive noun.

Concerning this usage, there is no just room to doubt. But the sense of νόμου has been thought to be less obvious. Does νόμος then mean *ceremonial law, revelation in general*; or *the moral law*, whether

revealed or natural? Ambrose, Theodoret, Theophylact, Pelagius, Erasmus, Cornelius a Lapide, Grotius, Koppe, Ammon, and others, have explained νόμος as meaning *the ceremonial law*. But is this correct? The meaning of a word which is capable of various significations, is always to be judged of by the object or design of the writer, so often as this is practicable. What then is the object of Paul in the present case? Surely it is, to shew that both Gentiles and Jews need that gratuitous justification which the gospel proclaims, and which Christ has procured; compare 3: 9, πᾶν στόμα and πᾶς ὁ κόσμος in 3: 19, πάντες in v. 23, together with v. 29. Compare also chap. 1: 19—32 with 2: 17—29. Nothing can be more certain than that the conclusion of the apostle is a *general* one, having respect to Jew and Gentile both. But how can it be apposite to say, in respect to the Gentiles, that they cannot be justified by the *ceremonial* law? Did the apostle need to make a solemn asseveration of this? Were the Gentiles sinners, because they had not kept the *ritual* laws of Moses? So the apostle does not judge; see 2: 14, 15, 26. How then can he be supposed to say in reference to the Gentiles, (for the present verse refers to them as well as to the Jews,) that *by the law is the knowledge of sin*? What knowledge of the *ceremonial* law of Moses, did the heathen possess?

I remark in the next place, that transgressions of the *ritual* law are no part of the accusation which the apostle here brings against the Jews. In chap. 2: 17—29, he accuses them of breaking *moral* laws; and after having enumerated a long catalogue of crimes common among the Gentiles, in chap. 1: 19—32, he goes on immediately to intimate in chap. 2: 1, seq., that the Jews were chargeable with the same, or with the like crimes. In 2: 14, seq., and 2: 26, seq., he intimates that the law inscribed upon the consciences and minds of the heathen, inculcated those very things, with regard to which the Jews were sinners. In 3: 9, seq., he brings Jews and Gentiles under the same accusation, explicitly charging all with being sinners; and sinners against a law which was common to both; as chap. 2: 15, 16, 26, seq., most explicitly shews.

Again; when it is asked in Rom. 6: 15, *Shall we sin because we are not ὑπὸ νόμον but under grace?* what sense would there be in this question (which is supposed to be urged by an objector), provided the *ceremonial* law be meant? Would an objector in the possession of his senses, ask the question: 'Have we liberty to break the *moral* law, i. e. to sin, because we are not under the ceremonial?'

Or, 'because the *ceremonial* law will not justify us, may we not break the *moral* law?' Yet νόμον in Rom. 6: 15, is plainly of the same nature as νόμος in 3: 20.

Finally; the apostle every where opposes the δικαίωσις or δικαιοσύνη of the gospel, to that justification which results from works in general, works of any kind whatever; e. g. 2 Tim. 1: 9. Eph. 2: 8, 9. Tit. 3: 5. Rom. 4: 2—5, 13—16. 3: 27. 11: 6, and in many other places.

From all this it results, that νόμον must here mean the *moral* law, whether written or unwritten, i. e. law in general, any law whether applicable to Gentile or Jew, any rule which prescribes a duty, by obedience to which men might claim a promise of reward. Nor can this duty be limited merely to what is *external*. Surely the law of God, whether natural or revealed, does not have respect merely to the *external* conduct of men; it also has reference to *the state of their heart and feelings*. So, most explicitly, does Paul teach, in Rom. 2: 28, 29, in Rom. 2: 16, and very often elsewhere.

Understood in this way, the phrase ἔργα νόμου is plain. Neither Jew nor Gentile can be justified before God on the ground of obedience; "all have sinned and come short of the glory of God;" each one has broken the law under which he has acted; the Gentiles, that which was written on their minds and consciences, 2: 14, 15; the Jews, that which was contained in the Scriptures, 2: 27. Now as the law of God, revealed or natural, requires *entire* and *perfect* obedience, just so far as it is known and understood, or may be so without criminal neglect on the part of men; and since "the soul which sinneth must die," and "he who offendeth in one point is guilty of all;" it follows of necessity, that all men, whether Jews or Gentiles, while in an unconverted state, are under the condemning sentence of the law; and therefore they cannot possibly claim acceptance with God, on the ground of perfect obedience. Nay, so far are they from this, that they can expect nothing but condemnation and misery from simple *retributive justice* being exercised toward them, under a pure system of law; for "all have sinned," and therefore "all have come short of the glory of God."

In no other way, as it seems to me, can the general course of argument by the apostle be understood, and interpreted so as to preserve consistency with the other parts of this epistle, and with his other writings, or so as to harmonize with the particular design and object of the writer. Accordingly, Storr, Flatt, Tholuck, not to

mention a multitude of the older commentators, have explained ἔργων νόμου substantially in the same manner as I have done.

Δικαιοθήσεται, see on δικαιοσύνη in 1: 17, where the verb δικαιόω is also explained. It means here, *to be accepted and treated* as having fully kept the precepts of the law.—Οὐ . . . πᾶσα σάρξ = רַבְרָבִּי לֹא אֶחָד, *no one*; a true Hebraism in all respects. Indeed, the expression would hardly have been intelligible to a mere Attic Grecian, there being nothing like it in his own dialect.

If *all the world* are ὑπόδικος τῷ θεῷ, then must it be true, that none can be δίκαιος before him in a legal sense, i. e. on the ground of perfect and meritorious obedience. Ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ = עֵינָיו, *in his view, in his sight, in his presence*. The mind of the writer is here contemplating mankind, as standing before the divine tribunal in order to be judged of the things done in the body.

Διὰ γὰρ . . . ἁμαρτίας, *for by law is the knowledge of sin*. Νόμου here must evidently mean the same as it does in the clause ἔξ ἔργων νόμου which clearly signifies any law of a moral kind, either natural or revealed. Turretin understands νόμου, in the phrase before us, as meaning the Jewish Scriptures. But inasmuch as the preceding phrase is general, it must be understood so here. All law is a rule of action, in the most extensive sense of this word, embracing the internal as well as the external developments of the human soul. By this rule, all actions are to be scanned; the Gentiles are to scan theirs by the law written upon their own minds, 2: 14, 15; the Jews, by their own Scriptures. The precepts of law, whether natural or revealed, by commanding this and prohibiting that, serve to make known the nature of sin; for all sin is ἀνομία, *want of conformity to the law*. The simple design of the apostle in saying διὰ γὰρ νόμον ἐπίγνωσις ἁμαρτίας, is, to remind those whom he addressed, that the law (any law either natural or revealed), so far from holding out to men who are sinners the prospect of justification before God, and promising them acceptance with him, is the very means of bringing them, by its disclosures respecting the nature and guilt of sin, to a knowledge of their unhappy and desperate condition, inasmuch as it shews them that they are exposed to its full penalty, for every transgression which they have committed.

CHAP. III. 21—31.

The apostle having shewn that both Jews and Gentiles are all under sin, and therefore are obnoxious to the penalty of the divine law; having also declared (what must indeed be obvious from the fact just stated), that *gratuitous* pardon or justification is the only way of salvation now open for men; he proceeds to intimate, that this way of salvation is disclosed in the Old Testament Scriptures, v. 21; even that justification which is proposed to all men without distinction, and conferred on all who believe in Christ, v. 22. No difference can be made, as to the need of such a justification, between the Jew and Gentile, inasmuch as all without exception are sinners, and therefore stand in the same need of gratuitous pardon, v. 24. Christ is set forth to all men as a propitiatory offering or sacrifice, the efficacy of which may be experienced by faith in his blood; and Christ is set forth in this manner, in order that God may manifest to the world the provision which he has made for the forgiveness of sins committed in former ages, and also under the new dispensation, thus disclosing a way in which his holy regard to justice may be preserved, and yet his pardoning mercy be bestowed on the penitent believer in Jesus, vs. 25, 26. All boasting then of salvation on the ground of our own merits, is entirely excluded, because justification by faith, from its own nature, must be wholly gratuitous, v. 27. Well may we conclude, then, from all this, that we are gratuitously justified, and not on the ground of merit, v. 28. God, moreover, justifies all on the same ground, because he stands in the same relation to both Jews and Gentiles, v. 29; both the circumcised and the uncircumcised he justifies by faith, v. 30. But are the Old Testament Scriptures annulled, by inculcating such doctrine? Not at all; for (as was before said, v. 21) they teach the very same doctrine, v. 31.

(21) *Nun̄i δὲ . . . πεφανέρωται*, but now, the justification which is of God, without law, is revealed. *Nun̄i*, now, i. e. under the gospel dispensation, in distinction from ancient times, or former days.—*Δέ*, “particula *discretiva*, opposita conjungens.”—*Χωρὶς νόμου*, without law, i. e. without the aid or concurrence of law, or in such a way as not to be by means of law, or in a way contrary to that of legal justification, which rests solely on the ground of perfect and meritorious obedience. *Χωρὶς νόμου* may be interpreted as qualifying *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, or it may be joined in sense with *πεφανέρωται*; the meaning in either case will be substantially the same. I interpret it as qualifying *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, and designating that this *δικαιοσύνη* is gratuitous, i. e. not on the ground of merit or legal obedience.

Δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, see on 1: 17.—*Πεφανέρωται*, is disclosed, manifested, revealed, viz. in or by the gospel.

Μαρτυρουμένη . . . προφητῶν, which is testified, i. e. plainly and openly declared, by the law and the prophets, i. e. by the Old Testament, the Jewish Scriptures; compare Matt. 5: 17. 7: 12. 11: 13. 22: 40. Luke 16: 16. John 1: 45. 4 Macc. 18: 10. The apostle means by this to aver, that he teaches no new thing; he only repeats what in substance has been declared respecting gratuitous justifica-

tion, by the Old Testament Scriptures. And when he says *ὡνὶ . . . πεφανέρωται*, in the preceding part of the verse, he means that this shall be *emphatically*, not absolutely, understood; otherwise the same verse would contain a contradiction of itself.

What is merely hinted in the declaration before us, Paul goes on fully to develop in chap. iv.

(22) What that *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* is, which is *χωρὶς νόμου*, the apostle next proceeds explicitly to develop. *Δικαιοσύνη δὲ . . . Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, the justification which is of God, by faith in Jesus Christ. This explanation makes it clear as the noon-day sun, that *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, in this connection, does not mean righteousness or the love of justice as an *attribute* of God. For in what possible sense can it be said, that God's righteousness or justice (as an essential attribute) is by faith in Christ? Does he possess or exercise this attribute, or reveal it, by faith in Christ? The answer is so plain, that it cannot be mistaken.

Διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, by *Christian faith*, i. e. by that faith of which Jesus Christ is the object, *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* being *Genitivus objecti*; for most clearly it is not faith which belongs to Christ himself, but the faith of sinners towards him. The meaning of the apostle is, that the gratuitous justification which the gospel reveals, is that which is to be had by believing and trusting in Christ as our Redeemer and Deliverer; compare vs. 23—26. Faith, indeed, is not to be regarded as the meritorious cause or ground of justification, (which is wholly *gratuitous*, v. 24), but only as the means or instrument by which we come into such a state or relation, that justification can, consistently with the nature and character of God, be gratuitously bestowed upon us.

Εἰς πάντας καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας, to all and upon all. Luther understands *ἐρχομένη* before *εἰς πάντας*, i. e. [*δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ ἐρχομένη*] *εἰς πάντας*. The sense is good; but the same end may be attained in another way. Why not construe *εἰς πάντας* as connected with *πεφανέρωται*? I am aware that *φανερῶ* usually governs the simple Dative after it in such cases; but then it is equally certain, that the New Testament writers often use the Accusative with *εἰς* instead of the simple Dative, or the Dative with *ἐν*: see Bretschn. Lex. *εἰς*, 5. b. Very naturally may we suppose, that after *πεφανέρωται* the persons would be named to whom the revelation is made. It seems to me that they are designated by *εἰς πάντας*.

Ἐπὶ πάντας appears to mark the subjects, who receive the *δικαιο-*

σύνη in question; which is clear from the *τούς πιστεύοντας* that follows and qualifies it. *Εἰς πάντας* denotes to whom the proclamation of *δικαιοσύνη*, *gratuitous pardon*, is made, i. e. to all men. *Καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας* I should consider, then, as a parenthesis thrown in, to guard against the idea that the actual bestowment of justification is as universal as the offers of it. The offer is made to all men without exception; *believers* only, however, are entitled to the actual reception of it. My reason for supposing such a parenthesis here, is, that the writer immediately resumes the generic or universal idea, *οὐ γὰρ ἔστι κ. τ. λ.*, which shews that his mind is intent on the illustration of *εἰς πάντας*, as his principal proposition. His object is to shew, that there is no exception at all, as to the need of that justification which the gospel proposes. As this is plainly his main point, he only suggests, here and there by the way, the extent in which the justification proposed is actually bestowed—*ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας . . . καὶ δικαιούντα τὸν ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ* (v. 26.)

It is by overlooking these nicer shades and connections of thought in this paragraph, that many critics have come to the conclusion, that no difference exists here between *εἰς πάντας* and *ἐπὶ πάντας*: a position which seems to me to be plainly contradicted by the course of thought before and after these expressions. Before *ἐπὶ πάντας* either *ἔστι* or rather *ἢ ἔστι* seems to be implied; and then *ἐπὶ* is used in the sense of *ad commodum*, *for*; comp. Heb. 8: 8. Heb. 12: 10; see also Bretschn. Lex. *ἐπί*, III. 5.

Οὐ γὰρ ἔστι διαστολή, *for there is no distinction or difference*; i. e. in regard to the matter of justification by faith or gratuitous justification, all men stand in the same need of it; and must perish without it. In this respect there is no distinction whatever between Greek and Jew; for as all have sinned, so justification by *deeds of law*, i. e. by perfect obedience to the law, is an impossible thing; for it is impossible that a sinner should lay in any proper claim to such a justification. The *γὰρ* here is *γὰρ illustrantis*, the sequel being added in order to illustrate and confirm the affirmation made above, viz. that the justification which is of God is revealed *εἰς πάντας*.

(23) *Πάντες γὰρ . . . ἤθεον*, *for all have sinned, and come short of the glory which God bestows, or of divine approbation*. The *γὰρ* here is again *γὰρ illustrantis vel confirmantis*; i. e. it is placed at the commencement of a sentence which is designed to illustrate and confirm the preceding assertion, and to shew the reason why there is no *διαστολή*. *Ἰσπερ* comes from *ὑστερος*, *last*, and sometimes

means (as its etymology would indicate), *to be last* or *inferior*, 1 Cor. 12: 24. 8: 8. 2 Cor. 11: 5. 12: 11. The passive voice (*ὑστεροῦνται* is passive) is used in the same sense, for substance, as the active; *ὑστερέω* meaning *deficio*, *destituo*, and *ὑστερέομαι* *destituor*, *I am wanting in*, *I am deficient in*. The idea in our text is that of *failing*, *wanting*, *being deprived* or *destitute of*. The verb, when used in this way, of course governs the Genitive, by the usual principles of syntax.

Δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ is rendered by many, *the divine approbation*. So, indeed, most commentators translate it; and with good philological support, inasmuch as *δόξα* frequently means *praise*, *approbation*; e. g. John 5: 41, 44. 7: 18. 8: 50, 54. 12: 43. Nevertheless, as *δόξα* very often means a *glorified state*, a *splendid glorious condition*, *supreme happiness*, it may be so taken here; and *θεοῦ* may be construed as *Genitivus auctoris*, so that *δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ* would mean, *the glory which God bestows*, or of which God is the author. This, on the whole, I should prefer. But still, as the subject is here that of *justification*, viz. acquittal, *δόξης* may be employed in the *classic* sense of opinion, (here *good opinion*, *approbation*), i. e. the approbation of the final judge of men, when they stand before his tribunal. The idea would then be, that inasmuch as all men have broken the law of God, so they cannot expect his approbation in the day of trial, provided they stand upon the ground of their own merits. Hence the necessity of some other method of justification, different from that which is *by works of law*.

(24) *Δικαιούμενοι . . . Ἰησοῦ*, [all] *being justified freely by his grace through the redemption which is by Christ Jesus*. On the one hand, the apostle declares that all have sinned, and thus rendered a sentence of acquittal and reward impossible, on the ground of *law*. He now asserts the counter-part of this, viz. that all who obtain justification, must obtain it gratuitously and only by virtue of the redemption that Christ has accomplished; a proposition which contains the very essence of all that is peculiar to the gospel of Christ, or which can make a solid foundation for the hopes of perishing sinners.

The ellipsis before and after *δικαιούμενοι* may be filled out thus: [*πάντες*] *δικαιούμενοί [ἔϊσι]*. In fact, vs. 23, 24, are really two different sentences; while the present grammatical construction of them makes but one.—*Δωρεάν*, *freely*, *gratuitously*, *in the way of mere favour*. *Δωρεάν* (Heb. *מַתְּנָה*) comes from *δωρεά*, *donum gratuitum*,

beneficium; and this, with δῶρον *munus*, δῶρημα *beneficium*, and δωρεύομαι *dono*, all originate from δίδωμι or διδῶω *to give*.

Τῆ αὐτοῦ χάριτι, *by his grace*, epeexegetical of δωρεάν, and added to give intensity to the whole sentence or affirmation; comp. Eph. 2: 8, 9. 2 Tim. 1: 9. Tit. 3: 4, 5.—Ἀπολυτρώσεως, *redemption*.

The force of this word may be best seen, by recurring to its root λύτρον, which means, the price of ransom paid for a slave or a captive, in consequence of which he is set free. Λυτρόω and ἀπολυτρόω both mean, *to pay the price of ransom*; just as λύτρωσις and ἀπολύτρωσις mean, (1) *The act of paying this price*; and (2) *The consequences of this act, viz. the redemption which follows it*. This latter sense is the one which belongs to the ἀπολυτρώσεως of our text.—Τῆς ἐν Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ designates the author of this redemption, viz. him who paid the ransom and procured our freedom, when we were the slaves and captives of sin and Satan. The sequel defines what the writer understands by ἀπολυτρώσεως.

(25) The most important word in the translation of the first clause of this verse, is ἱλαστήριον, the sense of which must first be determined. In classic Greek it is equivalent to the adjective ἱλάσιμος, *propitiatory, atoning*; which comes directly from ἱλασμός, *atonement, propitiation*; ἱλάσιμος, ἱλαστικός, ἱλαστήριος (the last three are equivalents), and ἱλασμα, all come from ἱλάσσομαι or ἱλάσομαι (*ιλέομαι* Att.), which Homer always employs to designate *the making of propitiation or atonement to the gods*. The later Greek sometimes used ἱλάσσομαι in the sense of *being propitious*.

In our text ἱλαστήριον is an adjective used in an elliptical way, like other adjectives of a similar nature; e. g. χαριστήριον, σπηῆριον, τὰ ἐτήσια, τὰ γενέθλια, etc. The question naturally arises: What is the noun here to be supplied after ἱλαστήριον? Is it ἐπίδημα (*ἐπίθεμα*), *cover*; or θῦμα, *offering or sacrifice*?

In the first of these ways, the Seventy employ ἱλαστήριον sometimes joining it with ἐπίθεμα, Ex. 25: 17; but usually omitting ἐπίθεμα and using ἱλαστήριον alone, in the same sense which both words would give; e. g. Ex. 25: 18, 19, 20 bis, 22. 37: (Sept. 38:) 6, 7, 3, 8 bis. Lev. 16: 2, 13, 14, 15, etc. In all these cases, whether ἱλαστήριον has ἐπίθεμα expressed or not, the Hebrew word is כִּרְבַּב, *covering*, viz. the covering of the ark of the covenant in the most holy place, which was overlaid with pure gold (Ex. 25: 17), over which the cherubim stretched out their wings (Ex. 25: 20), and which was the throne of Jehovah in his earthly temple, the place

from which he uttered his oracles, and communed with the representatives of his people, Ex. 25: 22; comp. Ex. 37: 6—9. Into the inner sanctuary where the ark was, the high-priest entered but once in a year (Heb. 9: 7), when he sprinkled the כִּפֹּרֶת , *ἱλαστήριον* [*ἐπίθεμα*] with blood, in order to make propitiation for the sins of the people, Lev. 16: 2, 15, 16.

In like manner with the Seventy, Philo calls the כִּפֹּרֶת , *πῶμα ἱλαστήριον* and *ἐπίθεμα ἱλαστήριον*, i. e. a *propitiatory covering*; Vita Mosis, III. 668. (Frankf. ed.)

Such is the Septuagint usage of *ἱλαστήριον*. But was Paul necessarily limited to this? Certainly not, inasmuch as the common Greek idiom afforded him another combination of *ἱλαστήριον*, viz. *ἱλαστήριον θῦμα*, a *propitiatory sacrifice* or *offering*. So Dio Chrysostom, Orat. II. 184, *ἱλαστήριον Ἀχαιοὶ τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ*, the Greeks [made] a *propitiatory offering* to *Minerva*. So Josephus, *ἱλαστήριον μνημα*, a *propitiatory monument*, Antiq. XVI. 7. 1. So in 4 Macc. 17: 22, *ἱλαστήριον θανάτου αὐτοῦ*, his *propitiatory death*.

Which now of these two methods of construing *ἱλαστήριον* shall we choose? Origen, Theodoret, Theophylact, Œcumenius, Erasmus, Luther, and others, have preferred the former; Hesychius, Grotius, Le Clerc, Kypke, Turretin, Elsner, Flatt, Tholuck, and others, the latter. "Fatemur (says Turretin) expositionem illam [priorem] minus commodam nobis videri;" after which he goes on to say, that he understands by *ἱλαστήριον*, an *expiatory victim*. I most fully agree with Turretin. But I have a reason for this opinion, which I have not seen noticed in any of the commentators; and this is, that in the phrase *ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ* which follows, there is a reference to the *αἷμα* of the *ἱλαστήριον*. It may be said, that if Christ be represented as the *mercy-seat* which was sprinkled with propitiatory blood, *αἵματι αὐτοῦ* may refer to this. But my answer is, that such an image is unnatural; for then Christ would be represented as a *mercy-seat*, sprinkled with *his own blood*; an incongruous figure, if the analogy of the Jewish *mercy-seat* be consulted. But if *ἱλαστήριον* means a *propitiatory sacrifice*, then is the image altogether congruous; inasmuch as the blood was sprinkled round about upon the altar, where the sacrifice was laid, Lev. 1: 5, 11. 3: 8.

There is another way of casting light on this subject, viz. by investigating the meaning of *προέθιτο*. In the classics, *προτίθημι* means, (1) *To lay before, to set before*, e. g. to set any thing before one for him to eat; also, to set a mark before one, or a punishment,

or a reward; i. e. *to propose*. (2) *Publicly to expose* or *to hold up to view*; e. g. to expose goods, wares, etc., for inspection and sale: also, to declare enmity, war, hatred, etc. (3) It means, *to prefer*; which is the least common signification. In the New Testament, *προτίθημι* is sometimes used in the sense of *purposing*, *decreeing*, *constituting*; e. g. Rom. 1: 13. Eph. 1: 9. So also in Joseph. Antiq. IV. 6, 5.

Of these various meanings, the second classical one seems plainly to be that which is best adapted to our text; for this best agrees with the *εἰς ἔνδειξιν* and *πρὸς ἔνδειξιν* which follow. "*Ὁν προέθετο ὁ θεὸς ἱλαστήριον* may then be rendered: *whom God hath openly exhibited to the world as a propitiatory sacrifice*. But suppose now, that we construe *ἱλαστήριον* as meaning *mercy-seat*, then where is the *congruity* of the image? Was the *mercy-seat* exhibited to the view of those for whom atonement was made? Never; the high-priest only saw it, once in each year, on the great day of atonement. To avoid this evident incongruity, one must render *προέθετο*, *constituit*; and then the evident reference made by it to *εἰς ἔνδειξιν* and *πρὸς ἔνδειξιν*, is lost or obscured.

On the whole, I see no congruous method of interpreting the passage before us, except by rendering *ἱλαστήριον*, *propitiatory sacrifice*. In respect to the sentiment which this rendering exhibits, compare John 1: 29. Eph. 5: 2. 1 Pet. 1: 19. 2: 24. Heb. 9: 14. 1 Cor. 5: 7. If *ἱλαστήριον* be rendered *propitiation* (as in our English version), the sense will be the same.

Διὰ τῆς πίστεως, *by faith*, i. e. this sacrifice then produces its propitiatory effect, when faith is exercised in the blood, i. e. death, of the victim which is offered. In other words: Christ makes expiation which is effectual for such, and only such, as trust or put confidence in his atoning blood, i. e. who believe in him as "the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world."

Διὰ τῆς πίστεως may also be connected with *δικαιούμενοι* or with *προέθετο* but not to so good purpose, or so naturally, as with *ἱλαστήριον*.

Ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ means, *his bloody death*; the expression and image being borrowed from the expiatory blood of the ancient sacrifices. Faith in this blood, or in the death of Jesus, as the means of expiation, seems to be the distinguishing trait above all others of true Christianity.

Εἰς ἔνδειξιν . . . πρὸς ἔνδειξιν. Two questions that are very

important in respect to the interpretation of vs. 25, 26, arise here, viz. (1) Are εἰς and πρὸς used in this place as equivalent terms, and joined with ἔνδειξιν as designating a sense which in both cases is the same? (2) Is πρὸς ἔνδειξιν co-ordinate with εἰς ἔνδειξιν, i. e. is it arranged in the same manner, and does it sustain the same relation to the *first* part of the whole sentence? As to the first question; nothing can be more certain than that both εἰς and πρὸς stand before the Accusative case, and before the Infinitive mode used as a noun in the Accusative, in order to design the *intention, object, purpose, design, end*, etc., of any thing; e. g. εἰς ζωῆν *in order to obtain life*, εἰς τὴν ἀνομίαν *in order to commit iniquity*, εἰς ὃ *for which purpose*, εἰς τοῦτο *for this purpose*, εἰς τὸ ἐμπαίξαι *in order to mock*, Matt. 20: 19, εἰς τὸ σταυρωθῆναι *in order to be crucified*, and so in numberless instances; see Bretsch. Lex. εἰς. 3. The same thing is true of πρὸς: e. g. πρὸς τὸ θεαθῆναι, *in order to be seen*, Matt. 6: 1; πρὸς παραχειμάσαι, *for the sake of passing the winter*, Acts 27: 12; πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι, *in order to lust*, Matt. 5: 28; πρὸς οἰκοδομήν, *for the sake of edification*, Rom. 15: 2; πρὸς εντροπήν, *for the sake of shaming you*, 1 Cor. 6: 5, et al. sæpe; see Bretsch. Lex. πρὸς, III. c.

So far then as *usage* is concerned, it is a perfectly plain case, that εἰς ἔνδειξιν and πρὸς ἔνδειξιν may be altogether equivalent. Tholuck thinks that the change of prepositions (εἰς and πρὸς) makes against the *co-ordination* of εἰς ἔνδειξιν and πρὸς ἔνδειξιν: and yet, in commenting on v. 30 below, he is obliged to admit, that ἐκ πίστεως and διὰ πίστεως are altogether equivalent. Such I take to be the case with the εἰς and πρὸς in question; and therefore,

(2) I must, with Flatt, Turretin, and many other expositors, explain εἰς ἔνδειξιν and πρὸς ἔνδειξιν as *co-ordinate*. The arrangement of the thought stands thus: ὃν προέθετο ὁ θεὸς ἰλαστήριον . . . εἰς ἔνδειξιν—ὃν προέθετο ὁ θεὸς ἰλαστήριον . . . πρὸς ἔνδειξιν: which arrangement fully exhibits what I mean, by saying that the expressions are *co-ordinate*. And this arrangement seems to be plainly and fully confirmed, by the antithetic comparison of προγεγονότων (*past*) in one clause, and ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ (*present*) in the other.

Τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ, *of his justification*, i. e. of the justification which he proffers, or of which he is the author. But here again is great diversity of opinion among commentators. Ambrose, Locke, and others, understand δικαιοσύνης as meaning *veracity*; Theodoret, Socinus, Grotius, Bolten, and Koppe, explain it as meaning

goodness; like the Hebrew קִדְּוָה . Flatt renders it *sanctitas*; Tholuck says that *δικαιοσύνη*, in Paul's writings, always means *righteousness* or *holiness*; in which he is most surely mistaken. To my own mind nothing can be plainer, than that *δικαιοσύνης* has the same sense here as in chap. 1: 17, and as in v. 22d above; where it seems too plain to be mistaken. What can be more certain, than that it is taken in a sense which is homogeneous with *δικαιωθήσεται* in v. 20, and *δικαιούμενοι* in v. 23?

What now is the sentiment which is in accordance with this? It is as follows: 'God has openly exhibited Christ to the world as a propitiatory offering for sin, unto all who believe in him, in order that he might fully exhibit his pardoning mercy (his *δικαιοσύνη*) in respect to the forgiveness of sins under the past and present dispensation.'

Is not this plain and consistent sentiment, congruous with the design of the writer and with the nature of facts? How or why so much difficulty should have been made about the word *δικαιοσύνης* here, I am not able to explain. Turretin, indeed, calls the exegesis which I have here given, "*frigida repetitio . . . apostolo nostro haud satis digna.*" I should have been better satisfied, if he had given some valid reason for such a remark; which it is always easier to make than to justify. One good rule in the explanation of Scripture is, that the same writer, on the same topic, and in the same connection of reasoning and thought, must be construed as using the same phraseology in the same sense. All I ask here is, that a maxim so plain and reasonable, should be observed. And where is the "*repetitio*" in this case? Where has the apostle before said, that God had openly proposed to the world the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ, in order to exhibit his pardoning mercy for sins committed under the old and under the new dispensation? And as to the "*frigida*;" if there be any one sentiment, in the whole New Testament, respecting the efficacy of the atoning blood of Jesus with regard to power and extent, which stands at the head of all others, the sentiment here developed holds this very place. It has its express parallel, only in Heb. 9: 15. I feel constrained, therefore, to differ here exceedingly from Turretin, as to what he names *frigida interpretatio*. It is as opposite to this, as light is to darkness.

Διὰ τὴν . . . θεοῦ, in regard to the remission of sins formerly committed, during the forbearance of God. That *διὰ* not unfrequently has the meaning *in respect to, in regard to*, see Matt. 18: 23,

διὰ τοῦτο, *in respect to this*, viz. the sentiment which Jesus had just uttered; the same in Matt. 21: 43. 23: 34, διὰ τοῦτο, *for the sake of this, on account of this*; Mark 11: 24. Luke 11: 49. 1 Thess. 3: 7, διὰ, *on account of*; to which I may add Rom. 5: 12, διὰ τοῦτο, *in respect to this*, viz. the sentiment which had just been uttered. So Flatt on our verse, διὰ, *in Rücksicht auf, in respect to*.

The clause διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν . . . θεοῦ, I regard as exegetical of the preceding δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ, viz. his δικαιοσύνη was manifested *on account of, in respect to*, the remission of sins committed in former times, etc.

Πάρεσιν (from παρίημι) means *remission, passing by, dismissing*, etc.; and therefore it has the same sense with ἄρεσιν, as we should expect from the etymology of the word.—Προγεγονότων, *formerly done, committed in times before*. In the sense of *done, taken place, or committed*, γίνομαι is often used with respect to *actions*; e. g. Matt. 6: 10. Luke 10: 13. 23: 24. 9: 7. 13: 17. 28: 8, et alibi; see Bretschn. Lex. γίνομαι, 3.

(26) Ἐν τῇ ἀνοχῇ, *during the forbearance of God*. The uniting of this clause with v. 26, is a mistake of Robert Stephens; for it is plainly connected with the preceding verse, and has reference either to πάρεσιν or προγεγονότων ἁμαρτημάτων. But to which of these? Does the writer mean to say, *remission . . . through the forbearance of God to punish sin*; or *sins formerly committed, while God forbore to punish*? I understand him in the latter sense; and this is the natural exegesis of ἀνοχῇ, so far as its present position in the sentence is concerned. That ἐν often has the sense of *during, dum est*, is quite clear; e. g. Matt. 12: 2, ἐν σαββάτῳ, *during the sabbath*; Matt. 13: 4, ἐν τῷ σπείρειν, *inter serendum, during the action of sowing*; John 2: 23, ἐν τῇ ἑορτῇ, *during the feast*; John 7: 11. Acts 8: 33. 17: 31. Rev. 1: 10.

As to the sentiment of the clause, it has in some respects a parallel, in Acts 17: 30; “As to the times of this ignorance, ὑπερίδων ὁ θεός,” i. e. God forbore punishment. But in our text, the apostle speaks of the *remission* which is connected with justification, i. e. the pardon of sin.

Πρὸς ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ, the same in all respects as εἰς ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ in v. 25. Ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ, *at the present time*, i. e. under the new dispensation. Thus has the apostle shewn, that the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ extends, with respect to its efficacy, to all ages of the world, to all generations and

nations; i. e. that it is capable of such an extent, where such a faith as God requires is exhibited. The parallel of this remarkable and most cheering and animating sentiment, is to be found in Heb. 9: 15. It is implied in other passages of the New Testament, not unfrequently; but it is no where else so explicitly asserted. The sentiment shews, moreover, in what light the apostle viewed the death of Christ. If this were to be regarded only as the death of a martyr to the truth, or as an example of constancy, etc., then how could its efficacy take hold on *προγεγονότων ἀμαρτημάτων*, whatever it might do as to those who lived *after* his death took place? This question seems to suggest the necessity of ascribing a *vicarious* influence to the death of Jesus; for how else can it avail for the forgiveness of sins committed in early ages?

Εἰς τὸ εἶναι . . . Ἰησοῦς, that he might be just, and yet the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus, i. e. has the faith of a Christian. Here again is a great diversity of sentiment concerning *δικαιον*: some making it to signify *kind, benignant*, for which they appeal to Matt. 1: 19. John 17: 25. 1 John 1: 9, and the frequent signification of the Hebrew קָדֵיץ and קָדֵץ. But although the word is capable of this sense, the connection does not seem to admit it here, as it would make tautology. The difficulty seems to be, that commentators have overlooked the logical connection of the whole clause. The *εἰς τὸ* at the beginning of it, shews that it has a like object with *εἰς ἔνδειξιν* and *πρὸς ἔνδειξιν*, and is co-ordinate with them. There seems to me, however, to be this difference, viz. that in *εἰς τὸ εἶναι δικαιον* *κ. τ. λ.*, the writer looks back to the whole sentiment proposed in vs. 21—24; which is, that all men are sinners, and that a regard merely to the law, i. e. a sense of justice merely on the part of God, or he being *δίκαιος* merely, does not in itself permit justification by overlooking or setting aside the penalty of the law; but the death of Christ is an expedient of infinite wisdom, by which the full claims of the law may be admitted, and yet the penalty avoided, because a moral compensation or equivalent has been provided, by the sufferings of him who died in the sinner's stead. Here then are two things conspicuous in this wonderful arrangement of infinite wisdom and benevolence; *the first*, that God will not give up the penalty of his law without an adequate substitute for it; he is *δίκαιος*, i. e. he fully retains a high and immutable regard to justice or rectitude, he is unwilling to sacrifice any part of the purity and strictness of his law which is "holy and just and good:" *the second*, that God has still

provided a way by which he may retain all his views of justice, and his law may remain without being in any measure dishonoured or sacrificed, and yet the penitent sinner may be pardoned, and treated as though he had yielded perfect obedience to it. These I take to be the sentiments conveyed by *δίκαιον* and *δικαίουνται* in this passage. Bengel has happily expressed it: "Summum hic paradoxon evangelicum; nam in lege conspicitur Deus justus et condemnans, in evangelio justus ipse et justificans peccatores." As I can find no case in which *δίκαιος* appears to mean either *justified*, or *justifying*, I must retain the sense of *just* in this place.

Τὸν ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ is like *οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς, οἱ ἐξ ἐρεθείας*, etc. The phrase may be correctly translated: *The believer in Jesus*, or *him who is of the faith which believes in Jesus*, i. e. the true Christian believer.

(27) *Ποῦ οὖν ἡ καύχησις; where then is boasting or glorying?* That is, if what I have said be true, viz. that all men, both Jews and Gentiles, are sinners, and can be justified only by grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus; then it follows, that all boasting of their own merits, all glorying in their special privileges, is entirely excluded. This has a special reference to the Jews, who were so prone to boast of these things.

Διὰ ποιοῦ νόμου; by what arrangement or economy? Νόμου appears to be used here in the sense of the Chaldee *ܢܗܢ*, *economy* or *rule* of doing any thing. It sometimes designates a *mode* of life; e. g. Phil. 3: 5, *κατὰ νόμον Φαρισαϊός*. For the sense of *rule* or *standard*, see in Rom. 7: 23, 25. 8: 2. 9: 31. In the sense of *economy* or *arrangement* it is used in Gal. 3: 21. Acts 21: 20, and perhaps 23: 29. The sense is: 'By what arrangement, or by what rule, is boasting excluded?'

Τῶν ἔργων; That is, Is it excluded διὰ νόμον τῶν ἔργων; Is it excluded by that economy or rule, which places justification on the ground of perfect obedience to the law, i. e. of entirely performing those works which the law demands?

Οὐχὶ . . . πίστεως, nay, but by the economy or rule of faith. That is, faith being the condition of justification under the gospel-arrangement or *νόμος*, this excludes all claims of desert on the part of the sinner. The very statement of itself shews, that although faith is a *conditio sine qua non* of justification, yet it is not the meritorious or procuring cause of it. *Νόμου πίστεως* means, that arrangement which makes faith necessary to salvation, but which, at the same time, bestows salvation merely as a gratuity.

(28) *Λογίζόμεθα . . . νόμου, we conclude, therefore, that a man is justified by faith, without the deeds of the law; i. e. we believe or count it as certain, that men are justified in a gratuitous manner, through faith in Christ, and not by perfect obedience to the law, or by perfectly doing those things which the law requires. What is meant by being justified by faith, is sufficiently plain here, inasmuch as it is opposed to justification by works, i. e. on the score of merit or perfect obedience. See remarks on chap. 4: 5.*

Luther translates *πίστει, ALLEIN durch den Glauben, i. e. by faith only.* And such were his views on this subject, that he rejected the epistle of James from the canon of the New Testament, because he thought that the second chapter of this epistle taught a doctrine different from that which Paul here inculcates. I must refer the reader to Excursus II. for a brief view of this subject.

(29) *Ἡ Ἰουδαίων . . . ἐθνῶν; Is he the God of the Jews only? Is he not also of the Gentiles?* That is, why should it not be acknowledged, that “the God of the spirits of all flesh,” who “has made of one blood all the nations that dwell upon the face of the earth,” and who of old was named *יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ*—why should he not sustain the same relation to the Gentiles as to the Jews, and admit them to the like privileges?

(30) He should; he must be so regarded. *Ναὶ, καὶ ἐθνῶν.* To confirm this he adds: *ἐπέπερ . . . πίστεως, since it is one and the same God who will justify the circumcised by faith, and the uncircumcised by faith. Ἕως, one and the same; so Luke 12: 52. 1 Cor. 10: 17. 11: 5, et al.—Ἐκ πίστεως and διὰ τῆς πίστεως are of the same import; for both ἐκ and διὰ are placed before the Genitive as signifying the instrumental cause, in the same sense, in almost numberless examples.—Περιομήν and ἀκροβυστίαν are examples of the abstract put for the concrete.*

(31) *Νόμου οὖν . . . πίστεως; Do we then make void the law through faith?* That is, do we counteract or annul the Old Testament Scriptures, by inculcating gratuitous justification? So I feel obliged to construe *νόμου* here, when I compare this verse with vs. 20, 21, and with chap. iv. where the object of the writer throughout is, to shew that the Old Testament inculcates the same doctrine as that which he here urges. So Flatt, Koppe, Tholuck, and others. Chrysostom also says of *νόμου* here: *τοῦτο [δικαιοῦν] οὐχ ἰσχυσεν ὁ νόμος.* The argument which renders this exegesis quite plain, is, that the apostle immediately proceeds to answer the objection here

made, by shewing that the Old Testament actually teaches the doctrine in question.

Νόμον ἰστωμεν, we confirm the law; i. e. we inculcate that which entirely accords with the Old Testament, and only serves to confirm it.

How gratuitous justification can be said to confirm or establish the moral law, (as this text has been often explained), it seems difficult to make out. That the doctrine of justification by faith does not, indeed, overthrow moral obligation; yea, that such a justification even serves in a most important way to promote holiness of life; the apostle shews in chap. vi. But his present concern is with the objection made to his sentiments, viz. the objection that he is weakening the force of the ancient Jewish Scriptures. Accordingly, he discusses this question at large, in the following chapter.

CHAP. IV. 1—12.

The writer now proceeds to shew, that the Scriptures of the Old Testament do in fact confirm the view which he had given of *gratuitous* justification. To the question: What special advantages were bestowed on Abraham, in consequence of his peculiar covenant relation with God? the apostle replies, that he had no cause of glorying before God, on the ground of any external privilege which was his, vs. 1, 2. The Scripture asserts, that *Abraham's faith was imputed to him for righteousness*; and consequently that he was gratuitously justified, vs. 3, 4. So also David speaks of the subject of justification, representing it as *gratuitous* forgiveness, not as acceptance *pro meritis*, vs. 6—8. If it be asked now, whether such forgiveness belongs only to those who are circumcised, i. e. to Abraham and his natural posterity, the answer is, that such cannot be the case; for Abraham was himself justified *antecedently* to his circumcision; and he received this rite merely as a token of confirmation in respect to the blessing already bestowed; and in order that he might be a spiritual father, i. e. an eminent pattern or exemplar of spiritual blessings, both to Gentiles and Jews, vs. 9—12.

Verses 1—12 may be divided into three distinct parts, if the reader desires it; viz. (1) Vs. 1—5, the justification of Abraham was *gratuitous*. (2) Vs. 6—8, David discloses the same views of acceptance with God. (3) Vs. 9—12, circumcision was not, and could not be, any ground at all of the justification of Abraham. I have, however, chosen to connect these under one general head, because I view the third particular as the answer to the question in v. 1, and the first and second particulars as being preparatory to this, and also as having respect to the main design of the writer, which is to shew that the Old Testament Scriptures do in fact exhibit the same views of justification, which he has given in the preceding context. The particular introduction to the remaining parts of the present chapter, will be found in its appropriate place.

(1) *Τί οὖν . . . κατὰ σάρκα;* What then shall we say that Abraham our father obtained in respect to the flesh? This question is parallel with those in chap. 3: 1. The apostle evidently suggests

it, as one which an opponent to his views would naturally ask. The import of it is: 'How will your doctrine concerning justification as entirely gratuitous, agree with the views which the Scripture leads us to take of Abraham? Had he no advantage from his precedence and privileges? Was the covenant and rite of circumcision, by which he was distinguished from all the rest of the world, of no avail in his case?' Such is evidently the tenor of the discourse, whether we suppose the apostle to put such interrogations in his own person, or in that of his opponent.

Οὖν, then, i. e. on the ground which you take, what can we say, etc.—*Τὸν πατέρα ἡμῶν, our father*, shews that the objector here is supposed to be a Jew. *Εὐρηκέναι, obtained*; comp. Luke 1: 30. Heb. 9: 12.—*Κατὰ σάρκα* is a controverted phrase here. Should it be united in sense with *τὸν πατέρα ἡμῶν*? Or must we join it with *εὐρηκέναι*? If the question here concerned the relation of Abraham respectively as a *spiritual* father and as a *natural* one, we should feel in a measure necessitated to join *κατὰ σάρκα* with *τὸν πατέρα ἡμῶν*. Chrysostom, Erasmus, Limborch, and others, do thus join it; and some manuscripts, in accordance with such views, have transferred *εὐρηκέναι* and placed it *before τὸν πατέρα ἡμῶν*. But as the weight of authority is against these; as the *hyperbaton* or transposition, taking the text as it now stands, would be abrupt and improbable, if we should join *κατὰ σάρκα* with *τὸν πατέρα ἡμῶν* and specially as *κατὰ σάρκα* would not then add any thing to the idea designated by *τὸν πατέρα ἡμῶν*: so it would seem to be more eligible, to regard *κατὰ σάρκα* as qualifying *εὐρηκέναι*. One meaning which has been given here to *σάρξ*, is, *external privileges* or *advantages*; and the appeal is made to 1 Cor. 10: 18. Phil. 3: 3. Gal. 6: 12, in order to confirm this; but these texts all plainly relate to circumcision. *Σάρξ* sometimes means, that which is *external* or *physical*, in distinction from that which is *internal* or *spiritual*, e. g. Gal. 4: 23. Rom. 9: 8. In accordance with this general idea, and with probability on their side, Wetstein, Michaelis, Bretschneider (Lex.), and others, understand by *κατὰ σάρκα* in our text, *circumcision*; *σάρξ* being frequently used to designate the physical member which was circumcised, or fleshly circumcision, e. g. Phil. 3: 3. Gal. 6: 12. 1 Cor. 10: 18. Eph. 2: 11. Col. 2: 13; comp. Gen. 17: 11, 14, 24, 25. Tholuck makes the objection to this exegesis, that the apostle does not undertake, in the sequel, to shew that *circumcision* was not the ground of Abraham's justification, but that *works* were not. He also suggests, that the

second verse seems to construe *κατὰ σάρκα* as being equivalent in sense to *ἐξ ἔργων*. Calvin renders *κατὰ σάρκα*, *naturaliter*; and Grotius, *propriis viribus*; to support which appeal has been made to Matt. 16: 17. Gal. 1: 16; but there the phrase is, *flesh and blood*. But if we consider *κατὰ σάρκα* as the opposite of *κατὰ πνεῦμα*, and regard *πνεῦμα* as designating the *gracious spiritual influences* vouchsafed to believers under the gospel, the meaning of *κατὰ σάρκα* would then be: 'In respect to efforts by one's own natural powers, or efforts made in one's own strength.' This is the interpretation which for substance Tholuck defends. If, however, *κατὰ σάρκα* is to be taken as qualifying *ἐυηκέναι*, (and so the present text compels us to take it), I must prefer the predominant sense of it in the epistles of Paul, viz. *in respect to circumcision*; comp. 3: 1, where the very same question is put in a more literal way. The meaning of the question would then be: What good or advantage has Abraham our father obtained, in respect to the distinguishing rite which separated him from all the world and consecrated him to God? Of what use was it? The apostle, in answer to the like question in chap. 3: 1, shews that the Jewish nation were all under sin and under condemnation, and that they can therefore lay no claim to justification on the ground of external privileges. The objector, however, is not satisfied with this general answer, but now suggests the case of Abraham as a more urgent one, and wishes to know whether we can justly hold that no pre-eminence was given to him on account of the covenant and the rite of circumcision. The apostle in his answer does not deny, or rather he *tacitly* admits, that Abraham enjoyed some advantage on account of his external privileges. He admits the same thing *expressly* of the whole Jewish nation, 3: 2. But as to the great subject in question, viz. *gratuitous justification*, Paul avers at once that Abraham was not justified at all on the ground of his external advantages, or of any merit; for then he would have had matter of boasting. But this he has not before God; whatever may be the praise which his privileges or his conduct in general may deserve from men.

The particular reason why Paul introduces the case of Abraham here, in distinction from that of the Jews at large, seems to be, the use which he is to make of it in the sequel, in refuting the assumption of the objector. After shewing, in vs. 2—9, that the justification of Abraham must have been gratuitous, the apostle proceeds to a special refutation of the idea that Abraham could have been justified *κατὰ σάρκα*, i. e. on account of the rite and covenant of circumcision.

Tholuck is therefore mistaken, when he states that the apostle has not laboured to contradict this groundless objection of the Jew. Indeed he has made this contradiction so prominent and striking, that one cannot well avoid the supposition, that he had this thing in view, when he used the phrase *κατὰ σάρακα*.

(2) *Εἰ γὰρ . . . καύχημα*, *if, however, Abraham was justified by works, he has ground of boasting*. This seems to me to be the real response of the apostle, which is marked by the nature of the sentiment, and the *γὰρ respondentis*, as Bretschneider calls it, (Lex. in *γὰρ*). *Γὰρ* is undoubtedly sometimes employed in making replies, with the sense of *yet, however*, (see Matt. 27: 23. Luke 23: 22. John 7: 41. 9: 30. Mark 7: 28); and so I have rendered it above. But when so employed, something is usually implied which precedes it. So here the apostle means the same as to say: 'I concede that Abraham had advantages from his external condition and privileges, [comp. 3: 2, where this idea is expressed]; it is still true, however, that he was not *justified* by any works or merit of his own, certainly not in the sight of God; for the Scripture saith, etc.' When the writer says *εἰ*, *if*, etc., he makes a supposition which he immediately and fully negatives. *Εἰ ἔξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη* means, *if he were justified meritoriously*, i. e. on the ground of any thing which belonged to him, or which he had done.

Ἀλλ' . . . θεόν, *but not* [i. e. he had no ground of boasting] *before God*. Whatever advantage, then, the Jew might attribute to Abraham, he could not justly attribute that of obtaining justification by his own privileges or merits. So the writer goes on to prove from the Jewish Scriptures.

Οὐ πρὸς τὸν θεόν may be considered either as referring to *ἔχει καύχημα* or to *ἔξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη*. The sense will be substantially the same. The immediate antecedent, in such a case, has the preference; and therefore I consider it as referring to *ἔχει καύχημα*.

(3) *For what saith the Scripture? And Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness*; see Gen. 15: 6, which runs thus: "And he [God] counted it to him [Abraham] as righteousness." Instead of the *active* form, the apostle (with the Seventy) employs the *passive* one, which for substance communicates the same sense. But what is *λογίζεσθαι εἰς δικαιοσύνην*?

This inquiry is of great importance in order to understand the present chapter, in which the expression mentioned is so often employed. In v. 4, the phrase in question is exchanged for *λογίζεται*

κατὰ χάριν· which affords a view of its meaning that is entirely satisfactory. *To reckon Abraham's belief as righteousness*, cannot mean, that the simple act, on the part of Abraham, of giving credit to the divine testimony, was tantamount to complete obedience in all respects to the divine law, and was accepted as such. In this case, Abraham would have been accepted on the ground of his own *merit*; for his *belief* was as much his own act, as any kind of obedience could have been. To have his belief *imputed* or *counted for righteousness*, then, must mean, that in consequence of his belief, *he was treated as righteous, he was accepted as righteous*, i. e. he was gratuitously justified, treated as righteous, or accepted as righteous. So vs. 4, 5; which speak so plainly to this point, that the force of their testimony cannot be avoided; see the remarks upon them.

In regard to the *faith* of Abraham, (which, as described in Gen. 15: 6, is not appropriately faith in Christ), Heb. xi. shews, that all faith, i. e. all *true* faith, is of one and the same nature, and is connected with the like blessings. All true faith is *confidence in God*; confidence in his declarations, whether they have respect to the Messiah, or to any fact or doctrine whatever. Substantially, then, faith must always perform the same office; for it is always *essentially* of the same nature.

In order further to illustrate the meaning of λογίζεσθαι *u. v. l.* to *impute* or *reckon*, etc., it may be remarked, (1) That the word sometimes means, *to reckon to one what he actually possesses, to impute that to him which actually belongs to him*, i. e. to treat him as actually possessing the thing or quality reckoned to him; e. g. Ps. 106: 31 (105: 31), (comp. Num. 25: 10—13). 2 Sam. 19: 19, *μη λογισάσθω ὁ κύριός μου ἀνομίαν*. Ps. 32: 2 (31: 2). 1 Cor. 13: 5. 2 Cor. 5: 19. 2 Tim. 4. 16.

(2) It also means, *to impute something to one which does not actually belong to him; to treat him as possessing what he does not actually possess, or as having done that which he has not actually done*; e. g. Lev. 17: 4, *αἷμα λογισθήσεται*, *blood shall be imputed to that man*, i. e. he shall be treated as if guilty of shedding human blood; which he had not done, for so the sequel shews. So also Hos. 8: 12. 1 Sam. 1: 13 (Sept.) Lam. 4: 2. Wisdom (Apocrypha) 2: 16. Such is plainly the sense, in Rom. 4: 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 22, 23, 24. So also ἐλλόγει, Philem. v. 18. See the remarks at the close of v. 5.

The reader will note also, that in most of the cases just cited, εἰς

is plainly used as equivalent to $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ and in the same sense the Hebrew כִּי is often used, to which $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ corresponds.

(4) $T\tilde{\omega}$ $\xi\rho\gamma\alpha\zeta\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega$ (Midd. voice), *to him who worketh*, i. e. to him who performs all the $\xi\rho\gamma\alpha$ $\nu\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\upsilon$, to him who yields entire obedience to the precepts of law; compare the remarks on $\xi\rho\gamma\alpha$ $\nu\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\upsilon$ under 3: 20 above. $\xi\rho\gamma\alpha\zeta\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega$ here is equivalent to $\acute{\omicron}$ $\pi\omicron\iota\omega\tilde{\nu}$ $\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\xi\rho\gamma\alpha$. comp. 3: 20, 27, 28. 2: 15; also v. 6. below. Luther translates: *Der mit Werken umgeheth*; Beza: *Is qui ex opere est aliquid promeritus*. Tholuck defends Luther's version. To me it seems to convey truth, but not the *whole* truth. Better has Turretin said: *Per cum qui operatur non intelligimus . . . eos qui bona opera faciunt, sed eos qui perfectè implèrunt legem Dei absque ullo defectu*.

$\acute{\omicron}$ $\mu\iota\sigma\theta\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$. . . $\chi\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\upsilon$, *reward is not regarded or counted as a matter of grace*; i. e. it is his just *due*, as the sequel ($\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\acute{\omicron}\rho\gamma\acute{\iota}\lambda\eta\mu\alpha$) shews; a due in consequence of the promise or engagement of reward which the law contains, and not because the obedience of men can really profit the divine Being, so as to lay him under obligations on this account.

(5) $T\tilde{\omega}$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ $\mu\grave{\eta}$ $\xi\rho\gamma\alpha\zeta\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega$, *but to him who does not yield perfect obedience*; plainly the opposite of the first part of the verse. The meaning is: 'To the sinner who has not exhibited perfect obedience, but $\pi\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\upsilon\acute{\omicron}\nu\omicron\tau\iota$ $\kappa.$ $\tau.$ $\lambda.$, believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly,' i. e. on Christ who died for sinners, and by whose death they are justified; comp. 5: 8—10. 4: 25. 1 Pet. 3: 18. Heb. 9: 28.

$\Lambda\omicron\gamma\acute{\iota}\zeta\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$. . . $\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\sigma\upsilon\tilde{\nu}\eta\varsigma$, *his faith is counted as righteousness*; i. e. through belief in Christ who died for sinners, he comes to be treated or accepted as if he were himself righteous; in other words, through the favour of God he is freed from the penalty of the law, and accepted and treated as he would be, had he been perfectly obedient.

But how can a man's *faith be counted as righteousness*, and yet this man at the same time be *gratuitously justified*, i. e. justified without attributing to him any merit? Is not faith *an act of his own*? And if his faith be counted as righteousness, and he in this way be justified, why is he not justified as truly by his own doings, as if he were justified on the ground of perfect obedience?

These questions are very natural, and they have often been asked and urged. To answer them satisfactorily, we must recur for a moment to the nature of *faith* and *works*, as placed in contra-distinction to each other by the apostle Paul.

We have already seen (3: 20), that *ἔργα νόμου*, (and therefore *ἔργα*, which, in this epistle, is for the most part only an abridgement of this phrase), means *those works which the law requires*. To do *these works* must of course mean, to do them *as* the law requires, i. e. to do all of them, and perfectly; in a word, it means *perfect obedience*. This is one ground (the *legal* one) of justification; and it stands on the simple basis: "This do, and thou shalt live." To be justified by *works of law*, or *by works*, means, of course, to be justified by complete or perfect obedience.

To this the apostle directly opposes justification *by faith*, Rom. 3: 27, 28; comp. vs. 20—22. Consequently justification by faith means, *gratuitous justification*. So the apostle has shewn us most clearly, by averring that what he had called *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ διὰ πίστεως* in 3: 22, is the same as *being justified δωρεάν, τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι*, v. 23. The contrast also in 3: 27, 28 fully confirms the same view.

In the verses which we are now considering (4: 4, 5), this contrast is fully drawn out and presented to view. *ἔργαζόμενος* is one who does all the *ἔργα τοῦ νόμου*, and so is entitled to the reward *κατὰ ὁμολογίαν*, i. e. agreeably to the promise made in the law. On the other hand, *ὁ πιστεύων ἐπὶ τὸν δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἀσεβῆ* is one, who, abandoning all hope of salvation on law-ground, i. e. by his own merit, puts his confidence in the Saviour only for pardon and acceptance with God. Now the faith by which he does this, is intimately connected of course with his justification; so that Paul very often speaks of *δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως*, and employs the phrases *δικαιοθύντες ἐκ πίστεως*, *ἐδικαιώθη ἐκ πίστεως*, etc. But the manner in which he speaks of justification every where; the assertion that it is *δωρεάν*, that it is *τῇ χάριτι*, that it is bestowed on *τῷ μὴ ἐργαζομένῳ*; and the direct contrast which he makes between being justified by works, i. e. by perfect or meritorious obedience, and by faith; shew, beyond all reasonable question, that faith is never connected with justification as the *meritorious* cause of it, but only as a *conditio sine qua non*, a state of heart and feelings without which the gratuitous benefits that Christ bestows on sinners, cannot be received. To use the language of the old writers: 'It is a mere *meritum ex congruo*, not a *meritum ex condigno*;' i. e. it implies simply a *fitness* in the subject of blessings to receive them, not a *desert* of such blessings.

This is all plain. What then is it to have one's *faith counted for righteousness*? This question is fully and most satisfactorily answered in 4: 6, 7. It is 'to be forgiven *χωρὶς ἔργων*,' without meri-

torious obedience, without having fulfilled the demands of the law; it is for one 'to have no iniquity imputed to him.' It is quite clear, then, that by *λογίζεσθαι πίστιν εἰς δικαιοσύνην* is not meant, that one's faith is put in the place of perfect obedience to the law, and counted to him on the score of *merit*; but that faith, when exercised by the penitent sinner, is a means or instrument of his being regarded or treated as righteous. Yet the fact that he is so treated, is a *mere gratuity*; not something due to the sinner on the score of merit, a merit connected with his faith. Nothing can be made clearer than this is, by Rom. 3: 20—24, 28, 29. 4: 4, 5, 6, 7. And according to these plain and certain views, are we to modify the expression *λογίζεσθαι πίστιν εἰς δικαιοσύνην*. Whenever faith is so counted, it is all of gratuity. The *faith* of a *sinner*, is not what the divine *law* originally requires; strictly speaking, then, it is not obedience to the *law*; the faith of a sinner is a requisition of the *gospel*, (I mean faith in its appropriate Christian sense), as distinguished from the law. *To count this faith as righteousness*, is to treat the penitent sinner who possesses it, as if he were righteous, i. e. to deliver him from punishment and to advance him to happiness. It must of course be by *gratuity* altogether, that a sinner who has faith is thus treated. The very nature of the whole transaction shews this; for the faith in question is belief in a Saviour, who came to deliver sinners that were in a perishing condition. That deliverance is *of grace*. Faith is not of itself such an act of obedience to the divine *law*, as that it will supply the place of perfect obedience. Nor has it any efficacy in itself, as a *meritum ex condigno*, to save men. It is merely *the instrument of union to Christ, in order that they may receive a gratuitous salvation*. But of this salvation we must always say, with Paul: "If by grace, it is no more of works; otherwise grace is no more grace," Rom. 11: 6.

(6) *Καθάπερ καὶ . . . ἀνθρώπου, in like manner, also, David speaks of the blessedness of the man.* The apostle having adduced the example of Abraham, as being *gratuitously* justified through faith, now goes on to add the example of David, in order to shew, (what he had before asserted in 3: 31), that he does not disannul the Old Testament Scriptures by avowing the doctrine of *gratuitous justification*. *Λέγει, describes, speaks of.*—*Μακαρισμόν, the blessedness or the happiness, the great privilege.* Ὡς ὁ θεὸς . . . ἔργων, i. e. whom God accepts and treats as righteous, *χωρὶς ἔργων*, without entire obedience to the law, without having done all the works which the

law enjoins; comp. v. 5 above, with the references there. *To impute righteousness without works*, is substantially the same as *to impute faith for righteousness*, as we have already seen.

From the use made of *δικαιοσύνη* in vs. 3—6 here, and elsewhere in this chapter where the same phraseology occurs, it is evident that the word is not to be understood in the sense of *justification*, (which is the more common meaning of it in our epistle), but in the usual sense of *ἡ ἀρετή*, viz. *the doing of that which is right, obedience to the divine law*. This results from the connection in which *δικαιοσύνη* here stands, from the evident design of the writer, and from the particular nature of his phraseology. Paul is aiming to shew, that on the ground of perfect obedience (*ἡ ἀρετή* or *δικαιοσύνη* in the complete sense), no one can be saved; and that the Old Testament Scriptures teach us plainly, that even such men as Abraham and David were saved *κατὰ χάριν . . . οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων*. But how? The answer is, that, "believing on him who justifieth the ungodly," their "faith was counted for righteousness," i. e. they were gratuitously justified through faith, or they found through faith that acceptance with God, which would have followed perfect obedience or the *δικαιοσύνη* which the law of God demands. In other words: Their faith was *gratuitously* reckoned as equivalent to the *δικαιοσύνη* demanded by the law. The nature of the case and the object of the writer shew, therefore, that the *δικαιοσύνη* here mentioned is a *legal* one; and consequently that the meaning *justification* cannot be attached to it. And besides all this, the phrase *λογίζεσθαι εἰς δικαιοσύνην* is peculiar, and shews that a special sense is to be attached to it. To say—*was counted for justification*, would make no tolerable sense; but to say—*was counted as complete obedience*, would be saying just what the apostle means to say, viz. that the believer is gratuitously justified; for through vs. 3—6, and for the most part in the sequel, *λογίζομαι* is used in the *second* sense mentioned under v. 3, viz. that of imputing to one what in reality does not belong to him. When the penitent sinner's faith is counted for righteousness, i. e. when the penitent sinner is accepted and treated as if he were righteous, then is something counted to him which does not belong to him; i. e. righteousness is counted to him, when it does not belong to him. It lies then upon the face of this whole matter, that his salvation is gratuitous, and not of merit.

(7) *Μακαρίου, happy, greatly privileged.*—*Ἀφέθησαν, are remitted*, from *ἀφίημι, to remit, forgive.*—*Whose sins ἐπεκαλύφθησαν, are covered;* a figurative expression, not unfrequently applied to

the remission of sin. *To cover or conceal*, is to remove from sight or notice; and sins which are left out of sight and out of notice, of course are sins which are not punished.

(8) *Happy the man, to whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity!* Here λογίζηται means, *to reckon a thing to one which actually belongs to him*; in the sense No. 1, under v. 3 above. The meaning is: 'Happy the man who obtains forgiveness of sins, and is accepted and treated as if he were righteous.' *To impute one's own iniquity to him*, is to hold him accountable for it in respect to the demands of punitive justice.

This verse most clearly shews what Paul means by faith being imputed for righteousness; for he commutes with this phrase the expressions, *covering sins* and *imputing not iniquity*. To pardon sin, then, and to treat with favour, constitute the essential ideas intended to be conveyed by the above expressions, as used by the apostle.

The apostle has now prepared the way to refute the special allegation designed to be made by the question in v. 1, τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν Ἀβραάμ τὸν πατέρα ἡμῶν εὐσχημέναι κατὰ σάρκα; He has shewn that justification on the ground of merit or perfect obedience is out of the question; for even Abraham and David were justified through faith gratuitously, and not ἐξ ἔργων. No ground of boasting, then, could be claimed by either of these conspicuous individuals. It was grace only that saved them. But if it is true, in the general sense here stated, that salvation is altogether a gratuity, one question (and but one) still remains, viz. is this gratuity bestowed only on those who are circumcised, i. e. on the Jews only, or is it also granted to the Gentiles? The prejudiced Jew of course would hold to the first; and this is intimated in the question in v. 1, and had been before more expressly signified in chap. 3: 1. This part of the questions there put, the apostle did not directly answer in chap. III., but contented himself with a discussion of the general question, whether in respect to offences against the divine law, and in regard to the matter of justification, the Jew had any pre-eminence over the Gentile. Having disposed of this subject in chap. III., and fortified the general views there given concerning justification, by appeals to the Old Testament in chap. 4: 1—8, he now comes to the special consideration of the question about circumcision, which was first asked in chap. 3: 1, and, as it had not been particularly answered in the sequel, is again virtually repeated by the εὐσχημέναι κατὰ σάρκα in chap. 4: 1.

The discussion on this particular point I understand him as now

introducing, by the language of an objector. 'Ὁ μαζαρισμὸς . . . ἀροβυστίαν; [Cometh] *this blessedness then upon the circumcised [only], or also upon the uncircumcised?* That is: 'Granting the truth of the quotation which you have made, conceding the blessedness of the man whose sins are forgiven, and whose iniquities are covered, still I ask: Does such a blessedness belong only to the Jews? Or are we to suppose that David here means to include the Gentiles also? Do God's promised mercies belong to his own peculiar people only; or are we to credit it, that they are also bestowed on the idolatrous heathen?'

The Jew doubtless felt that such questions must carry along with them their own answer, and that they would refute the position advanced by the apostle. So confident is he of this, that he even suggests that the very Scripture which the apostle had been quoting, in respect to Abraham, proved a *limitation* of the blessings in question; λέγομεν γὰρ . . . εἰς δικαιοσύνην, *for we say that faith was imputed to Abraham for righteousness.* The word *Abraham* is of course emphatic, according to this method of interpretation. The language of the objector means as much as to say: 'Be it so that gratuitous justification is the only one which men can obtain; still the Scripture, in declaring this, says only that faith was counted to *Abraham*, not to the uncircumcised Gentiles. Your quotation, therefore, does not establish your general assertion. It only proves that God's covenant people were so justified.'

In this way of interpreting v. 9, I find no difficulty in the λέγομεν γὰρ which seems incapable of any other satisfactory explanation. If the words are to be considered simply as the apostle's, they must still be explained as virtually raising objections, or asking questions, that would naturally proceed from his opponent.

(10) The reply of the apostle now follows: Πῶς οὖν . . . ἀροβυστία· *How then was it counted? While he was in a state of circumcision, or of uncircumcision? Not in a state of circumcision, but of uncircumcision.* In ἐν περιτομῇ κ. τ. λ., the ἐν stands (as often) before the *Dative of condition*, i. e. the Dative of a noun designating state or condition.

The design of the writer is very plain. The objector suggests by his remarks, that only those within the pale of God's ancient covenant of circumcision, received the blessedness which David describes. But this is not so; for Abraham's *faith was imputed to him for righteousness*, i. e. he was gratuitously justified, *before* the covenant of circum-

cision was made with him, and of course before he was a partaker in this rite. Consequently the blessedness in question is not limited to those who are circumcised, and therefore does not depend on circumcision.

(11) Καὶ σημεῖον . . . ἐν ἀκροβυστία, and he received the sign of circumcision as a seal of the righteousness by faith, which [he obtained] while in a state of uncircumcision. That is, circumcision was not the cause or ground of his faith being counted for righteousness, or of his being gratuitously justified; it was merely a *seal*, i. e. a token of confirmation (for such is σφραγίς, 1 Cor. 9: 2. 2 Tim. 2: 19) in respect to the blessing which he had before obtained. The allusion in the language, is to the practice of confirming written instruments, by seals placed on them in token of ratification. Τῆς δικαιοσύνης τῆς πίστεως might here be rendered, *of the justification which is by faith*; but the idiom of this chapter rather points us to a different version. There is, however, no ground for mistake here, inasmuch as the qualifying words τῆς πίστεως, in connection with what had before been said, sufficiently guard against it.

This circumstance alone is fatal to the claims of the bigoted Jew, in respect to circumcision. But the apostle is not satisfied with repelling the enemy. He advances into his camp, and takes entire possession of it. 'Abraham was not only justified before he was circumcised, but this was done for the very purpose of confirming the truth which I am proclaiming. He was justified before the covenant of circumcision, εἰς τὸ εἶναι . . . δικαιοσύνην, in order that he might be the father of all those who believe in a state of uncircumcision, so that righteousness might be imputed to them. That is, God, in justifying Abraham before he was circumcised, did intend to make him a father, i. e. an eminent pattern or example, to Gentile as well as Jewish believers, and to shew that righteousness might be imputed to the uncircumcised as well as to the circumcised. Δι' ἀκροβυστίας is an example of διὰ conditionis, i. e. of διὰ before a noun in the Genitive which designates state or condition. It is of the same import, when thus employed, as the Dative with ἐν as used above, and is here evidently commuted for it. The meaning of the whole verse is, that Abraham received the sign of circumcision as a confirmation of his justification by faith in an uncircumcised state; and this was thus solemnly confirmed, in order that he might be a spiritual father; i. e. an eminent pattern or example, to Gentiles who would also be gratuitously justified in an uncircumcised state.

(12) In all this, moreover, the apostle admits that there was another object also in view, viz. that Abraham should be a spiritual father of the *circumcised*, as well as of the *uncircumcised*, i. e. that he should be an eminent example to all, both Jews and Gentiles, of that justification which God bestows on men under the gospel dispensation. So the sequel: *Καὶ πατέρα . . . Ἀβραάμ, and also the father of those who are circumcised, who are not only of the circumcision, but walk in the steps of that faith which our father Abraham had while in a state of uncircumcision.* The ellipsis in the construction of this part of the sentence must be filled up thus: [εἰς τὸ εἶναι] αὐτὸν πατέρα κ. τ. λ., which the mind spontaneously carries forward from the preceding clause. The connection requires us to understand the apostle as asserting, that the sign of circumcision which Abraham received, as a seal of the righteousness of faith or a token of confirmation in respect to his gratuitous justification, was received by him in order that he might be the spiritual father of such Jews as imitated his example. The writer clearly makes the same distinction here, that he does in chap. 2: 28, 29. Not the literal posterity of Abraham, or his descendants by natural generation only, who received the external sign of circumcision in their flesh, were the children of this patriarch, in the sense here intended. *To walk in the steps of Abraham's faith* means, to follow the example of Abraham, to possess and exercise a faith like his. It is to such, and only to such, that Abraham is a *spiritual* father.

This last clause of the verse renders very plain what is meant, when Abraham is called the *father* of both Gentile and Jewish believers. The word כֹּהֵן, *πατήρ*, employed in this way, designates an *exemplar, a pattern, a leading and eminent example* after which others copy; comp. for such a sense, Gen. 4: 20, 21. John 8: 38, 41, 44, where the devil is called the *father* of the wicked Jews; comp. also 1 Macc. 2: 54. In the verse before us, the *children* of Abraham are those *who walk in the steps of his faith*, i. e. imitate his example.

One difficulty remains in respect to τοῖς στοιχοῦσι. The repetition of the article before it here, seems as if the writer intended to distinguish those whom it designates, from the τοῖς οὐκ ἐκ περιτομῆς μόνον, which by placing the οὐκ before τοῖς would mean, *not only to those of the circumcision*; and then ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς κ. τ. λ. would mean, *but also to those who walk*, etc., i. e. but also to Gentiles who imitate Abraham's faith. To this purpose the Syriac version, the Vulgate, Theodoret, Anselm, Castalio, Grotius, Koppe, and others. But the

objection to this is, that heathen believers have already been mentioned in the preceding verse; and that the writer seems plainly here intending to characterize such Jews, and only such, as were the spiritual children of Abraham, i. e. to whom he was a spiritual father. The repetition of the article before *στοιχοῦσι* in this case is indeed peculiar; Tholuck calls it a *solecism*. I regard it rather as a *resumption* of the sentence begun with the preceding *τοῖς*, and interrupted for a moment by the *ὄν ἐκ περιτομῆς μόνον ἀλλὰ καί*. If these latter words are omitted, or regarded as parenthetic, and the second *τοῖς* (which is the sign of *resumption*) be omitted, the sentence runs smoothly. Nothing is more certain, however, than that anomalous constructions do occur, not only in the writings of Paul, but not unfrequently in classic heathen writers.

CHAP. IV. 13—18.

The apostle now proceeds to another illustration and confirmation of his assertions respecting gratuitous justification. The Jew gloried in belonging to a nation to whom God had given a revealed law, and looked upon the pre-eminence which this gave him, as a proof that God would treat him with special favour in a spiritual respect. The reader has only to look back, and re-peruse chap. 2: 17—24, in order to see what dependance the Jews were prone to place upon the knowledge which they possessed of the holy Scriptures, and their superiority in this respect over the Gentiles. In order to take away all ground of glorying in this manner, the apostle here proceeds distinctly to remind them, that Abraham was not justified by any such privilege, the law having been given more than four hundred years after the time in which he lived. Such then as are his spiritual children, i. e. such as are justified on grounds like those on which he was justified, cannot regard the law as the ground of their justification.

The proof of the writer's position is very striking, and could not fail to make a deep impression on the mind of a serious Jew. The manner in which it is exhibited, is well adapted to make such an impression. 'Abraham,' says the apostle, 'did not receive promises for himself and his seed, on account of the law or by means of the law, but gratuitously, i. e. by the righteousness of faith, v. 13. Now if the possession of the law, or obedience to it, were necessary to constitute Abraham and his seed heirs of the promises, then heirship by faith, and the promises connected with this, would be annulled, because these were granted to Abraham before the giving of the law, v. 14. The law, moreover, is so far from being the ground of such promises, that it is a means of indignation on the part of God toward sinners, i. e. a means of their punishment; for it is the prohibitions of the law which constitute and define transgressions, and if there were no law, there could be no transgression, v. 15. Such being the case, the promises are made, not on the ground of law, but through the instrumentality of faith, i. e. gratuitously, in order that all the seed might be assured respecting them, both Gentiles who have not the law, and Jews who have it, provided they have like faith with Abraham, the spiritual father of all, v. 16. The Scripture points out such a relation of Abraham to all true believers, and he is regarded as sustaining such an one, by him who raises the dead to life and calls things out of nothing into existence, v. 17.

Such was the faith of the father of believers, that he put entire confidence in the divine declarations, when, to all appearance, there was no ground to hope that they could be carried into execution; so that he became the spiritual father of many nations, Gentiles as well as Jews, according to the tenor of the Scripture promise: *So shall thy seed be*, v. 18.

(13) Οὐ γὰρ . . . σπέρματι αὐτοῦ, *for not by the law was the promise made to Abraham, or to his seed. Διὰ νόμου, through law, by means of the law.* The writer designs by it either to designate the possession of the law, or the privilege of living under it and being the depositary of it, or else he means *obedience to it*. I am inclined to give it the former sense here, on account of the οἱ ἐκ νόμου in v. 14, which rather designates such as live under the law, than those who fulfil it.

What the *promise* made to Abraham and his seed was, the writer proceeds to tell us, viz. τὸ κληρονόμον . . . κόσμου, *that he should be heir or possessor of the world*. This expression is found in none of the passages which contain the promises made to Abraham, Gen. 12: 1—3. 15: 1—6. 17: 1—8. But in Gen. 15: 5 is a promise, that the seed of Abraham should be like the stars of heaven for multitude; and in Gen. 17: 5 it is said: “A father of many nations have I made thee.” That the apostle had his mind intent upon this text, is plain from v. 17 in the sequel. When he says, then, that *the promise was, that Abraham should be heir of the world*, his meaning evidently is, that the seed of Abraham (in the sense here meant, viz. his spiritual seed), should be co-extensive with the world, or (to use the phraseology employed in another of the promises made to Abraham), “in him should all the families of the earth be blessed.” Taken in the sense now adverted to, the phrase before us would imply, that the spiritual seed of Abraham should be co-extensive with the world, i. e. should be of all nations. But there is a somewhat more figurative way of understanding the phrase, *to be heir of the world*; viz. to take it as an expression that designates the receiving of great and important blessings. In such a way most clearly are קָרַבְתָּ אֶת־הָעוֹלָם κληρονομεῖν τὴν γῆν to be taken, Ps. 25: 13. 37: 9, 11, 22, 29. Prov. 2: 21. Matt. 5: 5. The former method of exegesis, however, is here to be preferred, on the ground that v. 17 develops the fact, that Paul here had a *special* meaning.

In regard to that *seed* of Abraham, to whom the promise was specially made; who can this be but the Messiah? Who else of Abraham's seed was to be possessor of all the earth, particularly in a spiritual sense? That Paul himself had such a view of this subject, is made

quite certain by Gal. 3: 16. It is true, indeed, that in respect to the promises of a *temporal* nature made to Abraham, his literal descendants were the partakers and heirs of them; see Gen. 17: 8. 15: 18. So also were they, that is some of them, heirs of spiritual promises. But the specific promise to which the apostle alludes in our text, seems to have been made to Christ, at least seems to have been fulfilled only by him, Gal. 3: 16.

The promise in question was not *διὰ νόμου*, i. e. on account of any privileges connected with the giving of the law, for the law was not yet given; but it was *διὰ δικαιοσύνης πίστεως*, *through the righteousness of faith*, i. e. it was gratuitously given, faith being the medium or instrument by which it was conferred; see on 3: 22.

(14) *Εἰ γὰρ . . . κληρονόμοι*, *if now they who are of the law, are heirs*; i. e. if they who live under the law and enjoy its privileges, or only those who fulfil it, are heirs of the promise made to Abraham and his seed. *Γὰρ* here is prefixed to an additional clause designed to confirm the preceding one—*γὰρ confirmantis*. *Οἱ ἐκ νόμου* may mean, either those who rest upon the law, make their boast of having fulfilled it, and so expect justification from it, (in which way Tholuck and many others have understood it); or it may mean, those who enjoy the privileges and the distinction which a revelation confers. I prefer the latter sense, as being more consonant with the special object of the apostle; which here is, to prove that no external rites or privileges can be the ground of justification before God.

Κεκένωται . . . ἐπαγγελία, *faith is rendered of no effect, and the promise is made void*. The reason of this is, that the promise was made to Abraham and his seed, on the ground of faith, and therefore gratuitously; but if those only who enjoy the privilege of living under the law, (or those who obey the law), are heirs of the promise, and are so without walking in the steps of Abraham as to faith, then the ground of the promises to Abraham is done away. Neither his faith, nor the promise connected with it, is of any avail; because neither of them stands on law-ground, and neither depends on the privilege of possessing the law, or on the merit of obeying it. In a word, the ground of justification taken by those who plead for it *ἐκ νόμου*, is entirely diverse from and opposed to that, by which Abraham was justified, and on which the promises were made to him; and if they are in the right, the promises made to Abraham are of course null.

(15) *Ὁ γὰρ νόμος . . . παράβασις*, *for the law is the occasion of wrath; for where there is no law, there is no transgression*. I take

this verse not to be an illustration or confirmation of the next preceding one, but of v. 13, which declares that the promises made to Abraham, stand not upon law-ground, but on that of gratuity; or in other words, that they are made on condition of faith. Verse 14 assigns one illustration or confirmation of this assertion; which is, that on law-ground, both the faith of Abraham and the promises made to him would be null, inasmuch as the law (the apostle is speaking here of the Jewish law) was not yet given, or perfect obedience to the law was not yielded by Abraham. In v. 15 a second reason is assigned by Paul, why the promise is not *διὰ νόμου* and this is, that the law is the occasion of bringing upon us divine displeasure, by reason of our offences against its precepts. If there were no law, then there would be no transgression or sin. All sin is *ἀνομία*, i. e. want of conformity to the law of God, either as to omission or commission. Now as all men do sin, the law against which they offend (inasmuch as it prohibits and condemns sin) is the instrument of their *condemnation*, not of their justification. This is indeed no fault of the law, which is of itself "holy and just and good" (Rom. 7: 12); the fault lies with the transgressor. But when such transgressor appeals to the law as the ground of his justification, he must be told (as he is here told), that the law, instead of delivering him from death, condemns him to it; nay, that its precepts, although altogether holy and just and good in themselves, and worthy of all respect and obedience, are nevertheless the occasion (the innocent occasion indeed) of the sinner's guilt and ruin. The fault lies in him; but still, if there had been no precepts to transgress, and no penalty connected with transgression, then he could not have been a transgressor. It is on such ground, that the apostle (chap. 7: 7—13) declares most explicitly, that "he had not known sin, except by the law;" that "sin, taking occasion by the law, wrought in him all manner of concupiscence;" that "without the law sin was dead," i. e. the power of sin was inefficacious; but still, that "the law is holy and just and good," and all the fault lies in the transgressor. Chap. 7: 7, seq., is indeed an ample commentary on the sentiment expressed in the verse before us.

Admitting the truth of the apostle's representation, it follows, that those who have no knowledge of law, that is, *no moral sense of any moral precept*, cannot be transgressors. This is plainly and palpably the doctrine which he teaches; a doctrine which is sanctioned by the fundamental principles of our moral nature, and essential to the idea of right and wrong. In common cases, we never pronounce any

man to be an offender against a moral law, unless he is *an intelligent, rational, moral, free agent*. Any one of these qualifications being found wanting, we absolve him from guilt. And does not Paul the same? But this does not settle the question *when* men begin to be such agents; for plainly they may be moral and free agents before they can read the Scriptures. The question as to the time *when sinning begins*, in each individual case, can be settled only by Omniscience. Why should we not be content to leave it with 'the Judge of all the earth, WHO WILL DO RIGHT?'

The first *γὰρ* in this verse is co-ordinate with that in v. 14, i. e. each of them stands related in the same way to the declaration in v. 13, the one standing at the head of one illustration or confirmation of it, and the other at the head of another. The second *γὰρ* in v. 15 is placed at the head of a reason or ground of the assertion immediately preceding; which is, that the law is the occasion or instrument of condemnation. How does this appear? In this way, viz. because that where there is no law, there is no transgression. The *γὰρ* here, then, is *γὰρ confirmantis*, i. e. preceding that which serves to confirm the expression immediately antecedent.

(16) Because then the law can never justify, but only condemn, it follows that, if justification be at all bestowed on sinners, it must come in some other way than a *legal* one. *Διὰ τοῦτο . . . χάριν, on this account it was of faith, that it might be of grace*; i. e. justification is through the medium or in the way of faith, in order that it may be gratuitous; there being no way left in which it can be bestowed on the ground of merit. See the notes on vs. 4, 5 above. *Εἰς τὸ εἶναι . . . σπέρματι, in order that the promise might be sure to all the seed*. On any other ground than that of *grace* or *gratuity*, the promise could not be sure either to Abraham or to his seed; for if it were to be fulfilled only on condition of entire obedience to the law, then would it never have any fulfilment, inasmuch as no mere man ever did or will exhibit perfect obedience.

Οὐ τῷ . . . Ἀβραάμ, not only to him who is under the law, but to him who is of the faith of Abraham; i. e. the promise is given on gratuitous grounds, in order that it may not fail of being carried into execution, and that the blessings which it proffers may be bestowed on both Jew and Greek, that is, on all men without distinction, on all *τοῖς στοιχοῦσι τοῖς ἔργοις τῆς ἐν τῇ ἀνομοβυστίᾳ πίστεως τοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν Ἀβραάμ*.

(17) This last idea, viz. that Abraham is the spiritual father of

both Jews and Gentiles, the apostle now takes occasion farther to illustrate and confirm, by a reference to the Jewish Scriptures. "Ὁς ἐστὶ . . . ἡμῶν, who is the father of us all; καθὼς γέγραπται . . . σε, as it is written: A father of many nations have I made thee. Τέθεικά σε is the Septuagint rendering of הָיִיתִיךָ, the Hebrew הָיִיתִי frequently meaning to put, place, or constitute; in which meaning it is frequently followed by the Septuagint and New Testament, in the use of τίθημι. In respect to the original in Gen. 17: 5, the only question is, whether the passage there means any thing more than that the literal posterity of Abraham should be very numerous. Tholuck and many commentators so construe it; but it seems clear to me, that the apostle puts a different interpretation upon it, and that he viewed it as having reference to a *spiritual* seed. This is made quite clear by comparing Gal. 3: 7. Rom. 2: 28, 29. 4: 11, 12, 16, 18. The embarrassment in the interpretation of Gen. 17: 1—8 seems to arise principally from the fact, that promises of both a temporal and spiritual nature are there made. A *double paternity* (so to speak) is assigned to Abraham; many nations are to descend from him *literally*; his seed, i. e. some of them, are *literally* to possess the land of Canaan. But he is also to become the *spiritual* father (i. e. an eminent pattern or exemplar in regard to faith and justification by it) of "many nations," and in him are "all the families of the earth to be blessed," Gen. 12: 3.

Such a father he is to be κατέναντι οὗ . . . θεοῦ, in the sight of God whom he confided in or believed. Κατέναντι is equivalent to the Hebrew בְּפָנָיִךְ, בְּפָנָיִךְ, בְּפָנָיִךְ, בְּפָנָיִךְ, in the sight of, in the view of, before. The sentiment is this: 'Abraham is the father of many nations, in the sight of that God in whom he trusted or whose word he believed;' i. e. God has constituted him the spiritual father of many nations. The construction of the verse is difficult, at first view, and has given rise to many critical doubts. I regard the real sense of it as being the same, as if the arrangement in Greek were thus: Κατέναντι θεοῦ οὗ [= οἱ] ἐπίστευσε. The οὗ is to be considered as a case of *attraction*, as grammarians say. See instances of this nature in John 2: 22. Mark 7: 13. Luke 2: 20. Acts 7: 17, 45. 1 Pet. 4: 11. John 15: 20, etc.; but in all of these cases, the noun *precedes* the pronoun which conforms to it. Examples however of the like nature with the present, are the following: viz. Mark 6: 16, ὃν ἐγὼ ἀναπέφαλισα Ἰωάννην, οὗτός ἐστι. Acts 21: 16, ἄγοντες παρ' ᾧ ξενισθῶμεν Μνάσωνι. Rom. 6: 17, εἰς ὃν παραδόθητε τύπον διδασκαλίας.

in which examples, indeed, the *noun* conforms to the pronoun as to its case. If we regard οὗ ἐπίστευσε as a circumstance thrown in, and to be mentally included in a parenthesis, the difficulty of the sentence will be removed. The present construction, after all, is somewhat anomalous, the usual order being thus: Κατέναντι θεοῦ οὗ ἐπίστευσε κ. τ. λ.

Τοῦ ζωοποιούντος . . . ὄντα, *who giveth life to the dead, and calleth the things which are not, as if they were.* Another contested passage, which I shall endeavour briefly to explain. To express the idea of divine, almighty power, is plainly the object of it. This it does by asserting that God raises the dead, and exercises creative, controlling power. In regard to τοῦ ζωοποιούντος τοὺς νεκρούς, it may mean generally, that God has the power to raise the dead, and exercises it; or, it may have a special reference to God's promise to raise up a numerous progeny from Abraham, who was dead as to the power of procreation; comp. Heb. 11: 17—19, and v. 19 below. In either case the meaning is good. In the first, it is more expressive; in the second, more appropriate to the special object of the writer.

Καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα is Hebraistic in its manner. Καλέω is sometimes employed like the Hebrew נִקְרָא, i. e. to designate the idea of *commanding a thing to be or exist*, which did not before exist; e. g. Is. 41: 4. 48: 13; comp. 2 K. 8: 1. Is. 22: 12. Comp. also 2 Macc. 7: 28, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐποίησεν αὐτὰ ὁ θεός, which resembles in sense the phrase before us; also Philo de Creat. p. 728, τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἐκάλεσεν εἰς τὸ εἶναι. The reference in the mind of the writer, when he used the phrase before us, no doubt was to Gen. 1: 3, seq. *The calling of things that are not*, is to command that they shall exist, in order to fulfil the purposes which the Creator has in view by bringing them into existence. This latter circumstance seems to have been overlooked; and thus has arisen great perplexity among interpreters. How, it has been asked, could God call into existence things that are not, as if they were? A paradox, to be sure; for things that already are, we may well say, cannot be called into existence. But the meaning of the apostle in καλοῦντος is not simply *bidding to exist*, but directing, disposing of, commanding in any way and for any purpose, the things called. 'God,' says he, 'can call into existence things that now have no existence, and employ them for his purposes, just as he directs and disposes of things that already exist; God calls τὰ μὴ ὄντα, just as he does τὰ ὄντα' things that now exist not, are under his control as really and

truly as things that do exist, i. e. they can be made to exist and to subservise his purpose, in the same manner as things do which now already exist.' Is there any room for difficulty, in respect to such a meaning as this?

CHAP. IV. 18—25.

The apostle having thus shewn that the doctrine of gratuitous justification by faith does not at all impugn the Scriptures of the Old Testament, by appealing to the example of Abraham and to the declarations of David; and having more particularly insisted on the justification of Abraham, previously to the covenant of circumcision and independently of it; and this, in order that Abraham might be the spiritual father of all believers, both Jews and Gentiles; he now concludes the whole by an animated description and commendation of Abraham's faith, and by pointing out the happy consequences of imitating it to all who profess to be the disciples of Christ. First, Abraham hoped, when to all human appearance there was no ground of hope, that he might become the father of many nations through the birth of a son, v. 18. His strong faith led him to overlook his own extreme old age and that of Sarah, v. 19; to trust with full confidence in the simple promise of God respecting a son, thus giving glory to God by reposing in him such an unlimited trust, and by being so fully persuaded that he would perform what he had promised, vs. 20, 21. On this account, he was justified through his faith, v. 22; nor was this fact recorded merely for his sake, but also for our sake, that we may be inspired with the hope of attaining to the like justification, provided we believe in the declarations of him who raised up Jesus from the dead, and proposed him to the world as the object of saving belief, inasmuch as he died for our offences, and rose again in order that we might be justified.

(18) "Ὁς παρ' ἐλπίδα ἐπ' ἐλπίδι ἐπίστευσεν, *who against [all apparent] ground of hope, believed in hope that he should become the father, etc.* The expression παρ' ἐλπίδα ἐπ' ἐλπίδι, is what the Greeks call ὀξύμωρον [*oxymoron*], i. e. a sharp, pointed saying, which to appearance exhibits a kind of contradiction; like the Latin *spes insperata, ignavia strenua*, etc. The παρ' ἐλπίδι, *beyond or against hope*, in this case, refers to the circumstances recounted in verse 19.

Κατὰ τὸ εἰρημένον, viz. in Gen. 15: 5.—Οὕτως, *so*, viz. like the stars in respect to number, to which Abraham had just been pointed, i. e. *innumerable*; Ps. 147: 4.

(19) Μὴ ἀσθενήσας, *not being weak*, i. e. being strong; the negative form of declaration being used, where an affirmative sense is meant. So, "He confessed, *and denied not*, but confessed," John 1: 20. The Greeks call this mode of expression, λιτότης (*smallness, slenderness*), or μείωσις (*diminution*); because it seemingly diminishes from the full strength of the *positive* form. Often, however,

(as here), it is equivalent in all respects to the affirmative or positive form.

Τῇ πίστει, Dative of condition, being strong in faith or in respect to faith, i. e. having strong confidence.

Οὐ κατενόησε, he did not regard.—Ἡδὴ νενεκρωμένον, already dead, i. e. inefficient with regard to procreation; comp. Heb. 11: 12. Gen. 17: 17.—Καί, nor, inasmuch as it follows οὐ in the preceding clause. So in Hebrew, ׀ following ׀ means nor, Heb. Gramm. § 358. Note.—Τὴν νέκρωσιν τῆς μητέρας = τὴν μητέρα τὴν νενεκρωμένην. Comp. the age of Sarah at this time, Gen. 17: 17.

(20) Οὐ διακρίθη, he did not doubt, did not hesitate; comp. Rom. 14: 23. James 1: 6. 2: 4. Matt. 21: 21. Mark 11: 23.—Εἰς ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ θεοῦ, respecting the promise of God.—Τῇ ἀπιστίᾳ, through, by reason of, an unbelieving spirit; the Dative is frequently employed in this way, in the same sense which the Genitive preceded by διὰ would have; Winer, Gramm. Excurs. p. 71. 16. c.

Ἀλλ' ἐνεδυναμώθη τῇ πίστει, the opposite of the preceding expression, he firmly and confidently believed, or he was confident through belief; τῇ πίστει being the Dative of manner or means; see Winer *ut supra*.

Αὐτὸς δόξαν τῷ θεῷ, giving glory to God. The Hebrew כָּבֹד מְבָרָךְ means, to shew by our actions that we acknowledge any attribute of God; which is ascribing to him what belongs or is due to him. So here, Abraham, by the strength of his confidence, did in the highest manner ascribe to God omnipotence and veracity. Comp. John 9: 24. Josh. 7: 19. The meaning of the phrase as here employed by the writer, is given in the next verse.

(21) Καὶ πληροφοροῦσθε ὅτι κ. τ. λ., a repetition or epexegetis of what the preceding clause asserts. "Being strong in faith" there, is equivalent to πληροφοροῦσθε here, which means, being fully persuaded.—Ὁ ἐπηγγελται, that which had been promised, or rather, what he had promised. This last rendering can be retained, because the Perf. pass. not unfrequently has an active sense, inasmuch as it serves for the Perf. Middle as well as Passive, (Buttm. Gramm. § 123. 4). So in Acts 13: 2, προσκέκλημαι, I have invited. Acts 16: 10. 1 Pet. 4: 1. John 9: 22.—Καὶ ποιῆσαι, also to perform, καὶ in the sense of etiam, quoque, as it often is; i. e. καὶ intensive.

(22) Διὸ . . . εἰς δικαιοσύνην, wherefore [his belief] was counted to him as righteousness; in other words, through his faith, he was counted or treated as righteous; he was admitted to the divine favour. See on v. 5 above.

(23, 24) Nor was this method of justification and acceptance limited to Abraham. The history of it is recorded as an example, for the encouragement and imitation of all others down to the latest period of time. Those who believe in him who raised up Jesus from the dead (comp. v. 17 above), i. e. those who believe in what God has done and said with respect to the Messiah, the only foundation of the sinner's hope, will be justified through their faith, in like manner as Abraham was by his.

(25) *Παρεδόθη*, was given up, was delivered up, viz. to death, Matt. 26: 2.—*Διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν*, comp. Is. 53: 12, 5, 6, 8. Gal. 1: 4. 2: 20. Tit. 2: 14.

Διὰ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἡμῶν, on account of our justification, i. e. our acceptance with God. Christ rose from the dead, in order that this great and glorious work might be completed. The *primary* object of his death is here stated as being *expiatory*, i. e. as having a special influence on that part of *justification* which has respect to remitting the penalty of the divine law. But as justification, in its *full* sense, comprehends not only forgiveness, but the accepting and treating of any one as righteous, it implies of course the being advanced to a state of glory. The resurrection of Christ was connected with this; for “if Christ be not risen, then our faith is vain.” By his resurrection he was prepared to receive the kingdom given him of the Father, and thus to complete the redemption of those who believe in him.

CHAP. V. 1—21.

The apostle having now shewn, (a) That all men, Jews and Gentiles, are sinners; (b) That they are therefore under the condemning sentence of the divine law; (c) That the only method of escape from the execution of this sentence, is by gratuitous pardon, i. e. by justification obtained through the death of Christ; and (d) That all this is no new doctrine, but one inculcated in the Old Testament both by precept and example; he next proceeds, in chap. v., to exhibit the blessed fruits of this pardon or justification. (1) We have peace with God, (with whom we were before in a state of enmity, being alienated from him, comp. vs. 6—10), and we enjoy, through Christ, free access to a state of favour with God, and thus are led to rejoice in the hope of future glory, vs. 1, 2. (2) We are supported and comforted in all our afflictions during the present life; nay, we may even rejoice in them as the instruments of spiritual good to us, vs. 3—5. (3) All this good is rendered certain, and the hope of it sure, by the fact that Christ, having died for us while in a state of enmity and alienation, and having thus reconciled us to God, will not fail to perfect the work which he has thus begun, vs. 6—10. (4) We may now rejoice in God, (who is as truly *our* covenant God as he has been that of the Jews), on account of the reconciliation which Christ has effected, v. 11. (5) This state of reconciliation or filial relation to God, is now extended to all

men, (i. e. proffered to all, laid open for all, rendered accessible to all), in like manner as the evils occasioned by the sin of our first ancestor have extended to all, v. 12—14; yea, such is the greatness of Christ's redemption, that the blessings procured by his death far exceed the evils occasioned by the sin of Adam, vs. 15—19; they even exceed all the evils consequent upon the sins of men, who live under the light of revelation, vs. 20, 21.

Such appears to me the sum of what is taught in chap. v. The difficulties attending the interpretation of this passage, I readily acknowledge, and have long and deeply felt. To the study of them I have devoted much more time, than to any other equal portion of the holy Scriptures. I do not persuade myself, however, that I have succeeded in all respects with regard to the solution of them; much less do I expect, that what I shall propose will be satisfactory to the minds of all others. What I could do, I have done; if others succeed better, it will be matter of sincere joy to me. One thing I cannot help remarking here; which is, that any exegesis of vs. 12—21, which represents the contents as irrelevant to the tenor of the context both before and after these verses, must wear the air, of course, of being an improbable one. Never have I found more difficulty, however, than in satisfying myself of the relation which vs. 12—21 do in fact hold to the surrounding context; and in particular how they bear upon the theme discussed in vs. 1—11. The result of my investigations is given, as to substance, under No. 5 above.

Tholuck states his result a little differently: "To render more conspicuous the fruits obtained by redemption, the apostle contrasts the state of mankind *as a whole*, and as being in the misery of their unredeemed condition, with the state of mankind *as a whole*, in their happiness as partakers of the benefits of redemption. By a striking parallel, he exhibits mankind in Adam the head and source of our race as sinful; and in Christ the head and source of it, as redeemed; and he so represents this, that redemption appears to be the greatest and most important occurrence which has taken place with regard to mankind—the central point of all spiritual life and all happiness." (Comm. über Rom. p. 158. edit. 2). Whether this summary comes nearer than my own to the true exhibition of the contents of vs. 12—21; in particular, whether it harmonizes better with the context; I submit to the reader to decide, when he shall have carefully studied the whole. In the mean time, I acknowledge with gratitude the important aid that I have received from the Commentary of the above named excellent writer.

The reader will find a statement of the contents of vs. 12—19, more detailed than the above, at the commencement of the commentary on this passage.

(1) Ἐκ πίστεως, i. e. *gratuitously*; by means of *belief*, instead of perfect obedience; see on chap. 4: 5 above.

Εἰρήνην ἔχομεν, *we have peace*; here in opposition to a state of enmity, a state of alienation; see v. 10.

Διὰ τοῦ Κ. Ι. Χριστοῦ, viz. by the reconciliation which he has effected, v. 11.

(2) Δι' οὗ καὶ, *by whom also*.—Τὴν προσαγωγὴν, *access*, as well as reconciliation; comp. Eph. 2: 18. 3: 12. We have access εἰς τὴν χάριν ταύτην, i. e. *to this state of favour or grace*, in which we now stand or are.

Tholuck and some others: 'We have access [to God], by belief

in the grace or gracious condition in which we continue.' I prefer the other construction; and so most interpreters have done.

Καὶ καυχώμεθα, *and we rejoice*; i. e. in addition to peace, and access to a state of favour, we are filled with joy, *in the hope of that glory which God will bestow*. Θεοῦ is here *Genitivus auctoris*.

(3) Οὐ μόνον δέ, ἀλλὰ καυχώμεθα κ. τ. λ., *not only so, but we also rejoice, etc.* This is a formula of transition, or of enumeration of particulars, answering to our numerical divisions in a discourse; comp. v. 11.

Εἰδότες, *knowing, having assurance*, viz. from our relation to God, and from his gracious purposes toward us.

"Οτι . . . καταργάζεται, *produces patience or perseverance*. Neither of these virtues can be exercised without sufferings and trials. Afflictions, therefore, are essential to the cultivation of them. They are not, indeed, the direct and efficient cause of patience; but they are at least an occasion or *instrumental* cause.

(4) Δοκιμήν, *trial or approbation*. Either rendering is correct; for perseverance or patience in the enduring of afflictions, makes thorough *trial*; and the same virtue secures *approbation*. I prefer the second meaning, viz. *approbation*; because it more naturally connects itself with the ἐλπίς that follows. Comp. δοκιμάζω, which means *to try*, and also *to approve*.

Ἐλπίδα, *hope*, which springs of course from the approbation bestowed on patient endurance of suffering for virtue's sake.

(5) Οὐ καταισχύνει, *will not disappoint*; as the sequel shews. So the Hebrew, לֹא יִבְזֶה.

"Οτι ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ κ. τ. λ. The *first* reason given why the Christian's hope will not disappoint him, is, that *the love of God* [love toward God] *is diffused* (ἐκκέχνηται) *in his heart or mind*, i. e. is copiously given to him; and this, by that holy Spirit which is imparted to him, i. e. by the gracious residence or influence of that Spirit who dwells in the hearts of believers; 1 Cor. 6: 19. 3: 16. 2 Cor. 6: 16; comp. 2 Cor. 1: 22, where the spirit in the hearts of believers is called their ἀσφαβών, *the pledge* of their future happiness, the pledge that their salvation is secure. Comp. also Eph. 1: 13, 14, where the same sentiment is fully expressed.

CHAP. V. 6—10.

Verses 6—10 are a kind of episode, (if I may so speak), and contain an illustration and confirmation of the sentiment expressed in v. 5, viz. that *Christian hope will not disappoint them*. To shew that this is truly the case, the writer goes on to produce an illustration, which exhibits an argument of the kind called *a majori ad minus*; i. e. 'if Christ has already done the greater thing for you, viz. reconciled you to God when you were in your sinful state, how much more will he *complete* the work, the greatest and most difficult part of which has already been accomplished?'

In this view, the passage before us seems to be more direct, in respect to the *perseverance of the saints*, than almost any other passage in the Scriptures which I can find. The sentiment here is not dependant on the *form* of a particular expression, (as it appears to be in some other passages); but it is fundamentally connected with the very nature of the argument.

(6) "Ἐτι γὰρ Χριστὸς ὄντων ἡμῶν, a singular *metathesis* or transposition of the particle ἔτι, which belongs to ὄντων, and plainly qualifies it.—Γὰρ *confirmantis* here, i. e. it stands before a paragraph which assigns a cause or ground of the assertion in the preceding sentence, viz. that the hope of the Christian would not disappoint him.

"Ἐτι ὄντων ἡμῶν, *while we were yet, or we yet being*.—Ἀσθενῶν, literally, *destitute of strength*; here plainly in a *moral* sense, i. e. destitute of moral vigour, without any holy energy, in a state of moral indisposition.

Κατὰ καιρὸν, *in due time, at an appointed or set time*, viz. that fixed upon in the counsels of God. Comp. Sept. in Job 5: 26. Is. 60: 22; comp. also Luke 21: 24, 8. Heb. 11: 11. Gal. 4: 4.

Ἐπεὶ ἀσεβῶν, i. e. ὑπερ ἀσεβῶν [ἡμῶν], *for [us] who were ungodly*. It is plain that ἀσεβῶν here means the same as ἀσθενῶν in the preceding clause.

(7) Γὰρ *illustrantis*, i. e. γὰρ *declarative*. The sequel is designed to illustrate the great benevolence which the death of Christ displayed. Δικαίων is here used in distinction from ἀγαθοῦ. Often they are *synonymous*; yet they are capable of distinct use, and are not unfrequently, in classic usage, distinguished from each other. E. g. Cicero: "Recte *justum* virum, *bonum* non faciliè reperiemus;" de Offic. III. 15. Again: "Jupiter *Optimus* dictus est, id est, *beneficentissimus*." So in the Talmud (Pirque Aboth, 5. 10) it is said: "There are four kinds of men; (1) Those who say: What is mine is mine, and what is thine is thine; these are the *middling men*. (2) Those who say: What is mine is thine, and what is thine is mine; these are the *common people*. (3) Those who say: What is mine is thine, and what is thine is thine; these are the *יְדֵי יְדֵי*, i. e. *ἀγαθοί*. (4) Those

who say: What is mine is mine, and what is thine is mine; these are the רְשָׁעִים.” So, by the Seventy, דִּיקָר is usually distinguished from דִּיקָק; inasmuch as the former is usually rendered ὄσιος, while the latter is translated by δίκαιος. Δίκαιος may be used (and not unfrequently is used), to designate a person who is *innocent* merely; so in the Septuagint, Ex. 23: 7. Gen. 18: 23, seq. So in the New Testament, Matt. 27: 19, 24. It corresponds also to the Hebrew דִּיקָר, Prov. 1: 11. 6: 17. Joel 3: 19.

In using δίκαιος, therefore, as designating a character somewhat different from ἀγαθός, and inferior to it, the apostle has not varied from sacred and classic usage. Δίκαιος clearly means here, *one who is just* in the common sense of the word, *one who is free from crimes* cognizable by law, *one who does not defraud*, etc. For such an one, the apostle says, it would be rare to find any person willing to volunteer the sacrifice of his life.

‘But for an ἀγαθός, i. e. a *benevolent* or *beneficent* man, a דִּיקָר, some perhaps might venture to lay down their lives.’ This has, in fact, not unfrequently been done. The difference between the readiness of men to hazard their lives, for a man of peculiar and overflowing benevolence of heart, and for a man who merely pays a nice regard to *meum* and *tuum*, is very plain to every observer who has a feeling heart.

(8) Yet the grace of the gospel has far surpassed any exhibition of human benevolence. Συνίστημι, *commends, sets forth, displays*. — Ἀγάπην, *benevolence, kind feeling*, רַחֲמִים, *compassionate kindness*. — Ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, *in our stead, or on our account*. In either way of rendering, the sense here must be, that the death of Christ saved us from that, which we as ἁμαρτωλοὶ deserved.

(9) Πολλῶ οὖν . . . ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς, *much more, then, being justified*, i. e. acquitted, pardoned as to our past offences, *by his blood*, i. e. the sufferings and death of Christ, *shall we be saved by him from [future] indignation*. In other words: ‘If Christ by his death has accomplished our reconciliation, while we were in a state of enmity; *a fortiori* we may expect that the great work, thus begun and accomplished as to the most difficult part, will be completed.’

(10) A repetition of the same general ideas, in which the sentiment of the whole is compressed, and rendered prominent. Θανάτου κ. τ. λ. here, corresponds to τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ in the preceding verse. — Ἐν τῇ ζωῇ αὐτοῦ, the antithesis of θανάτου αὐτοῦ. Meaning: ‘If we were reconciled to God, when enemies, by a *dying*

Saviour; *a fortiori* shall we now attain salvation, when thus reconciled, through a *living one*; i. e. if Christ in his humble and suffering state reconciled us to God, much more in his exalted and glorified state will he complete the work thus begun.

(11) Οὐ μόνον δὲ, ἀλλὰ καὶ κ. τ. λ., *and not only* [do we rejoice in afflictions, v. 3, as tending to produce a hope of glory, which the death of Christ has rendered *sure* and *certain*], *but we rejoice, καυχώμενοι* [ἔσμεν] *in God*, viz. as our God, our covenant God, our supreme and eternal joy; comp. Rev. 21: 3. Heb. 8: 10. Zech. 8: 8. Jer. 4: 2; also John 8: 41, 54. Rom. 2: 17, which last passage shews the claims of the Jews in respect to their covenant relation with God. The apostle means to intimate in our text, that all which the Jews boasted of, is in reality secured to Christians.

The verse before us is not so much a distinct ground or reason for rejoicing, as it is a *summary* or *consummation* of all the grounds of it; for to rejoice in God as our God, expresses the consummation of all the Christian's happiness. In respect to form or mode of expression, it constitutes a diverse head; and it is one which is really diverse in this respect, viz. that it is more generic than the others. The phrases in vs. 1, 3, and 11, viz. *καυχώμεθα—οὐ μόνον δὲ ἀλλὰ καὶ—οὐ μόνον δὲ ἀλλὰ καὶ*—present the natural divisions of the apostle's discourse, and correspond to our 1st, 2d, 3d, in English.

Τὴν καταλλαγὴν ἐλάβομεν receives its *form* from the expression in v. 10, *κατηλλάγημεν κ. τ. λ.* The word means *reconciliation*; and such is the sense in which our English translators here used the word *atonement* (quasi *at-one-ment*).

CHAP. V. 12—19.

That this is one of the most difficult passages in all the New Testament, will be conceded, I believe, by all sober and reflecting critics. As I have before remarked, I have bestowed repeated and long-continued efforts upon the study of it. I do not say this, however, as affording in itself even a presumptive proof that I have at last attained to a right understanding of it; but only to shew that I have felt, and in some measure rightly estimated, the difficulties attendant upon the nature of an undertaking to explain it, and have not neglected any efforts within my power to overcome them.

The *main design* of this passage is indeed plain. It lies, one may say, upon the very face of it. It is this; viz. 'to exalt our views respecting the blessings which Christ has procured for us, by a comparison of them with the evil consequences which ensued upon the fall of our first ancestor, and by shewing that the blessings in question not only extend to the removal of these evils, but even far beyond this; so that the grace of the gospel has not only abounded, but *superabounded*.'

Even the most unpractised critic can hardly fail to discern the general object, as thus stated. But the *detail* is replete with difficulties; which have been greatly augmented on account of the numerous theories formed by speculative minds, relative to the various topics on which the paragraph before us has been supposed to touch.

A full *synopsis* of what is taught in vs. 12—19, comprises the following particulars; viz. (a) Sin entered the world [commenced], by the offence of Adam; and death, i. e. punishment or misery, came in as the necessary result of it. In like manner, death came upon all men, because that all became sinners, v. 12.

(b) It is indeed true, that all men have been the subjects of sin and death; for that even those have been so, who have not lived under the light of revelation, or been made acquainted with any *express* commands of God, is proved from the fact, that all those who lived between Adam and Moses, were sinners, and lay under sentence of death, vs. 13, 14.

(c) Adam, who was the occasion of introducing sin into the world and of bringing sin and death upon all men, may be considered as a *τύπος* of Christ, in respect to the influence which he has had on others; (but not as to the *kind* of influence, or the *degree* of it, for here is a wide diversity); v. 14, last clause.

(d) That the *kind* and *degree* of influence which Adam had on all men, is not like that which Christ has on them; or that Adam, when regarded as a *τύπος* of Christ, is not to be so regarded in these respects; is plain, (1) From the fact, that Adam occasioned the *condemnation* of all men; but Christ delivers mankind from condemnation, and bestows eternal happiness on them, v. 15. (2) The condemnation of which Adam was the occasion, has respect only to *one* offence; the pardon which Christ procured, extends to *many* offences, v. 16. Hence, (3) If death reigned over men because of *one* offence; much more shall they reign in life, who through Christ receive pardon for *many* offences, and a title to future blessedness, v. 17.

Having thus guarded his readers against extending the idea of *τύπος* to points of which *τύπος* cannot be predicated; and having shewn that the influence of Christ on the human race is exactly the *reverse* of that of Adam, in respect to its *kind* or *nature*; and also that it far surpasses it in *degree*; the apostle now returns to the consideration of the real point of resemblance or *τύπος* between Adam and Christ, viz. the *universality* or *extent* of influence. This he states as follows:

(e) As the consequences of Adam's sin were extended to all men, so the consequences of Christ's obedience [viz. unto death] are extended to *all*; i. e. Jews and Gentiles all come on an equal footing into the kingdom of Christ, or the blessings which the gospel proffers are made equally accessible to all men without exception; and to all on the same terms or conditions, vs. 18, 19. Compare, as an illustration of this last idea, Rom. 3: 23—30.

Such appear to be the principal contents of this contested and celebrated passage. The sequel will present many specific and particular illustrations, which cannot properly find a place in a *general synopsis*, such as I have now endeavoured to give.

(12) *Διὰ τοῦτο, wherefore, therefore.* So it is usually translated, viz. as *illative*; i. e. as shewing that what follows is a consequence or deduction from what has gone before. But in what tolerable sense can this be here asserted? How are the sentiments in the sequel here, *deduced* from that which precedes them?

A question that has greatly perplexed critics and commentators. Some have converted the words *διὰ τοῦτο*, into a mere *formula of transition*; e. g. Schleusner makes them so here; and Wahl repre-

sents them as being so in Matt. 13: 52. If this were admissible, they might then be rendered, *moreover, further*. But it is somewhat difficult, perhaps, by reasoning which is strictly philological, to justify such a latitude of translation as this; although one is strongly tempted to indulge in it, by such examples of the phrase in question as occur in Matt. 13: 13. 14: 2. 18: 23. 21: 43. Mark 12: 24, and Rom. 13: 6 (where *διὰ τοῦτο* is preceded by *οὐ μόνον* in the clause going before, just as in our verse). On the whole, in view of the passages just cited, one might acquiesce in the meaning: *Qua cum ita sint*, which Wahl and others assign to *διὰ τοῦτο* in such places. But in such instances, the *illative* form of the phrase does not involve a *sylogistic* or *logical* deduction or inference from what precedes; it indicates only, that *the expression of the sentiments disclosed in the sequel, was occasioned by what precedes*, or that *the sequel was suggested to the mind by that which precedes*.

Such an illation or deduction (if it may be so called) as this, may be admitted in our text; nay, it is altogether probable: but a *sylogistic* or *logical* one cannot be made out; at least, I am unable for myself to perceive how it can be made out. Admitting, however, the *former* kind of illation, we have no specific formula of expression in English, which will designate the exact shade of it, i. e. the peculiar nature of the connection, in the case before us, between what precedes *διὰ τοῦτο* and what follows it.

In a sense like the one just mentioned, Schott understands *διὰ τοῦτο*, in his able Essay on Rom. 5: 12—14 (*Opusc.* vol. I. p. 318, seq.) But Tholuck and Flatt both represent *διὰ τοῦτο* here as *illative*; although they do not shew *how* the sequel is a *deduction* from what precedes. Nor has any writer with whom I am acquainted, satisfactorily done this; I mean, no one who makes these words *illative* here in a *logical* sense.

I would propose another method, somewhat diverse from this, of illustrating this phrase, which is so difficult; difficult not in itself, i. e. not as to the sense in which it is commonly employed, but difficult *here*, by reason of the connection in which it stands. *Διὰ*, as correctly explained by Passow, has all the various meanings of the German *wegen*, which means, *on account of, because of, in respect to, in relation to, for the sake of*, etc. Now if the meaning *in respect to*, be adopted here, the sense will be thus: '*In respect to this*,'—viz. this matter or subject of *reconciliation*, of which the apostle had just spoken, or *in respect to* this matter of rejoicing in God through Christ

who has effected a reconciliation—‘*in respect to this I say* (*λέγω* being implied), that as by one man [Adam] evils were brought upon all the human race, so by one man [Christ Jesus] superabounding good is effected for all, through the reconciliation accomplished by him.’

The connection of thought would then be substantially as follows: ‘I have further to say, in regard to the reconciliation effected by Christ, that it enures to the benefit of all men without exception, of Gentiles as well as Jews; in the same manner as the evils brought on the human race by Adam, have occasioned mischief to all; although the blessings conferred by Christ, far surpass in degree the evils in question.’

Considered in this way, vs. 12—19 are designed at once to confirm the statement made in chap. 3: 23—30 and 4: 10—18, i. e. to confirm the sentiment, that Gentiles as well as Jews may rejoice in the reconciliation effected by Christ; while, at the same time, the whole representation serves very much to enhance the greatness of the blessings which Christ has procured for sinners, by the *contrast* in which these blessings are placed. I cannot perceive the particular design of introducing such a contrast in this place, unless it be to shew the propriety and justice of extending the blessings of reconciliation to the Gentiles as well as to the Jews, and to set off to the best advantage the greatness of these blessings. In respect to the former of these designs it may be remarked, that the Gentiles, in common with the Jews, being sufferers on account of the sin of the first Adam, the propriety of extending help to them by the gratuitous salvation of the gospel that had been effected by the second Adam, becomes the more conspicuous. In respect to the latter design, it is clear that the *abounding* grace of the gospel is rendered more striking, by virtue of the contrast which the apostle presents.

Admitting such a connection and course of thought as I have now pointed out, it would follow, that *διὰ τοῦτο* is substantially an *elliptical* expression here, and that *λέγω* should be virtually understood after it. This will make it in *substance* (although not in form), a phrase or formula of *transition*. That it is sometimes employed in a way like that now suggested, the reader may satisfy himself, by consulting Matt. 13: 13, 52. 18: 23. 21: 43. Mark 12: 24. Rom. 13: 6. Matt. 6: 25, where *λέγω ὑμῖν* is expressly supplied; as it is also in Matt. 12: 31. 21: 43.

On the whole, I feel constrained to adopt this method of inter-

pretation; at least I must do so, until I can find one which will better consist with the subject of the discourse, in the preceding and succeeding context. Such a method is plainly consonant with the laws of language, i. e. with the *usus loquendi* of the New Testament. It has not yet been shown, so far as I am able to judge, that any of the commonly proposed methods of interpretation will better suit the context. May I not add, respecting most of them, that they do not at all harmonize with it?

"Ὡσπερ, *as*, of course introduces a comparison; ὥσπερ standing before the *protasis*, which seems to extend through the verse. But where is the *apodosis*? The form of the sentence completed would be: "Ὡσπερ κ. τ. λ.—οὕτω καὶ κ. τ. λ. But the latter member is here wanting. This is supplied, however, in different ways, or is differently constructed, by different critics.

(a) Διὰ τοῦτο [τὴν καταλλαγὴν ἐλάβομεν], ὥσπερ δι' ἐνὸς κ. τ. λ.; making ὥσπερ κ. τ. λ. itself an *apodosis* instead of a *protasis*. So Cocceius, Elsner, Koppe, Rosenmüller, Stolz, and some others.

(b) By inverting καὶ οὕτως, and writing it οὕτως καὶ κ. τ. λ.; and so making the rest of the verse which follows, to be the *apodosis* of the sentence. So Le Clerc, Wolf, and others.

(c) Καὶ διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας κ. τ. λ. is made the beginning of the *apodosis* by Erasmus and Beza; which of course they must translate, *so also by sin*, etc.

But all these methods come short of fully exhibiting the *contrast* here, which the apostle designs to make between the one man (Adam) who sinned, and Christ; which contrast appears fully and plainly in vs. 18, 19. With the majority of interpreters, therefore, I hesitate not to regard vs. 13—17 as substantially a parenthesis, (thrown in to illustrate a sentiment brought to view in the *protasis*, v. 12); and I find a full *apodosis* only in vs. 18, 19, where the sentiment of v. 12 is virtually resumed and repeated, and where the *apodosis* regularly follows, after an οὕτω καί. (I admit, however, that ὅς ἐστι τύπος τοῦ μελλόντιος, in v. 14, is a kind of *apodosis* by way of hint). In this manner, and only in this, can I find the real antithesis or comparison to be fully made out, which the apostle designs to make. This method of writing, too, where the *protasis* is suspended for the sake of explanations thrown in, is altogether consonant with the usual method of the apostle Paul; comp. Rom. 2: 6—16. Eph. 2: 1—5. 3: 1—13. 1 Tim. 1: 3, 4. Rom. 9: 10, seq. Rom. 9: 22, seq. Rom. 8: 3. Heb. 4: 6—9. 5: 6—10. 5: 10—7: 1. 9: 7—12.

Tholuck suggests, that ὅς ἐστι τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος (v. 14) is, as to sense, a real apodosis of the preceding declarations in v. 12; v. 13 and the preceding part of v. 14 being regarded as a parenthesis. The meaning of the apostle must then be thus represented: 'As by one man sin and death entered the world; . . . [so] this one (ὅς in the sense of καὶ οὗτος) was a type, i. e. an antithetic type, of Christ who brought righteousness to all men.' But this seems to be, at best, only an imperfect apodosis, as already hinted; and withal it is somewhat embarrassed; for Tholuck supposes the apostle to have forgotten here that he had begun the sentence with an ὡσπερ, and moreover he changes ὅς into καὶ οὗτος. I much prefer, therefore, the more easy and obvious solution of the difficulty, by supposing the existence of a suspended sentence; suspended for the sake of intermediate explanations and illustrations, and completed after these have been made, viz. completed in vs. 18, 19. Especially do I prefer this, because this method of writing is so frequent in Paul.

Δὲ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου, by one man, i. e. by Adam, as appears from v. 14; comp. 1 Cor. 15: 21, 22. The apostle cannot design that this should be strictly construed; for he himself has told us, that "Adam was not deceived; but the woman, being deceived, was in the transgression" (1 Tim. 2: 14), i. e. Eve first transgressed; which moreover Paul assigns as a reason why she should not usurp authority and have precedence in the church. In the like way, the son of Sirach represents Eve as the first transgressor, 25: 24. If now it was a principal object with the apostle here, to point out specifically and with exactness the *first* author of transgression, how could he omit mentioning Eve? Or if his main design was, to point out a corrupt nature propagated by ordinary generation, then why should he neglect to mention Eve along with Adam; for *both* parents surely were concerned in this? In respect to these questions it may be remarked further, that either the apostle, in making mention of Adam, trusted that his readers would spontaneously call to mind the primitive pair, the woman being comprehended along with the man; or that he designed merely to compare the origin itself and extent of sin and misery, (without particularizing the manner), with the origin and extent of the deliverance from them as wrought by Christ. In respect to the first of these answers, the rule *a potiori nomen fit* seems to be applicable to the sentiment of it. Adam, as the constituted superior, first formed, and made lord of the inferior creation; Adam, who by consenting to the sin of his wife and participating in it, made himself a full partaker of it; is named here from the fact of his precedence. He *only* is named, because it is the particular design of the writer to make a comparison between the second Adam (Christ) and the first. The congruity of the representation and comparison would be marred, by naming more than one author of sin and misery. Nor can any importance be here attached to the fact itself, that *two* were concerned in the primitive transgression: for "they twain were one flesh;" they were one also in guilt, i. e. they were both partakers of the same criminality. The question is not concerning the *exact manner* in which the first transgression came to be committed, (for this is not here

any object of investigation with Paul); but the question is: What influence had the primitive sin, in which Adam was the most conspicuous, responsible, and important actor, on the race of men, as to introducing and occasioning sin and misery?

It may also be remarked, that had Adam refused to unite with his wife in her transgression, the consequences must inevitably have been altogether different from what they have now been. His act, then, *completed* the mischief which was begun by Eve; and so the apostle names him here as the occasion of all the evils which followed. This, however, does not prove that he considers Eve as less blameworthy than Adam, or more excusable; for 1 Tim. 2: 14 is directly opposed to such a notion: but it results, I apprehend, merely from a desire of congruity, in respect to the comparison which he is to make, i. e. the congruity of comparing *one* person with *one*, one *man* (i. e. the first Adam) with one *man* (i. e. the second Adam). How would it strike readers, if Eve had been here substituted for Adam? And this suggestion leads, at once, to a perception of what *congruity* demands in the case before us.

Ἡ ἁμαρτία, *sin*. The *sin* would mean, in English, something different from what the Greek here means, although the article is prefixed to the word. Whenever any thing is named which is generic in its nature, but *unique* or single in its kind, the Greeks usually prefix the article to it; e. g. ὁ φιλόσοφος, ἡ ἀρετή, ἡ ἀλήθεια, τὸ ἄγαθόν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, etc. In such cases ἡ δικαιοσύνη (for example) as an entire *genus*, is *unique*, i. e. it differs from all other qualities of moral beings; and so it has the article prefixed in order to denote this. But still, δικαιοσύνη may at another time be considered as a *genus* comprehending *several subordinate species*, such as commutative justice, penal justice, integrity, etc.; in which case the article would naturally be omitted. Agreeably to these principles, ἡ ἁμαρτία here appears with the article, because it appears in its simple *generic* nature, i. e. as single or monadic. That it is generic here, i. e. that it comprehends both sinful actions and affections, seems to be clear from the nature of the case, and from what follows. If Adam was created so as to be upright, and was purely holy until his fall, then sin commenced with his fall; sin of every kind, or rather of any kind; sin either in *affection* or *action*. That such a *generic* meaning must here be given to ἡ ἁμαρτία, is evident, moreover, from the sequel; viz. ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, v. 12; ἁμαρτία ἦν ἐν κόσμῳ, v. 13; Comp. Rom. 7: 7, seq., where sin is represented as comprising *concupiscence*, i. e. internal affection; Rom. 7: 15—19, where the fruits of this concupiscence, i. e. external actions, are called *evil*, i. e. *sin*.

Bretschneider remarks (Dogmatik. II. 48, edit. 3), that the article is used before ἁμαρτία in the verse before us, because it designates *vitiösitas*, but not *peccata actualia*. But surely he will not contend, that the article is not used before nouns employed in a *generic* sense, like ὁ φιλόσοφος, ὁ στρατιώτης, ὁ ἄγαθός, etc.; which is even a law of the Greek language. Nor does the sequel here justify his remark; for the ἡ ἁμαρτία of Adam is called (v. 14) his *παράβασις*: in vs. 15, 17, and 18, his *παραπτώμα*: in v. 19, his *παρακοή*: all of which implies *peccatum*

actuale, viz. the eating of the forbidden fruit. It must be evident, also, that if *actual sin* is the fruit and consequence of *vitiōsitas*, and if this last entered the world by the act of Adam, then *sin* in its *generic* sense must have entered the world δι' ἐνός ἀνθρώπου, i. e. by Adam's offence.

Εἰς τὸν κόσμον, *into the world*, i. e. among men, into the world of human beings; comp. Matt. 26: 13. 2 Pet. 2: 5. 3: 6. Matt. 13: 33. John 1: 10. 3: 16, 17. 16: 33. 2 Cor. 1: 12. Comp. also ἔοργεσθαι εἰς τὸν κόσμον, John 6: 14. 9: 39. 11: 27. 12: 46. Heb. 10: 5. That the right explanation of κόσμος is given above, is confirmed by v. 18, where εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους is a substitute for it, and one of equivalent import.

Εἰσῆλθε, *entered into, invaded*. So the Latin *invadere terram vel provinciam*, etc.; and so εἰσέρογομαι in Mark 3: 27. Acts 20: 29. The representation is full of vivacity; for *sin* is here personified, and represented as *invading* the human race, in the first transgression of Adam. Compare also the expressions in Wisd. 2: 24, φθόνου δὲ διαβόλου θάνατος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον· 14: 14, κενοδοξία γὰρ ἀνθρώπων [εἰδωλολατρεία] εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον.

Καὶ διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, *and by sin*, i. e. through the instrumentality of sin; or rather, *by reason of sin, in consequence of sin, on account of sin*; διὰ being usually employed in this sense, when put before the Genitive.

Θάνατος, *death*. But what death? That of the body, or of the soul, or of both? In other words: Is temporal evil here meant, or eternal, or both?

The answer must be sought for, first of all, in the *usus loquendi* of the author himself. In the context we have his own explanation of θάνατος. In v. 15, *death* (ἀπέθανον) stands opposed to χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἡ δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι. In v. 17, it stands opposed to τὴν περισσεῖαν τῆς χάριτος καὶ τῆς δωρεᾶς τῆς δικαιοσύνης. In v. 21, it stands opposed to ζωὴν αἰώνιον. In chap. 6: 23, θάνατος is directly contrasted with ζωὴ αἰώνιος. That θάνατος, then, by the *usus loquendi* of Paul, does sometimes mean *a death* which is the *opposite* of *eternal life* or happiness, is here made certain.

In the like sense, i. e. as used to designate the penalty of sin, the reader may find θάνατος, in Rom. 1: 32. 6: 21. 6: 16. 7: 5. 7: 10. 7: 13. 7: 24. 8: 2. 8: 6. 2 Cor. 2: 16. 7: 10. 2 Tim. 1: 10. Heb. 2: 14.

This usage agrees with that of other sacred writers in the New Testament; e. g. John 8: 51. 5: 24. James 1: 15. 1 John 3: 14. Rev. 2: 11. 20: 6. 20: 14.

In like manner we find it used in the Old Testament; e. g. Deut. 30: 15. Jer. 21: 8 (comp. Sirach 15: 7). Prov. 5: 5. 8: 36. 11: 19. 12: 28. Ezek. 33: 11.

In the same way the verb *to die* is employed; e. g. by Paul, Rom. 8: 13; by John, 6: 50. 11: 26. 8: 21. So in the Old Testament; e. g. Ezek. 18: 4. 18: 20. 18: 17. 18: 21. 18: 24. 18: 28. 18: 32. Prov. 15: 10. Ezek. 33: 8. 33: 11. 33: 14. 33: 15. Prov. 23: 13. Must not this be the sense, also, in Gen. 2: 17. 3: 3, 4?

If any one now will carefully investigate all these examples, he will find that in many cases it is quite impossible to limit the word *death*, so as to make it signify no more than the dissolution of the body or temporal death. E. g. John 8: 51, 'If any man shall keep my saying, *he shall never see death.*' John 5: 24, 'He that heareth my words . . . *is passed from death unto life.*' John 11: 26, 'Whosoever . . . believeth in me, *shall never die.*' Ezek. 18: 28, 'He . . . that turneth away from his transgressions . . . shall surely live, *he shall not die;*' and to the same effect in many of the other passages quoted; to which it would be easy to add many more.

That the *usus loquendi*, then, *permits* θάνατος to be construed as designating the *whole penalty* of sin, there can be no good ground of doubt. The only question now is: Whether θάνατος is employed in this sense, in the passage before us?

The antithesis in vs. 15, 17, 21, and 6: 23, as produced above, would seem to go far toward a final settlement of this question. Indeed, I see no *philological* escape from the conclusion, that death in the sense of *penalty for sin in its full measure*, must be regarded as the meaning of the writer here.

But is there any thing in *the nature of the case*, which goes to shew that death should here have a *limited* meaning given to it; in other words, that it should be construed as meaning only the death of the body?

What then is the nature of the case? It is this, viz. that as condemnation [κατάκριμα] came upon all men by the offence of one man (Adam), so by the obedience of one (Christ) all men have access to δικαιοσύνη εἰς ζωὴν, v. 18. Now as ζωὴ is here plainly the antithesis of θάνατος [κατάκριμα], we have only to inquire what must be the meaning of ζωὴ, in order to obtain that of θάνατος. But in respect to this there can surely be no doubt. Ζωή means the blessings procured by a Saviour's death, viz. all the holiness and happiness which this introduces. But certainly these blessings are not limited to *the resurrection of the body*. I do not deny that such a resurrection is a blessing to the righteous; for so the apostle plainly considers it in 1 Cor. xv.; or rather,

I would say, it is a thing preparatory to the bestowment of blessings. But it must be remembered, that the wicked will be raised from the dead as truly as the righteous; yet no one will count this a *blessing* to them. It is only a preparation for augmented misery.

It cannot be then, that a *resurrection from the dead*, in itself considered, is *δικαίωσις ζωῆς*; and therefore a *state of temporal death* is not the antithesis, i. e. is not the evil from which it is the main object of Christ to deliver us. A resurrection from this is a good or an evil, just as the case may be in regard to the moral character of him who is the subject of it.

Does Christ then deliver from the *suffering itself* of temporal death? A formal answer to this is unnecessary, since all men without distinction are mortal and die.

One thing, however, should be said in reference to this; which is, that 'the sting of death' is taken away through the hopes inspired by a Saviour's blood; and that in this way the evil is greatly mitigated to those who have true hope in Christ.

I remark, once more, that the penalty of *all sin*, is evil both of body and soul. "The soul that sinneth shall die." Now if Adam's first sin was a *real sin*, and a *fortiori* if it was one of the greatest of all sins (as we surely have much reason to conclude when we consider its consequences), then *death in its most extensive sense* must have been the penalty attached to it. What reason can be given why other less sins are punishable with *death* in the enlarged sense of this word, and yet that the sin of Adam was not punishable in the like way? Was he not the more culpable, who fell from a state of entire holiness?

Finally, the apostle, when he comes to point out the dissimilitude between Adam's offence and its consequences, and the obedience of Christ and its consequences, (as he does in vs. 15—17), opposes the *ἥμιμα* occasioned by Adam to the *δικαίωμα* effected by Christ, v. 16; and the *θάνατος* introduced by the former to the *βασιλεύειν ἐν ζωῇ* accomplished by the latter, v. 17. Now as *δικαίωμα* is not, in its more important sense, a deliverance from temporal death, nor *the reigning in life* merely a deliverance from mortality; so *temporal death* cannot, with any good appearance of reason, be understood here as the essential meaning of *θάνατος*. That *θάνατος* includes this among other evils, I would not by any means be understood to deny; for 1 Cor. 15: 22 shews, that Paul clearly held the death of the body to have been introduced by Adam. But that this was the *prominent* evil in his mind, so much so as to be here named as the principal thing which constituted the penalty threatened to our first parents, has, I trust, been rendered sufficiently improbable, by the considerations above stated. See Excursus III.

Καὶ οὕτως, and thus, or and in like manner. An important inquiry may be here raised, viz. Does the apostle mean to say: 'In consequence of sin's entering the world and death by sin, through the transgression of Adam—as the natural and necessary, at least the

established consequence of this—sin and death came upon all other men;’ in other words, does he mean to say that ‘the coming of sin and death upon all other men, was occasioned by Adam’s committing sin and incurring death?’ Or does he mean thus: ‘As it was with Adam, when he sinned and death came upon him in consequence of it, so it is with all other men, i. e. they sin, and death in like manner comes upon them?’

The former meaning implies a *special* connection between Adam and his posterity, and a *special* influence of his crime and condemnation upon their sin and condemnation; the latter contains no such implication, but merely avers that all who sin, whether Adam or his posterity, fall under sentence of condemnation. The word *οὕτως* is capable of either interpretation; as it means either *hoc modo*, *hac ratione*, or *similiter*, *simili modo*. Which of these is the sense that the writer here means to express, we shall be enabled to inquire more advantageously, when we have gone through with the remaining words of the verse.

Ἐφ’ ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, *because that all have sinned*. Another method of rendering this has often been urged, viz. IN WHOM *all have sinned*. So the Vulgate; and so, after this, Augustine, Beza, Calixtus, E. Schmidt, Calovius, Quenstedt, Raphelius, et alii. But the objections to translating ἔφ’ ᾧ by *in quo*, *in whom*, are weighty; for, (1) If ᾧ be made a *masc. relative pronoun* here, there is no antecedent for it within any probable limits. Ἀνθρώπου lies too far back; and θάνατος as an antecedent, would make no tolerable sense. (2) Ἐπὶ ᾧ (ἔφ’ ᾧ) does not, by Greek usage, mean *in whom*; ἐν ᾧ would of course be the proper expression for this. So Thomas Magister, ἔφ’ ᾧ, διότι. Comp. 2 Cor. 5: 4. (3) The assertion ἔφ’ ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, is dwelt upon and explained in vs. 13, 14; and in these verses, men’s *own personal* sins are spoken of (as we shall hereafter see), not those of another which are laid to their charge. If this explanation be admitted, then ἔφ’ ᾧ cannot here mean *in whom*. (4) If ἔφ’ ᾧ could be properly taken as equivalent to ἐν ᾧ, (and so much is true, viz. that ἐπί and ἐν are beyond all doubt frequently commuted as to sense in the New Testament), yet the whole phrase, viz. ἁμαρτάνειν ἐπὶ τινι, meaning *to sin in one* or *by one*, is without any example, that I can find, to support it. How can it then be here adopted, against the usual idiom of the Greek language, and against another and preferable sense?

On the other hand; agreeably with the rendering *because that*, or

for that, is the version of the Syriac, the commentaries of Theodoret, Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Vatablus, Flatt, Tholuck, Schott, and a multitude of others, together with our English version.

Grotius, indeed, proposes another rendering, viz. *per quem*. That ἐπί has not unfrequently the sense of *causá, propter, gratiá*, there can be no ground of philological doubt; see Luke 5: 5. 9: 48. Acts 3: 16. 1 Cor. 8: 11. But what would be the sense of 'all have sinned for the sake of Adam?' It makes it more tolerable, however, to translate thus: 'By reason of Adam, i. e. through his transgression, all men have sinned.' But if the writer had meant here to say this, he could hardly have avoided saying δι' οὗ for in the same way he continually employs διὰ, in the paragraph under examination; e. g. in vs. 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, no less than *nine* times.

On the whole, we can have no reasonable ground of doubt here, that ἐφ' ᾧ means *because that, or for that*, as our English version has it. Augustine, indeed, does strenuously contend for the Vulgate rendering *in quo*; for on this he builds his views of original sin. Accordingly he says: "Fuerunt enim omnes *ratione seminis* in lumbis Adam quando damnatus est; et ideo sine illis damnatus non est: quemadmodum fuerunt Israelitæ in lumbis Abrahæ, quando decimatus est," [Heb. VII. 9, 10]; contra Jul. Pelag. V. 12. And again: "In Adam omnes tunc peccaverunt, quando in ejus natura, illâ insitâ vi quâ eos gignere poterat, adhuc *omnes ille unus fuerunt*," De pecc. merit. et rem. III. 7. The same *unity* with Adam has Pres. Edwards laboured to establish, in Part IV. chap. 3 of his work on Original Sin; where he has argued, that the identity of one and the same individual is merely an effect of "an arbitrary divine constitution;" and that unity may as well be predicated of each individual of the human race with Adam their common ancestor, as of any individual with himself at different points of time; unity in both cases being merely a matter of "sovereign and arbitrary appointment." In the like way with Jerome, moreover, did Origen and Ambrose think; and the Schoolmen have speculated *ad nauseam* on this subject.

Πάντες ἥμαρτον, *all have sinned*. But how? In their *own proper persons*? Or in Adam? Or is it merely the meaning of ἥμαρτον here, that men *are treated as sinners*?

This last opinion Storr maintains; and he appeals to Gen. 44: 32, וְהָאֲנִי אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי, *then I will bear the blame*, i. e. I will be treated as a sinner. He also refers to Job 9: 29, אֲנִי אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי; which however does not support the appeal. Grotius also appeals to Gen. 31: 27 and Job

6: 24 (!), for the like purpose; but without ground. And although, if an exigency of the passage demanded it, ἡμαρτον might be rendered *are treated as sinners* (comp. 1 K. 1: 21); yet no such exigency occurs here, as vs. 13, 14 shew; for in these (which are plainly explanatory of the latter part of v. 12), the writer labours to prove that men are themselves *actual* sinners, not merely sinners in Adam; as we shall see in the sequel. Besides, it is a good rule of interpretation, never to depart from the *usual* sense of words unless there is an imperious reason for it; and the usual sense of ἀμαρτιάνω, is *not to be treated as a sinner*.

There remain, then, only the other two methods of construing ἡμαρτον, which are adverted to in the first and second questions above. But the second method, viz. that *all men have sinned in Adam*, cannot be admitted here, for reasons already stated above; it can be admitted only in a case of philological necessity, which does not occur here. There remains, therefore, only the first plain and simple method of interpretation, viz. all men have sinned in their own persons; all men have themselves incurred the guilt of sin, and so subjected themselves to its penalty; or at least, all men are themselves sinners, and so are liable to death.

I am aware that a different sense has been given to πάντες ἡμαρτον here, by many of the most respectable commentators. They regard it as meaning that all have sinned in Adam, or at least, that through him they have become sinners; and they appeal to vs. 17—19 in support of this sentiment. And it must be confessed, that there is no more ground for objection to the *sentiment* which the expression thus construed would convey, than there is to the sentiment in vs. 17—19. It is not on this ground, that I hesitate to receive this interpretation. It is because there are philological difficulties involved in such an exegesis, which I see no way of satisfactorily removing. Vs. 13 and 14 seem plainly to recognize such sin as that of which men are *personally* and *actually* guilty; yea, a sin different in some important respects from that of Adam's first transgression, . . . ἐπὶ τοὺς μὴ ἀμαρτήσαντας ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοίωματι τῆς παραβύσεως Ἀδάμ. This is a sin, moreover, on account of which "death reigned over them." But if this sin were the very sin of Adam, imputed to them, and not their own actual sin; if it were his sin propagated to them (as the usual sentiment respecting original sin is); then how could it be, that death came upon them, although they had *not* sinned after the likeness of Adam's transgression? So far from this must it be, that Adam's sin is their very sin, and the ground why death reigns over them.

This consideration, united with the principle that the ordinary meaning of ἡμαρτον should be received, unless there is a solid reason for departing from it; and all this added to the consideration that vs. 13,

14 are plainly expegetical of the latter part of v. 12; seem to make it unavoidable that πάντες ἡμαρτων should be here construed, *all have sinned in their own persons or actually.*

I know, indeed, that such distinguished men as Calvin, Edwards, Flatt, Tholuck, and others, explain the phrase in question by referring to v. 19; and some of them allege as a ground of this, that the design of the apostle requires us so to understand πάντες ἡμαρτων here, because he is evidently intent upon representing the evils which Adam occasioned. But it does not follow, because v. 19 asserts an influence of Adam upon the sinfulness of men, that the same sentiment must therefore be affirmed in v. 12; certainly not that it should be directly asserted in the same manner. It appears quite probable, I readily concede, that Paul, in making the declarations contained in v. 12, had in his own mind a view of the connection between the first offence of Adam and the sinfulness of his posterity. It is possible, that καὶ οὕτως may imply this; which (with Erasmus, Tholuck, and others) we might construe, *et ita factum est, i. e. and so it happened, or and thus it was brought about, viz. brought about that all men came under sentence of death, and also became sinners; in other words, Adam's offence brought sin and condemnation upon all men.* Yet I am not persuaded that this is the true method of interpreting the words καὶ οὕτως. While, however, I readily concede what I have just stated above, and am persuaded there is no good reason to deny that Paul did entertain the idea, when he made the declarations in v. 12, that the fact of all men's becoming sinners and being subjected to the dominion of death, was connected with the first transgression of Adam (comp. vs. 17—19); yet that the apostle has asserted this sentiment *explicitly and directly* in v. 12, cannot, I think, be made out by any just rules of interpretation. Nay, for reasons already given, and on account of what is yet to be said, I cannot but regard the case as quite clear, that no more is here *explicitly and directly* asserted, than that all men are themselves actual sinners, and therefore come under condemnation. This assertion the latter clause of the verse seems to me fully and plainly to contain. But in the preceding ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον ἐσηλθε, and in the καὶ οὕτως . . . δὴλθε, I think we may, without any forced construction, say that we must discover an indirect intimation of what is directly asserted in vs. 17—19, viz., that the first offence of Adam was connected with the sin and misery of his posterity, and in some sense or other *causal* of it. Nothing can be plainer, than that at the outset Paul had this sentiment in his mind; yet in v. 12 he seems to intimate it only in the expressions just cited. Construed in this way the sense of the verse would be as follows: 'By Adam's first offence, sin and death invaded the world of mankind; and having thus invaded it, they have been marching through it (δὴλθε), and carrying on their conquests ever since; all men have become sinners, all have come under condemnation.'

Now while this asserts the fact that all have become sinners, and have come under condemnation, it does also intimate by implication, that the whole of what has come upon men, stands connected with the introduction by Adam of sin and death into the world. I cannot, there-

fore, agree with those commentators who find in our verse *no intimation* of such a connection of all men with Adam; neither can I assent to those who find in it no charge upon all of Adam's posterity, of *actual sin in propria personâ*.

The objection made by Flatt against construing the clause before us as having respect to *actual sin*, seems to be destitute of any good ground of support. 'In this way,' says he, '*infants* must be included among *actual sinners*; which is not true.' But how can any more difficulty arise from saying that *all are sinners* here, than from the apostle's saying the very same thing so often in the previous part of his epistle, e. g. 3: 9—18, 19, 23? Of course the writer of these declarations must be understood, (if he means to designate *actual sinners* in the passages just adverted to, as it is agreed that he does), to designate such as are capable of being so; just as when it is said: "He that believeth not shall be damned," we understand the Saviour to speak of *such as are capable of belief or unbelief*. There is surely no more difficulty in the one case than in the other. That the apostle had his eye on the case of *infants*, in particular, any where in this whole paragraph, may be justly regarded as doubtful; particularly must we doubt this, when we bring Rom. 9: 11 into the account, which surely implies a state of infants somewhat different from that which the charge in Rom. 5: 17—19 would imply, in case we suppose them to be there included. I remark, once more, on the exegesis of πάντες ἡμαρτον by Calvin and others, that the evils occasioned by Adam, are surely not limited by the apostle, and by the nature of the case are not to be limited, to that part only of suffering which comes upon our race by reason of *original sin* (as it is called), whatever this sin may be. Verse 14 speaks of 'death as reigning over those *who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression*;' and of course it speaks of a sin committed by Adam's posterity, different from that of Adam; and v. 16 speaks of the *many* offences which the free gift of Christ takes away or causes to be pardoned, in distinction from the *one* offence only of Adam's that enters into the account of our condemnation. It follows of course, and we are assured, that the apostle does not limit himself to the *one* offence of Adam, and its consequences in the way of imputation, when he exhibits the contrast between Adam and Christ. Why should he do so? If *actual sin* in any way proceeds from, is connected with, or is occasioned by, *original sin*; and if this latter can be traced to Adam; then does it follow, that actual as well as original sin should enter into the contrast presented by the apostle, between the sin and misery occasioned by the first Adam, and the justification and happiness introduced by the second.

Of course there seems to be no valid reason, why we may not construe πάντες ἡμαρτον as I have already done above.

Let us return now to the καὶ οὕτως, the interpretation of which was left unfinished. Does it mean: '*And in like manner with Adam, did his posterity sin, and come too, like him, under sentence of death?*' Or: '*As death followed sin in the case of Adam, so it did*

in the case of his posterity? Or: 'Since Adam introduced sin and misery into the world, it has so happened, that his sin was imputed to all his posterity, and all of them are subjected to death thereby?' Not the first; because v. 14 tells us that death came on many of Adam's posterity, who had NOT sinned in the manner that he did, i. e. against a revealed, express law. Not the third; for reasons which have already been given, why we must accede to the idea that πάντες ἡμαρτον here means *actual sin in propria personâ*. The meaning of καὶ οὕτως, then, must be substantially what is implied in the second of the above questions; viz. as sin entered the world, and death was inseparably connected with it; so death has passed through the world and come upon all men, because it was inseparably connected with their sin. More than this cannot be looked upon as *directly* asserted by the latter clause of the verse. But that the whole verse contains an intimation, that both the sins of men and their condemnation stand connected, in some way or other, with the first offence by Adam, has already been stated. The force of καὶ οὕτως, however, cannot fall directly on this. Consider what the writer asserts: 'Death came on Adam διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας· and in like manner (καὶ οὕτως), death came upon all men,' [διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, he might have said, which would have meant neither more nor less than καὶ οὕτως, but he has expressed the same idea by] ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον.' In other words: 'As Adam sinned and brought death upon himself, so death in all other cases is in like manner the inseparable attendant upon sin; and death is universal, because sin is so.' So much, and I think no more, can be fairly made out of καὶ οὕτως· it must be considered as intended to designate the connection—the invariable, inseparable connection—between sin and death. But how it came about that sin is *universal*, is a thing not intended to be comprehended in the comparison made by καὶ οὕτως· although it is probably *hinted* at, as I have already shewn, by other words, in the same verse, viz. εἰσῆλθε and διῆλθε. There is no room here for such a comparison, by means of καὶ οὕτως· for how would it sound to say: 'As sin and death were universal in respect to Adam, so they are universal in respect to his posterity?'

In regard to construing καὶ οὕτως, with Erasmus, Tholuck, and others, as meaning *ita factum est*, viz. 'so it happened that all men sinned in Adam, and were sentenced to death by reason of this sin,' I must make one more remark. I cannot help feeling this exegesis to be wholly inadmissible here. If the apostle had designed to say

what this interpretation represents him as saying, would he not have written: *Καὶ οὕτως ἐγένετο ὅτι κ. τ. λ.?* But as he has now constructed the sentence, the force of *καὶ οὕτως* seems fairly and inevitably to fall on *the inseparable connection* between sin and death; which is directly asserted by *ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον* i. e. it is simply and directly said, that all are condemned as Adam was, *because* all have sinned.

CHAP. V. 13, 14.

The apostle having thus asserted that sin and death were introduced into the world by one man, and had become universal, in order to complete the comparison which he designs, and which is intimated by *ὅσπερ* at the beginning of v. 12, would have naturally filled out the sentence by adding, at the end of this verse, *οὕτως καὶ δι' ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἡ ζωὴ εἰς τὸν κόσμον [εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους] εἰσῆλθη*, comp. vs. 17, 18. But he suspends his *apodosis* here, for the sake of elucidating and confirming what he had already said; comp. p. 210 above. This confirmation is made by the verses now under consideration; as the *γὰρ confirmantis* with which they are introduced, very clearly shews. What has he said? That *all* have sinned, and that *all* are under sentence of death. How is this elucidated and confirmed? By taking a case in which one might be disposed to say, it would be difficult to prove that men are sinners, since the apostle himself had already explicitly declared, that it is 'the law which occasions punishment; for *where there is no law, there is no transgression*,' 4: 15. To meet this difficulty which might easily arise, he avers that men were sinners (*ἁμαρτία ἦν ἐν κόσμῳ*), before the giving of the Mosaic law; although they are not themselves prone to acknowledge their guilt in such circumstances, or they make but little account of it. Yet the fact was, that they were sinners, and that death therefore prevailed over them all, even all who had not sinned against a revealed law as Adam did.

Such I take to be the *confirmation* of what was asserted at the close of v. 12. To establish and defend this exegesis, is of course our next immediate object.

"*ἄχρι νόμου, until the law*; i. e. the law of Moses, as v. 14 leads us inevitably to construe it. Some commentators, (Origen, Chrysostom, Erasmus, Koppe, and others), construe *ἄχρι νόμου* not as designating *the commencement* of the Mosaic economy, but as extending *through the whole period of it*. In defence of such an interpretation, we are referred to *ἄχρι* in Acts 3: 21, and its synonyme *ἕως ἄν* in Acts 2: 35. Gen. 28: 15, etc. That these words are sometimes employed in such a manner, as not to indicate a cessation of any thing that is or is done, at the time which is mentioned in connection with *ἄχρι* or *ἕως*, is true. In other words, the *terminus ad quem* does not limit the thing affirmed *universally*; it only expresses a limit for a certain purpose. For example; in Acts 3: 21 it is said, that "the heavens must receive Jesus *ἄχρι χρόνων ἀποκαταστάσεως πάντων, until the restoration of*

all things; by which it is not surely meant, that he is no longer to dwell in heaven, but that he will certainly dwell there until that time. In like manner ἄχθῃ, it is said, may here admit the time of the Mosaic law to be included.

But whatever may be true in regard to the possible meaning of ἄχθῃ in some cases, v. 14 clearly shews, that here it means only *until the commencement* of the laws of Moses, i. e. the time when these laws were given.

‘But how can this be? Was sin in the world no longer than that period? Did it cease when the law was introduced? This would be a direct contradiction of v. 20, and of many other passages.’ The answer is brief and conclusive. It is no part of the apostle’s object, to aver that sin did not exist *after* this period; but to declare that it existed *before* it. What he had already said, again and again, necessarily involved the idea, that where law was, there sin was. But he had also said, that “where there is no law, there is no transgression.” Now some of his readers might suggest, and this not unnaturally: ‘Since you say that where there is no law, there is no transgression (Rom. 3: 15), how then were men sinners *before the law was given*?’ I allow that no intelligent and candid man could have good ground to put such a question, after all which the apostle had already said on this subject. But surely we are not to suppose, that Paul had to do only with men of this character. The objections answered throughout the epistle, shew a state of things quite different from this.

To the question, then, as above suggested, I suppose the apostle to answer in our verse. ‘Sin,’ says he, ‘was in the world, until the law of Moses; i. e. men were sinners between the time of Adam and Moses, for death reigned during all this period,’ v. 13. It is not necessary that there should be a law *expressly* revealed, in order that men should be sinners; “the heathen who have no law, are a law unto themselves,” 2: 14.

That ἁμαρτία here means something different from *original sin* or *imputed sin*, seems to be clear from the reference which the apostle here tacitly makes to a law of nature that had been transgressed. A *revealed* law there was not for men in general, antecedently to the time of Moses; yet men were sinners. How? By sinning against the law “written on their hearts,” (2: 15). But if such was their sin, it was *actual* sin, not *imputed* guilt.

Very different views of ἁμαρτία here, however, are entertained by some, who state the whole of the apostle’s reasoning in the following

manner; viz. 'Men's own sins were not imputed to them on the ground of their transgressing any law, until the law of Moses was given; yet they were counted sinners (*ἁμαρτία ἦν ἐν κόσμῳ*); consequently, it must have been by reason of Adam's sin being imputed to them, inasmuch as their own offences were not imputed.'

Although this mode of exegesis is supported by many names of high respectability, I find myself unable to admit it for the following reasons: 1. To aver that men's *own* sins were not imputed to them by God, (so they construe *ἁμαρτία δὲ οὐκ ἔλλογείται μὴ ὄντος νόμου*), is directly to contradict the whole tenor of Old Testament history and declarations; and also what Paul has, in the most explicit manner, asserted in the preceding part of his epistle. As evidence in favour of the first assertion, I appeal to the case of Cain; of the antediluvians who perished in the flood; of Sodom and Gomorrha; and to all the declarations of divine displeasure made against the *actual thoughts* and *deeds* of the wicked, not against their *original* sin. In respect to the second, I appeal to the whole of what Paul has said in Rom. 1: 19—32. 2: 12, 14, 15. 3: 9, 19, 23, 25. All these charges are made against *actual* sins; and it is impossible to suppose that the apostle means here to say, that those who are *ἄνομοι* (without revelation), are, or ever have been, counted by God as being without sin, actual sin; for both *ἄνομοι* and *ἔννομοι*, according to Paul, are ALL UNDER SIN, *under ACTUAL sin*. To admit the contrary, would be to overturn the very foundation the apostle had taken so much pains to lay, in chap. 1.—III., in order to make the conclusion entirely evident and unavoidable, that all men need gratuitous justification.

2. To aver that men's sins are not imputed to them, when they do not live under a revealed law, would be to contradict what the immediate context itself must be considered as asserting. Who are those that have *not* sinned after the manner of Adam? The answer of those whom I am now opposing, is: 'They are those, who have only *original sin* or *imputed sin* charged to their account.' But then I find great difficulty in this answer. By the supposition of those who make it, Adam's first sin does become really and truly that of all his posterity, inasmuch as it is propagated to them in the way of natural generation. Yea, Augustine, Pres. Edwards, and many others, maintain a *real physical unity* of Adam with all his posterity; and hence they derive to all his posterity, a participation in his sin. But if his sin be theirs in any proper sense, either really by such a unity as is asserted, or by mere imputation without this; then how is it that the sin of the *ἄνομοι* is (as Paul asserts) *not* like that of Adam? How can it be unlike it, when it is the very same; either the very same in reality (as Augustine and his followers hold), or the very same putatively? But,

3. I have another difficulty. How can the sins of Adam be here asserted to be imputed to all his posterity, and yet their own personal sins to be not at all reckoned? By the exegesis of those whose opinion I am now endeavouring to controvert, Paul is made to say, that God did not count to men their own personal and actual sins, i. e. to those who lived before the Mosaic law. By a parity of reason, then, the Gentiles

at all times and every where, who are ἄνομοι, are freed from the imputation of their own transgressions; which would directly contradict the declarations of Paul.

From this conclusion, however, Schott and Tholuck, who defend for substance the exegesis which I am calling in question, do in some measure revolt, and say that to οὐκ ἐλλογεῖτο must be assigned only a *comparative* sense; that although the *guilt* of men who sinned against the law of nature, was not taken away absolutely, yet their *accountability* for it was in a good measure superseded. To illustrate this, Tholuck refers us to ἀνοχη in Rom. 3: 26, and to ὑπεριδών ὁ Θεός in Acts 17: 30. Both of these instances, however, relate to *deferring punishment*, not to a remission of accountability; comp. 2 Pet. 3: 8, 9. Such a remission of punishment would directly contradict what Paul has fully and strongly asserted, in Rom. 2: 6—16.

And to what purpose is it to say, that men who were ἄνομοι, were in a *comparative* sense not accountable to God for their own personal sins? This means neither more nor less, than that they were accountable in some degree, although not as highly so as those who were ἔνομοι. But accountability being admitted, (how can it be denied after reading Rom. 2: 6—16?) then the argument is marred, which those whom I am opposing deduce from the verses in question. They make these verses to say, that 'the ἄνομοι are not accountable for their own sins; but inasmuch as they are still *treated as sinners*, it must be because of *imputed sin only*.' But while we admit accountability *in some degree* for the sins of the ἄνομοι, it forecloses such an argument from the passage; for it leaves it fully liable to the following construction, viz. 'Although men were held less accountable and criminal, who lived before the Mosaic law, than those who lived under this law, yet that they still were sinners, and were regarded as such, is true, for all were subjected to death.' That they were sinners in their own person, or actual offenders in a way different from that of Adam, is clear from what is said in v. 14 respecting them. How then can Adam's sin be here asserted to be theirs, and, by implication, to be the only sin for which death came upon them?

In such an interpretation, moreover, as that which I am now considering, a very different sense is given to ἐλλογεῖτο from that which it will here bear; as we shall see in the sequel.

I have only to add, that the supposition of men's own personal sins *not* being reckoned to them, while they perish by the imputation of another's sin, is a position so revolting with respect to the justice, and goodness, and impartiality of the sovereign Judge, "who will render to every man according to his works," that it should not be made out from *constructive* evidence; it requires most ample and satisfactory arguments to support it.

The phrase ἄλλοι νόμον ἁμαρτία ἦν ἐν κόσμῳ, appears then to be only an affirmation of that respecting a particular class of men, (whom some might think it difficult to prove to be sinners), which in the preceding clause had been affirmed of *all men*, πάντες ἡμαρτον. It

is illustrating and confirming this latter expression, by shewing that even that class of men are sinners, whom one might be prone to exempt from such a charge.

Ἄμαρτία δὲ . . . νόμου, *although sin is not counted where there is no law*; an expression which has given occasion to great perplexity and difficulty. This has arisen, however, in a great measure from construing ἐλλογεῖται as though it were connected with θεός, as the agent by whom the *counting* or *imputing* is to be done. The difficulties of such an interpretation have already been stated, in the considerations presented above. Bretschneider (Dogmatik. II. 49. edit. 3) seems to have suggested the true solution of the phraseology: "Ἐλλογεῖται is not *imputatur a Deo*, but *refertur ab hominibus ad peccata*, i. e. *habetur, agnoscitur peccatum*." The like views did Calvin and Luther entertain, relative to the expression. The former says, that [homines] sibi nihil imputarent in peccatum, nisi [lege] coacti . . . sine legis stimulis in socordiam se demergunt; i. e. 'men do not count themselves as sinners, and are not alarmed for their guilt, unless the law first excites and quickens their consciences.' So Luther renders ἐλλογεῖται by *achten*, *to regard*, *to have respect to*. To the like purpose Heumann and Camerarius. Tholuck says this is doing violence to the word. But surely, when it is rendered (as by Bretschneider) *habetur, imputatur* [ut peccatum] *ab hominibus*, this is no more a departure from the meaning of ἐλλογεῖται, than to render it *imputatur a Deo*. Whether θεός or ἄνθρωποι is to be understood here, must be decided, of course, by the nature of the sentiment. And as to ἐλλογεῖται, why should attributing to it the meaning of *regarding, accounting, esteeming*, etc., be called strange? inasmuch as in sense this word accords altogether with λογίζομαι, which often occurs with such a meaning; e. g. Acts 19: 27. Rom. 2: 26. 6: 11. 8: 36. 9: 8. 14: 14. 1 Cor. 4: 1. 2 Cor. 10: 2. 11: 5, et sæpe. So בָּשָׁחַ, Gen. 31: 15. 1 Sam. 1: 13. Job 41: 24. The ellipsis after ἐλλογεῖται may be supplied by εἰς ἁμαρτίαν or ὡς ἁμαρτία, both methods of construction being common after λογίζομαι, as any one may see by consulting the above instances. That ἐλλογέω occurs in Philem. v. 18, in the sense of *impute*, is no more a reason why it should have that particular meaning in the verse before us, than it is that λογίζομαι should *always* have the sense of *impute*, because it often means *to impute*; but we know, also, that oftener still it means *to compute, to regard, to make account of*.

That the sentiment derived from such an exegesis as that which

I have adopted, is not foreign to the writings of Paul, is quite clear from comparing Rom. 7: 7—11 and 3: 20. In the former of these passages the law is represented as greatly exciting and aggravating the unholy desires of the carnal heart, by its restraints and disclosures; so that “without the law, sin is dead,” i. e. it is little estimated and felt. In the latter, Paul declares that “by the law is the knowledge of sin.” How well this accords with ἁμαρτία δὲ οὐκ ἔλλογεῖται μὴ ὄντος νόμου, needs hardly to be suggested.

I admit that a *modified* sense of the expression is to be regarded as the true one, viz. it is not to be considered so absolute as to convey the idea that *no* sense of sin existed among the heathen in any measure; for this would contradict fact, and contradict what Paul says in chap. 2: 14, 15. But then the modification is of just the same nature, as is to be received in respect to Rom. 7: 7—11. 3: 20, and also of John 15: 22—24, where the Saviour says, that if he had not come and spoken to the Jews, “they would not have had sin.”

Pres. Edwards has given the verse before us a peculiar turn: “For *before* the law of Moses was given, mankind were all looked upon by the great Judge as sinners, by corruption and guilt derived from Adam’s violation of the original law of works; which shews, that the original universal rule of righteousness is not the law of Moses; for if so, there would have been no sin imputed before that was given, because sin is not imputed where there is no law,” (*Orig. Sin*, p. 275. Worces. edit.) He supposes that the main design of the apostle is here to shew, that the Jews could not claim their law as the only criterion of right and wrong; and in order to do this, Paul shews that men were condemned on account of *imputed* sin, before the giving of the law. But besides the forced construction which this introduces, it also obliges us to bring in here a subject of consideration that the apostle seems for the present to have dismissed from his mind, viz. the confident reliance of the Jews on their law, and their boasting of it. In order to make out the interpretation of Edwards, it must be shewn that the apostle here asserts the existence of another law antecedent to that of Moses, to which men were accountable. This he had done in chap. 2: 14, 15; but here it is not to his purpose to repeat this. He says merely, that men were sinners antecedently to the law of Moses, although in a state of nature they make but little account of sin; they were sinners, notwithstanding they made light of it; and they incurred the sentence of death, although they had not, like Adam, sinned against a revealed and express law. Now this goes to confirm the assertion in v. 12, viz. πάντες ἡμαρτον inasmuch as it serves to shew that a part of mankind were actually under sentence of death, about whom doubts might most easily arise. And as it seems to be spoken for this very purpose, so we may acquiesce in such an interpretation of the language as shows that it is directly subservient to the purposes of the writer.

'*Ἄλλ' ἐβασίλευσεν . . . Μοϋσέως, still or nevertheless death reigned from Adam unto Moses. Ἄλλά, tamen, attamen.—'Ἐβασίλευσε, reigned, means was predominant, exercised uncontrolled sway or power. The writer designs, by this word, to express in a strong manner the universal dominion of death among men. But what death? The same, I would answer, as before; but still, I should be disposed to believe that he had in his eye here a particular part of what is comprehended under the generic term death; in other words, that temporal death was the special object to which he here adverts. My reason for this is, that temporal death is a palpable part of the execution of the sentence, so palpable that all must admit it; and to some such undeniable evidence does the writer appear to appeal, for he seems to regard what he states as a thing that will not be denied. I do not look upon this sense of θάνατος here as a departure from the preceding one, in any important respect; for it should be construed as referring to a palpable part of the death threatened, which by its relations to the other parts of the same, involves or implies them also. So Tholuck, Comm. p. 187. 2 edit.*

Καὶ ἐπὶ . . . Ἀδάμ, even over those who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression.

A part of the text itself is here a matter of dispute. Some Latin Codices, also Origen, Cyril, Rufin, Tertullian, Victorinus, Sedulius, and Ambrosiaster, omit the *μὴ* here. Semler, Mill, and some others, have done the same. But nearly all the Greek manuscripts, the Syriac version, the Vulgate, and many of the most conspicuous Greek and Latin fathers, e. g. Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophilus, Irenæus, Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, and others, insert it. The weight of authority on the side of inserting it, seems, therefore, to be quite conclusive. Moreover, there is internal evidence of its genuineness. Tællner, Koppe, and Schott, have well remarked, that the use of *καὶ* here, before *ἁμαρτήσαντας*, intimates that something unusual or unexpected was designed on the part of the writer. Accordingly, while one would expect to find him saying simply, (which would apparently make a much more facile and seemingly unexceptionable sense), *ἐβασίλευσε . . . ἐπὶ τοὺς ἁμαρτήσαντας*, we find him saying, *ἐβασίλευσε . . . καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς μὴ ἁμαρτήσαντες*.

Ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοιώματι, is like the Hebrew *בְּצַדִּיק* (*confidenter*); i. e. a noun with a preposition is employed instead of an adverb. So the Hebrew *בְּדַרְשׁוֹ בְּיַד אֱלֹהִים*, Dan. 10: 16, is rendered in the Septuagint, *ὡς ὁμοίωσις υἱοῦ ἀνθρώπου*. In all respects, *ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοιώματι* is

equivalent to *ὁμοίως*: so that *ὁμοίως τῷ Ἀδὰμ παραβάντι* would express the sense; as would *ὡσπερ Ἀδὰμ παρέβη*. Comp. *ὁμοίωμα* in Rom. 1: 23. 8: 3. Phil. 2: 7.

As to the sense of the passage; by mentioning those who lived before the law of Moses, as *not* having sinned after the manner of Adam, there is a plain implication that those who lived under the law, did sin after the manner of Adam. But the *likeness* in question did not consist in this, viz. that the very *same* precepts were given to them, and were transgressed by them; it consisted plainly in the fact, that they, like Adam, had positive or revealed precepts as the rule of duty. Consequently those who sinned, but yet did not sin in the like way, (and such are described in vs. 13, 14), must have sinned without positive revealed precepts. Such are described in chap. 2: 14, 15.

Origen, Augustine, Melancthon, Beza, Pres. Edwards, and others, have construed the clause *μη̅ ἁμαρτήσαντας κ. τ. λ.*, as having respect to *infants* only. But Calvin rejects this interpretation: "Malo . . . interpretari de iis qui sine lege peccaverunt." Nevertheless he thinks infants may be included. But the ground of this is, that he construes *πάντες ἡμαρτον* and *ἁμαρτία ἦν ἐν κόσμῳ* as referring to *imputed* sin. The remark of Turretin is directly to the point: "Ex scopo apostoli serieque sermonis patet; hic agi etiam *de adultis* omnibus qui ab Adamo usque ad Mosem vixerunt. Etenim si de solis infantibus ageretur, cur intra id spatium se contineret, quod inter Adamum et Mosem fuit? Nam infantium omnium, et ante et post legem, eadem est ratio." Accordingly, the interpretation of Augustine is generally rejected by distinguished critics of all parties, at the present day.

I am aware that it has been frequently alleged, in regard to *μη̅ ἁμαρτήσαντας κ. τ. λ.*, that the *dissimilitude* here affirmed consists in the fact that Adam was an *actual* sinner, and others to whom reference is here made, sinners *only by imputation*. But such an interpretation has already been shewn to be inconsistent with the tenor of the passage, and with the declarations of the Old and New Testament in relation to this subject. How can it be in any way rendered probable, or even plausible, that men from the time of Adam to that of Moses, were sinners *only by imputation*? It is fairly out of question. The attempt to establish such an interpretation must fail. For if such an imputation be made out, by virtue of the *unity* of Adam's race with himself, (and this is the ground on which it is asserted),

then it would follow, of course, that their sin is NOT *different* from his, but the *very same*; for if they were *in* him, and sinned *in* and *with* him, surely their sin is not *different*, but the *same* with his; which is what the apostle here denies.

Ὁς ἐστὶ τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος, *who is a type of him that was to come.* Τύπος signifies, (1) In its original and most literal acceptation, an *impress*, a *note* or *mark* made by impression, sculpture, beating, etc.; inasmuch as it comes from *τίτυπα* the second Perfect of *τύπτω*. In this sense it is employed in John 20: 25. Hence, (2) It means *example*, *pattern*, *model*; as in Acts 7: 44. Heb. 8: 5. Ex. 25: 40 (where the Hebrew has תִּבְרֵת). (3) It means *example*, *model* in a good sense; e. g. Phil. 3: 17. 1 Thess. 1: 7. 2 Thess. 3: 9. 1 Tim. 4: 12. Tit. 2: 7. 1 Pet. 5: 3; but sometimes an example for the sake of warning, not of imitation, as in 1 Cor. 10: 6, comp. v. 11. (4) It means *image*, *something which is a resemblance* of some other thing supposed or real; as in Acts 7: 43. Amos 5: 26 (Heb. תִּבְרֵת). In this last sense, i. e. that of *image* or *resemblance*, not in a physical sense, but in a *causal* one (if I may so speak), is Adam called a *τύπος* of Christ.

That Christ is meant by τοῦ μέλλοντος, is clear from v. 15 seq., where he is by name brought into comparison with Adam. The ellipsis after μέλλοντος, i. e. the noun with which this participle agrees by implication, seems to be Ἀδάμ, viz. the *second Adam* or ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ, as he is called in 1 Cor. 15: 45.

But in what sense, i. e. how far, is the first Adam here considered as an image of the second? A question of no small importance; inasmuch as by the answer to it must, in a great measure, all our views of the general meaning of vs. 12—19 be regulated.

An answer somewhat in detail, would occupy too much space to be inserted here. I have therefore thrown it into the form of an Excursus, which the reader may consult, in respect to the illustration and support of the following sentiments, which contain the principal results of what I have there exhibited; viz.

I. The *τύπος* asserted of Adam, in respect to Christ, is *not* to be taken in the widest and fullest sense that the word itself is capable of, but in a sense which has many important limitations. For, (1) The whole is *contrast*; i. e. the *τύπος* is *antithetic*. In many cases, a *τύπος* in the Old Testament is of the *same* nature with the *ἀντιτύπος* in the New Testament. But here, the whole is most plainly *antithetic*. (2) The degree or measure of the evils occasioned by Adam, is not the point of *τύπος* in respect to Christ; for this measure is declared to be far exceeded by the blessings which Christ has procured; "grace superabounds." (3) It is not the *person* of Adam as such, which is compared

with the *person* of Christ as such, in order to point out any personal resemblances. It is the *acts* of each, and the *consequences* of what each HAS DONE, that are the objects of comparison by the apostle; it is the *παράκοή* or *παράπτωμα* and *κατάκριμα* of Adam, which are compared with the *ὑπακοή* and *δικαίωμα* of Christ.

We have seen what points do *not* belong to the *τύπος*: let us now inquire what does belong to it.

II. The actual and principal point of similitude is, that each individual respectively, viz. Adam and Christ, was the cause or occasion, in consequence of what he did, of greatly affecting the whole human race; although in an opposite way. Adam introduced sin and misery into the world; and in consequence of this, all men are, even without their own concurrence, subjected to many evils here; they are born in a condition in which they are entirely destitute of holy affections, and which renders it certain that they will sin, and will always sin in all their acts of a moral nature, until their hearts are renewed by the Spirit of God; and of course, all men are born in a condition in which they are greatly exposed to the second death or death in the highest sense of the term; and in which this death will certainly come upon them, without the interposition of mercy through Christ. On the other hand; Christ introduced righteousness or justification, and all the blessings spiritual and temporal, which are connected with a probationary state under a dispensation of grace, and with the pardoning mercy of God. A multitude of blessings, such as the day and means of grace, the common bounties of Providence, the forbearance of God to punish, the calls and warnings of mercy, the proffers of pardon, etc., are procured by Christ for all men without exception, and without any act of concurrence on their part; while the higher blessings of grace, actual pardon and everlasting life, although proffered to all, are actually bestowed only upon those who repent and believe.

In this way we see, quite plainly, that Adam was a *τύπος* of Christ; because what he did affected the whole of the human race, to a certain extent, even without any concurrence or act of their own; and also exposed them to imminent hazard of everlasting death. As the antithesis of this, Christ procures blessings for all the human race, to a certain extent, even without any concurrence or act of their own; and he has also procured by his blood, and proffers fully and freely to all, eternal redemption from the higher evils which the divine law would inflict upon sinners. The *extent* of the influence of Adam, is a proper *τύπος* of that of Christ. Each of these, by what he did, affected our whole race, without any concurrence of theirs, to a certain extent: the one has placed them in a condition, in which, by their own voluntary acts, they are peculiarly exposed to the most awful of all evils; the other has enabled them to secure the greatest of all blessings. Here then is clearly and plainly antithetic *τύπος*.

The *superabounding* of gospel grace, which is insisted on so emphatically in vs. 15—17, consists, (as is stated in v. 16), in the simple fact, that the death of Christ procures pardon for the numerous offences which we commit (*πόλλων παραπτωμάτων*), i. e. the effects of the death

of Christ have respect to unnumbered offences; while the effects of Adam's sin have respect only to one offence, viz. that of eating the forbidden fruit. In other words; the death of Christ, as a remedy, is far more powerful and efficacious, than the sin of Adam was, as a means of corruption and misery.

For the considerations which may serve to explain and confirm the views here given of *τύπος*, I must refer the reader to Excursus IV., at the close of this volume.

I have one more remark to make, on the phrase *ὅς ἐστι τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος* which is, that Calvin and Tholuck regard the expression as the *apodosis* of v. 12. Calvin: "Hæc particula posita est vice alterius membri . . . perinde ergo accipias ac si scriptum esset: Sicut per unum hominem intravit peccatum in universum mundum, et per peccatum mors; ita per unum hominem rediit justitia, et per justitiam vita." To the same purpose, Tholuck in his Commentary. And indeed, it cannot be denied that there is some ground for this. The apostle had said, that sin and death entered the world by Adam; he now says, that Adam is a *τύπος* of Christ, (an antithetic *τύπος* is of course meant); by which must be signified, that Christ is in like manner the author of justification and happiness. This of course contains virtually, and by way of implication, what is contained in the *apodosis* which is fully and formally expressed in vs. 18, 19.

CHAP. V. 15—17.

The general object of these verses is plain and simple; and this is, to guard the reader against mistake as to the meaning of the writer, when he asserts that Adam is a *type* of Christ. Certainly it is very easy to carry the meaning of the word *τύπος* too far; and that most readers are prone to do so, scarcely needs to be mentioned. In order then to guard against so doing, on the present occasion, the apostle proceeds, in vs. 15—17, distinctly to name or point out some important things, in regard to which *similitude* (*τύπος*) cannot be asserted, between the first Adam and the second. In particular, the *degree* of evil occasioned by Adam's transgression, is not to be compared with the *degree* of good accomplished by Christ. Accordingly v. 15 asserts, that as 'the many were brought under sentence of death by the offence of Adam; so may we well conclude it to be plainer still, that the grace of God, through Christ, would abound to the many.' V. 16 repeats the same sentiment, but in a more specific manner: viz. 'the condemnation which comes upon us through Adam, has respect only to *one* offence; while the justification effected by Christ, has respect to *many* offences.' V. 17 repeats the general sentiment of both the preceding verses, and adds the declaration, that as the offence of Adam caused death to reign over men, so the pardoning mercy and grace of the gospel will not only deliver us from punishment, but advance us to a state of eternal happiness and glory. This last verse, then, is plainly a climax, in relation to the two which precede it. All three verses exhibit the same general sentiment; but each one also exhibits a specific difference from the others.

Such is the *dissimilitude*, then, between the case of Adam and that of Christ. Consequently we must exclude the particulars named by the apostle, from the idea which we attach to *τύπος* on the present occasion. How often the *οὐχ ὡς* here has been forgotten, in the parallels which have been drawn between the first and the second Adam, no one who has read theology extensively needs to be informed. It may be further remarked, that the sentiment, which attributes to the grace of Christ *good* which is *far greater* than the evil occasioned by Adam's offence, lies upon the very face of vs. 15—17, and should never be overlooked. What we should be in ourselves, as the fall of Adam has left us, is one thing; what our condition now is, through the grace of Christ, is another and very different one. When we maintain, then, that our present state, depraved and ruined as in itself it is, is *more eligible as to securing our final salvation*, than that of Adam while on his first probation, let it not be said that we deny or extenuate the evil consequences of the fall. By no means. But let this be said, viz. that, after the example of Paul, we represent grace as *superabounding* over all the evils introduced by the apostasy. And is not this true? yea, is it not strongly and repeatedly asserted in the chapter before us?

(15) *Παράπτωμα*, *offence, fall*, viz. the *first sin* of Adam. That only *one* sin, and this altogether peculiar as to its effects, is here taken into view by the apostle, seems clear from vs. 16, 17, 18.—*Χάρισμα*, *favour, benefit, good bestowed on us, or done for us*.

Εἰ γὰρ, *for if*, does not imply *uncertainty* here, but *concession*. The shape of the argument stands thus: 'Granting (as we must do) that the many [all] die [come under sentence of death] through Adam or by means of him; much more must we allow,' etc. *Γὰρ* is here obviously *γὰρ confirmantis*.—*Ἐνός* refers of course to *Ἀδάμ*.

Οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον, *the many died*, i. e. all men came under sentence of death. *Πολλοί* here is exchanged in v. 18 for *πάντας ἀνθρώπους*, which is doubtless the meaning of *πολλοί*. The reason why the apostle employs this word seems plainly to be, because he had just said *τοῦ ἑνός*, of which *οἱ πολλοί* is the direct antithesis, and as such would designate all men in distinction from Adam. In regard to *ἀπέθανον*, I must refer the reader to what is said on *θάνατος* under v. 12. I would merely remark, that if *θάνατος* means, as I have there stated it to mean, *evil of any kind*, in this world and in the next, then it is true that Adam did by his offence cause *θάνατος* to come on all without exception, inasmuch as all his race are born destitute of holiness, and in such a state that their passions will, whenever they become moral agents, lead them to sin. All too are the heirs of more or less suffering. It is true, then, that *all* suffer on Adam's account; that all are brought under more or less of the sentence of death; that *οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον*· but it need not, as I have already endeavoured to shew above, be maintained that all without distinction, and without any voluntary act of their own, are equally exposed to *θάνατος* in its fullest, highest, and most awful sense.

This I regard as no more true, than that all men partake of the *χάρισμα* of Christ in its highest sense, without any act of their own, i. e. without repentance and faith. To say that *οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον διὰ Ἀδάμ*, is not to say that all have the sentence *executed* on them in its highest sense (which is contradicted by fact); but it is to say, that in some respect or other, all are involved in it; that as to more or less of it, all are subjected to it; and that all are *exposed* to the whole of the evil which death includes. In what sense all this is true, we have already seen. In like manner, all receive some important benefits from Christ, even without any concurrence of their own; and the most important favours are proffered to every individual; but still these can be actually possessed only by penitence and faith.

In a word, it appears to be the design of the apostle to say, that all the human race without exception are involved, by the offence of Adam, in more or less of *evil*, i. e. in *θάνατος* of some kind or other; and as the antithetic *τύπος* of this, to affirm that all without exception partake of blessings which Christ has procured. Here then is one essential point of *τύπος*. Now as to the detail; it certainly is not necessary to suppose, that those who never had any knowledge of duty, and never arrived at a state in which they were capable of moral agency; in a word, that infants and idiots—are liable to the same *θάνατος* in *all* respects, as those who have *πολλὰ παραπτώματα* (v. 16) of their own to answer for. It is enough for the apostle's purpose, that all, even without any act or concurrence of their own, do in some degree partake both of the evil and the good, although the good *ἐπερίσσευσε*: while all, by their own acts, may be exposed to *θάνατος* in its ultimate and highest sense on the one hand, and may by penitence and faith obtain *ζωή* in its highest sense on the other.

Πολλῷ μᾶλλον, *much more*; in sense just what the old logicians call an *a fortiori* in argument.—*Ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἡ δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι*, *the grace of God and the gift which is by grace*, may be regarded as a Hendiadys, meaning *the gracious gift of God*, viz. that which the gospel proffers, or the blessings which Christ has procured. If the reader prefers a different interpretation, and construes each separately, then *χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ* should be regarded as designating the gracious purpose of God, and *ἡ δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι* the actual execution of this purpose. There can be no important objection urged against this method of interpretation. I prefer the other, however, as the more simple and easy.

Τῆ τοῦ ἐνός . . . Χριστοῦ, *which is of one man Jesus Christ*.

Τῆ has *χάριτι* for its antecedent. The Genitive *τοῦ ἐνὸς κ. τ. λ.* may be construed in different ways. If it be taken as Gen. *objecti*, then it will mark the favour bestowed on Christ, i. e. of which he was the recipient; which does not seem here to be the object of assertion. If it be construed as Gen. *auctoris*, then it will designate the grace of which Christ is the cause or author. But as Paul had just said *χάρις θεοῦ*, denoting *θεός* as the author, so it is more probable that *τοῦ ἐνὸς κ. τ. λ.* is Gen. *instrumenti vel modi*, i. e. it signifies here, that the blessings bestowed upon men, come by or through Christ, by his means or his agency. So Erasmus and Tholuck; and this sense seems best to fit the passage.

Εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπερίσσευσε, hath abounded toward the many. *Τοὺς πολλοὺς* is, of course, of a different meaning from *πολλούς*: just as *οἱ πολλοί*, in the preceding clause, differs from *πολλοί*. The latter would signify *many* in distinction from a few; but *οἱ πολλοί* signifies *the many*, i. e. the mass of men, as we say in English; or in German, *die Gesammtheit der Menschen*; in Hebrew, *רַב־לְבָבִים*. Rightly has Augustine said (on v. 19): *Ἀμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν οἱ πολλοί*, *multi constituti sunt peccatores*, i. e. *omnes*, qui revera sunt *multi*. So in v. 18, the synonyme is *πάντας ἀνθρώπους*.

The reader will observe, that the statement made in this verse is simple declaration; a declaration, however, in which the appeal is tacitly made to that sense of the divine goodness, which, the apostle seems to have taken for granted, dwelt in the breast of all his readers. 'If it be true,' says he, 'that the sin of Adam occasioned so much evil; then surely we may regard it as true, that the goodness of God has abounded so as to counterbalance it.' He needed no argument to make his readers inclined to receive this.

As to the question, how much *ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ* and *ἡ δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι* here mean, and how these are bestowed on all men, I must refer the reader to what is said above, and in Excursus IV. Let us count in what manner we please, and, if we make a right estimate, the blessings of the gospel more than counterbalance the mischiefs of the fall; and this is true, even when we take into view the full extent of those mischiefs. *How* this can be, I have already attempted to explain, in the places to which I have just referred.

(16) *Καί, imo, immo, yea. Καί confirmantis*, but with the repetition of the preceding idea. It is obvious, indeed, that v. 16 repeats the first proposition in v. 15, and then adds an explanation, or rather, a confirmation of it. It is constructed in the same manner; inasmuch

as it begins with the general assertion of *dissimilarity* (οὐχ ὡς), and then continues with a γὰρ *explicative*, as before. After οὐχ ὡς, κρίμα should be mentally inserted in order to fill out the ellipsis; as is clear from the next clause, viz. τὸ μὲν γὰρ κρίμα. Comp. οὐχ ὡς τὸ παράπτωμα, in v. 15.

Ἄμαρτήσαντος. Several important Codices, viz. D. E. F. G.; also the Syriac, Vulgate, and old Latin versions; read ἄμαρτήματος. But the present reading has, on the whole, the weight of evidence in its favour; and it is attended with no serious difficulty. One need only insert κρίμα after ὡς, and the comparison is obvious; and that this should be done, is plain, as has already been hinted, from the clause immediately following, viz. τὸ μὲν γὰρ κρίμα κ. τ. λ. The whole would then read thus: 'Yea, [the sentence] by one who sinned, is not like the free gift; for the sentence by reason of *one* [offence] was unto condemnation [was a condemning sentence]; but the free gift [pardon] is of *many* offences, unto justification, i. e. is a sentence of acquittal from condemnation.'

Τὸ μὲν γὰρ κρίμα ἐξ ἑνός, i. e. ἐξ ἑνός [παραπτώματος]; for the antithesis, χάρισμα ἐκ πολλῶν παραπτωμάτων, shews, very clearly, that παραπτώματος is to be supplied after ἑνός.

Δώρημα and δικαίωμα differ not at all in sense here. It appears to be merely variety of expression which is sought for in the use of them, but not a difference in the meaning or idea.

The verse thus interpreted, shews the ground of the *περισσεία*, *the abounding* of the grace of the gospel, over the κρίμα or κατὰκριμα occasioned by the sin of Adam. This *abounding* was asserted in v. 15, but not particularly explained. *Here* it is explained. Whatever were the evils occasioned to the posterity of Adam, by his fall, they were only such as *one* offence occasioned. But, on the other hand, the blessings procured by Christ, are not merely commensurate with these evils; they extend not only to counterbalancing the consequences of the fall; but also to the removing of the consequences of the πολλά παραπτώματα of men.

I cannot agree with Süsskind, who (*Magazin der Dogmatik und Moral*, Th. XIII. p. 86, seq.) supplies ἀνθρώπου after ἑνός here, and refers πολλῶν, not to παραπτωμάτων, but to ἀνθρώπων understood; a violence by which nearly the whole of the antithesis is lost, and which seems to me plainly to force upon the passage a sense not belonging to it. Chrysostom saw the passage in another light; who says: Ἡ δὲ χάρις οὐ τὴν μίαν ἐκείνην ἁμαρτίαν ἀνεῖλη μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς μετ' ἐκείνην εἰσελθώσας.

The *general* object of the verse is sufficiently plain, from the considerations already stated. But there is still some difficulty as to the *detail*. *Κρίμα*, implied after οὐχ ὡς, and expressed in τὸ μὲν γὰρ κρίμα, means *judgment* or *sentence of condemnation*, or *punishment*. So it often means, e. g. Rom. 3: 8. 13: 2. 1 Cor. 11: 29. Gal. 5: 10. 1 Tim. 5: 12, et alibi. It is plainly the opposite of δώρημα, which is only another name for χάρισμα, as the sequel of the verse shews, in which the latter is substituted for the former. Now as δώρημα and χάρισμα both denote *favour, good bestowed* of any kind; so κρίμα (the antithesis) must of course denote the opposite of this, i. e. *evil inflicted, the withholding of good*. As in Hebrew, חַטָּאת means not only *sin*, but the *penal consequences of sin*; so κρίμα means, not only *condemning sentence*, but the *consequences of condemnation*; see the passages referred to above.

But how are we to interpret κρίμα δι' ἐνὸς εἰς κατάκριμα? The very expression shews, that here κρίμα is to be taken as explained above, viz. as meaning the *evil inflicted* by Adam's sin. Now whether this be considered as the loss of the righteousness of man's original state, and the being born in a condition in which it is certain that our passions will get the better of our reason and bring us under condemnation; or whether it be considered as matter of fact, that the sin of Adam occasions all men to be born with a disposition which is in itself positively sinful, and thus necessarily leading to our condemnation; it is still true in either case, that the κρίμα, the *evil inflicted* or *suffered*, is of such a nature as to lead to, or prepare the way for, *κατάκριμα, condemnation*, i. e. θάνατος in its higher and more dreadful sense. Before εἰς κατάκριμα the verb ἐγένετο is of course implied.

But you may ask: Does the κρίμα then lead *all men without exception* to κατάκριμα? All, I reply, who sin; but others, i. e. infants and idiots, are not necessarily involved in this, in its highest and most awful sense, any more than they are in the sentence: "He that believeth not shall be damned." The declaration now in question, does not extend of necessity, (I mean, of course, in its high and full sense), to every individual, any more than the δικαίωμα does, which is mentioned in the last clause of the verse. Some voluntary act on the part of each individual, (as has once and again been already said), is essential either to subject one to the κατάκριμα, or to receive the δικαίωμα, in their *full* sense. If the comparison of the apostle will hold here, (and who will deny that he means to make

the impression that it will?) it can no more be true that the *one sinner* has brought *κατάκριμα* in its highest sense on all men, without any act of their own, than it is true that *δικαίωμα*, in its full sense, is actually conferred by the *one righteous* on all, without any act of their own. But the latter is certainly not true; how then can the former be made out? That the fall of Adam has had an influence on the guilt and condemnation of all who perish, in some way or other; that it is one of the *causes*, in the sense of being an *occasion* of, or being accessory to, a state or condition preparatory to the guilt that brings on *κατάκριμα* in its highest sense, I do most fully believe and freely admit. I see no ground to deny that the apostle had at least so much in view. More than this, his language does not oblige us to admit; and more than this, the nature of his comparisons does not seem to allow. Certainly the analogy of other parts of Scripture speaks for such an interpretation; as we shall see in the sequel. For additional considerations relative to this topic, I must refer the reader to the remarks on v. 19, and to the Excursus which is connected with it.

In regard to *ἐξ ἑνὸς [παραπτώματος]*, Flatt observes, that the mention of *one* offence, viz. the *first* one of Adam, does not exclude the idea that his other and subsequent offences might have contributed to the evils of his posterity, as well as this; "much less," he adds, "can we conclude that this one sin was the *only* cause of corruption." But I cannot accede to this sentiment, in the shape in which it is here stated. It is clear throughout this passage (vs. 12—19), that *τὸ παράπτωμα, ἡ παράβασις, ἡ παρακοή*, all have a specific relation to Adam's *first* sin. Equally clear is it, that 1 Tim. 2: 14. 2 Cor. 11: 3. 1 Cor. 15: 21, 22 favour this opinion. And in the verse before us, *ἐξ ἑνὸς [παραπτώματος]* is plainly and directly opposed to *πολλῶν παραπτωμάτων*. But how could this be, unless Paul considered the *first* offence of Adam, and (I may say) this only, as having procured the evils which he here contrasts with the blessings bestowed by Christ?

It must indeed be granted, that this was a peculiar dispensation of the Most High, one which displayed his sovereignty in a special manner. But so was the dispensation of grace. It was the act of *obedience unto death*, by which Christ procured *justification* (*δικαίωμα*) for us. All the obedience of his life did indeed contribute to the perfection of his character, and so fitted him to become an acceptable propitiatory sacrifice; but his *obeying to the death of the cross* was

the grand act by which our salvation was ensured; comp. Phil. 2: 8. Matt. 26: 39, 42. John 10: 18. Heb. 10: 7—10. In this respect, therefore, the *obedience* of the one may be compared with the *disobedience* of the other; as it is, indeed, in v. 19.

(17) Thus much, in the preceding verse, with regard to counterbalancing, or rather, hindering or removing, the evils occasioned not only by the sin of Adam, but by all the sins which men have committed^s in their own persons. What is there said, seems to refer simply and only to the hindering or removing of the evils in question. This of itself would merely deliver men from *positive* evil, i. e. from actually 'going down to the pit;' leaving them where they are, without advance to a state of positive happiness and glory. But such is not the work of Christ. The apostle had already intimated, in vs. 8—10 of the present chapter, that the Saviour does not begin his work and leave it half completed; and in accordance with this sentiment Paul now goes on to state, that in addition to saving men from the penalty of their many offences (v. 16), i. e. saving them from positive evil, Christ advances them, when thus delivered, to a state of exalted happiness and glory.

Ἐὶ γὰρ . . . διὰ τοῦ ἑνός, for if by the offence of one, death reigned by means of one. The *γὰρ* here is *γὰρ illustrantis*, in the same manner as it is in the beginning of v. 16; for v. 17 is (in respect to *sense*, not form) co-ordinate with v. 16, both being parts of an illustration or confirmation of the declaration made in v. 15. V. 16 declares that Christ saves men from the punishment of their many offences; v. 17, that he actually advances them to glory.—*Ἐνός* in both cases means, *τοῦ ἑνός* [ἀνθρώπου.] The *reign* of death is here the same thing as in v. 14, i. e. *ἐβασίλευσε* means, *was predominant, exercised an uncontrolled power*. In what sense death affected all, has already been explained, once and again.

Πολλῶ . . . Χριστοῦ, much more shall they who receive abundance of grace and of the gift of justification, reign in life through one, Jesus Christ. *Περισσεΐαν τῆς χάριτος καὶ τῆς δωρεᾶς τῆς δικαιοσύνης*, refers to the *χάρις* and *δωρεά* already mentioned in v. 15. Tholuck refers *δικαιοσύνη* here to internal sanctification, or to the life of God in the soul of man, i. e. subjective holiness. But it seems to me quite clear, that *δικαιοσύνη* conveys the same meaning here, as *δικαιωθέντες* in vs. 1, 9. Certainly this makes the best antithesis to the state of condemnation, designated by *ὁ θάνατος ἐβασίλευσε* in the preceding clause. In case we construe *δικαιοσύ-*

νης as I have proposed above, the sentiment runs thus: 'For if all are in a state of condemnation by reason of the offence of one, much more shall those toward whom abundance of mercy and pardoning grace are shewn, be redeemed from condemnation, and advanced to a state of happiness.' But suppose, instead of inserting this latter clause, we should say: 'Much more shall they who receive grace and are sanctified, be saved, etc.?' would the antithesis be equally forcible, or the congruity of the sentiment equally striking? A negative answer seems to me unavoidable; and of course I cannot accede to the exegesis of Tholuck; especially when I compare the sentiment in v. 16, τὸ δὲ χάρισμα . . . εἰς δικαίωμα.

Βασιλεύσουσι ἐν ζωῇ, shall reign in life, i. e. shall be elevated to an exalted and glorious state of happiness. That ζωή is the common word to indicate *happiness*, needs not to be here proved. That *to reign* means *to be exalted to an elevated and glorious condition*, the reader may see by comparing Rev. 2: 26, 27. 3: 21. Matt. 19: 28. Luke 22: 30. 1 Cor. 6: 2. 2 Tim. 2: 11, 12. Rev. 20: 4. Dan. 7: 22. Ps. 49: 14. Ex. 19: 6, comp. 1 Pet. 2: 9.

Flatt, in his Commentary, represents v. 17 as an advance upon the sentiment in v. 16, after the same manner (for substance) that I have done. This interpretation seems to me to fall in with the natural progress of thought in the apostle's mind; for the first thing, in contemplating the remedy for the miseries which followed in the train of Adam's transgression, would naturally be, deliverance from positive evil or suffering. But this would not complete the idea of περισσειά, the *abounding* of gospel grace. The *reigning in life* was essential to the full completion of this; and this v. 17 exhibits.

CHAP. V. 18, 19.

We have already seen, that v. 12 contains a *protasis* without a corresponding *apodosis*. We have also seen, that ὅς ἐστι τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος (v. 14) comprises in substance, but still in the way of hint and not formally, a kind of *apodosis*. No sooner was τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος uttered by the apostle, than his mind was turned to the comparison itself thus proposed, instead of going on to complete his *apodosis*; and he plainly seems to have felt it to be important, to guard his readers against misconstruing τύπος, or carrying the resemblance indicated by it too far. Accordingly he does this, as we have also seen, in vs. 15—17; which exhibit the *epanorthosis* (ἐπανόρθωσις) in question; for so grammarians call that form of speech which is designed to guard against mistakes. This being completed, he now proceeds fully to exhibit his *apodosis* in vs. 18, 19, which we are next to consider.

(18) "Ἄρα οὖν . . . κατάκριμα, *wherefore, as by the offence of one, [sentence] came upon all men unto condemnation.* "Ἄρα and ἄρα οὖν are commonly *illative*, according to New Testament usage; e. g. Matt. 7: 20. Gal. 4: 31. Rom. 7: 3, 25. 8: 12. 9: 16, 18. 14: 12, 19, et alibi. Nor does this make any serious difficulty here. The apostle had already averred, that Adam was τύπος τοῦ μελλόντος. He had already shewn, that the mischiefs resulting to our race from the fall of Adam, were more than repaired by the grace of Christ. "Ἄρα οὖν, then, would by no means be inapposite. It is as much as to say: 'Matters being as I have already declared, it follows or results from them, that the comparison begun in v. 12 will hold, viz. that as all have been introduced to sin and death by Adam, so righteousness and life are provided for all by Christ.' While ἄρα οὖν may be admitted, then, (as Tholuck urges), to be *illative*, it does not hinder it from standing at the head of a sentence, which is properly a resumption of what had been said in v. 12.

That δι' ἐνὸς παραπτώματος means *by the offence of one*, is evident from the antithesis, δι' ἐνὸς δικαιώματος, which naturally cannot mean any thing but *the righteousness of one*, (not *one righteousness*). That κρίμα is implied after παραπτώματος, is suggested by Calvin, and is clear from the manifestly elliptical condition of the sentence as it now stands, as well as from a comparison of it with the middle clause in v. 16.

In regard to the manner or extent of the κρίμα εἰς κατάκριμα, see the notes on v. 16.

Οὕτω καὶ . . . ζωῆς, so [the free gift] *came upon all men unto justification of life.* That χάρισμα is here to be supplied, is manifest from the nature of the case, from the elliptical state of the phrase, and from a comparison with the latter clause of v. 16. Οὕτω καί, here, is the genuine mark of the *apodosis*, which stands in antithesis both to v. 12; and to the first clause in the present verse, which is merely a resumption or repetition in substance of that verse.—Δικαιώματος being here the antithesis of παραπτώματος, must be explained as meaning *obedience, holiness, righteousness* = ὑπακοή in v. 19.

Εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους, *unto all men.* Let us hear Calvin: "Communem omnium gratiam facit, quia omnibus exposita est, non quod ad omnes extendatur re ipsâ: Nam etsi passus est Christus PRO PECCATIS TOTIUS MUNDI, atque OMNIBUS INDIFFERENTER Dei benig-nitate offertur; non tamen omnes apprehendunt." So do such men speak, when they look away from system, and have thoroughly studied

the Scriptures, as Calvin had done when he wrote this. In his early work entitled *Institutiones*, he has sometimes exhibited sentiments which appear to differ from these. I only add, that no words can more exactly express what I suppose the apostle to mean, than those of Calvin.

Δικαίωσιν ζωῆς, *justification of life*, means that justification which is connected with eternal life or happiness. So Calvin; and so the nature of the case requires. It is plain that *δικαίωμα* in v. 16, *δικαιοσύνη* in v. 17, and *δικαίωσις* here, are all used in the same sense; as indeed they all may be, consistently with their form and etymology. These different words seem to be chosen by the writer, purposely for the sake of avoiding uniformity of diction.

(19) The first impression on reading this verse is, that it is merely a repetition of the sentiment in v. 18. But, as Calvin remarks: *Non est tautologia, sed necessaria proximæ sententiæ declaratio; i. e.* it is not tautology, but a necessary explanation of the preceding verse. In v. 18 the apostle simply says, that [sentence] *came upon all men to condemnation*; WHY, he does not there say. In v. 19 he gives the ground or reason of this, viz. that "all men were constituted sinners by the disobedience of Adam." And so, *mutatis mutandis*, in respect to justification.

That *παρακοή* here, is the same as *παράβασις* in v. 14, and *παράπτωμα* in vs. 15, 17, 18, needs hardly to be mentioned. But in this case, as there in respect to *παράβασις* and *παράπτωμα*, reference is not made to other offences of Adam besides the first, but specifically to the first, and to that only. See on v. 16 above. In other words; it is not the *παρακοή* of Adam's whole life, to which the apostle refers, but the *first* act only of his disobedience.

Ἀμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν οἱ πολλοί, *the many were constituted sinners, or became sinners*. *Καθίστημι* means, in the active voice, *to appoint, constitute, make, cause, to put* one in any place or office, *to set* him in any place, etc. In the passive and middle voices, (for *κατεστάθησαν* may belong to either, inasmuch as the first Aorist pass. is frequently employed in the sense of the middle voice), *κατεστάθησαν* may mean, *were constituted, or became*; comp. James 4: 4, where *καθίσταται* denotes *becoming* an *ἐχθρὸς θεοῦ* by one's own act, i. e. by being a friend of the world. And so in 3 Macc. 3: 5, 'the Jews *καθειστήκεισαν* [*became*] *εὐδόκιμοι*,' by their own voluntary doing of justice, as the first part of the verse asserts. In like manner here, no necessity is laid upon us, by the use of the word

κατεστιάθησαν, of understanding the apostle to assert that men *involuntarily*, or without the concurrence of their own free will, become sinners. Surely men may become sinners in consequence of the act of another, and yet be altogether voluntary in becoming so; as is clear from the fact, that men every day yield to temptations offered by others to commit sin, and yet are altogether voluntary in thus yielding. Nothing then can be drawn merely from the use of the word κατεστιάθησαν, to shew that here the doctrine of imputation, in the strict and proper sense of this word, is taught.

‘But if this doctrine does not lie in the word κατεστιάθησαν alone, does it not lie in this word joined with διὰ τῆς παρακοῆς τοῦ ἐνός? How can men *become sinners διὰ τῆς παρακοῆς τοῦ ἐνός*, and be themselves proper agents in their own sinfulness?’

Bretschneider, in commenting on this passage, has remarked (Dogmatik p. 53), that the apostle, throughout vs. 12—19, has used διὰ with the *Genitive* after it; in which case, he says, it designates not the *efficient* cause, but only the *means* or *occasion* of a thing; and this he states as a *principle* in regard to the preposition διὰ. He adds, moreover, that διὰ should have been followed by the *Accusative* case, if the writer had meant to designate the *efficient* cause.

I can hardly see how a writer of such distinguished acuteness as Bretschneider, and the author of an excellent lexicon of the New Testament, should have let such a remark as this escape him. That διὰ before the *Genitive* often marks the *efficient* cause, the reader may see in John 1: 3. Rom. 11: 36. John 3: 17. Rom. 1: 5. 1 Cor. 1: 9. Gal. 1: 1. 2 Thess. 2: 2. Heb. 1: 3, δι’ ἐαυτοῦ. That it signifies the *efficient* cause any oftener or more naturally, when followed by the *Accusative*, has, I am fully persuaded, no foundation in point of fact. It can be made altogether clear, that διὰ before either *Genitive* or *Accusative*, in the New Testament, and also in classical writers, may mean, and does mean, both the *efficient* and *instrumental* or *occasional* cause.

But although there is no just ground for the remark of Bretschneider, yet the fact that διὰ may mark either the *principal* cause, or merely the *occasional* one, shews that we cannot here lay any stress on the preposition itself as determining either for or against the usual idea of imputation, in the verse before us.

We must come then, in the next place, to the examination of the *general nature of the whole phrase*, in order to get the satisfaction which is required. And if now “the many became sinners *by the*

disobedience of Adam," must it not follow that his sin is imputed to them, i. e. reckoned as theirs?

In reply I would ask: Why should this be a necessary consequence of admitting the apostle's assertion? If a writer should say, that millions in Europe have become or been constituted profligates, by Voltaire; would the necessary meaning be, that the sin of Voltaire was put to their account? Certainly not; it would be enough to say, in order fully to explain and justify such an expression, that Voltaire had been an *instrument*, a *means* or *occasion* of their profligacy. The *sin itself of profligacy* is, after all, entirely *their own*. There is no room for mistake, in such a case as this.

But I will select a case more directly in point still; one taken from the very epistle under consideration, and which therefore must serve to cast direct light upon the *usus loquendi* of Paul. In Rom. 7: 5, this apostle says, τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν, τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου, *our sinful passions which were by the law*. Again, in v. 7 he says: "I had not known sin, except διὰ νόμου." Again, in v. 8: "Sin taking occasion, διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς wrought in me all manner of concupiscence;" and so again in v. 11. Suppose now, that one should undertake to prove from these passages, that *the law* or *the commandment* (which is the same thing) is the *efficient* cause of all sin; what would be the reply? It would be, that the law, by the restraints and prohibitions which it imposes on the sinner, becomes the *innocent* occasion of exciting the sinner's passions and opposition to what is enjoined. These passions would have lain comparatively dormant, had they not been roused by opposition and restraint. It is thus that our "sinful passions are *by* the law." But is the law the *efficient* cause of our sinful passions? Or is there evil in the law, which evil is put to our account, i. e. merely imputed to us? The answer to this is, that "the law is holy, and just, and good." Διὰ then does mark some other cause besides an *efficient* one; for surely the law is not the efficient cause of sin. Nay, we see by the instance just produced, that our *sinful passions* may be said to be διὰ τοῦ νόμου, and yet that the law itself is altogether "holy and just and good." It may surely then be said, that 'men become sinners *by* or *through* the disobedience of Adam, without meaning by this, that his own personal sin is ours, or that his personal guilt is imputed to us. If the apostle had said simply: Διὰ Ἀδάμ ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν οἱ πολλοί, we could not have determined merely from this, even whether Adam was the guilty or innocent occasion of our becoming

sinner, (for surely the law, as above, was an *innocent* occasion); it is only from the *ἁμαρτία, παράβασις, παράπτωμα,* and *παρακοή* which are attributed to Adam, and from the history of his fall, that we know him to have been the *guilty* occasion of bringing evils on his posterity.

It were easy to produce many other cases of *διά*, applied in the like way as in Rom. vii.; but I deem it superfluous. It is impossible, then, that any legitimate conclusions in favour of imputation in its strict sense, can be made out either from the particular words or the general phraseology of v. 19.

We must, then, examine *the nature of the case*. What is it? It is (according to the *common* theory of imputation), that the sin of one man is charged upon all his posterity, who are condemned to everlasting death because of it, antecedent to, and independently of any voluntary emotion or action on their part. But this idea seems to be attended with some serious difficulties; for, (a) It appears to contradict the essential principles of our moral consciousness. We never did, and we never can, feel guilty of another's act, which was done without any knowledge or concurrence of our own. We may just as well say, that we can appropriate to ourselves and make our own, the righteousness of another, as his unrighteousness. But we can never, in either case, even force ourselves into a consciousness that any act is really our own, except one in which we have had a personal and voluntary concern. A transfer of moral turpitude is just as impossible as a transfer of souls; nor does it lie within the boundaries of human effort, that we should repent of Adam's sin. We may be filled, and we should be filled, with deep abasement on account of our degraded and fallen nature; but to repent, in the strict sense of this word, of another's personal act, is plainly an utter impossibility.

(b) Such an imputation as that in question, would be in direct opposition to the first principles of moral justice, as conceived of by us, or as represented in the Bible. That "the son shall not die for the iniquity of the father," is as true as that "the father shall not die for the iniquity of the son;" as God has most fully declared in Ezek. xviii. I am aware that Pres. Edwards (Orig. Sin) has endeavoured to avoid the force of the declarations in this deeply interesting chapter, by averring, that "the thing *denied*, is communion in the guilt and punishment of the sins of others, that are distinct parts of Adam's race, i. e. who are different individuals," p. 338. The same writer has laboured at length to prove the actual physical or metaphysical (I hardly know which to name it) *unity* of all our race with Adam. According to him, then, we are all *one* in Adam and with him. How then can we all be *separate* and *distinct* from each other? Are we any more separate from each other, than we are from our first parents? Pres. Edwards and many others have often and at length represented our connection with Adam, by the figure of a tree and its branches. Conceding this for the present, we

may ask, whether the topmost branch is not more nearly and intimately connected with the one next below it, than it is with the root; and whether it receives the laws of its nature any more from the root, than it does from the branch immediately next to it? Then we may ask again, whether any law exists between the branches as they have respect to each other, that is fundamentally different from, and opposite to, that law by which they are all connected with the root? Can the *root* communicate that to the topmost branch, which does not come through the next branch below the topmost, and conform to the laws of its nature? Or has the root some other mode of communication with the topmost branch, independently of that through the next intermediate one, and in conformity with the laws of its nature?

But I must desist from urging questions. I can only say, that my limits, and the nature of my present undertaking, allow me to do no more than to give mere hints; and these, only in respect to a small part of the subject. I make the appeal, however, to all who have not a point to carry, and ask, for I feel constrained to ask: Would such an exegesis of the prophet Ezekiel have ever been produced, except for the sake of avoiding the force of a consideration, which at least seems to overturn the doctrine of imputation in its rigid sense? I add only, that the whole doctrine of moral retribution, as built on the principles of moral justice, appears, at the very first view of it which is taken by our conscience and our sense of right and wrong, to be consentaneous with the principles laid down in Ezek. xviii; and the representations of moral retribution in the Scriptures surely accord with the views of that chapter.

‘But still you admit, that the whole human race became degenerate and degraded, in consequence of the act of Adam.’

I do so; I fully believe it. I reject all the attempts to explain away this. (See in Excursus V.) I go further: I admit not only the loss of an original state of righteousness to all, in consequence of Adam’s first sin, but that temporal evils and death have come of course on all by means of it. I admit that all are born in such a state, that it is now certain they will be sinners as soon as they are moral agents, and that they will never be holy until they are regenerated; consequently I must admit, that all have come into imminent hazard of everlasting death, by means of Adam’s first offence. But it does not follow, that the evils of the present life, (which, I admit, in and by themselves considered, may be truly regarded as a part of the penalty threatened to Adam), may not still, through “superabounding grace,” be converted even into instruments of good, with regard to the discipline of the penitent in this fallen state. “We know that all things will work together for good to those who love God.” If infants are saved, (as I do hope and trust they are), all the evils which they now suffer in this world, may be made, by a wise and holy Providence, to contribute to their eternal good. In what way, I pretend not to determine. If they are in fact saved, this fact of itself will render it certain, that their sufferings will be made to contribute to their eternal good; for so much we are taught, and so much therefore we know from the assurances of the

Scriptures. It does not follow, then, because a part, a very small part, of the penalty of the law is inflicted on all our race without exception, and only such a part as is capable of becoming the means of good, (so the "superabounding" and wonderful grace of the gospel has ordered it), that it can be proved from such infliction, that all are the heirs of *eternal* damnation, whether guilty or not of voluntary sins. It does not follow, because we are born destitute of those holy inclinations which Adam had in his original state, that we are born with a *positive infusion* of evil inclinations into our nature. (See Edwards on Orig. Sin, Part IV. chap. 2, who strongly asserts here the same sentiment). It does not follow, because it is certain that all who come to be moral agents, will sin and will not do any thing which is holy until they are regenerated, that when men do sin, they do not sin of their own free will and choice and without any compulsion or necessity. It was just as certain before Adam and the fallen angels first sinned, that they would sin, as it is now that they did sin. Yet they sinned freely. Certainty, in the view of God or in the nature of things, as to a future event, does not diminish at all from the possibility that it should be altogether voluntary and of free choice. It does not follow, then, from the entire certainty that all Adam's race in their present fallen condition will sin so soon as they are capable of sinning, and thus bring on themselves the sentence of death in its fullest sense, that *his* sin is strictly and fully imputed to them.

I might go further. Pres. Edwards and others have vehemently urged the *universality* of sin, as a proof that our nature has inherited a *positive* infusion of corruption from Adam; and he insists on this at great length, in the first part of his Treatise on Original Sin, as an unanswerable argument. But I find great difficulty in admitting the *force* of the argument. Just so far as the human race have had any trial in a pure and holy state, just so far the consequence was a *universal* falling from that state. Pres. Edwards himself has taken great pains, in another part of his book, to shew that we had a more favourable trial in the person of Adam, than we should have had *in propria personâ*. Of course, then, he must admit that we *all* should have fallen, had we, like Adam, been placed in a state of holiness. The corruption, therefore, by his own arguments, would have been *just as universal as it now is*, if all men had been placed on trial in a state of innocence. How then can the *universality* of corruption prove that men have now a *positively depraved* nature which has been *inherited* from Adam?

I might even go farther still, and aver, that if the argument from the *universality* of corruption be a valid one to prove our native and *positive* depravity; the same argument will prove, that men would have been greater sinners if they had been born in a holy state, than they now are. For as *all* of mankind who were placed on trial in a state of holiness did fall; and as by the statement of Pres. Edwards himself, it must be admitted that all their posterity would have fallen, in the like condition; and as it is clear, that when beings in a holy state sin and fall, they are preeminently guilty; so, for aught that I can see, Pres. Edwards himself being judge, the guilt of men would have been just as

universal as it now is, if they had been born holy and placed on trial as Adam was; while the measure of this guilt would of course have been much greater than at present. For why were the fallen angels passed by, without any redemption provided for them, if their sin was not beyond the reach of mercy because of their previous holy state? And why did Adam's first sin produce such tremendous consequences as no other sin among men ever produced, unless its aggravation was exceedingly great, in consequence of his having fallen from a state of holiness? And even at the present time, is it not true that the sins of Christians are, for obvious reasons, more blame-worthy than those of the unregenerate?

But to return; when I say, then, that the whole human race have become *degenerate* and *degraded* by the fall, I mean, that they have lost the righteousness of their original state; that they are subjected to various evils in the present life; that they are in such circumstances, that *they will all sin as soon as they are capable of sinning, and never do any thing holy until they are regenerated*. But in his original state, Adam did neither sin as soon as he was capable of doing it; nor did he fail to live in a manner entirely holy, for some time; how long, the Scriptures have not told us. Here then are *two* things, in which *his* state was exceedingly different from *ours*; and in respect to these two things, it was far superior to ours. This entitles us to say, that our nature is now *degraded* and *degenerate*, in itself considered. As elevated by the grace of God, a different view is presented. But we have been contemplating it now, merely as it is in itself.

I add only, that as "the many" are never "made righteous" without penitence and faith, i. e. without some act which is properly their own, so, by a parity of reason, we must suppose that "the many" are not "constituted sinners," except in the same way.

I see no way, then, either by philology or from the nature of the case, of establishing the doctrine of imputation, in the sense of moral transfer or communication of turpitude, or in the sense of guilt construed as meaning obnoxiousness to punishment in the full and proper sense of the word; at least, no way of proving this from the passage under examination.

In respect to *δικαιοσύνη*, I regard it here as designating peculiarly the obedience of Christ as exhibited in his expiatory sufferings; comp. Phil. 2: 8. Matt. 26: 39, 42. John 10: 18. Heb. 10: 7—10.—*Δίκαιοι κατασταθήσονται οἱ πολλοί*, *many shall be constituted righteous*, i. e. be justified, pardoned, accepted and treated as righteous, shall be subjects of the gospel *δικαιοσύνη* which Christ procures for sinners. Under the gospel this is proffered to all men, as stated by Calvin; see on v. 18. So much is done without any concurrence or voluntary act on the part of the sinner; just as the same sinner is subjected to certain evils on account of Adam's transgression, and without any voluntary act of his own. But whether the sinner shall

obtain the higher ransom thus proffered, or whether he will suffer the second death or higher penalty—*is suspended on his own act*. It remains still true, as it ever has been, that “except we repënt, we shall all perish.” Men do not become *δίκαιοι*, therefore, without some voluntary act of their own. Even so they do not become sinners, without their own concurrence.

For farther considerations respecting this deeply interesting passage of Scripture, the reader is referred to Excursus V.

CHAP. V. 20, 21.

The reader will observe, that in all which the apostle has said in vs. 12—19, respecting the evils occasioned by Adam and the blessings procured by Christ, he has said nothing respecting any good achieved by the Jewish dispensation, as a remedy for these evils. It is very natural to suppose that the Jew, ever jealous for the honour of the Mosaic economy, would feel a strong objection to the representation which the apostle had made; inasmuch as deliverance from evils seems to be wholly attributed by Paul to Christ and his gospel, and nothing of this great work to be attributed to the law. I regard vs. 20, 21, as designed to answer such an objection, which the apostle would very readily anticipate. The substance of the answer may be thus expressed: ‘As to the Mosaic law, it was so far from delivering men from sin and its fearful consequences, that the result of it was just the contrary, viz. the abounding of sin, or at least the more conspicuous and striking exhibition of it. Both of these sentiments, indeed, we may suppose to be included in the assertion made in v. 20. If the reader is surprised at this, or doubts it, let him study attentively Rom. 7: 5—13, where he will find that Paul fully maintains these views, and comments at large upon them. The facts simply considered, are, that the restraints which the law puts upon the evil passions of men, make them more violent in their opposition; the light which the law sheds on the path of duty, makes men the more guilty and inexcusable when they sin; and ‘the holiness, justness, and goodness of the law’ (Rom. 7: 12), renders sin altogether more conspicuous than it otherwise would be, (Rom. 7: 13). In all these respects, then, the entrance of the law was followed by the abounding of sin; and what is said in chap. 7: 5—13 seems to render clear the meaning of the apostle in 5: 20.

Moreover, in vs. 20, 21, the apostle plainly designs to shew, that the gospel, instead of being superseded by the law in any important respect, was rendered (so to speak) the more necessary. The law, instead of diminishing the sins of men, did, on account of their abusing it (Rom. 7: 11), render them more guilty; and consequently it increased their need of a new dispensation of pardoning mercy. And such is the rich provision for mercy under this new dispensation, that not only the sins which men committed before the law of Moses was published, may be forgiven, but even the more aggravated guilt which they incur who sin against the precepts of revelation, may be pardoned. In a word; the law, instead of superseding the gospel, rendered it the more necessary: and the gospel was fully adequate to every case of need, however great this might be; for the sins of men, even of men enlightened by express revelation, great as they are, may now be forgiven by that mercy which abounds through Jesus Christ.

Considered in the point of view now presented, the verses under consideration are pregnant with highly important meaning.

(20) *Nóμος, revelation, the Mosaic law.*—*Παρεισῆλθεν*, either came in unawares (which would make no tolerable sense here); or supervened, came in by way of addition, *præterea introiit* (as Beza translates it); i. e. it supervened upon the state which preceded Moses, when men were living without a revelation. Philo uses the word *παρεισῆλθεν* in the same sense as *εἰσῆλθεν*, (see Bretsch. Lex.); but I regard the second meaning above given to the word, as the best in this passage.

“*Ἰνα* is said by Chrysostom to be *οὐκ αἰτιολογίας ἀλλ’ ἐκβάσεως*, q. d. not *causal*, i. e. not introducing a reason or cause *why* the law came in, but *ekbatic* (*ἐκβατικὸς*), i. e. shewing the effect or consequence; so that we may translate: *The law supervened* so THAT offences abounded. That *Ἰνα* sometimes has an *ekbatic** sense, viz. *so that*, may be seen in Wahl’s Lex. *Ἰνα*, No. 2. See also (on this use of *Ἰνα* which some critics deny) Hoogveen *Doctrina Partic. Græc. voc. Ἰνα* or Schütz’s *Abridgment* of the same work. Comp., as clear cases of such an usage, *Ἰνα* in Luke 9: 45. 11: 50. 14: 10. 16: 9. Gal. 5: 17. John 17: 12; and see Bretschn. Lex. *Ἰνα*, No. 2.

The *telic* sense of *Ἰνα*, however, may be retained in the verse under examination, by construing *πλεονάση*, as we do *ἐπερίσσεισεν* in 3: 2, which there means, *may appear to abound, may exhibit or display its abounding*, (like the Piel and Hiphil conjugations of Hebrew verbs); and to the same effect is *περίσσειύση* used in 2 Cor. 4: 15. In this way the sense will be: ‘The law came in, in order that sin might be abundantly exhibited, or that a full display of sin might be made;’ according with Rom. 7: 13, comp. 7: 5—12. 3: 12. In this way it is construed by Tholuck, Flatt, and others; and it scarcely needs to be said, that the end or design of the law itself was not the *increase* of sin, but the *restraint* of it.

My objection, however, to the explanation of these interpreters, is, that v. 21 evidently demands a sense of *πλεονάση* different from that which they give. If we say: ‘The law entered in order that the odious nature of sin might be more fully and plainly exposed and known;’ then what shall we make of v. 21? It must be this: ‘Where sin was more fully displayed, grace superabounded,’ viz.

* When *Ἰνα* is employed in the sense of *in order that, to the end that, etc.* i. e. when it is *causal*, it is called by the Greeks *τελικός* (from *τέλος*), q. d. *indicative of the end or reason why a thing is, or is done.* When it is used in the sense of *so that*, i. e. used in such a way as to denote the *effect or event* of a thing, it is called *ἐκβατικός*, or in Latin, *effectivum*, i. e. shewing the effect or event of a thing.

above the display. But clearly the apostle means not to say this, (for what can be the meaning of such a declaration?) but that where sin *actually abounded*, there grace *actually superabounded*.

We must return then to the *ekbatic* use of *ἵνα* here, which Chrysostom has proposed. The meaning of the verse may be thus given: 'The Mosaic law which was introduced, instead of diminishing the guilt and sins of men, served only to increase them; for although in itself holy and just and good, yet being abused and resisted by the evil passions of men, it was made the occasion of increasing their guilt, because the light which it shed on them, both aggravated their offences and rendered them more conspicuous.' Chap. 7: 5—13, as before suggested, is a full and satisfactory comment on these sentiments.

Thus understood, it is easy to see, that the apostle has a deep design in saying what he does; viz. it was his purpose not only to convince the Jew, that the Mosaic law afforded him no prospect of deliverance from the power and penalty of sin, but that it had become the occasion of his contracting deeper stains of guilt than he otherwise would have had; and therefore, of plunging him into a more hopeless condition. The necessity of deliverance through the pardoning mercy of the gospel, does, in this way, become truly conspicuous; and the need of its *superabounding* grace is thus placed in a strong light, by the apostle. I observe that Turretin, perceiving the difficulties of other explanations, has for substance adopted the same which I have now given.

(21) *But where sin abounded, grace did superabound*; i. e. the pardoning mercy of the gospel has triumphed even over the sins of the Jews, which were greatly aggravated by reason of the light they enjoyed.

ἵνα ὡσπερ κ. τ. λ., so that as sin reigned by death, i. e. brought sentence of death or condemnation upon all men, in like manner, also, grace might reign by justification unto eternal life, through Christ Jesus our Lord; i. e. grace might reign or have an influence widely extended, in the bestowment of justification or pardoning mercy, which confers eternal life or happiness on all men who will accept it, through Jesus Christ our Lord.—After *δικαιοσύνης* here, one must supply *τῆς οὐσίας* (which is) *εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον*. In this verse, *ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ* is the Dative of *means*, or rather of *manner*; and it stands in antithesis with *διὰ δικαιοσύνης εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον*. Of course *δικαιοσύνης* does not here mean *righteousness* in the sense of holi-

ness or conformity to the divine law, but in the sense of *justification*; exactly as *δικαίωμα*, *δικαιοσύνης*, and *δικαίωσιν*, in vs. 16—18 above. The meaning is, that as sin exercised its sway over men, in occasioning their condemnation (*θάνατον*); so grace, which superabounds, has exercised its sway in procuring a remission of the sentence of condemnation, and bestowing that justification which is connected with eternal life. Turretin makes *δικαιοσύνης* here mean both *justification* and *sanctification*; which is unnecessary, and indeed incapable of being defended. The antithesis of *δικαιοσύνη*, viz. *θάνατος*, does not mean both *sin* and *condemnation* at the same time; of course, then, *δικαιοσύνη* should be interpreted in such a manner, as to have a *single* and not a double sense.

The reader will not fail to remark, also, that as *θάνατος* is the direct antithesis of *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* here, so it must mean more than temporal death merely; nay, more than any limited term of misery in a future world; unless, indeed, it can be shewn that the happiness of the righteous is *limited*. But this none will attempt to shew. How then can the misery of the wicked be shewn to be *temporary*? That *θάνατος* is here employed in the same sense as in vs. 12—19, impresses itself spontaneously on the mind of every reader, not misled by *a priori* reasonings.

It should also be noted, that *ὑπερπερισσευσεν ἡ χάρις* cannot, of course, be applied to the *number* of its subjects here; for how could grace *superabound* as to these, when *all* men were sinners? It plainly has reference, therefore, to *abounding sin* which existed after the law was introduced. What the apostle means to affirm, is, that however much sin was aggravated, under this new order of things, yet such was the greatness of gospel-grace, that it triumphed even over this aggravated guilt. In other words, the salvation of the gospel is so ample, that it may be extended to all men, however depraved and deserving of punishment they may be.

CHAP. VI--VIII.

When the apostle (chap. I—II.) had shewn the guilt of all men, both Jews and Gentiles, and that none could escape the wrath to come, except by the mercy of God through Christ, he represents the Jew as objecting to such a sentiment, on the ground that the fidelity of God, in respect to the promise made to Abraham and *his seed*, would be called in question by it. To this the apostle replies, that no such objection could be made; for God is to be regarded as faithful to his promises, even if all men are thereby convicted of being unfaithful to their engagements. The faithfulness of God is, in fact, the more

conspicuous, when he treats those who have sinned, and who continue impenitent, according to their real desert.

The Jew, however, not satisfied with this, objects that there would in this way be encouragement for men to sin; inasmuch as the divine glory would be the more conspicuous, in consequence of the display of pardoning mercy. But this objection the apostle repels, with strong language of disapprobation, 3: 5—8. He does not, however, proceed to canvass it, because he has other things which he is desirous to say, before he enters particularly into the consideration of such an objection.

These he exhibits in chap. 3: 9—5: 21. After all which he here says, and especially after such an exhibition of *superabounding grace*, as is made in chap. 5: 12—21, it is natural to expect, that the Jew would renew, at least in his own mind, the same objection as before; and this, with more appearance of reason than he then had. Accordingly, we find the apostle representing him as immediately objecting to the views of gospel grace which he had expressed, in the following words: "Shall we continue then in sin, that grace may abound?" Chap. VI. VII. VIII. are designed to canvass the great subject which this objection brings forward, and fully to illustrate it. The course of thought appears to be as follows:

1. The very profession and nature of the Christian religion are directly opposed to continuance in sin; for he who is "baptized into the death of Christ," if sincere in his professions, must renounce sin, and mortify his carnal appetites, 6: 2—11.

2. The remainder of chap. VI. forms a peculiar argument, if I may so call it, with respect to the subject under the apostle's consideration, viz. whether a dispensation of grace allows its subjects to sin. Verses 12, 13 are an *exhortation* to guard against sin; which is occasioned by the preceding considerations that the writer has proffered. But in v. 14, Paul places his subject in a new attitude. He had before shown, that Christianity from its very nature stands opposed to sin, and implies the subduing and mortifying of all evil passions and desires. He now ventures to suggest, not only that there is no good ground for the allegation of the objector, viz. that the doctrine of grace would encourage men to continue in sin, but that this very doctrine furnishes powerful motives, yea more powerful ones than those which a dispensation of law furnishes, to excite men to the practice of holiness. He begins by saying, that 'sin will not have dominion over Christians, for they are not under law, but under grace.' This is as much as to say, that if they were still under the law (in the sense here meant), sin would have dominion over them; but inasmuch as they are under grace, this will not be the case, v. 14. By being *under the law*, he means being subjected to it and devoted to it, in the sense in which the Jews (as *legalists*) were, viz. confidently expecting sanctification from it. *Being under grace* means, being servants of grace, i. e. subject to its influence and obedient to its requisitions. Vs. 16—19 necessarily lead us to such an explanation.

The subject thus introduced is one of vast magnitude and importance. If it be true, that a *system of grace is the only one which now proffers adequate means of sanctification*, as well as pardon, then is the importance of the gospel rendered doubly conspicuous. This is what the apostle intimates in v. 14, and which he goes on through the remainder of chap. VI., and also through chap. VII. VIII., to confirm and illustrate. That this essential circumstance has been so often overlooked by commentators, has been the occasion of much that is irrelevant and unsatisfactory in their remarks upon this passage.

The first illustration of the power of gospel grace to subdue sin, is drawn from the relation which the Christian sustains toward the gospel or *χρίστος*. He has become *the servant of grace*; consequently he must yield it his obedience; and by becoming the servant of grace, he has renounced his subjection to sin; consequently he must act in a manner that accords with the relation which he sustains, i. e. he should live in a holy manner, vs. 16—20. Thus the Christian must be led to act, on the ground that the consequences of obeying sin and of obeying grace are so unspeakably different and important, vs. 21—23.

Thus far the apostle has employed comparison, in order to illustrate and

enforce his sentiment. I mean, that under the figure of Christians being the *servants of grace*, he has signified their obligation to yield obedience. This is laying a good foundation; for obligation to be holy surely lies at the basis of the Christian's duty. In the next place, he brings into view the *consequences* of obedience to sin and holiness. 'Thus much, then, (he would seem to say by all this), belongs to a system of grace; and in respect to obligation and penalty it is in no wise behind a system of law. It holds forth both the obligation to duty, and the encouragement to it; while the awful penalty of the divine law for neglect of it, i. e. for sin, remains in full force under the gospel.'

This, however, is negative argument; if I may so speak. I mean, that it does not *directly* prove what is intimated in v. 14, viz. the superiority of grace to law in influencing us to lead a holy life. But it proves, that even in those respects in which the law might seem to claim a high preeminence, it has none. The gospel confers as high obligation, and threatens as high penalties. In both respects it is opposed to sin; its obligations are directly contrary to sin; its consequences are just the reverse of those which follow sin. In all these respects, then, we may truly affirm of the gospel, as much as could be affirmed of the law.

3. Thus much in order to shew that a system of grace is not behind a system of law, either in regard to obligations or penalties. All this prepares the way to accomplish the subsequent part of the apostle's design; which is, to shew that *the law* (in the sense to which Jewish legalists adhered to it), is *virtually and substantially renounced*, by giving ourselves to Christ in the way of the gospel, 7: 1—4. This is an important point, and a great advance toward the attainment of the apostle's design.

But he does not stop even here. He goes on (7: 5, 6) to assert that the law, instead of being an effectual means of sanctifying men and making them truly holy, is in reality the occasion of their plunging into deeper guilt; while grace produces just the contrary effect. This is the ultimate and highest point at which Paul aims, in order to wean *legalists* from their unwarrantable attachment to the law. That he may fully accomplish his object, he shews, first, how the law, instead of delivering us from sin, is the occasion of our being plunged deeper into it, 7: 7—12. Secondly, he removes the objections which one might naturally raise against the law, on such a ground, 7: 13—25.

4. He next goes on to shew that grace operates upon men in a manner entirely different from that of law, 8: 1—11.

5. In the remainder of chap. VIII., he insists on the duties and privileges that result from such a state of grace.

If the reader will now look back, for a moment, he will see a regular series of thought, all pertaining to the same great subject, from the commencement of chap. VI. to the end of chap. VIII. To the apostle's plan of justification by grace alone, the natural and most formidable objection, at first view, would be, that such a doctrine would lay no restraint upon sin, but rather encourage it. Already had he adverted to this objection, in chap. III. 5—8. But with chap. VI. the formal discussion of the subject which is introduced by it, commences. The simple outlines of the argument and illustration are, (1) The very profession and nature of Christianity imply a renunciation of sin, 6: 1—11. (2) The Gospel lays more effectual constraint upon us to abstain from sin, than the law can do, 6: 14; for (a) By becoming servants of it, we must yield our obedience to it, 6: 16—20. (b) It sets before us the highest possible rewards, and renders them attainable, 6: 21—23. (3) We renounce our *legality*, i. e. our dependence on the law as the effectual means of sanctification, when we become affianced to Christ. We sustain a new relation in consequence of this, and are laid under new obligations, which are of a more forcible nature, 7: 1—4. (4) The law, instead of restraining and subduing our sins, is even the occasion of their being aggravated, of plunging us into deeper condemnation, 7: 5—11; yet this is not chargeable upon the nature of the law, which in itself is holy and just and good, but on our evil passions which abuse it, while our consciences testify to the excellence and purity of the law itself, 7: 12—25. Consequently sanctification, as well as justification, can be expect-

ed not from the law, but only from a dispensation of grace. (5) Such is the actual effect of grace; it subdues and mortifies the principles of sin within us, and affords us the effectual guidance and aid of the Spirit of God, in the discharge of our duty, 8: 1—11. Consequently, (6) The obligation to live in a holy manner may now be urged on Christians with the hope of success, for they have aid which is adequate for every time of need; yea, which will make them to triumph over all the troubles and sorrows and trials of life, and to persevere even unto the end, in the way of holiness and truth, 8: 12—39.

I hope the reader will pardon this partial repetition of the course of thought in chap. VI—VIII; which I have indulged in merely for the sake of being explicitly understood. The attainment of correct views in regard to this course, is a *sine qua non* to a right exegesis of the whole. How can we correctly explain a writer, unless we rightly apprehend his aim, and the scope of his discourse? It is impossible; and therefore it is of fundamental importance that we should obtain correct views of the apostle's design in the chapters above named, before we can safely advance to the particular explanation of their several parts. All form one harmonious whole; all resolve themselves, at last, into the simple design of shewing, not only that the grace of the gospel is not justly liable to the charge of encouraging sin, but that it *does in fact proffer to sinners the only hopeful and effectual means of* SANCTIFICATION, as well as justification; yea, that it assures them of these means being effectual even to the end, so that their hopes can never be disappointed.

If it be asked why *sanctification* is here so much insisted on, rather than justification; the answer is, that the apostle had before most fully shewn, in chap. I—IV., that justification by the law is impossible. The question now with him is, whether this plan of salvation, viz. gratuitous justification, encourages the sinner to continue in sin. This question he treats in the manner stated above; and thus shews, that the grace of the gospel is as necessary to us in respect to our sanctification, as it is in respect to our justification. A noble triumph, indeed, of true Christian principles over all opposition and objections! One too which shews, that a system of law strictly adhered to, can only end in the aggravated ruin of sinners; and that therefore our only hope of salvation is in him, "who hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us."

If the reader has still any doubt, whether I have correctly stated the general outlines of the apostle's design and argument, let him look back on chap. I—IV., and see that the great discussion concerning gratuitous justification is there terminated; as is evident from chap. 5: 1—11. Let him look at the nature of the subject proposed by the question in 6: 1, and the arguments and illustrations which follow. Let him duly consider the assertion in 6: 14, with the sequel in vs. 15—20. Let him then see, in vs. 21—23, that *καρπὸς εἰς ἀγασμόν* is still before the writer's mind. In passing to 7: 1—3, 4, let him note, that v. 4 sums up the object of all by *ἵνα καρποποιήσωμεν τῷ θεῷ*. In reading vs. 5, 6, he must observe, that the law is set forth as being even the occasion of aggravating our carnal desires, instead of mortifying and subduing them; all of which shews the insufficiency of it as a means of sanctification. Vs. 7—11 only expand and enforce this idea; while vs. 12—23 defend it from abuse. Chap. VIII. opens as if the subject of justification were a prominent object of the writer's attention; but vs. 2—4 shew that this is only in consequence of justification being connected with sanctification. The special object of God's sending his Son, as considered in vs. 3, 4, is *καταργήσεν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐν τῇ σαρκί*, and *ἵνα τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου πληρωθῆῃ ἐν ἡμῖν*. And so the sequel shews, that sanctifying grace subdues sin, and secures filial obedience. Hence, in vs. 12—17, the exhortation subjoined to the preceding context is, that Christians "should not live *κατὰ σάρκα*." And finally, it is the sanctified, filial, obedient spirit, inspired by the gospel and given by the Spirit of God in connection with it, which supports us under all sorrows and trials, and will end in complete and everlasting triumph. On the face of all this course of thought, there lies, then, what has already been attributed to it.

There is another circumstance still, which affords no small ground for con-

firming what has been stated above. Let the reader look back to chap. 5: 1—11, and see that the apostle, after finishing his discussion with regard to the subject of justification by grace, goes on to declare the happy fruits of this, viz. cheering support under all the sorrows of life, and assurance of final happiness in the kingdom of glory, through the redemption of Christ. Even so in chap. 8: 14—39. When Paul has completed the discussion of his second grand theme, viz. *the sanctifying nature of gospel grace*, he goes on to shew, first, how it triumphs over sufferings and sorrows, inspiring a joyful hope; and secondly, that it will assuredly bring the believer, at last, safe to glory. The parallelism, as to the general course of thought, is so exact between chap. 5: 1—11, and 8: 14—39, that no one can help perceiving it. There is then good ground to believe, from this circumstance, in addition to the other evidence produced above, that the apostle had, in his own view, here completed a second prominent topic of discussion; just as, at the end of chap. IV., he had completed his first one. The rest of his epistle is employed in canvassing various objections raised by Judaizing opponents; and in delivering various precepts and exhortations suited to the condition of the church at Rome.

If the general course of thought now lies before us, in an intelligible manner, we are prepared to advance once more to the consideration of particulars.

(1) *Τὶ οὖν ἐροῦμεν*; words of the objector; viz. 'What shall be said, now, as to such a sentiment as that just uttered, viz. that *where sin abounded, grace did superabound*? Does it not follow that one may well say: Let us continue in sin, that grace may abound?' The meaning of the question is: Since God is glorified in the abounding of his grace; and since this abounds in proportion to the sin which is committed; then why should we not go on to sin, as the glory of God will in this way be made to abound?

(2) *Ἀπεθάνομεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ*, *dead to sin* means, to renounce sin; to become as it were insensible to its exciting power or influence, (as a dead person is incapable of sensibility); or, as Chrysostom well expresses it, *μήκετι ὑπακούειν [τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ], ἀλλὰ μένειν ἀκίνητον ὡσπερ τὸν νεκρόν*. Comp. the phraseology in Gal. 2: 19. 1 Pet. 2: 24. Rom. 7: 4.

Πῶς ἐτι ζήσομεν ἐν αὐτῷ; *how shall we any longer live in it?* i. e. how shall we who have renounced sin, and profess to be insensible to its influence, any more continue to practise it, or to be influenced by it?

There has been not a little discussion and controversy, in respect to the meaning and design of the apostle's language here. To me it appears wholly divested of obscurity. When the objector asks (v. 1), *whether we shall continue in sin*, he means, beyond all doubt: 'Shall we go on to sin? Shall we still continue the practice of it?' To this question the apostle answers in the negative; and this negative he expresses by the phrase *ἀπεθάνομεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ*. This must therefore mean: 'To refrain from the practice of sin, no longer to

continue in it.' It means just the opposite of *ζήσομεν ἐν αὐτῇ*, the signification of which is, to continue in the practice of it. *To become dead to sin, or to die to sin*, plainly means, then, to become insensible to its influence, to be unmoved by it; in other words, to renounce it and refrain from the practice of it.

That such is the condition of true Christians, the apostle now proceeds to shew, by shewing what is implied by the very nature of a Christian profession with its initiatory rites.

(3) *Ἐβαπτίσθημεν εἰς τὸν Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν*. The sense of this depends on the meaning of the formula *βαπτίσειν εἰς τίνα*—or *βαπτίσειν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τινός*. (a) In regard to *βαπτίσειν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα*, the noun *ὄνομα* is, no doubt, to be regarded as *expletive*; as *עַבְד* in Hebrew often is. So in the Jewish formula of baptizing proselytes; if the proselyte was a servant, the master, at his baptism, made a declaration whether he intended to make the servant free as a proselyte, or to have him still remain a servant. This declaration was made thus: *טַבַּל בְּשֵׁם בֶּן חֵרֵרְךָ*, *he is baptized into the name of freemen*; or *טַבַּל בְּשֵׁם עֶבֶד*, *he is baptized into the name of a servant*. So Matt. 28: 19, *baptized εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς, καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ, καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος ἁγίου*: which is the same as *baptized εἰς τὸν πατέρα, καὶ τὸν υἱὸν, καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον*. Accordingly we find *ὄνομα* omitted in our text, as also in 1 Cor. 10: 2. Gal. 3: 27; it is used in Acts 8: 16. 19: 5. 1 Cor. 1: 13, 15.

(b) The sense of the *whole formula* is more difficult to be ascertained. Most commentators, after Vitringa (*Obs. Sac. III. 22*), explain *εἰς* as meaning *INTO the acknowledgment of*; with an implication of affiancing, subjection, discipleship, etc. But the formula in 1 Cor. 12: 13, *πάντες εἰς ἓν σῶμα ἐβαπτίσθημεν*, seems not to accord with such an explanation. Here *εἰς* plainly means, *participation*; i. e. by baptism we come to belong *to one body*, to participate in one body, to be members of one body. In like manner, we may say, by baptism we come to belong, (in a special and peculiar sense, no doubt), to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; to Moses, 1 Cor. 10: 2; to Paul, 1 Cor. 1: 13. In this way all the passages may be construed alike, and the sense in all will be good. The idea is, for substance, that 'by baptism we become consecrated to any person or thing, appropriated (as it were) to any person or thing, so as to belong to him or to it, in a manner peculiar and involving a special relation, and consequent special duties and obligations.'

This sense is such an one as fits the passage under examination.

Thus interpreted it would mean: 'As many of us as have become devoted to Christ by baptism; as many as have been consecrated to Christ by baptism; or been laid under peculiar obligations, or taken upon them a peculiar relation to him, by being baptized.'

Εἰς τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ ἐβαπτίσθημεν, we have been baptized into his death, i. e. we have, as it were, been made partakers of his death by baptism; we have come under a special relation to his death; we have engaged to die unto sin, as he died for it; we have a communion or participation in death to sin; comp. Rom. 6: 6. Gal. 2: 19. *The being baptized into his death* is, therefore, an internal, moral, spiritual thing; of which the external rite of baptism is only a symbol; for the relation symbolized by baptism, is in its own nature *spiritual* and *moral*. *The participation in the death of Christ*, of which Paul here speaks, is surely something more than what is external; it is of a *moral* or *spiritual* nature, of which the external rite is merely a symbol.

(4) *Συνετάφημεν οὖν κ. τ. λ.*, we have been buried with him, then, by baptism into his death, i. e. we are (by being baptized into his death) buried as he was, *συνετάφημεν*: where *συν* means *like, in like manner with*; comp. v. 6; also Rom. 8: 17. Col. 3: 1, where any other sense of *συν* is out of question; 2 Tim. 7: 11, to which the same remark will apply.

Most commentators have maintained, that *συνετάφημεν* has here a necessary reference to the mode of *literal* baptism, which, they say, was by *immersion*; and this, they think, affords ground for the employment of the image used by the apostle, because *immersion* (under water) may be compared to *burial* (under the earth). It is difficult, perhaps, to procure a patient re-hearing for this subject, so long regarded by some as being out-of-fair dispute. Nevertheless, as my own conviction is not, after protracted and repeated examinations, accordant here with that of commentators in general, I feel constrained briefly to state my reasons.

The first is, that in the verse before us there is a plain *antithesis*; one so plain that it is impossible to overlook it. If now *συνετάφημεν* is to be interpreted in a *physical* way, i. e. as meaning baptism in a physical sense, where is the corresponding *physical* idea, in the opposite part of the antithesis or comparison? Plainly there is no such *physical* idea or reference in the other part of the antithesis. The *resurrection* there spoken of, is entirely a *moral, spiritual* one; for it is one which Christians have already experienced, during the

present life; as may be fully seen by comparing vs. 5, 11, below. I take it for granted, that after ἡμεῖς in v. 4, ἐγεροθέντες is implied; since the nature of the comparison, the preceding ὡς ἠγέοθη Χριστός, and v. 5, make this entirely plain.

If we turn now to the passage in Col. 2: 12, (which is altogether parallel with the verse under examination, and has very often been agitated by polemic writers on the subject of baptism), we shall there find more conclusive reason still, to argue as above respecting the nature of the *antithesis* presented. "We have been buried with him [Christ] by *baptism*." What now is the *opposite* of this? What is the kind of *resurrection* from this grave in which Christians have been buried? The apostle tells us: "We have risen with him [Christ], by faith wrought by the power of God [τῆς ἐνεργείας τοῦ θεοῦ], who raised him [Christ] from the dead." Here, there is a *resurrection by faith*, i. e. a *spiritual, moral* one. Why then should we look for a *physical* meaning in the antithesis? If one part of the antithesis is to be construed in a manner entirely *moral* or *spiritual*, why should we not construe the other in the like manner? To understand *συνετάφημεν*, then, of a *literal burial under water*, is to understand it in a manner which the laws of interpretation appear to forbid.

(b) Nothing can be plainer, than that the word *συνετάφημεν*, in Rom. 6: 4, is equivalent in sense to the word *ἀπεθάνομεν* in v. 8. It seems to be adopted merely for the sake of rendering more striking the image of a *resurrection*, which the apostle employs in the other part of the antithesis. *A resurrection from the grave* is a natural phrase, when one is speaking with respect to the subject of a *resurrection*; see John 5: 28, 29; comp. Dan. 12: 2. In accordance with this statement, the context does most plainly speak, both in respect to Rom. 6: 4, and Col. 2: 12. For in respect to Rom. 6: 4, the apostle goes on in the very next verse, (as is usual with him), to present the same idea which is contained in v. 4, in a different costume. V. 5 (which is a mere epexegetis of v. 4) says: *If we have been homogeneous* (σὺμψυτοι, like, of the same kind) *with Christ* IN HIS DEATH, *then shall we be in his resurrection*. The same idea and explanation is repeated in v. 8—*ἀπεθάνομεν—συζήσομεν*· and the whole is summarily explained in v. 11: *So reckon ye yourselves to be νεκροὺς μὲν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ζῶντας δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ*.

Exactly in the same manner has the apostle gone on to explain *συνταφέντες* in Col. 2: 12. In v. 13 he adds: *You νεκροὺς ἰν*

your offences . . . συνεζωοποίησε, has he [God] made alive with him [Christ], having forgiven us all our offences."

There can be no real ground for question, then, that by *συνετάφημεν*, in both cases, is meant neither more nor less than by *ἀποθάνομεν, νεκροί*, etc. The exegesis added in both cases, seems to make this quite plain.

The only reason, then, which I can find, why *συνετάφημεν* is preferred in Rom. 6: 4, and in Col. 2: 12, is, as has been suggested above, that the language may be a fuller antithesis of the word *resurrection*, which is employed in the corresponding part of the comparison. "You who were [dead] buried with Christ," gives energy to the expression.

(c) But my principal difficulty in respect to the usual exegesis of *συνετάφημεν* is, that the image or figure of *immersion, baptism*, is, so far as I know, nowhere else in Scripture employed as a symbol of *burial in the grave*. Nor can I think that it is a very natural symbol of burial. The obvious import of *washing with water*, or immersing in water, is, that it is symbolical of purity, cleansing, purification. But how will this aptly signify *burying in the grave*, the place of corruption, loathsomeness, and destruction?

For these reasons, I feel inclined to doubt the usual exegesis of the passage before us, and to believe that the apostle had in view only a burying which is *moral and spiritual*; for the same reasons that he had a *moral and spiritual* (not a physical) resurrection in view, in the corresponding part of the antithesis.

Indeed what else but a *moral burying* can be meant, when the apostle goes on to say: *We are buried with him* [not by baptism only, but] *by baptism INTO HIS DEATH?* Of course it will not be contended, that a literal *physical* burying is here meant, but only a *moral* one. And although the words, *into his death*, are not inserted in Col. 2: 12; yet, as the following verse there shews, they are plainly implied. In fact it is plain, that reference is here made to *baptism*, because, when that rite was performed, the Christian promised to renounce sin and to mortify all his evil desires, and thus to die unto sin that he might live unto God. I cannot see, therefore, that there is any more necessary reference here to the *modus* of baptism, than there is to the *modus* of the resurrection. The one may as well be maintained as the other.

I am aware, however, that one may say: 'I admit that the burial with Christ has a *moral* sense, and only such an one; but then the

language in which this idea is conveyed (*συνετάφημεν*), is evidently borrowed from the custom of immersion.' In reply to this, I would refer to the considerations under (*c*) above. The possibility of the usage I admit; but to shew that the image is natural, and obvious, and that it is a part of Scripture usage elsewhere, is what seems important, in order to produce entire satisfaction to the mind of a philological inquirer. At any rate, I cannot at present think the case to be clear enough, to entitle any one to employ this passage with confidence, in a contest respecting the mode of baptism.

Διὰ τῆς δόξης (= כְּבוֹד) *glorious presence*, i. e. glorious display of power, might. The Hebrew כֶּבֶד, *might, power*, is sometimes rendered δόξα by the Seventy; e. g. Ps. 68: 35 (67: 34). Is. 12: 2. The idea really conveyed by *διὰ τῆς δόξης* here, can be satisfactorily explained, however, only by a reference to the Hebrew כְּבוֹד, which was employed to designate *the divine presence* as being attended with a supernatural *brightness* or *splendor*. In the same sense הַכְּבוֹדָה was employed by the Rabbinic writers; comp. Matt. 28: 3. Luke 24: 4, which seem to disclose that to which *διὰ τῆς δόξης* here refers. Bretschneider (Lex.) has rendered the phrase, *in Dei gloriam*; a liberty which *διὰ* before the Genitive does not seem to allow. *Διὰ* signifying *on account of, for the sake of*, as an end or object, must have the Accusative after it; at least I have not been satisfied with any proof which I have seen, that it admits the Genitive in such a sense. Compare, as to sentiment, Col. 2: 12. Eph. 1: 19.

Ἡμεῖς [ἐγεροθέντες]; which latter word plainly must be added here, in order to make good the comparison commenced with *ἠγέρθη* above.

Ἐν καινότητι τῆς ζωῆς περιπατήσωμεν, *we* [being raised from the dead] *should live a new life*; i. e. as we have been made like unto Christ in his death, so must we also in his resurrection, or, we must, like him, live a new life after our resurrection. See the explanation given in v. 11.

It will occur to the distinguishing reader, at once, that the comparison here instituted by the apostle, is not one in all respects of *like with like*. Christ died for *sin*, i. e. on account of it, in order to make expiation for it; the believer dies to *sin*, that is, he mortifies, subdues it, becomes insensible to its influence, or at least successfully resists it. Christ had no sin of his own to mortify; the believer's *dying* consists in the mortification of his own sins. Even so it is with the resurrection. Christ rose *physically* from the dead; the believer, in

the present life, rises *spiritually* from a state of moral death. Christ lived physically and naturally a new life; the believer lives spiritually and morally a new life.

On the whole, this is one of those cases of comparison, which, not affording strict analogies throughout, can be brought to bear only in a *general* way, and will not stand the test of being urged into particulars. It were easy to bring many instances of the like nature from the Scriptures; but the attentive reader will of course observe them. Those who insist, in all cases, on exact similitudes throughout in comparisons, will find difficulty here; for nothing can be more evident, than that merely some general traits of similitude exist between the two cases. Christ died for sin—a painful death; the believer in dying to sin suffers pain and distress, he ‘crucifies the old man with his deeds.’ Christ died in order to destroy the power of sin; the believer in becoming dead to sin, destroys its power or influence: Christ rose from the dead to live in wholly a new state; the believer who is quickened, must also live in a new state. Here the similitude ends; and here it should end, for the writer evidently did not design to push it any farther. Turretin, in speaking of v. 4, says truly and forcibly: “Non tam est argumentum directum . . . quam vivida atque elegans hujus argumenti illustratio, et quasi pictura pro more orientalium hominum ac specialiter Judæorum, qui ejusmodi figuris atque emblematis plurimum delectabantur.”

CHAP. VI. 5—11.

The main idea or essential features of the apostle’s comparison being thus introduced, he now proceeds to expand the thought, and to present it in a variety of costume appropriate to the nature of the case, and serving to impress the whole upon the mind of the reader. (1) We have been intimately connected (*σύνστροι*, lit. *grown unitedly*) with Christ as to his death, i. e. we have died in respect to sin, as he died on account of it; and consequently we must be like him as to rising from a state of death to a new life, v. 5. (2) Our old man, i. e. our sinful passions and desires, is crucified, for the very purpose that our bodies which incline us to sin should no more be subject to the power of sin; for (to carry the figure through) he who is dead, is freed from sin; consequently we, being dead to sin, should be freed from its power, vs. 6, 7. (3) If then we are in fact dead with Christ, i. e. if we have died to sin as he died for it, we must believe of course that we shall live with him, i. e. live a new life, as he lived a new one; for as Christ, when once risen from the dead, could no more be subject to the dominion of death, (since he could die on account of sin but once), and as he now lives forever a divine and heavenly life, so Christians must die once for all to sin, i. e. renounce it forever, and live continually unto God, i. e. live a holy and heavenly life, vs. 8—11.

The reader will see, that the same idea for substance is kept before the mind, through vs. 5—11. But he will also see, that there are shades of differ-

ence in the diction and method of illustration. V. 5, for example, presents the simple idea, in a generic way, of being connected with Christ as to his death and resurrection. Vs. 6, 7, present the specific idea of crucifying our old man (as Christ was crucified), in order that, being put to death, he might no more lead us to sin. Vs. 8—11 present the general notion of dying and living with Christ, i. e. as he did, but with the accessory idea, that as he died once for all, and can never die again but lives forever a new life, so we must, in dying to sin, die once for all, i. e. renounce it for ever, and ever live a new life.—How then, (for such is the question implied at the close of all this), can Christians continue in sin that grace may abound? There is no foundation for this objection.

(5) *Εἰ γὰρ σύμφυτοι γηγόναμεν, if we have been made homogeneous, if we have been connected together.* So *σύμφυτοι* must be explained, if philology is to be the guide. *Σύμφυτος* and *συμφύης* appear to be synonymous; and both mean *grown up together, sprung up together*, and so secondarily, *intimately connected together*, etc. Of the whole grain, growing together in one field, the Greeks would say: It is *σύμφυτος*. The evident meaning here is the same as *ὁμοιος*, *homogeneous*, or *participating in, intimately connected with*; therefore we may render: *If we have become connected or homogeneous, by a likeness in respect to his death, τοῦ θανάτου* being the Gen. *objecti*, i. e. the object in respect to which we have become like to Christ. The meaning is: If we have become dead to sin, as he died for sin; then shall we in like manner live a new life, when risen from our [moral] death, as he lived a new one after his resurrection.

Ἀλλὰ καί, then surely; ἀλλά, certe, profecto, sane (*ἀλλά* affirmantis); at the same time contrast is implied between the part of the sentence to which *ἀλλά* is prefixed, and the preceding part.—*Ἐσόμεθα*, in the Fut. tense, but here designating a time future to that in which Christians were made to resemble Christ as to his death. Sentiment: 'After we have died to sin, we must henceforth live in a new state.' Or the Fut. *ἔσόμεθα* may be regarded here as expressive of *obligation*; for so the Fut. is not unfrequently employed; e. g. Matt. 4: 10. Luke 3: 10, 12, 14. Judg. 13: 13, 14 (Sept.). Deut. 6: 5 (Sept.). Matt. 22: 37, 39. Lev. 19: 17, 18 (Heb. and Sept.). That the apostle does not mean here to argue merely that Christians should, at some future period, become alive to God, is clear from v. 11.

(6) *Τοῦτο γινώσκοντες, knowing this*, i. e. we acknowledge, concede, or consider as established, thus much, viz. what is immediately mentioned in the sequel.

Ὁ παλιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος, our old man, a phrase of Jewish origin, no doubt. Thus in the Talmud it is said of proselytes, that

“they became as little children” (Jemavoth. fol. 62. 1); and they are also called *a new creation*, הַבְּרִיאָה הַחֲדָשָׁה. This serves to shew, that when our Saviour spoke to Nicodemus, of the necessity of being born again; and when Paul spake of him who is in Christ as being *a new creature* (καινη κτίσις); there is no probability, that the language employed by them was unusual or strange among the Jews. The παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος here seems plainly to mean, the internal man, i. e. the sinful desires and propensities which belong to us in a natural or unrenewed state. The epithet παλαιός (old) is given, in opposition to the new spiritual man, which is put on in Christ Jesus.

Συνεσταυρώθη, *is crucified as he* [Christ] *was*, literally, *is crucified with him*. On the comparative meaning of σὺν in composition, see on συνετάφημεν under v. 4. Meaning: ‘The sinful desires and propensities of the natural man are mortified and subdued in the Christian, so that they will no longer have a predominant influence over his conduct.’ Not improbably, the apostle, in choosing the word συνεσταυρώθη here, might have an allusion in his mind, to the painful and protracted struggle which every Christian must go through, in subduing his carnal desires. Certainly the word is very significant, when viewed in this light.

Καταργηθῆ, *might be deprived of efficiency, might be destroyed*, i. e. might be deprived of sinful vigour, power, life; might be rendered inefficacious, or be disabled any more from causing sin.

Τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, (*locus vexatus*) is explained by Hammond, Schættgen, Glass, Tholuck, and others, by referring it to the Hebrew idiom; in which מַצָּע and תַּג (substance and body) are often employed either in a kind of superfluous manner, or (which is the more usual fact) in order to add *intensity* to the expression. This interpretation well fits the sense of the passage. Explained in this manner, the whole runs thus: ‘Our old man, i. e. our carnal natural man, is crucified as Christ was, in order that the substance or essence of our sinful passions might be destroyed.’

Another explanation is admissible. Σῶμα in some cases has the same meaning as σάρξ· comp. Rom. 7: 24. 8: 13; and taking ἁμαρτίας here as an adjective, we may translate: *In order that our sinful desires and lusts might be destroyed*. Tholuck objects to this as *tautology*; but if it be so, then there is abundance of tautology in all parts of the Bible. Comp. Rom. 7: 5 and 8: 3, where is an expression exactly equivalent; viz. σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας. See also Rom. 7: 25, σώματος θανάτου.

The true solution of the difficulty, as it seems to me, lies in the sentiment of the apostle here in the context, with respect to the *body* or fleshly part of man. He regards it, and speaks of it, as the seat and cause of passions and desires which war against the soul, and bring destruction upon it; e. g. Rom. 6: 12, "Let not sin reign in your mortal body, *so as to obey* THE LUSTS THEREOF" (αὐτοῦ, sc. σώματος). Here it is the *lusts of the body*, which are represented as constituting the reign or dominion of sin. So in Rom. 7: 24, τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου means, *the body which occasions this death or condemnation* (θανάτου Gen. effectus). So again in Rom. 8: 13, we have τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος, *the deeds (sins) of which the body is the cause or occasion*, (σώματος, Gen. causæ vel auctoris). The idea is the very same which is expressed by the apostle in Rom. 7: 23, when he speaks of "the law in our members, which wars against the law of the mind."

With these ideas and phrases in view, let us observe now that the apostle has just spoken of crucifying *the old man*. And what is the object? Plainly in order that this *old man* might be put to death, i. e. mortified, subdued, rendered inactive or inefficient as to its influence over us. He means a *moral crucifixion* plainly, and not a natural or physical one. Nothing seems to be plainer, then, than that τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας means the same as ὁ παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος. Both of course mean *the natural internal man*; the sinful, unsanctified, internal man, in opposition to the regenerated and holy one. 'Let us crucify the old man,' says the apostle, 'in order that he may lose all power over us, ἵνα καταργηθῇ, *that he may be deprived of all influence, or that he may be destroyed*. But instead of repeating the phrase ὁ παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος a second time, he substitutes σῶμα ἁμαρτίας in its room, as being altogether an equivalent for it. And thus viewed, all is plain. Σῶμα ἁμαρτίας is the παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος which excites to sin; and which, therefore, the spirit of the gospel requires should be crucified. Tholuck thinks it would be incongruous to speak of our body as *being destroyed*. But not to insist that καταργηθῇ is not confined to such a sense, (it is not indeed the leading or primary one), it is enough to say, that the body here, as merely flesh and blood, i. e. as merely physical, is not the object of the apostle's contemplation. So Œcumenius: Τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας—περιφραστικῶς· αὐτὴ ἁμαρτία. It is either mere circumlocution for *sin itself*; or it is the body merely as the cause or occasion of sinning; and just so far as it is so, it should be mortified and ren-

dered inefficacious. Comp. in respect to the like sentiment, 1 Cor. 9: 27; and exactly the same idea is found in Rom. 8: 13, *τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος θανατοῦτε*.

Ἄμαρτία here is used in a *personal* way; comp. vs. 10—14. This removes the objection of Tholuck to the exegesis suggested above, viz. that if *σῶμα ἁμαρτίας* means *sinful body*, then the apostle must have said *αὐτὸ* [not *ἡμᾶς*] *δουλεύειν*. What hinders us from understanding the apostle to say: 'This body, as the cause of sin, must be mortified and subdued, in order that *we* may no more be the servants of sin?'

Τοῦ μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἁμαρτία, *that we should no more be servants to sin*. *Τοῦ . . . δουλεύειν*, instead of *ὥστε δουλεύειν* for in this latter way the Greeks usually express themselves. There are, indeed, examples of such a use of *τοῦ* before the Infinitive, even in classic Greek authors; see Buttman's Gr. Gram. § 127. *b*. Anm. 1. But the *frequency* of this usage in the New Testament and Septuagint in the sense of *that, in order that*, which must be assigned to *τοῦ* in some of these cases, seems to have its basis in the use of *ל* before the Infinitive in Hebrew, where it may signify either *design, object, or end, event, consequence*. For a full exhibition of this subject, with abundance of examples of all the different shades of usage, see Winer, Gramm. N. Test. § 45. 4.

(7) This verse may be regarded as a kind of general maxim or truth, in regard to all such as die physically or naturally. The object of the writer is, to draw a comparison between the effects of *natural* death, and those of *spiritual* death; the first causes men to cease from all actions, and of course from their transgressions; and by analogy we may conclude, that the second, which is a death unto sin, will do as much. The saying, in its physical sense, was probably a *proverbial* one among the Jews. Thus in the Talmud, it is said: "When a man dies, he is freed from the commands." *Tract. Nidda*. Now what is said by the common proverb adduced by the apostle, in a *physical* respect, (and correctly said in the sense intended to be conveyed), the apostle means to intimate will apply, in a *spiritual* respect, to one who is *spiritually* dead as to sin, i. e. he must become free from its influence. His great object is to illustrate and enforce this point. The *γὰρ* with which the proverb is introduced, is *γὰρ illustrantis vel confirmantis*.

Ὁ γὰρ ἀποθάνων is understood by some, as referring here to a *moral death unto sin*; so that the verse is supposed to mean: 'He

who is dead to sin, is freed from its influence.' The objection to this is, that it would seem to be a tautology, i. e. a mere repetition, or nearly so, of the preceding verse. Bretschneider (*Lex. δικαιώω*) has proposed a singular exegesis: "Qui mortuus est, absolutus habendus est a poenâ mortis, nimirum quum poenam peccati (i. e. descensum in Haden) jam tulerit." How he who has gone down to Hades, and is there still, is freed a *poenâ mortis*, I do not perceive; nor is this exegesis applicable to the case in hand, for the question here is not about freeing from the *penalty* of sin, but from its *power*; the apostle is treating of *sanctification*, not of *justification*. On this ground the exposition of Alting, Wolf, Carpzov, and others, which gives to ἀποθανών here the sense of an *expiatory death*, (by virtue of being like to Christ in his death), and so makes δεδικαιώται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας mean, 'is acquitted from the penalty of sin,' must be rejected; although other reasons might be urged against it.

I must understand δεδικαιώται, therefore, in the sense already intimated above, viz., *freed, delivered from*. Nothing is more common in the writings of Paul than the use of δικαιώω in the sense of *acquitting, freeing*, viz. from the sentence or penalty of the law, etc. But here the idea is more general, and is equivalent to that conveyed by ἐλευθερώω, which is substituted in its room, in v. 18 below. Compare 1 Pet. 4: 1, ὁ παθὼν ἐν σαρκί, πέπαιται ἁμαρτίας. In Sirach 26: 29, we read: οὐ δικαιωθήσεται κάπηλος ἀπὸ ἁμαρτίας, *a pedlar will not be freed from sin*, meaning that in the course of his business he will almost of course be led to contract guilt.

Thus explained, v. 6 asserts the fact, that in case the old man is crucified, Christians can no more be engaged in the service of sin. V. 7 enforces this declaration by a simile drawn from natural or physical death; viz. as he who is physically dead, ceases from all action, and therefore from sin, so he who is dead to sin (for this apodosis is implied), ceases from the practice of it. What is said literally of the one—literal death, is said morally or spiritually of the other death, which is of a moral nature. It hardly needs to be added here, that when the apostle speaks of natural death as freeing us from sin, he means from sinning here, in our present state and condition. What may be the condition of the soul in a future world, is not here an object either of inquiry or of assertion.

(8) In order to understand the nicer shades of the apostle's discourse here, the reader must cast his eye back upon vs. 5—7, and re-survey the course of thought, which is this: 'We are dead with

Christ, and we shall live with him [in the sense explained above]; for if we are made like him in the first respect, then we must be in the second. That such must be the case, follows from the fact that our *old man* is crucified, and we are thus freed from the power of sin, and can no longer serve it.' Vs. 5—7 are therefore merely an illustration or confirmation of v. 4; and accordingly εἰ γάρ and ὁ γάρ, the usual signs of clauses added for such a purpose, here make their appearance. But v. 8 commences with an εἰ δέ, which here develops one of the nicer shades of meaning. Δέ is not unfrequently employed as a *continuative* of the discourse; and particularly, where the theme before introduced is resumed, and something added by way of illustration or confirmation; in which case we may call it δέ *resumptionis*. Here the apostle resumes the sentiment of v. 4, (Turretin and Tholuck say, of v. 5, overlooking the γάρ confirmantis of v. 5), for the sake of adding a new circumstance by way of establishing his position, viz. that as Christ died but once, and thenceforth lives for ever a new life, so the believer dies once for all to sin, when he truly dies to it; so that he must ever after live a new life, and no more practise sin as he once did.

For the sense of ἀπεθάνομεν σὺν Χριστῷ and συζηήσομεν αὐτῷ, see on v. 4 above; where also the whole nature of the comparison is stated.

Εἰδοῦτες ὅτι is employed here in the same way that τοῦτο γινώσκοντες is in v. 6, and for the same purpose, viz. as prefatory to the introduction of matter that was confessedly obvious and true. This form of speech is equivalent to saying: 'What I have now asserted must be true, inasmuch as you know this or that to be true, from which my position is a plain and necessary deduction.'

Οὐκέτι ἀποθνήσκει, *dies no more*, i. e. will never more die. The whole force of the illustration hangs on these two words; for in these consists the *additional* matter which the apostle introduces.—Θάνατος . . . κυριεύει, *death has no more dominion over him*; merely a repetition of the preceding declaration, in different language, in order to give it intensity. As to the sentiment here and in v. 10, comp. Heb. 9: 25—28. 10: 11—14. One is strongly tempted to believe, that the same hand traced all these passages, from the peculiar shade of sentiment which is found in them. They mutually illustrate and confirm each other.

(10) ὁ γάρ . . . ἐφάπαξ, *for in respect to his dying, he died on account of sin once for all, or only once*. The construction of ὁ (neu-

ter pronoun) here, is rather unusual in the New Testament; comp. Gal. 2: 20 for a like example. For its use in the classics, see Matth. Gramm. II. 894. Like the corresponding Latin *quod* thus placed, it means *in respect to this*, viz. that what is immediately subjoined; which here is ἀπέθανε.—Γάρ *illustrantis vel confirmantis*, the verse being designed to confirm the preceding affirmation.

Τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ἀπέθανεν, *he died to sin*. But “he who knew no sin,” could not die to sin in the sense that sinful men do. The use of the Dative, in order to signify *on account of, for the sake of*, is not strange; Eurip. *Androm.* V. 334, τέθνηκα τῇ σῇ θυγατρὶ, *I die for the sake of your daughter*. The *Dativus causae vel occasionis* also is not unfrequent, e. g. Rom. 11: 20, 30; and this might be applied to the expression before us, in case it stood alone, in the following way, viz. Christ died *on account of* the sins of men, i. e. they were the occasion of his death, and he died in order to expiate them. But then we could not well interpret ζῆν τῷ θεῷ which follows, in like manner; and therefore we cannot admit this solution. The true solution, after all, seems to be the general principle of the Dative, which is designed to express an object to which the action of the verb stands related, but not the object on which it *directly* terminates. This last is marked by the Accusative case after transitive verbs. Here the *dying* expressed by ἀπέθανεν bears a relation to τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ. This is designated by the Dative of this noun. But what the kind of relation is, the Dative does not of itself designate. This must be gathered from the context, or from the nature of the case. And here the sense requires us to construe Christ’s dying to sin, as meaning that he died in order to diminish its power or influence, (*Dat. incommodi*, as the grammarians express themselves in such a case).—Ἐκάπαξ, lit. *for once*; but the meaning is, as we say in English, *once for all*.

Ὁ δὲ ζῆν, ζῆν τῷ θεῷ, *but in respect to his living, he lives to God*. As this clause is an antithesis of the former, so the Dative here is an antithesis of the one there employed; for here it is a species of the *Dativus commodi* (as grammarians call it), the meaning being evidently that ‘Christ lives to the honour and glory of God.’ For such a sense of the Dative, and in a like case, comp. Rom. 14: 6—8. See also 2 Cor. 5: 13. Matt. 3: 16. Luke 1: 55. 12: 21. The case in Luke 20: 38, πάντες γὰρ αὐτῷ ζῶσιν, resembles the present one in form, but not in sense, inasmuch as αὐτῷ (sc. θεῷ) appears to mean *by him*.

Theophylact paraphrases τῷ θεῷ by ἐν τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ θεοῦ· which spoils the sense in its present connection. Oecumenius says: "He lives by his divine nature;" which is equally inapposite. The *Dativus commodi* is, therefore, the preferable principle. So Demosthenes: οὐκ αἰσχύνονται Φιλίππῳ ζῶντες, *they are not ashamed, who live for the advantage of Philip.*

(11) Now follows the comparison of the *members* with the *head*. Οὕτω καὶ . . . θεῷ, *in like manner you also must account yourselves dead to sin, but alive to God.* For the sense of νεκροὺς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, see on v. 2. above.—Ζῶντας τῷ θεῷ has here the same sense as in the preceding verse.

The only difficulties that seem to remain, are, (1) That the comparison in vs. 10, 11, between Christ and believers, will not hold in the same sense. On this I have already remarked under v. 4. (2) That Christ *lived to God*, in the sense here supposed to be asserted, *before* his resurrection, as well as *after* it. How then can the apostle be supposed to assert what would imply, that it was only *after* his resurrection that he lived to God? The answer to this is virtually exhibited in the context. The apostle has said that *Christ died to sin, once for all; death has no more dominion over him.* Now as his living to God is placed in antithesis to this, the necessary implication is, that he lives to him in such a way as to have no more concern with suffering and sorrow on account of sin, he lives to him in a state that is new, and the happiness of which is not interrupted by sin. In like manner, believers are to become *dead to sin*, i. e. to be unaffected by its solicitations, and alive to God, i. e. devoted in heart and life to the honour and glory of God, or living in a state in which God, and not sin, shall be the chief object of all their regard.

In the case of Christ's living to God, the meaning is, that he is forever exempt from the troubles and sorrows which dying for sin gave him; believers live to God, when they are exempt from being led astray through the solicitations and influence of sin. All this is to be attained ἐν Χ. Ἰησοῦ, *through Jesus Christ*, for 'his is the only name given under heaven among men, whereby we can attain to such a happy condition.'—Τῷ κυρίῳ ἡμῶν is marked by Knapp as being spurious. It matters nothing to the sense of the passage in general, whether it be received or rejected.

(12) Οὕτω, *therefore*, i. e. all this being true which I have said, it follows that sin ought not to reign, etc.—Βασιλεύτω, *reign, predominate, have rule*; see on 5: 17.—Τῷ θνητῷ ὑμῶν σώματι, *in your*

mortal body. The word *θνητῷ* has given occasion here to a variety of exegesis. I regard the appellation as designating our *physical, fleshly* bodies, and the whole phrase, *θνητῷ σώματι*, as equivalent to *σάοξ*, or *σάοξ καὶ αἷμα*. The reason why the apostle calls the body *θνητόν*, seems to be, that he may present, in an impressive manner, the sin and folly of permitting the lusts and passions of a *frail, perishable* body, to have dominion over the soul. The ground why he speaks of one body as the seat of reigning sin, is, that carnal lusts and desires have great influence in leading men to sin. Comp. with the sentiment here, Rom. 7: 5, 23, 24. 8: 3, 6, 7. See also the remarks on *τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας*, v. 6 above.

Εἰς τὸ ὑπακούειν . . . αὐτοῦ, i. e. let not sin have such a predominance, as to yield obedience to its dictates. There seems to be a tacit acknowledgment in the form of this expression, that sinful appetites are not *extinguished* in the believer; he must keep them in subjection, but he does not wholly extinguish them. Fact accords with this.

Ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτοῦ is rejected by Griesbach, but admitted by Knapp; and with good reason, as it seems to me; for the construction appears to be incomplete without it.

(13) *Παρισιάνετε, proffer, give up, devote, afford.* *Μέλη* means literally, *the members of the body*. This verse, then, is only a virtual repetition of the preceding one, in different language, and for the sake of intensity.—*Τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ* connects with *μὴ παρισιάνετε, give not up to sin*, i. e. to sinful lust or desire, *your members as instruments of iniquity*, i. e. as instruments of doing that which is sinful.

Τῷ θεῷ, being arranged immediately after *παραστήσατε* here, shews that *τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ* in the clause above is to be constructed in like manner.—*Ὡς ἐκ νεκρῶν ζῶντας*, as *alive from the dead*, i. e. as raised from the dead; comp. Eph. 2: 1, 5. The ground of this figurative language is easily found in vs. 3—11. That moral life and death are here meant, the reader scarcely needs to be reminded.

Καὶ τὰ μέλη [παραστήσατε] . . . τῷ θεῷ, give up to God your members, as instruments of righteousness; viz. as instruments of doing that which is lawful and right. *Τῷ θεῷ* is construed here by some, as a *Dativus commodi*; i. e. as instruments of doing that which is right and proper, *for God*, viz. for the glory and honour of God. Tholuck prefers this construction. But analogy with the preceding clause seems plainly to require a different one, viz. such as I have given in the translation above.

(14) Ἄμαρτια γὰρ . . . κυριεύσει, *for sin shall not have dominion over you.* The γὰρ here makes no little difficulty; yet commentators in general have passed it by, without even noticing it. It is clearly not the γὰρ *respondentis*; nor yet is it the γὰρ *illustrantis vel explicantis*, for a *new* declaration is introduced in this verse, a *new* subject, and not merely an explication of one already introduced. That Christians will not sin because they are under grace, i. e. that grace is a direct and efficient means of preventing sin, is a new attitude of the writer's subject, first presented in this verse. I see no way, then, of accounting for the γὰρ here, except in the manner so amply and ably illustrated in Bretschn. Lex. γὰρ, 1. b, where he shews that γὰρ is often introduced by a writer or speaker, in connection with what is *implied* in his discourse, but not *expressed*, i. e. there is an ellipsis of some part of the sentiment, with which γὰρ stands connected. So here, the ellipsis may be completed by supplying [καὶ τοῦτο ποιήσετε, or καὶ παραστήσετε ἑαυτοὺς], ἄμαρτια γὰρ κ. τ. λ. That the sense of the verse is *prediction, promise*, (and not simply command or obligation), I must believe, with the great body of commentators, e. g. Origen, Chrysostom, Augustine, Theodoret, Melancthon, Erasmus, Calvin, etc. Consequently I cannot regard γὰρ here as *causal* in respect to the preceding commands which are expressed in v. 13; for then the matter would stand thus: 'Be not the servants of sin, because you shall not be the servants of sin.' But if γὰρ depends on such a clause (mentally supplied) as I have indicated above, then all is plain: 'Ye will give up yourselves to God, for sin shall not have dominion over you;' i. e. sin shall not be able to prevent your doing so, inasmuch as ye are not under the law, but under grace.

Οὗ κυριεύσει means, to have a predominant influence, to hold dominion over you, as a master does over his slave; comp. vs. 16—18.

Οὗ γὰρ ἐστε . . . χάριτι, *for ye are not under law, but under grace*; an expression much contested, and not unfrequently misunderstood. The simple meaning seems to me plainly to be: 'Ye are not under a legal dispensation, but a gracious one.' This is a general proposition, and one which the reader will hardly be able to understand, without reading the whole remainder of this chapter and also chapters VII. VIII. By so doing he will see, that the apostle means to assert the incompetency of the law to furnish the requisite means for the sanctification of the sinner in his present condition. See in particular 7: 1—5, 9—11. 8: 3, 4. The confidence of Paul,

that sin would not have dominion over Christians, was wholly reposed in the grace proffered by the gospel. He well knew, that no strictness of precept, no authority of law, no sanctions of it however awful, would effectually deter men from sin. He has shewn, in chap. VII., that the law instead of doing this, is even the occasion of the sinner's being plunged into deeper guilt and condemnation, than he would otherwise be. How then can it deliver either from the *power* or the *penalty* of sin? It can do neither. The latter of these he has abundantly shewn, in chap. I—IV. The former is what he now designs to assert, and what he goes on to illustrate and to confirm.

To say, with some commentators, that ὑπὸ νόμον refers only to the *ceremonial* law, would be to give the passage a sense frigid and inept. Where, in all the sequel down to the end of chap. VIII., is there any thing which reminds us that the discussion here has relation merely to the ceremonial law? Does not chap. VII. 5—25 most fully contradict such a view of the subject? The law there discussed, is not only "holy, just, and good," but it is the internal moral law, the νόμος τοῦ νοῦς (v. 23), it is a νόμος πνευματικός (v. 14).

But the question is asked: How can it be true that Christians are not *under the law*? The Saviour did not come to abolish the moral law; nay, he came that it might be fulfilled (Matt. 5: 17, 18); how can it then be said that we are not under the moral law?

My answer is, that this is not designed to be said. Every expression of such a nature as the one under examination, is of course to be understood according to the circumstances and intention of the writer. Paul had to do with Jewish *legalists*. And what was their doctrine? It was, that salvation is attainable by legal obedience, not in theory only, but in an actual and practical way, i. e. as a matter of fact. It was, moreover, that the law by its precepts, its restraints, and its penalties was an adequate and effectual means of sanctification. The first part of this scheme, the apostle has overthrown in chap. I—IV; the last part he is now employed in overthrowing. How he does this, the reader may see, by reperusing the illustration of the general course of thought, prefixed to the present chapter.

Now that Christians are not under the law, either as an actual, effectual, adequate means of justification or sanctification, is true. If they are so, their case is utterly hopeless; for ruin must inevitably ensue. That they are not so, the apostle asserts in the verse under consideration. And from the sequel of his remarks (6: 15—8: 39), it is plain that this is all which he means. What can be plainer, than that the moral law as precept, is altogether approved and recognized by him? See chap. 7: 12—14. Nay, so far is the apostle from pleading for abolition or repeal of moral precept, that he asserts directly (8: 3, 4), that the gospel is designed to secure obedience to these precepts; which the law itself was unable to do.

It is then from the law viewed in this light, and this only, viz. as inadequate to effect the sanctification and secure the obedience of sinners, that the apostle here declares us to be free. Who can object to this? Or if any one should object, how is he to answer the arguments which the apostle has adduced in the sequel, in order to confirm his declaration?

Let no one then abuse this declaration, by imagining that it in any measure affords ground to believe, that Christians are freed from obligation to obey the precepts of the moral law? What is the divine law, but a transcript of the divine will? And are not Christians to be conformed to this? Is not all the law summed up in these two declarations: "Thou shalt love the Lord with all thine heart; and thy neighbour as thyself?" And are Christians absolved from loving God and their neighbour? If not, then this part of the subject stands unembarrassed by any thing which the apostle has said in our text or context. Indeed, when rightly viewed, there is no ground at all for embarrassment.

I will only suggest, in addition, that *ὑπὸ χάριτι* implies, that Christians are placed in a condition or under a dispensation, of which *grace* is the prominent feature; grace to sanctify as well as renew the heart; grace to purify the evil affections; grace to forgive offences though often repeated, and thus to save from despair, and to excite new efforts of obedience.

Viewed in this light, there is abundant reason for asserting, that Christians, under a system of grace, will much more effectually throw off the dominion of sin, than they would do if under a mere law-dispensation.

(15) *Τὶ οὖν; . . . χάριτι; What then? Shall we sin, because we are not under the law but under grace?* i. e. What shall we say to this? viz. what he had just asserted. Shall we conclude that one may sin, etc.? The first impression made by the declaration of the apostle, we might easily suppose, would lead the legalist to such a conclusion. 'Is not the law,' he would ask, 'holy? Does it not forbid all sins? And does not grace forgive sin? How then can grace restrain sin? That is, why may we not sin, if we are under grace merely, and not under the law? But this question the apostle follows with a *μη γένοιτο* and then goes on to illustrate and confirm the important truth which he had uttered in v. 14.

(16) *Οὐκ οἴδατε; Know ye not?* i. e. I take it for granted that ye know and believe. The reader will not fail to mark how often the apostle introduces this and the like expressions, as a preface to matters which he knows are well understood and assented to by those whom he addresses; see *τοῦτο γινώσκοντες* v. 6, and *εἰδότες* v. 9.

**Ὅτι ᾧ . . . ὑπακούετε, that to whomsoever ye give up yourselves as servants bound to obey, ye are the servants of him whom ye obey.*

Δούλους εἰς ὑπακοήν means, *servants for the sake of obedience*, servants obedient, ready, or bound to obey, devoted to obedience; *εἰς* before the Accusative denotes purpose, object, intention, obligation. *Δούλοι ἔσθε*, i. e. when you have once given up yourselves to any one as *δούλους εἰς ὑπακοήν*, you are no longer your own masters, or at your own disposal; you have put yourselves within the power and at the disposal of another master. When the reader calls to mind the extent of a master's power over his slave or servant, in the days of Paul, he will perceive the strength of the expressions here.

"*Ἦτοι ἀμαρτίας . . . δικαιοσύνην*, *whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto justification*; i. e. ye are servants, when once ye are given up, either to sin or to righteousness. If ye give up yourselves as servants of sin, then you must expect the consequence to be death; for "the wages of sin is death," v. 23. Once devoted to sin, and continuing to be so, you cannot avoid the end of it, which is death. But if you are the servants of that *obedience which is unto justification*, i. e. which is connected with justification, which ends in it, then you may expect eternal life (*ζωὴν αἰώνιον*, v. 22). The argument intended to be urged by these representations, is, that when the Christian has once given himself up as the servant of grace, he will of course, if sincere, yield obedience to its dictates; and these are such as will lead *εἰς δικαιοσύνην*, *to justification*. That such is the meaning of this last phrase here, seems to me quite clear from its being the antithesis of *εἰς θάνατον*. How the construction of these passages could have been a matter of so much dissension and doubt among commentators, as it has been, I cannot well conceive. When I compare the very explicit exegesis of the whole in vs. 21, 22, where *ζωὴν αἰώνιον* is substituted for *δικαιοσύνην* in v. 16, all seems to be plain and easy. Yet if the reader will consult even the commentaries of Tholuck and Flatt, he will find himself unable, (at least I have been so), to make out an explicit opinion from either. There is, indeed, a little doubt about the *genuineness* of the reading, *εἰς θάνατον*, inasmuch as Codd. D. E., the Syriac Version, etc., omit it. Yet, on the whole, no substantial doubt remains, that we should admit it. Then what is there so strange and difficult in the contrast here? Paul says we must be the servants of him to whom we devote ourselves, we must go where and when he bids; and this holds true, he adds, whether we apply it to our being the servants of sin, which will lead us to death, i. e. condemnation, or to our being the servants of that obedience which is connected with or leads to justification,

i. e. pardon, acquittal from the penalty of the law. How can δικαιοσύνη here mean *holiness, uprightness*, when ὑπακοή itself necessarily designates this very idea. What is an obedience which *leads to* righteousness? Or how does it differ from righteousness itself, inasmuch as it is the very act of obedience which constitutes righteousness in the sense now contemplated? Then, moreover, the contrast here with θάνατον does not seem to leave any room for doubt, what the meaning must be. The sentiment is: 'Fearful as the consequences of sin are, when you are its servants, you must follow its dictates. But, on the other hand, the obedience which you yield to grace, is a joyful, glorious service, ending in eternal life.'

(17) Χάρις δὲ . . . διδαχῆς, *but thanks be unto God, that ye were the servants of sin, but have become obedient from the heart to that model of doctrine in which ye have been instructed.* Such is the literal translation. But the nature of the case is sufficient to show, that the apostle's thanks to God are not designed to have a special bearing on ἥτε δοῦλοι τῆς ἁμαρτίας. In view of the whole case, viz. that they once were the servants of sin, but now are devoted to Christian obedience, Paul thanks God; as well he might, for 'there is joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth.' But to say that he thanks God with special reference to the fact that they were sinners, and because they were so, would be saying what contradicts not only the whole strain of Paul's epistles, but all the Bible.

It has been proposed here to render ὅτι *although*; but, first, there is no adequate authority for such a translation; secondly, the present construction of the sentence requires ὅτι as *rationem reddens* in respect to χάρις τῷ θεῷ; and the δέ (but) after ὑπηκούσατε, indicates that ὅτι in the preceding clause, retains its usual sense. The true solution of the difficulty consists in taking the whole phrase together; for then a meaning is conveyed, which might well excite the mind of the apostle to gratitude.

ὑπηκούσατε δὲ ἐκ καρδίας, *but ye have heartily, sincerely, become obedient.* The apostle means to express his cheering confidence in the reality of their devotedness to the cause of Christ, which they professed to love; and this seems to me to be all that he here means to express. Tholuck says, however, that ὑπηκούσατε joined with ἐκ καρδίας, 'is designed to render conspicuous the idea of the free will with which the sinner first came to Jesus and received pardon.' Was it true, then, that Jesus first sought the sinner, or the sinner him? Do we "love him because he first loved us;" or is it the reverse? That

the sinner was "willing," I doubt not; but that he was "made willing in the day of God's power," seems to be equally plain. Does not "God work in us both to will and to do?"

Εἰς ὃν . . . διδαχῆς. The construction here has given much trouble to critics. It need not have done so; for *ὑπακούω* may govern the Accusative as well as the Dative; see examples of the Accusative in Prov. 29: 12. Deut. 21: 18. It may also govern the Genitive; e. g. Deut. 21: 20. 26: 14, 17, et al. sæpe. The Dative after it, however, is most common. We may then construe thus: *ὑπακούσατε τύπον διδαχῆς . . . εἰς ὃν παραδόθητε.* *Εἰς* with the Accusative very frequently follows *παραδίδωμι*, although the simple Dative is the most usual. But here the Dative would not give the sense—*into which ye have been initiated*, or *in respect to which ye have been instructed*.

A second way of solving the grammatical construction, is by *attraction*. The noun, as all grammarians of course know, is almost as often *attracted* to the case of the pronoun, as the pronoun is to that of the noun. The former we may suppose to be the case here, so that *τύπον* is written for *τύπῳ*, which latter would be the more usual construction after *ὑπακούω*. Why Tholuck, Flatt, and others, should prefer the forced construction here, *ὑπηκούσατε εἰς τύπον ὃς παρεδόθη ὑμῖν*, I do not see. They do not seem to have adverted to the fact, that *ὑπακούω* may take the simple Accusative after it, as shewn above.

That *ὑπηκούσατε* corresponds in the second clause here, to *ἦτε δοῦλοι* in the first, is plain. The apostle might have used *ἐδουλώθητε* in the room of it; but *ὑπηκούσατε* corresponds better to the phraseology of the preceding verse.

Τύπον διδαχῆς, *model of doctrine*; *τύπος*, *model, form, example*, etc. Comp. Rom. 2: 20, *μόρφωσις τῆς γνώσεως*. 2 Tim. 1: 13, *ὑποτύποισις ὑγιανόντων λόγων*. In the classics, also, such expressions occur; e. g. Jambl. Vita Pythag. c. 16, "He had *τῆς παιδείσεως ὁ τύπος τοιοῦτος*, *such a model of instruction*, and looking to this," etc.; Ib. c. 23, "For the sake of rendering more conspicuous *τὸν τύπον τῆς διδασκαλίας*." Bretschneider (Lex. *τύπος*) gives the meaning of *τύπον διδαχῆς* here, by *doctrina animis vestris insculpta*; a sense which might receive some countenance from *ἔμαυτοῦ λόγον* in James 1: 21, but which, however, cannot be maintained as Pauline, after weighing the examples in Rom. 2: 20. 2 Tim. 1: 13.

(18) *Ἐλευθερωθέντες . . . ἀμαρτίας*, *being freed from sin*, i. e.

from a state of bondage to sin, from being the servants of sin. This was effected, when they "passed from death unto life," from "the bondage of Satan to enjoy the liberty of the children of God." Then it was, also, that they became the Lord's; they became so ἐκ καρδιάς. Being "bought with a price," they held themselves, in their new state, to be under obligation to "glorify God with their bodies and with their spirits, which are his;" which is expressed by ἰδουλώθητε τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ.

It is easy to see, that vs. 17, 18, do not advance the argument of the apostle. They are not designed for this purpose; but only for the sake of making an impression on the minds of his readers. He intends to shew them, that they have a personal interest in what he says, and indeed that they are themselves examples of what he is declaring. To a like purpose, are the declarations in vs. 19, 20. Verse 18 may indeed be viewed as an appeal *ad hominem*: 'Ye, brethren, are no more the servants of sin; how then can you any longer continue to obey its dictates? Ye have become the servants of righteousness; and of course you must obey its dictates, i. e. live a life of holiness.'

(19) Ἀνθρώπινον λέγω seems to be equivalent to κατ' ἀνθρώπων λέγω, 3: 5; i. e. *I speak as men are accustomed to speak*, viz. I use such language as they usually employ in regard to the affairs of common life. So the classic Greek authors say, in the like sense, ἀνθρωπίνως λέγω or ἀνθρωπειώς λέγω; see Aristoph. Ranæ, 1090. Vespæ, 1174. Strato in Athenæus, Deipnos. Tom. III. lib. IX. 29. So also the Latins; as Petronius, Satyr. c. 50, Sæpius poetice quam humane locutus es. Cicero, de Divinat. II. 64, hominum more dicere. The apostle means to say, that in speaking of the subject under consideration, he uses language borrowed from common life, which may be easily understood. The reason of this he now proceeds to assign.

Διὰ τὴν . . . ὑμῶν, because of the weakness of your flesh, i. e. because of the feebleness or imperfection of your spiritual knowledge, or of your ability to comprehend me, which is occasioned by the flesh, i. e. the carnal part, having so great an influence. Or τῆς σαρκὸς ὑμῶν may, like the Hebrew רִשְׁפָּ, be used by way of periphrasis, merely to indicate *your own selves*. Or ἀσθενείαν may be used here, (as ἀσθενῶν is in Rom. 5: 6), for *moral weakness*. So Beza and others; but this is an improbable sense; for the apostle does not here speak in the tone of *chiding*. The expression in 1 Cor. 3: 1, seems

to afford aid sufficient to make the matter plain: "I could not speak to you as *πνευματικοῖς*, but as *σαρμικοῖς*;" which latter word is immediately explained by the expegetical clause, *ὡς νηπίοις ἐν Χριστῷ*. So then, the *ἀσθένεια τῆς σαρκός* may be regarded as indicating (if I may thus speak) the feeble or infantile state of spiritual knowledge among the Romans; and to adapt himself to this, the apostle had made use of the familiar phraseology which the context exhibits. In giving this construction to *ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκός ὑμῶν*, we must regard *τῆς σαρκός* as *Gen. causa vel auctoris*; so that the sense is: 'The weakness which the flesh or carnal part occasions,' viz. the inability to comprehend language of a higher and more difficult nature, which had been occasioned by their fleshly passions and appetites.

"Ὡσπερ γὰρ . . . ἀνομίαν, as then ye have given up your members to be the servants of impurity and iniquity, for the sake of iniquity. *Γὰρ* here is rather difficult of explanation. Passow (Lex. *γὰρ*) observes, that '*γὰρ* as a *causal* particle often precedes, in respect to position, that to which it stands related;' e. g. *Ἀτρείδη, πολλοὶ γὰρ τεθνήσκουσιν Ἀχαιοί, τῷ σε χοῦ πόλεμον παῦσαι*, II. VII. 328, *Atreides, since many of the Greeks have perished, it is necessary that you should put an end to the war*. Here *πολλοὶ γὰρ τεθνήσκουσιν Ἀχαιοί* follows (in respect to sense) the clause which now succeeds it in regard to position. Passow adds, that in such cases *γὰρ* has the sense of *well since, because that, or da (since)*. This would fit the passage before us well, were it not that *ὥσπερ* forbids such a rendering; for to translate: *As since ye have given up*, etc., would not be congruous. We must refer *γὰρ*, then, to the whole of what the apostle had said in vs. 14—18. "*Ὡσπερ γὰρ* *κ. τ. λ.* resumes the exhortation in v. 13, and resumes it with additional strength, in reference to what had been said in vs. 14—18. 'In view of all this,' the apostle means to say, 'it becomes you, as you have once served sin, now to serve the cause of holiness;' i. e. if you were once actively engaged in the service of sin, much more should you now be in the cause of holiness. In this view of the subject we can see how *γὰρ*, in this place, can be rendered *then* (Passow, *denn*); which is as much as to say: 'In view of what has been suggested, or on account of what has been suggested, I may go on to say,' etc.

Τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν is equivalent to *σῶμα θνητόν* in v. 12. It is resuming the diction of v. 13. The ground of the usage is, that *our members* are the instruments actually employed either in the service

of sin or righteousness. They are our instrumental agents.—*Δουῖλα* is here an adjective, *δοῦλος -η -ον* comp. *Wisd. 15: 7*.—*Τῇ ἀκαθαρσίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἀνομίᾳ*, *Dat. commodi*, at least a species of it.—*Εἰς τὴν ἀνομίαν*, *for the purpose of iniquity*, i. e. of doing iniquity, of committing sin.

Οὕτω νῦν . . . ἀγιασμόν, *so now give up your members to be the servants of righteousness, for the sake of holiness*.—*Εἰς ἀγιασμόν* stands here without the article, although we have in the antithesis *εἰς τὴν ἀνομίαν*. But this is one of those cases in which the writer may insert or omit the article, so far as I can see, without any difference of meaning in his discourse. Abstract nouns allow this liberty; *Winer, Gramm. § 18. 1, ed. 3*.

(20) "*Ὅτε γὰρ . . . δικαιοσύνη*, *for when ye were the servants of sin, ye were free in respect to righteousness*. The expression in itself is not difficult, excepting perhaps the last clause of it; but the connection and object of the verse are truly difficult. *Tholuck* says, that *γὰρ* points to *v. 22*, in respect to the reward of Christians; but this is a liberty with *γὰρ* which it would be no easy task to justify. I must connect it with what *precedes*, in this case, not with what follows. What says the apostle? 'As you once served sin, so now you must serve holiness. Your present relation admits of no other conclusion; for when you served sin, you deemed yourselves free from all obligation to righteousness, [so now, serving holiness, count yourselves free from all obligation to sin.]' I cannot see in what other way *ὅτε γὰρ* *κ. τ. λ.* is here connected. As *γὰρ confirmantis* vel *illustrantis*, I think we must take the particle here; and if so, then I cannot make out the object of the verse in any other way than as above. There is, indeed, an *anacoluthon* in this case; but how often Paul admits this into his epistles, the distinguishing reader of them needs not to be informed.

Bretschneider (*Lex. ἐλεύθερος*) renders *ἐλεύθεροι*, *destituti*; and so, many others have done; but this is a sense which it would be difficult to vindicate, and which is unnecessary. When the apostle says, that they, being the servants of sin, were *ἐλεύθεροι τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ*, he cannot mean that in fact they were free from all obligation to holiness, (for this can never be true of any moral being whatever); he must mean, then, that in their own estimation, or according to the tenor of their own reasonings, they were absolved from obligation to pursue holiness. I understand him here as making an appeal *ad hominem*, as in the preceding verse, and as saying in

effect: 'Since you formerly, when in the service of sin, counted yourselves free from the dominion of holiness; so now, as the servants of righteousness, count yourselves free from obligation to obey sin.' Verse 19 I understand as making appeal to the state of facts merely; v. 20, as appealing to the views and feelings of Christians, in respect to their old and new condition. In this way, all is apposite, and we are not forced to do violence to the laws of language. The Dative τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ here, belongs to that class of Datives whose office it is, to designate *relation to, respect to*, a particular thing, i. e. the noun is put in the Dative, which limits to a particular thing a predicate which in its own nature is general. So here ἐλεύθεροι—a general idea—but τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ limits it to this particular thing. See Winer, § 31. 3; and comp. 1 Cor. 14: 20. Acts 7: 51. 20: 22. 1 Cor. 7: 34. Heb. 5: 11.

(21) *Τίνα οὖν . . . ἐπαισχύνεσθε; What fruit, moreover, had ye then, in respect to those things [of which] ye are now ashamed?* There are various ways of pointing and constructing this sentence. Some put the interrogation point after τότε, and make the answer to be: 'Such fruit as ye are now ashamed of.' So Koppe; with whom Flatt and Tholuck agree. I prefer the division of Knapp, who points as above. Οὖν, "*orationi continuandæ inservit*," (Bretsch. Lex.). There seems to me plainly to be a *transition* in the discourse here to another topic, viz. from the topic of *obligation* of which the writer had been speaking, to that of *consequence*, i. e. either penalty or reward. This makes the second point of comparison, between being under the law and under grace. The end or event of the two states is unspeakably different. The writer, however, assumes the fact here, that while under the law men will continue to sin, and thus bring death upon themselves. It is only in the sequel (chap. 7: 5—25), that he fully illustrates the reason or ground of this.

Καρπὸν εἶχετε κ. τ. λ. must mean: *What reward had ye? What benefit did ye experience?* Comp. Rom. 1: 13. 15: 28. Heb. 12: 11. Ἐχειν καρπὸν has a different meaning from φέρειν καρπὸν. To make the construction full, ἐκείνων must be understood before ἐφ' οἷς. Such an ellipsis is very frequent; see Bretsch. Lex. ὅς, c. β. Ἐπαισχύνομαι usually governs the Accusative, but is here constructed with ἐπί after it.

Τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἐκείνων, θάνατος, *for the end of those things, is death*; viz. of such things as they formerly practised, but are now ashamed of. Τέλος retains here a sense which is very common, viz.

the consequence, final event, *fata ultima, exitus rei*. *Γὰρ confirmantis*; as if the writer had said: 'What solid good can result from your former course of life, since the end of this course must be death?' For the sense of *θάνατος*, see chap. 5: 12.

(22) *Νυνὶ δὲ . . . ἁγιασμόν*, but now, being freed from sin, and having become servants to God, ye have fruit in respect to holiness. The preceding context explains *ἐλευθερωθέντες . . . θεῷ*. *Ἔχετε τὸν καρπὸν* must mean the same as in v. 21, viz. *you have your benefit or reward*.—*Εἰς . . . ἁγιασμόν*, in respect to holiness or sanctification (Bretsch. Lex. *εἰς*, 4); not (with Flatt and others) *unto holiness*, i. e. the consequences are, that ye are holy. The consequence of serving God it is not the writer's object here to represent as being the attainment of holiness; for *serving God* implies that holiness already existed. It is the *fruits*, i. e. consequences of serving God, which Paul here brings into view; for nothing else would make out the antithesis to the preceding verse; a circumstance overlooked by many commentators. I understand the apostle as saying: 'You already enjoy important benefits, in respect to' a holy course of life; and you hope for more important benefits still, viz. *ζωὴν αἰώνιον*.'

Τὸ δὲ . . . αἰώνιον, and the end [is to possess] *eternal life*. The reader will observe, that the Acc. *ζωὴν αἰώνιον* renders it necessary here to supply some verb, in order to complete the construction; which is different from that in v. 21, where *θάνατος* is in the Nom. The sentence may be filled out in two ways; viz. (1) *Τὸ δὲ τέλος [ἔχειν or ἔξειν] ζωὴν αἰώνιον*. (2) *Τὸ δὲ τέλος [ἔξει] ζωὴν αἰώνιον*. The sense is the same in both cases. In the latter case, *ζωὴν αἰώνιον* is put in apposition with *τὸ τέλος*, and is explanatory of it. In the former case, the construction is thus: 'The end or event will be, that you shall obtain everlasting happiness.' One or the other of these constructions, the context and the form of the words compel us to adopt.

The reader cannot help remarking here the antithesis between *ζωὴν αἰώνιον* and *θάνατος*. How can the latter be temporal only? What comparison would this make, between the two members of the antithesis?

(23) Such consequences must follow from the established rules of the divine government, respecting the fruits of sin and of holiness. *Τὰ γὰρ . . . θάνατος*, for the reward (wages) of sin is death; comp. on Rom. 5: 12.—*Γὰρ confirmantis*; for what is said in the sequel confirms vs. 21, 22.—*Οψώνια*, properly the *rations of*

soldiers, i. e. their wages, which at first were paid in grain, meat, fruit, etc., but afterwards in money. Observe that the apostle employs this term, in order to designate something which was really the *proper due* of sin, viz. for the service of it; as the wages which a soldier earns by his hard military service, are properly his due. But, on the other hand, the reward of Christians is all of *grace*, not of *debt*; and so it is designated in the sequel by *χάρισμα*.

Ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ τῷ κυρίῳ ἡμῶν, i. e. through the redemption or atonement of Christ, 3: 23—26. 5: 1, 8, 11, 17—19, 21.

CHAP. VII. 1—4.

The variety of opinion respecting the first four verses in this chapter, is so great, and so many difficulties present themselves in the way of almost every exegesis which has hitherto been proposed, that one is strongly tempted to abandon the hope, that any thing can be offered which will be satisfactory to an enlightened and inquiring mind. After long and often-repeated study of these verses, however, I have come to the persuasion, that the difficulty with most commentators, lies principally in their insisting upon too minute comparison between the conjugal connection here mentioned, and the connection of Christians with the law. A minute and exact comparison cannot be made; for, (1) The apostle represents the *husband* as dying, and the *wife* as becoming *free*, in consequence of his death. Then, (2) Christians are said to *die to the law*, (not the law to them), and they are thus prepared to be affianced to Christ; i. e. the party who *dies* is, in this last case, represented as married to another; while, in respect to the literal *conjugal* union, it is of course only the party who *lives* that can be joined to another. This apparent *dissimilitude* between the two cases, has given great trouble to commentators; and in fact it appears inexplicable, unless we acquiesce in a mere general point of similitude as to the things compared, without insisting on minute and circumstantial resemblances.

Let us inquire first of all: What is the *object* of the writer in presenting the comparison before us? The answer is, to illustrate and defend the sentiment avowed in chap. 6: 14; viz. "For we are not under the law, but under grace." Those Christians who were inclined to be legalists, and to look for justification or sanctification (the latter is here the subject of the writer) by the law, and therefore to hold fast to the law as an adequate means of accomplishing this end, would easily take offence at such a declaration. 'What!' they would naturally say, 'does the gospel then absolve us from our relation to the law? Shall we throw by the ancient Scriptures as of no more use to us, because we now come under a new dispensation of grace?'

The apostle has prepared the way in chap. 6: 16—21, for the declaration which he is now about to make relative to this subject. He has there shewn, as we have already seen, that a state of *grace* diminishes nothing of our obligation to refrain from sin; for by this very state we are made servants to righteousness; and the practice of holiness is at the same time urged upon us, by the prospect of a glorious reward, while the neglect of it is followed by endless misery. He now advances another step, and declares that we are "dead to the law," i. e. that the law as an *efficient means* of sanctification (which the legalist holds it to be), has been renounced by true Christians; for the death of Christ, "who is the end of the law for righteousness to every one who believes," in whom, moreover, we profess to trust as the ground of our sanctification as well as justification, has placed us in a new relation as to ade-

quate means of being sanctified, and freed us from the vain and deceptive hopes of legalists, who were leaning upon the law both as the ground of sanctification and justification.

I have already stated reasons, for supposing that the apostle is here speaking in particular of the law as an adequate means of *sanctification*; see the introduction to chap. VI. I merely remark here, that the close of v. 4 shews very explicitly, that the special object which the apostle now considers as attainable by becoming dead to the law, and being affianced to Christ, is *ἵνα καρποφορήσωμεν τῷ θεῷ*. *Sanctification* then, not justification as many commentators suppose, is here the particular subject of the writer's attention.

Vs. 1—4 may rather be called an *illustration* of what the apostle had avowed in 6: 14, than an argument to establish the declaration there made. The simple basis of the whole comparison I understand thus: 'Brethren, you are aware that death, in all cases, dissolves the relation which exists between an individual and a law by which he was personally bound. For example; the conjugal law ceases to be in force, by the death of one of the parties. So it is in the case of Christians. They not only die to sin, i. e. renounce it, when they are baptized into the death of Christ, 6: 2—11; but they also die to the law at the same time, i. e. they renounce all their hopes and expectations of being sanctified by the law, so that sin will no more have dominion over them.' They do, by the very fact of becoming real Christians, profess to receive Christ as their "wisdom, and justification, and sanctification (*ἀγιασμός*), and redemption," 1 Cor. 1: 30.

Let the reader consider, for a moment, the true nature of the declaration just quoted. Christ is our *wisdom*; i. e. our teacher, he who communicates the spiritual knowledge and light which we need, "the light of the world." Christ is our *justification* (*δικαιοσύνη*); i. e. the meritorious cause, ground, or author of it; comp. Rom. 3: 21—28. Christ is our *sanctification*; i. e. the author, cause, or ground of our sanctification, by what he has done in our behalf in order to ensure it. Christ is our *redemption* (*ἀπολύτρωσις*); i. e. he is (to sum up all in one word) the cause of our deliverance from the penalty and power of sin, and of our being brought to enjoy the glorious liberty of the children of God. The last word makes the climax of the whole sentence.

Christ then is as really and truly our *sanctification*, as he is our *justification*. If now, in despair of being justified by the law (for so we must be if we rightly view the subject), we go to Christ for justification, and receive him as our only Saviour, renouncing all merit of our own, and all hope of being saved by the law—if, I say, we feel and do all this, then we do renounce the law forever as the ground of justification, and accept the gratuitous salvation which is proffered by Christ. In the same manner, when the sinner comes to an adequate and proper view of the strictness and purity of the divine law, and also to right views of the state of his own heart while in a natural condition, he will utterly abandon all hope of being sanctified by the law; for he will see, what Paul has so fully asserted in Chap. 7: 5—11, 'that the law brings him, (through his own fault indeed, but not the less surely because of this), into a state of deeper guilt and condemnation.' How then can the law be an adequate means of his *sanctification*? It is impossible; and the truly convicted sinner renounces all hope of this, and betakes himself to Christ and his salvation as the only ground of hope in this respect.

Here is the great difficulty, and here the solution of the whole passage must come in. Consider, for a moment, the true nature of the apostle's assertion, and no alarm need be felt as to the tendency of his sentiments. For what is it which he affirms in chap. 6: 14? It is, that "sin shall *not have dominion* over Christians, because they are not under the law, but under grace." The *dominion* or *power* which sin is to have over Christians, is then the subject of his inquiry, and of his assertions. So indeed the preceding context teaches; and so the subsequent context also. That we are *not under the law*, then, must of course mean, in this connection, that we are not under it as an efficacious or successful means of deliverance from the power of sin; for this it has never

been, and cannot be, as chap. 7: 5—25 most fully shews. Christians are dead to the law, then, in this respect, viz. they renounce all hope of deliverance from the power of sin, through the law. It convinces, and condemns, and keeps up a perpetual struggle in the sinner's breast by awakening his conscience; but it does not deliver, 7: 14—25, comp. 8: 3, 4. Consequently the true penitent, coming to feel its impotence as the means of delivering from the power of sin, renounces all hope of deliverance in this way, and gives himself up to Christ, as his *sanctification*, as well as his wisdom, justification, and redemption.

Now what is there in all this, which infringes on the obligation of moral precept contained in the law? Surely nothing. "The law is holy, and just, and good;" it is all summed up in the requisition, 'to love God with all our heart and our neighbor as ourselves.' Will any one assert that Paul contends against this, after all that he has said in chaps. VI—VIII., relative to the Christian's obligation to renounce sin and live a holy life? Nothing can be farther from his intention. The only question that needs to be solved, in order to remove all real difficulty, is: In what sense does Paul say that we are *dead to the law*? This I have endeavoured to answer, by making the apostle his own expositor. The sum of the answer is, that as Christians renounce the law as an effectual means of *justification* (chap. I—III.), so they must renounce it as an effectual means of *sanctification*. Christ is our only hope in this respect, as well as in the other. The grace of the gospel is the only effectual means by which we can hope successfully to resist sin, and persevere in holiness.

And is not this true? Just as true as that Christ is the ground of our justification? I appeal to chap. 8: 3, 4 for an exhibition of the sum of this sentiment; and to the whole of chaps. VI—VIII., and also to the experience and feelings of every truly enlightened and humble Christian on earth,—in confirmation of the same sentiment.

I acknowledge it is a truth often overlooked. Many a time have I read the epistle to the Romans, without obtaining scarcely a glimpse of it. When I ask the reason of this, I find it in neglect to look after the general object and course of thought in the writer. Special interpretation stood in the way of general views; the explanation of words hindered the discerning of the course of thought. And so I suppose it may be with many others. But now the whole matter appears to me so plain, that I can only wonder that I have ever been in the dark respecting it. Luther and other Reformers saw what was so long hidden from me; and of late, Knapp, Tholuck, and many other commentators, have explained the chapters in question in like manner as I now do.

Having already given what I consider as the only defensible exposition of the similitude, which the apostle employs in vs. 1—4, I merely advert to different expositions, ancient and modern. Augustine (Prop. 36): *Tria sint; anima tanquam mulier, passiones peccatorum tanquam vir, et lex tanquam lex viri*. Beza: "The old man is the wife, sinful desire the husband, sins the children." Origen, Chrysostom, Calvin, and others: "Men are the wife, the law the former husband, Christ the new one." This last explanation seems to accord substantially with v. 4, in which Christians are represented as having become dead to their former husband, and affianced to a new one. In order to carry the figure regularly through, it would seem as if the law (the former husband) must be represented as dead, by which Christians would be at liberty to be joined to a new husband. But this the apostle does not say; probably because he thought the expression would give offence to the Jews. Yet he says what is tantamount to it; for if either of the parties in a conjugal union die, then each is dead to the law, and the law to them, i. e. the conjugal law has no more application or relation to them, it is annulled as to them. It matters not which party dies, so far as the law is concerned; for the law is at an end if either dies. So in the case before us; one of the parties being dead, the conjugal relation ceases. A new connection, therefore, may be formed. But this last conclusion can be made out only on the ground, that "dying to the law" is a figurative expression; which, indeed, no one will deny. If it is to be expounded by analogy with chap. 6: 1—11, we must construe it as meaning, 'the renunciation of all trust in the law as the efficient means of sancti-

fyng the sinner.' When the awakened sinner comes to feel this sincerely and thoroughly, he is then prepared to be affianced to Christ, i. e. to receive him as his *sanctification*, as well as his justification.

(1) "Ἡ ἀγνοεῖτε, in sense the same as οὐκ οἶδατε in 6: 16; which see. "Ἡ, *num, an*, merely a sign of interrogation here. Here, as in 6: 16, the writer means to say, that they well know, or that they will readily acknowledge, viz. what he is about to state.—Γινώσκουσι . . . λαλῶ, *for I address those who are acquainted with the law*, viz. the Mosaic law. The apostle may mean here, that he addresses the Jewish part of the church at Rome, in a particular manner, in relation to what he is about to say; or what he says may imply, that the whole church had some acquaintance with the Old Testament Scriptures. In regard to this latter fact it may be said, that as the Old Testament was every where and continually appealed to by the primitive teachers of Christianity, and was moreover extant in the Greek language which was very generally understood at Rome, so it is altogether probable, that the Roman Christians in general had an acquaintance with at least the leading features of the Mosaic system. *Γὰρ*, "*rationem reddentis*;" for if they were acquainted with the law, they could not be ignorant of what the apostle supposes them to know.

"Οτι ὁ νόμος . . . ζῆ, *that the law exercises control over a man as long as he lives*. The apostle means the Mosaic law here; but what he says, is equally true of other laws of a permanent nature.—Κυριεύει, *performs the office of κυρίως*, i. e. *controls, is valid in respect to*.—Τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, *THE man*, i. e. the man who lives under it, not any man in general, but only any one who holds such a relation. Some interpreters here take ἀνθρώπου in the same sense as ἀνδρός, i. e. *husband*. But besides the want of *usus loquendi* in its favour, it may be said, that the proposition is evidently of a *general* nature, in respect to such individuals as lived under the Mosaic law.—Ζῆ is rendered by Flatt and others, *IT lives*, viz. the law. But first, how could this be? If the man dies, the law still lives as to others; it becomes inefficacious as to him, only by means of *his* death. It cannot die in any other way. Then secondly, what a tautology! The law is in force (*κυριεύει*), as long as it is in force (*ζῆ*). Is this the manner of Paul? Thirdly, the ἀνήρ ζῶν and ἀποθανόν of vs. 2, 3, clearly shews, that in v. 1 ἀνθρώπου is the Nominative to ζῆ.

(2) Ἡ γὰρ . . . νόμῳ, *for the married woman is bound to her husband by the law, so long as he liveth*.—Ἰπανδρός, a very expressive word, classical as well as Hellenistic, and like the Hebrew יְהוָה

תַּשִּׁיחַ, Num. 5: 29. In the East, ὑπανδρος denotes a higher degree of disparity between husband and wife, than is admitted in the western world.—*Αέδεται νόμῳ* has a force also here, which commentators have generally overlooked. Under the Mosaic economy, the husband could divorce the wife almost at pleasure; but where is the precept giving the like liberty to the wife? This would have been contrary to the genius of eastern manners and customs. This seems to be the reason why the apostle has chosen the *woman*, in this case, in order to exhibit an example of obligation while the life of the parties continues.—*Γὰρ illustrantis*; and it might, as to sense, be well translated *for example*. The instance in vs. 2, 3, seems to me very plainly to be a mere illustration of the general principle in v. 1.

Ἐὰν δέ . . . ἀνδρός, but *if her husband die, she ceases to be under the conjugal law*.—*Κατήργηται* (Perf. Midd. here), when followed by *ἀπό* (as in the present case), means *to cease to belong to any one, to cease to be subject to his control*; comp. v. 6 below, and Gal. 5: 4. In the next verse we find *ἐλευθέρα ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου*, in the same sense as *κατήργηται ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου* in this. Œcumenius: *κατήργηται ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπολέλυται, ἐλευθέρωται*.—*Τοῦ ἀνδρός*, Gen. of relation, viz. the law which related to her husband; or Gen. of attribute, viz. the conjugal law.

(3) *Ἄρα οὖν . . . ἑτέρα*, *therefore if she marry another, during her husband's life, she shall be called an adulteress*; i. e. it follows, from the nature of her obligation, that she can not be united with another man, while her husband is living.—*Χρηματίσει*, *she shall bear the name of, she shall receive the appellation of*. This usage of the word belongs to later classics; in which the verb puts the name called into the Nominative after it; e. g. *ἐχρημάτιξε βασιλεύς*, Diod. Sic. XX. 54.

Τοῦ μὴ εἶναι αὐτήν, *so that she shall not be*. The classic Greek would usually express this by *ὥστε μὴ εἶναι αὐτήν*. But Infinitives with *τοῦ* are very frequent in the Septuagint and in the New Testament; even in cases where, like the present, the *end* or *event* is designated by the article. In this respect *τοῦ* before the Infinitive resembles the Hebrew הַ, which expresses either *purpose, design*, or else *end, event*. See Winer, Gramm. § 45, 4.

(4) *Ὡστε* (compounded of *ὡς* and *τε*) standing at the *beginning* of a sentence, must, according to Bretschneider, be rendered *igitur, quare*, i. e. *therefore, wherefore*. The true sense here indicated by it, however, seems to be *thus*, i. e. these things being so, you also have

become dead to the law, in order that you might be affianced to Christ, etc. In other words; allowing that a new connection may be lawfully formed, after the death of one of the parties in the conjugal union, it follows that you, who have become dead to the law, i. e. wholly renounced it as an adequate means of sanctification, may be affianced to Christ, etc.

Τῷ νόμῳ, the Dative of *specification*, i. e. designating the particular thing in respect to which Christians have become dead; Winer, Gramm. § 31. 3, α. The declaration that *they had become dead to the law*, is new in respect to *form*. *Dead to sin* the apostle has asserted them to be, in chap. vi.; he has also asserted that they are not ὑπὸ νόμον, 6: 14. But that they were *dead to the law* is a new expression, and needs some explanation. The writer immediately subjoins one: διὰ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ. He must of course mean, the body of Christ as crucified, as having suffered in order to redeem us from the curse of the law; comp. Heb. 10: 5—10. Col. 1: 22. 2: 14. 1 Pet. 2: 24. Eph. 2: 15, which do not seem to leave any doubt with respect to the meaning of σῶμα Χριστοῦ here. As Christ, by his death, is made unto us “righteousness, and *sanctification*, and redemption;” so it is his death which has opened such new prospects for perishing sinners, that they are enabled to look away from the law, and to renounce it as an effectual means of sanctification. Hence the apostle says: “Ye have become dead to the law, by the body of Christ.”

Εἰς τὸ γένεσθαι . . . ἐγεθέντι, in order that ye should be [affianced] to another, who has risen from the dead; i. e. Christ has called you away from your vain hopes and expectations respecting what the law could accomplish as to purifying and saving you, and admitted you to participate in the blessed fruits of his death, viz. the gift of a sanctifying Spirit. But although by his *death* you are freed from the relation in which you once stood to the law as a means of sanctification, yet you are not affianced to him as being *dead*, but as being *risen from the dead*, as a conqueror who has burst the bars of death, and ascended to glory at the right hand of God the Father.

ἵνα . . . θεῶ, so that we may bring forth fruit to God; i. e. such fruit as God will accept. Θεῶ, Dat. *commodi*. The reader will observe, that the last circumstance noted here, is the climax of the figurative language used by the apostle. First, there is an annulling of a former marriage-contract by the death of one of the parties; next, there is a new union; and lastly the fruits of this, and also the

object of it, are designated. *To bring forth fruit for God, or unto God, is to live a holy life, to yield obedience unto his precepts, to act in such a manner as to do honour to him.*

CHAP. VII. 5, 6.

‘But what if we are dead to the law?’ the objector might here reply: ‘what if, in our new relation, we are affianced in a peculiar manner to Christ; does it follow from this, that the law was so inefficacious in itself for our sanctification, as you represent it to be? Nay, what you say implies even more; it implies that it is only in our new state of affiance to Christ, that we can *bring forth fruit to God*; and that, while under the law, no fruit but such as is of a contrary nature, can be produced.’

At this crisis of the discussion, the apostle comes out with his last, highest, and boldest assertion concerning the law, as to its efficacy with respect to the point under consideration, viz. its efficacy to sanctify the hearts of sinners. His course of thought seems to be in substance as follows: ‘I have said that you must be freed from the law and united to Christ, in order that you may bring forth fruit to God. This is true; for the law is so far from accomplishing the great end of subduing and sanctifying the hearts of sinners, that it occasions just the opposite effect, i. e. it is the occasion of their becoming more deeply involved in guilt, and of bringing them into more aggravated condemnation. It is the occasion of their *bringing forth fruit unto death*, and not unto God. But when we are freed from all reliance upon it as a means of subduing and sanctifying us, and with a becoming sense of our guilt and helplessness have betaken ourselves to Christ, and relied on him only as our “sanctification and redemption,” then we are enabled to serve God with a new spirit, and not in the old way of only a literal and external obedience.

These were propositions of a bold and startling nature to the Jewish legalist. Some formidable objections would at once rise up in his mind against them. The apostle fully anticipates this; and, as we shall see in the sequel, occupies the remainder of chap. VII. in canvassing and answering them.

In the mean time let it be noted, that v. 5 here is the theme of discussion through vs. 7—25 in the sequel; while v. 6 (the antithesis of v. 5) constitutes the theme of chap. 8: 1—11, which is in all important respects the antithesis of 7: 7—25. Knapp, Tholuck, Flatt, and, other distinguished commentators, have seen and noted this; and in fact it lies on the face of the whole discussion, if the reader will only lay aside for a moment his attention to particular words and phrases, and look simply after the course of thought and reasoning which the apostle pursues.

(5) “Οτε γὰρ . . . σαρκί, *for when we were in the flesh*; i. e. when we were in our natural or carnal state. That such is the meaning of this expression, is clear from the *usus loquendi*, and from the nature of the case. From the first; because they who are *in the flesh*, are contrasted with τοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, in chap. VIII. 1—11, where vs. 7—9 put it beyond all question what ἐν σαρκὶ εἶναι means. From the second; because the contrast in vs. 5, 6, is between the character which those whom the apostle addresses sustained *before* they became affianced to Christ, and that which they

sustained *after* they were affianced to him. Of course ἐν σαρκὶ εἶναι must mean, to be in a natural or unregenerate state, to be in that state in which men are who are not yet united to Christ.

Τὰ παθήματα . . . νόμου, *our sinful passions which were by the law*; i. e. our sinful passions which were occasioned by the law, v. 11.—Τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν, Gen. of *attribute*, our passions which lead us to sin, our sinful passions.—Τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου [sc. ὄντα or γεγονότα], *which were by the law*; not, as Chrysostom and Carpsov, τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου [καινόμενα or γνωστά], *which were shewn or disclosed by the law*; and not as Locke (Comm. on Romans), *that remained in us under the law*, who construes διὰ νόμου as διὰ conditionis, viz. we being in a law state. To both of these methods of commentary v. 11 is an unanswerable objection, as it is the author's commentary upon his own words. Moreover, the laws of language forbid the exegesis of Mr. Locke; for to make the sense which he gives, the Greek must be: ἡμεῖς διὰ τοῦ νόμου ὄντες, not τὰ [παθήματα] διὰ τοῦ νόμου.

Ἐνεργεῖτο . . . θανάτῳ, *put forth their energy in our members, to bring forth fruit unto death.* Ἐνεργεῖτο, vim suam exerebat, *efficax fuit.*—Ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ἡμῶν, the same in sense as σῶμα θνητόν in 6: 12, as may be seen by comparing v. 23 below. Μέλη is used as an equivalent for σῶμα, because the *members* of the body are its efficient agents in doing any thing.

Such was the influence of our *sinful passions*, τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου, that the consequences were fatal. Our fruit was *unto death*, i. e. was such as turned to the account of death, such as brought us under its power or subjected us to it. The Dat. τῷ θανάτῳ is a kind of Dat. *commodi*; as expressed in the paraphrase above. Θάνατος is here used in the way of personification.

(6) Thus much, then, for the influence of the law upon us, in our natural state. It was utterly unable to effect our renewal and sanctification; nay, it did but aggravate our guilt and condemnation; instead of delivering us from them. It is only in our new state and under our new affiancement, that we are enabled to bring forth fruit of a different kind.

Νυνὶ δὲ . . . νόμου, *but now being freed from the law*; i. e. no longer placing our reliance on it as a means of subduing and sanctifying our sinful natures. For the sense of κατηργήθημεν, compare κατήργηται ἀπὸ τοῦ νομοῦ in v. 2 above.

Ἀποθανόντες is a controverted reading; and there are some vari-

ations in the manuscripts. But the weight of external evidence is greatly in its favour; and the internal evidence seems to be quite conclusive. The sentiment of it is exactly the same, as that of *ἐθα-νατώθητε τῷ νόμῳ* in v. 4 above. Here the *first* person plural is used,—and there the *second*; but this changes not the nature of the sentiment. The full construction here would seem to be: *ἀποθανόντες [ἐκείνῳ] ἐν ᾧ κατειχόμεθα*. The verb *κατέχω* means *to hold back, to retain, to hold firmly*, etc. Here *κατειχόμεθα* must mean, the holding as it were in a state of bondage, from which the gospel frees. *Ἐν ᾧ*, i. e. *ἐν ᾧ νόμῳ*.

The sense of the whole may be made more facile, by a different arrangement: *but now being dead [to the law], we are freed from the law by which we were held in bondage.*

Ὡστε . . . γράμματος, so that we may now serve [God] in a new and spiritual manner, and not in the old and literal one. That *θεῷ* is to be understood after *δουλεύειν*, seems certain from the nature of the antithesis, and from comparing vs. 4, 5.—*Πνεύματος* I take to be the Gen. of *attribute* or *explanation*. *Ἐν καινότητι πνεύματος, in a newness of a spiritual kind*, i. e. in a new and spiritual manner. So *παιδιότητι γράμματος* designates the former method of *literal external obedience*, which the Jews endeavored to render to the law while *ἐν σαρκί*. There was no heart in it. *God is a Spirit*; and he must be worshipped *ἐν πνεύματι*. But this command is obeyed, only when there is a “new heart and a right spirit” in men; and this is not until they become affianced to Christ. “The law,” says Calvin, “puts a check upon our external actions; but it does not in the least restrain the fury of our concupiscence.”

CHAP. VII. 7—12.

We must expect the legalist to rise up with not a little excitement against the declaration of the apostle, viz. *τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν, τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου*. ‘What, then,’ he would at once say, ‘are we to believe that the holy and perfect law of God is not only incompetent to sanctify us, but that it is even the occasion of our being greater sinners than we should otherwise be? Can it be lawful or proper to make such an insinuation as this? Is the law sin?’

To this objection the apostle now replies; and replies in such a way as to shew, that while he fully maintains his ground, viz. that the law is the occasion of greatly aggravating our guilt and condemnation, still the fault lies in us and not in the law; for this is altogether worthy of approbation and obedience, because it is “holy, just, and good.” This is at once a delicate and difficult part of the apostle’s discourse, and it is managed with great skill and effect. How often it has been misunderstood, and construed so as to be irrelevant to the object which the writer has in view, will be better seen in the

sequel. In the mean time, I must beg the reader to dismiss every thing from his mind but the simple desire and inquiry to know what the verses before us mean, when explained by the object of the writer, the nature of the connection in which they stand, and the language which is employed.

(7) *Τί οὖν . . . ἁμαρτία; What shall we say then? Is the law sin?* Language of the objector, in opposition to what the apostle had said in v. 5.—*Ἀμαρτία*, from the necessity of the case must here mean, *the cause of sin*. So Mic. 1: 5, “What is the *transgression* of Jacob? Is it not Samaria?” i. e. what is the cause of Jacob’s *transgression*, etc.? Eph. 2: 16, “having slain the enmity thereby,” i. e. the cause of enmity. To give *ἁμαρτία* a different sense here, would be inept.

Μὴ γένοιτο is the answer of the apostle. He means by it wholly to deny the charge involved in the previous question, in the sense in which the legalist supposed the charge might be made, viz. that the law was the efficient cause or the sinful cause of our sin, and that our guilt might be justly put to the account of the law. So much is plain from the sequel. But he does not mean to deny, that there is a sense in which the law is connected with our sins, and that it is the occasion of their being aggravated, rather than the efficient means of our being sanctified. *Ἀλλά* intimates, that the apostle has some exception to the universal sense of *μὴ γένοιτο*. The course of thought runs thus: ‘The law is not the sinful or efficient cause of sin; but still there is a sense in which the law is connected with sin.’ What this is, the writer goes on to describe.

Τὴν ἁμαρτίαν . . . νόμῳ, I had not known sin except by the law. By what law? As a general proposition, it would be true as to the law of nature or of revelation. “Where there is no law, there is no transgression,” Rom. 4: 15. When the apostle (Rom. 1—11.) speaks of the Gentiles as sinners, he makes them offenders against the law of nature, written upon their hearts, Rom. 2: 14, 15; and when he convicts the Jews of guilt, he represents them as offending against revelation. What is said in the verse before us, if understood in a *general* way, might be explained and defended, then, on general principles. But plainly this is not the object of the writer here. He is controverting with the *legalists*. And who were they? *Jews*, not Gentiles; at least, they usually were not Gentiles. It is the *Jewish* law, then, to which he here adverts.

But in what sense would he *not have known sin, except by the*

law? Surely the Gentiles were sinners, who had no revelation; as he has abundantly shewn in chap. i. 11. This consideration leads us of course to say, that the meaning of *known* (ἐγνων) is a *qualified* and *comparative* one, in the present passage. The meaning must be, that he would not have known sin in any such manner and measure as he then actually did, had it not been for the law. In this idea is included, not a mere theoretical, and as it were scientific, knowledge of it, but that knowledge which is derived from experience, and experience in a high degree. The explanation subjoined in v. 8, appears to leave no room to doubt this exegesis. The simple explanation of the whole seems to be this: 'Unless the law had put restraint upon sinning, I should never have known how great my wickedness is, or how much propensity to evil I have. The restraints of the law galled my evil passions, and they broke out with redoubled violence; and in this way I have come, from bitter experience, to know much more of the nature and extent of my sinfulness. I should never have known to what extent I was capable of going, had not the restraints of the law brought me to a full development of myself. I was excited by the check which they put upon me; and I acted out myself in such a manner as I never should have otherwise done; and in this way I have come to know my sinfulness, through the law. In this way *πᾶσα ἐπιθυμία* (v. 8) was wrought in me, so that I have a knowledge of sin such as I never should have acquired in any other way.'

In this compound sense (so to speak) of fuller development, and (through this) of more complete means of knowledge, does the apostle appear to affirm that he has acquired a knowledge of sin by the law. Vs. 7 and 8 taken together, and so they must be treated, can leave no room to doubt, that it is not merely the instruction which the law gives concerning the nature of sin, that the apostle aims here to describe; but a knowledge which is acquired (as described in v. 8) by an experimental acquaintance with sin; which had been heightened to so great a degree by the restraints of law, as to place the subjects of it in such a condition as to practical knowledge with regard to his own sinfulness, as nothing else could have brought about.

On any other ground of exegesis, the connection between vs. 7 and 8 must be virtually broken up. The connection is thus: 'I had not known sin, as I now do, except by the law; but now I do so know it, because the law has brought out all my sinful nature in opposition

to it, which would otherwise have never so developed itself.' But if we understand v. 7 as a mere eulogy of the law, on account of the light which it gives, (as not a few commentators have deemed it to be); then in what respect is v. 8 the antithesis of v. 7? That antithesis or distinction is intended, the *δέ* in v. 8 here clearly shews. The true nature of the antithesis seems to be this: 'I had not so known sin, except by the law; but now I do so know it, on account of the law. Verse 8 shews how and why the sinner comes thus to know it, and that it is in an experimental way.

Τὴν τε γὰρ . . . ἐπιθυμῆσεις, for *I had not known even lust, unless the law had said: Thou shalt not lust. Γὰρ confirmantis* here; i. e. it is placed at the head of a clause designed to confirm and strengthen the preceding assertion. The second clause is an assertion of the same general nature with the first, excepting merely that it is in its nature more intense. *Ἐπιθυμίαν* is a word for which we have no equivalent in our language, when it means, as it here does, *unlawful or sinful desire* in general, i. e. desire of what would be in any way injurious to our neighbour. The reference in the mind of the writer, appears plainly to have been to Ex. 20: 14, לֹא תַחְמַדְךָ etc.; which is well rendered: *Thou shalt not covet*, i. e. shalt not inordinately desire; but which is rendered in Greek by *οὐκ ἐπιθυμῆσεις*, *thou shalt not desire, thou shalt not lust after or covet*. The misfortune is, that we have no English noun that corresponds to the verb *covet*; for *covetousness* means, a greedy appetite for wealth; and *lust* means (at least as now employed), *unclean desire*. We must then paraphrase *ἐπιθυμίαν*, and render it *inordinate desire, forbidden desire*. The word sometimes means *unlawful sensual desire*; but plainly it is not here limited to a meaning so circumscribed. The reference to Ex. 20: 14 forbids this supposition, as well as the nature of the case.

Τέ has given trouble to the critics here. How it differs from *καί* may be seen in Bretschn. Lex. *τέ*. When employed alone (as here), it is used to join those things which in their own nature are united and naturally follow each other; or those which, for some other reasons, must be associated together. Here the first of these reasons seems to apply. *Ἐπιθυμία*, in the sense which it here has, is of course a *species* under the *genus ἀμαρτία*. In such cases, *τέ* answers to the Latin *que, etiam*. I have rendered it *even* (*etiam*), because I apprehend that there is a kind of *climactic* sense in the clause in which it stands. The writer appears to say: 'Even immoderate desire, that internal feeling which the law might not seem

to modify, has been greatly excited and aggravated by its restraints.' This adds a kind of intensity to what the writer had said of *ἀμαρτία* in general.

That the whole is here to be understood in a *comparative* sense, is a clear case. If no revelation had ever been given to the Jews, then, like the Gentiles, they would have had the law of nature to guide and check them, Rom. 2: 14, 15. In the *absolute* sense, then, the apostle cannot be supposed to speak. The writer means: 'I had not so known sin as I now know it, except by the law.' A complete and full illustration and vindication of such a comparative sense, may be found in John 15: 22—24; which the reader is desired attentively to consult.

(8) This verse explains *how* the law has been the occasion of promoting the knowledge of sin, in the sense which the writer here means to convey. Ἀφορμὴν δέ . . . ἐπιθυμίαν, *but sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of inordinate desire.*—*Ἀμαρτία* is here the *sinful principle* in men, their corruption or sinful disposition. It is personified in the present verse. But how or why did sin take occasion by the commandment to produce all manner of inordinate desires? The apostle does not definitely answer this question, but leaves it to be supplied, as a matter of course, by his readers. What then is the principle in human nature, which he seems to consider so obvious as to need no mention? It is the one, I answer, to which I have already more than once adverted; viz. that opposition to the desires and passions of unsanctified men, inflames them and renders them more intense and unyielding. So most of the commentators. Calvin: Neque inficior quum acrius a lege extimuletur caro ad concupiscendum.—Per legem instigatur cupiditas nostra, ut in majorem ebulliat insaniam.—Vitiosa hominum natura, cujus perversitas ac libido, quo magis justitiæ repagulis coërceretur, eo furiosius erumpit (in v. 5). Chrysostom: "Ὅταν γὰρ τινοσ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν, εἶτα κωλυόμεθα, αἴρεται μᾶλλον τῆσ ἐπιθυμιασ ἢ φλόξ, *when we covet any thing, and are hindered from obtaining it, the flame of our inordinate desire is the more augmented.* Erasmus: Universa cupiditatum cohors irritata, prohibitione cœpit acrius ad peccandum sollicitare. A most striking and melancholy example in point is, that prohibition and penalty were not sufficient, even in paradise, to prevent our first parents from ruining themselves and all their posterity.

The very heathen fully acknowledged the principle in question;

so plainly is it a part of our nature. Thus Cato (Liv. xxxiv. 4) says of *luxury*: Non mota, tolerabilior esset quam erit nunc; ipsis vinculis, sicut fera bestia, irritata deinde emissa. Seneca: Parricidæ cum lege cœperunt, de Clem. I. 23. Horace: Audax omnia perpeti, gens humanum ruit per vetitum nefas, Carm. I. 3. Ovid: Nitimur in vetitum semper cupimusque negata, Amor. III. 4. To the like purpose is Prov. 9: 17: Stolen waters are sweet, and bread eaten in secret is pleasure.

Now as this is an obvious principle of a corrupt natural state, and will account for the fact which the apostle has asserted in the text, we may adopt the conclusion that it lies at the ground of his assertion.

Observe the strength of the expression, *διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς . . . ἐπιθυμίαν* as much as to say: 'Sin, i. e. my sinful nature or disposition, did not simply produce *ἐπιθυμίαν*, i. e. some *inordinate desire* that would lead to the commission of evil—but *πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν*, every kind of *inordinate desire*, a great variety of evil passions, and highly stimulated ones.' To account for this, we must resort to the principle already stated. It should be noted here, also, that in this way it was, that the law was the occasion of his obtaining a knowledge of sin, which he would otherwise never have acquired. So the sequel intimates:

Χωρὶς γὰρ νόμου ἁμαρτία νεκρά, for without the law sin is dead; i. e. comparatively sluggish and inoperative; comp. James 2: 17, 26, *πίστις νεκρά*. That such must be the sense, the preceding declaration shews; the amount of which is, that 'sin did by the commandment produce all kinds of inordinate desire in him.' Now if this be correct, then sin, without such commandment, i. e. without the occasion of producing *πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν*, would be comparatively inoperative. For the comparative sense of the whole passage, the reader is again referred to John 15: 22—24. That the apostle could not mean to be understood in the *absolute* sense, is plain from chap. 1. 11., where the Gentiles are convicted of sin, who nevertheless are without the law here spoken of, i. e. without a revelation.

(9) *Ἐγὼ δὲ ἔζων . . . ποτέ*, for I was alive once, without the law. A difficult and much controverted phrase. The *δέ* presents obstacles, in the first place. Is it *δέ orationi continuandæ inserviens*, or *δέ discretiva vel disjunctiva*? The first, I answer; but it belongs to that species of usage which inserts *δέ* before an *explanation*; "accuratius definit," Bretsch. Lex. In such a case *δέ* may be rendered

enim, etenim, and it differs not essentially from γάρ as to sense; comp. δέ in Mark 4: 37. 16: 8. John 6: 10. Acts 23: 13. Rom. 3: 22. 1 Cor. 10: 11. 15: 56. As I understand ἔζων here, it is an opposition of *phraseology* merely, not of sense. To say that *sin was dead*, and that *I was alive*, is saying the same thing as to sentiment; for whenever sin lives, then man dies, as the sequel of the verse clearly shews. And when the writer says ἐγὼ δὲ ἔζων κ. τ. λ., he evidently means to give an example of what he had just asserted, viz. that without the law sin was dead. 'Such,' says he, 'was my case ποτέ.'

But *when?* The difficulty of answering this question seems to have led Augustine, Calvin, and many others, to the opinion, that ἔζων here means: 'I deemed myself alive once,' i. e. before I understood the spirituality and extent of the law. But in such a case we should go through with the exegesis; and this would shew at once the insuperable difficulty which attends it. For example: 'I once deemed myself spiritually alive; but when I came under conviction by the law, I was brought to deem myself spiritually dead,' (so far all seems well); 'and the commandment which was designed to give life, proved to be deadly (εἰς θάνατον) to me;' i. e. it was deadly to me, because it brought me under real and true conviction as to my desperate spiritual condition! Is this then the way in which the law of God proves *fatal* to the sinner, viz. by convincing him of the true and deadly nature of sin? This cannot be admitted; nor is it at all to the writer's purpose, whose immediate object it is to shew, that the law can never cure our maladies, but that on the contrary it is the occasion of aggravating them.

Ἐγὼ δὲ ἔζων κ. τ. λ., then, has the same sense here, as the χωρὶς γὰρ νόμου ἁμαρτία νεκρά of the preceding verse has. It is an example in point to illustrate it; and of course the same thing is to be said as to the *comparative* sense which it bears here, as was said of ἁμαρτία νεκρά there. As I have already remarked, ἐγὼ ἔζων, and ἁμαρτία νεκρά, both convey the same idea: *when sin is dead, I am alive*; i. e. when sin is comparatively inactive or inefficient, (ἁμαρτιαν οὐκ εἶχον, John 15: 22, 24), then I may be said to be comparatively unexposed to death, or, in other words, be said *to live*.

Bretschneider and others understand ἔζων here in the simple sense of *degere vitam, to exist or be* for any length of time. But the nature of the antithetic language here does not seem to permit this; for in the sequel, ἀπέθανον is plainly opposed to ἔζων here; but ἀπέθανον cannot be the antithesis of ἔζων taken in the sense of

vitam degebam, for then ἀπέθανον must mean *physical death*. That both words are used in a comparative and modified sense, is plain from the nature of the case and the tenor of the writer's illustrations.

We return to the question: When was Paul χωρὶς νόμου; He says ποτέ, *once*. But does he mean *absolutely* without law, or comparatively? Not the first; for no moral agent in the universe ever was, or ever will be, without law in the absolute sense. But when did the *commandment come*? The whole turns on this. It is not the giving of the Jewish law, surely, to which Paul refers by this expression; for he did not live then. He must mean, then, some application of the law to himself, in a new manner, or in a way different from any which he had before experienced. *When* this was, he does not say. We may suppose it to be in childhood, or in riper years. The principle is the same. Whenever the law of God was pressed on his mind and conscience with such a weight and power that he could not dismiss attention to what it demands, then began his active and increased opposition to it. Before this, sin was comparatively dead. Now it revived in all its strength, and brought him into deeper guilt and more aggravated condemnation. Such is "the coming of the commandment;" and previous to this coming, Paul was, in the sense before stated, *alive*; i. e. he was less the subject of sin, and less exposed to death.

The δέ after ἐλθούσης is *discretive*; for that part of the sentence which follows is placed in antithesis with the preceding clause.—'Ἀμαρτία ἀνέζησε, *sin revived or flourished*. 'Ἀναζάω means *to gather new life, to shew additional vigour*; and such is clearly the sense here, as it does not mean merely *a renewal of a life* which had before existed. The expression itself is plainly one which the writer uses as equivalent to ἁμαρτία. . . . κατειργάσατο ἐν ἐμοὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν, in the preceding verse. As there "all manner of inordinate desire was wrought διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς" so here, the consequence of ἐλθούσης τῆς ἐντολῆς is, that *sin becomes vigorous*.

(10) Ἐγὼ δὲ ἀπέθανον, *but I died*. The δέ is here used, because ἀπέθανον is the antithesis of ἀνέζησε, δέ *discretiva*. The preceding δέ indicates the antithesis of the whole sequel of the sentence with the preceding part of it; the present one indicates an antithesis in the form of expression, between two subordinate clauses of the latter part of the sentence.—'Ἀπέθανον, *I fell under sentence of death*; "the soul that sinneth shall die;" "the wages of sin is death." So plainly the next clause explains it, where the death in-

curred is placed in opposition to the life which obedience to the whole law would ensure. But then, there is plainly an intensive sense to be attached here to the word ἀπέθανον just as there is to the word ἀνέζησε. The apostle means to say (as v. 8 shews), that sin put forth fresh vigour when the commandment came; consequently he incurred aggravated guilt; and aggravated condemnation must necessarily follow. It also lies on the face of the whole, that the writer designs to convey the idea, that the law, instead of affording sanctification and deliverance from sin, is the occasion of aggravating both guilt and condemnation. So he had intimated in 6: 14; and so he here proves the fact to be.

Καὶ εὐρέθη . . . εἰς θάνατον, *even the very commandment which was designed [to bestow] life, was found to be unto my death.*—Καὶ εὐρέθη κ. τ. λ. is evidently a clause added for the sake of intensity and variety of expression—a mere exegesis of ἀπέθανον. The καὶ here, then, is not *and*, but *καὶ etiam*; καὶ “intendit vel auget significationem.”—In saying ἐντολὴ εἰς ζωὴν, there was a reference in the mind of the writer to such passages of the Old Test. as the following: “My statutes . . . which if a man do he shall even live by them,” Ezek. 20: 11, 13, 21. Lev. 18: 5, et alib. *Μοί* is, in point of sense, to be constructed after θάνατον, and is a *Dat. incommodi*; comp. in verse 13.

(11) A repetition with some variations in the phraseology, of the same sentiment which is established in v. 8.—*Ἡ γὰρ . . . ἀπέκτεινε, for sin taking occasion by the commandment deceived me, and by it slew me. Γὰρ confirmantis*; for the sequel shows how the commandment came to prove deadly to him. In respect to ἀφορμὴν λαβοῦσα, see v. 8. The *occasion* was, that the law restrained evil passions; which, in a graceless state of the heart, aggravated opposition to it.—*Διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς* must mean, through the law as an *occasional* instrument or cause; not by it as the *efficient* cause of sin, which the sequel denies the law to be.—*Ἐξηπάτησέ με* seems to mean, the deceit which our sinful passions practise upon us, by leading us to regard all restraint of them as unreasonable and oppressive, and to feel that we are in the right when we resist such restraint. The consequences of such a feeling will be; to obey our passions and not the law. Of course *we are slain* by such deceit; it leads us to plunge into ruin.—*Δι’ αὐτῆς* must mean, *δι’ ἐντολῆς*. In what sense sin slays through the commandment, has been once and again stated.

(12) “Ὡστε ὁ μὲν . . . ἀγαθή, *wherefore the law is holy, and the*

commandment holy and just and good. "Ὡστε at the beginning of a sentence, is rendered *quare, itaque, igitur*, by Bretschneider. The true force of it seems to be *so that*, i. e. things being as I have said, it follows that, etc.—*Μέν* is difficult of grammatical solution here. Taken as the usual sign of *protasis*, where (we may ask) is the *apodosis*? Καὶ ἡ ἐντολὴ κ. τ. λ. will hardly make one, for it is merely epexegetical of ὁ νόμος ἅγιος. Bretschneider (Lex.) says, that μέν here cannot be translated. Be it so; it must still be true, I think, that the writer had some apodosis in his mind, when he employed it. I know it is often the case, in the Greek classics, that μέν is employed without any subsequent apodosis being expressed. But is it used unless one is *implied*? I think not. What then is the implied apodosis here? We may probably supply it from v. 13; and if so it would seem to be this: ἁμαρτία δέ ἐστιν ἡ κατεργαζομένη θάνατον διὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ νόμου.

It will be perceived, that the present verse is not a regular logical *deduction* from the preceding verses. The writer means to say, that after all that he has said, the view which he has taken of the case is such, that the excellence and purity of the law stand unimpeached. The law is indeed the *occasion*, but it is the *innocent* occasion, of sin. It is the abuse of it which makes men sinners. It is their evil passions which convert what in its own nature tends to life, into an instrument of death. The reason of repeating νόμος and ἐντολή both, here, seems to be, that both had been employed in the preceding illustration; see vs. 7—10. If there be any difference between the two words, it must be, that νόμος is the generic appellation of the divine law, ἡ ἄγία; while ἐντολή corresponds to ῥῆ, i. e. any particular precept. As used by the writer, however, no difference is here intended. Ἄγία here means *pure, free from all moral defect, free from sin, opposed to sin.* Δικαία, *agreeable to δική*, i. e. promoting justice and punishing sin. Ἀγαθή, *good* in its object and end, tending to secure the ends of benevolence. The most appropriate to the apostle's purpose here, of all the qualities which he mentions, is that of *holiness*. Hence, ὁ νόμος ἅγιος and ἡ ἐντολή ἅγια.

Thus much for statement, that the law is the occasion of our guilt being aggravated, instead of delivering us from it. The vindication of that character of the law, which is stated in v. 12, follows. But before we proceed to it, we must endeavour to solve some questions which naturally arise here.

The reader has doubtless perceived, that I suppose the apostle to be here speaking of himself when in a *legal state*, or under the law, and

before he was united to Christ. This I believe to be the case, for many reasons; some of which I must defer to the close of the whole chapter. It is sufficient to my present purpose to state, that nothing can appear more certain, than that vs. 7—11 are a defence and confirmation of the obnoxious expression (obnoxious to the legalist) contained in v. 5. It is this verse, which gives occasion to the objection expressed at the beginning of v. 7; and it is of course the same, which is the theme of vs. 7—11. But on looking back to v. 5, we find ἤμεν ἐν τῇ σαρκί to be the condition of the person, on whom the law of God produced the unhappy effect stated in the sequel. Indeed the case of itself determines this; for surely the law of God is not the object of the *believer's* hatred; nor does it enkindle his passions and aggravate his offences; it reproveth, restrains, moderates, subdues his evil affections and desires. To prove this, would be as superfluous as to prove that the renewed heart loves and approves of holiness. It is surely none but an *unsanctified* heart, which can make such a use of the law of God as is stated in vs. 7—11.

Moreover the difficulties attending the usual exegesis (usual in modern times and among a certain class of writers) of this passage, are truly appalling. E. g. vs. 9, 10, are thus explained: 'I thought myself alive, i. e. holy or good, before I was brought under conviction by the law; but when this conviction took place, a penitential sense of sin became strong and active; I was then fully persuaded that I deserved condemnation (ἐγὼ δὲ ἀπέθανον); and I found that instead of keeping the commandment, I had only brought myself under its penalty.' Now all this would do well, in itself considered; the sentiment is evangelical and correct. But the difficulty in obtaining this sentiment from the passage before us, is, (1) That one must violate the *usus loquendi*. (2) He must bring contradiction and inextricable difficulty into the context. (3) He must make the writer assert what is irrelevant to his present purpose.

First, to construe ἁμαρτία ἀνέζησεν as meaning, *a penitential sense of sin revived or became strong*, has no parallel in Scripture. ἁμαρτία cannot be shewn ever to mean *penitential sense of sin*. As little too can ζῶν be shewn to mean, *I thought myself alive, i. e. righteous*. Both renderings are discrepant from all *usus loquendi*.

Secondly, if we take the meaning of ἁμαρτία, *penitential sense of sin*, and carry it on through v. 11, which is indissolubly connected with v. 10, (as a comparison of vs. 7, 8, and the γόρ in v. 11, shew), it will make a sense utterly inadmissible. E. g. 'A penitential sense of sin (ἁμαρτία), taking occasion by the law, *deceived me and slew me!*' And is this an exegesis to be tolerated even for a moment? I trust not. Sorrow for sin neither *deceives* nor *slays*; but just the opposite. Yet such a carrying forward of the sense given to ἁμαρτία in v. 10, is fairly inevitable, unless one renounces all the principles by which a writer's thoughts are connected together.

Thirdly, such a sentiment as is given to v. 10, is irrelevant to the writer's purpose. His object is to shew, that he has not rashly said, τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου, v. 5. How will it prove this, if he declares merely that the law undoes the false hopes of the sinner,

and brings him under true conviction? This would seem, at least, to be proving just the opposite of what he designs to shew. Nor will it help the matter in the least, if you suppose him to be speaking of the experience of Christians; for surely it would not illustrate the declaration, that the law is the occasion of our evil passions being aggravated, to assert that Christians are convinced of sin by it, and brought to true penitence. The whole interpretation, therefore, which assigns such a meaning to v. 10, appears to be inept, and destitute of any adequate support whatever. The sentiment which it brings forward is indeed in itself correct; but whether it is the sentiment of the passage under examination—is a very different question.

I shall proceed, therefore, through the remainder of the chapter, on the ground that a person in a *law-state*, and not in a state of grace, is described. To some of the reasons for this method of interpretation I have just adverted; and to some more I must advert, in the course of my exposition. But the more ample defence of this principle of exegesis, and the answer to the principal objections, I reserve to the close of the chapter, because they will then be better understood than if they should now be introduced.

It is proper, however, to say a few words here, respecting the use of the *first person singular*, throughout vs. 7—25. Does the apostle mean to designate himself specially and peculiarly, or does he include others with himself? Others certainly are included, understand him as you please. If he speaks of himself while under the law, he means by a parity of reasoning to include all others who are in the same condition. If he speaks of himself as a Christian, he means in the same manner to include all other Christians, who of course must have similar experience. So that Ambrose very appropriately and truly says: *Sub suâ personâ quasi generalem causam agit*. The use sometimes of the plural and sometimes of the singular number, favours this supposition; comp. vs. 5, 7, 14, seq. and 8: 1, seq. The apostle often employs the first person singular, where he is discussing general principles; e. g. 1 Cor. 6: 12. 10: 23, 29, 30. 13: 11, 12. Gal. 2: 18, et al. sæpe. That it is not unusual for the apostles to include themselves, even where they are saying things which convey sharp reproof, is also true; e. g. James 3: 1, 2, 9. Whatever ground of exegesis one takes, as to chap. vii. in general, the principle that Paul speaks of himself only as an example of what others are in like circumstances, must of course be admitted. Comp. 1 Cor. 4: 6, where he explicitly asserts such a principle.

CHAP. VII. 13—25.

The Jew would very naturally ask, on hearing such a declaration as is contained in v. 12; 'What, then, is that which is good, the cause of sin?' This the apostle represents him as doing; and to this question he replies, that it is not the law itself which is the cause of sin, but the *abuse* of it by the sinner which renders him guilty; and that in this way the odious deformity of sin is peculiarly and strikingly exhibited. In the sequel the apostle proceeds to exhibit, in a very forcible manner, the fact that the law can in no way be involved in the charge of being the efficient cause of sin, for it stands in direct and perpetual opposition to all the sinful desires of men in an unsanctified and carnal state. That it is holy and just and good, is evinced by the fact, that the conscience and moral sense spontaneously take sides with it or approve of its precepts. Yet notwithstanding all this, such is the force of sinful desires and lusts, that they triumph over the precepts of the law, and lead the unsanctified man to continual opposition and transgression. Even against the voice of reason and conscience, i. e. of an internal moral nature, as well as against the divine precepts, does carnal desire prevail; we yield the *moral self* to the power of the *carnal self*, and plunge deep into ruin, while the voice of God's law is thundering in our ears, and the voice of our own consciences is loudly remonstrating against our conduct. 'Wretched men that we are!' Truly wretched, while out of Christ, while under the law, while destitute of that spirit of adoption, which subdues the carnal man, and leads us to walk *κατὰ πνεῦμα*, and furnishes us with grace to do so!

The purpose of all this illustration or representation, on the part of the apostle, is very plain. If such is the state of those who are under the law, that all its prohibitions, penalties, and commands will produce no decisive influence in reforming and sanctifying them; if such is the wickedness of unsanctified men, that they refuse to hearken to the voice of conscience even, as well as of the divine law; then is the condition of the legalist, who places his hopes in the sanctifying power of that law, desperate indeed. Well may he exclaim: *καταίματος ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπος! τίς με ῥύσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου;* Who can refrain, now, from perceiving that all this is much to the purpose of the apostle, whose object it is to show, that to be *under grace* (and not under the law) affords the only hope for the sinner? Accordingly, in chap. VIII. 1—17, he shews that the opposite of all which he has been before describing takes place in the unregenerate, and that a filial spirit subdues carnal affections, overcomes the world, and enables Christians to walk *according to the Spirit*; nothing of which is accomplished, while men are in the condition described in 7: 14—25.

Now to what special end of the apostle would it be here subservient, if we suppose him to be describing a state of grace in chap. VII.? How does the contest in the breast of Christians against sin, prove the inefficacy of the *law* to sanctify them? For to prove such an inefficacy, it must be admitted, is the general object of all the present discourse. The fact is, that such a statement would prove too much. It would shew that *grace* is wanting in efficacy, as well as the *law*; for the Christian, being a subject of grace, and still keeping up such a contest, one might of course be tempted to say: 'It appears, then, that grace is no more competent than law, to subdue sin and sanctify the heart.' And indeed he might well say this, if the ground of those who construe all this of the *regenerate* man be correct. For what is the real state of the whole matter as represented by the apostle? It is, that in every contest here between the flesh and the spirit (the moral man), the former comes off victorious. And can this be a regenerate state? Is this "the victory which is of God, and overcometh the world?" "He that is born of God sinneth not;" those that love his law "do no iniquity;" he that loveth Christ, "keepeth his commandments;" i. e. a habitual and voluntary offender such an one is not; he gives not himself up to any course of sin; it is his habitual study and ef-

fort to subdue his passions and obey the commandments of God. But what of all this is there, in the case which the apostle presents in 7: 14—25? Read now chap. VIII. 1—17, and then ask: Is the man described in 7: 14—25, who yields in every instance to the assault of his passions, and suffers them continually to triumph over law, conscience, and every other consideration, such a man or the same man as is described in 8: 1—17? In this latter passage the man is described “who walks not after the flesh, but after the Spirit.” Can this then be the same man who does walk after the flesh, and always does this, even when the voice of God and conscience is thundering in his ears, and his own internal moral nature is warning him against the course he pursues? Impossible. Light and darkness are not more diverse than these two cases.

The transition which is represented as taking place, at the close of chap. VII. and the commencement of chap. VIII., most fully exhibits this. Here is indeed a wonderful transition; one from a state of captivity to the law of sin and death, to a state of freedom from both, to the enjoyment of the glorious liberty of the children of God. But if the contest in chap. 7: 14—25 is meant for one which is only in the breast of the *regenerate*; then into what state does he go, or what is the condition of him, who makes the transition represented in chap. VIII.? The only answer which can be made, seems to be, that it is from a state of struggle with sin, to a state in which there is no struggle with it. And does the Christian, then, attain to this state in the present life? I will not deny the possibility of it; but as a matter of fact, who will bring adequate proof, that he does truly “love God with all his heart and his neighbour as himself,” without variation, and to the highest extent of which he is capable? “If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.” Such a transition, then, in this case, is utterly improbable; and therefore cannot be admitted.

But put the case which I have supposed above, and which accords with the design of the apostle and the language employed, viz. that the transition is from a state in which the carnal passions were uniformly victorious, to one in which the holy principle becomes predominantly so, and then you have not only a possible but an actual case; yea, thousands and millions of actual cases. Can we hesitate, then, as to what the object of the writer is, in the passage before us?

(13) *Τὸ οὖν ἀγαθὸν . . . θάνατος; Has then that which is good become death to me?* i. e. ‘You call the commandment *ἀγαθὴ*, kind, beneficent, productive of happiness; how can that which is beneficent, be fatal to me? Is not this a contradiction?’ The answer is, *μὴ γένοιτο* i. e. it is not true that the *ἐντολὴ ἀγαθὴ* was of itself fatal or deadly to you, *ἀλλὰ ἡ ἁμαρτία*, but sin [was death to you]; for that *σοὶ γέγονε θάνατος* is implied after *ἁμαρτία*, is very plain from the nature of the sentence.

“*Ἴνα φανῆ . . . θάνατον*, so that sin might exhibit itself, causing death to me by that which is good.—*Φανῆ* is 2 Aor. pass. Subj., but is employed (as the Aorists pass. often are) in the sense of the Middle voice. The meaning is: ‘Sin became the cause of death to me, by my abusing of the law which was altogether good; and so it exhibited, in a true light, its own deadly and odious nature. The *μοί* here, and the *ἐμοί* above, are the Dat. *incommodi*.

“*Ἴνα γένηται . . . ἐντολῆς*, so that sin, through the commandment,

might be exceedingly sinful; i. e. so that sin, by abuse of the commandment which was good, and making it the occasion of death to the sinner, and by its opposition to a commandment in its own nature holy and just and good, might thus appear to be exceedingly aggravated and detestable. For καθ' ὑπερβολήν, used adverbially instead of ὑπερβαλλόντως, comp. 1 Cor. 12: 31. 2 Cor. 1: 8. 4: 17.

(14) Οἶδαμεν γάρ some critics divide thus: οἶδα μὲν γάρ. But the general usage of Paul is against this; for in appeals of this nature he generally uses the plural number, and not the singular.—Γάρ illustrantis et confirmantis; for the sequel is designed to illustrate and confirm what he has said in respect to the law and sin, in v. 13.

Ὁ νόμος πνευματικός ἐστι, the law is spiritual, i. e. the law enjoins those things which are agreeable to the nature and mind of the Spirit. *Flesh* and *spirit* are often opposed to each other in a variety of senses; viz. (1) As *flesh* is weak and perishable (Gen. 6: 3. Ps. 78: 39. 56: 4. Jer. 17: 5. Is. 40: 6), so *spirit* (πνεῦμα, πνεῦμα), the animating and invigorating principle, is sometimes placed in opposition to it with the meaning of strength and permanence; e. g. Is. 31: 3. But, (2) The most common usage in the New Testament is the tropical one; where σάρξ is viewed as the principal seat or strong hold of sinful desires and affections, and is often employed to designate them, sometimes simply, and sometimes with φρόνημα added to it; while πνεῦμα, when employed in the way of antithesis to it, means the new living principle, which is τὸ πνευματικόν, something produced by the Spirit of God, and guided by his influence. Hence Christians are πνευματικοί, and unsanctified men are σαρκικοί, because the former are under the influence of the Spirit, and the latter are guided by their carnal appetites and desires. All this is quite plain, when one reads Rom. 8: 1—17, where the antithesis is fully and explicitly stated.

To say, then, that the law is πνευματικός, is to affirm that its nature is pneumatic, i. e. agreeable to the nature and mind of the Spirit. The antithesis, therefore, is plain; viz. ἐγὼ δὲ σαρκικός εἰμι, but I am carnal, i. e. under the influence of carnal desires and affections. Even such desires as do not spring directly from the flesh, are sometimes named carnal; and this, it would seem, because most of our sinful propensities are directly connected with the flesh, and those which are not, are similar in regard to their character. For example; in Gal. 5: 19—22, the apostle names hatred, envy, anger, etc., as ἔργα σαρκός; and so in Rom. 8: 5—9, κατὰ σάρκα εἶναι

or περιπατεῖν, includes every kind of vicious life. And in the passage before us, σαρκικός εἰμι is explained by a clause which the writer immediately adds; viz.

Πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, sold under sin, i. e. the bond-slave of sin, δοῦλος τῆς ἁμαρτίας· for so the sequel shews him to be, inasmuch as he always obeys sin, whatever opposition is made to it on the part of conscience or the divine law. The language is borrowed from the practice of selling captives, taken in war, as slaves. They were viewed as having forfeited their lives; and so they were sold into a state of the most absolute despotism. In allusion to this, the apostle represents the person who is still under the law, and therefore unredeemed, as being the bond-slave of sin. Stronger language than this he could not employ; and it will be important, in the sequel, to look back on this expression in order to solve some of the doubts which may arise from ὁ μισῶ, ὃ οὐ θέλω ἐγώ, τὸ θελεῖν παράκειται μοι, συνήδομαι τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ, etc. Let the reader, who wishes to know the writer's own exposition of σαρκικός here, carefully compare chap. 8: 5—9.

The law, then, is good, for it is πνευματικός, agreeable to the dictates of the Spirit. It is not this, therefore, which is the efficient cause of men's sins; it is that they are σαρκικοί, devoted to the desires of the flesh, following the dictates of its desires.

(15) That the law does sustain such a character, must be well known to the sinner himself. His own reason and conscience take sides with the law, and approve its precepts. Yet still, so carnally inclined is he, that he listens not to these, but acts directly against them.

In order to express this sentiment in the most striking manner, the apostle divides the person who is thus σαρκικός, but is still compelled to give testimony in favour of the divine law, into two selves, (if I may thus speak); viz. the νοῦς or ὁ ἕσω ἄνθρωπος (vs. 22, 23), and the σῶμα, σὰρξ, or carnal part of his nature. In the latter dwell the passions and affections which sway the ἄνθρωπος σαρκικός· in the former is still a portion of the image of God, which discerns, and cannot but approve, the holy and perfect law of God that is merely a transcript of his own nature. If the reader has any question, whether this last statement is in accordance with the apostle's views of unsanctified human nature, he needs but to turn back and read Rom. 2: 14, 15, in order to dissipate his doubts. That the unregenerate have reason and conscience which approve, and must approve,

the divine law, shews nothing more than that they are *rational* and *moral* beings, with faculties adapted to a state of moral probation; and that they are made in the image of God, so far as a rational and moral nature is concerned. This is merely saying that they are *men*, and not brutes. The faculty to discern what is good, the power to approve of it, is in itself no more holy or sinful, than the faculty of ratiocination is, or of seeing or hearing. Nothing can be more unfounded, than the supposition that moral good is put to the account of the sinner, merely because one assigns to him reason to discern its nature, and conscience to approve it. Without these he could not be a rational and moral being. They are mere *pura naturalia*, to speak in the language of the old theology.

The reader need not be in any degree alarmed, then, for the doctrine of human depravity, when he finds the sinner here represented as seeing something of the nature of the divine law, and testifying in its favour. It is on such a ground as this, that the ways of God toward men may be vindicated; for should we allow it to be true, that our *physical* nature is the exciting cause of most of our sins, we may still ask: 'Is there not an ἔσω ἄνθρωπος which opposes all this, and solicits us to avoid sin and cleave to duty?' And on this ground it is, that God regards the heathen as being without excuse; which is clear from Rom. i. ii.

Ὁ γὰρ . . . γινώσκω, for that which I do, I disapprove. The γὰρ here shews clearly that the writer adduces the considerations which follow, in order to illustrate and confirm what he had just asserted, viz. that he who is under the law is σαρκικός, etc.—Ὁὐ γινώσκω is rendered by Chrysostom, Theodoret, Tholuck, and others; I know not, i. e. my mind is so darkened by sin, that I do not perceive the true nature of what I am doing; but the explanation which Paul immediately subjoins seems to forbid this exegesis, viz. οὐ γὰρ ὁ θέλω κ. τ. λ. Besides, the very height of the criminality here depicted is, that the sin is against light and knowledge and conscience. On the other hand, that γινώσκω in Greek, and the Hebrew יָדַע, not unfrequently mean to know, in the sense of acknowledging or approving, may be seen in the lexicons; see Matt. 7: 23. 25: 12. Luke 13: 27. Ps. 1: 6. Hos. 8: 4.

Ὁὐ γὰρ ὁ θέλω, τοῦτο πράσσω, for not that which I approve, do I perform. Γὰρ confirmantis, i. e. the sentence that follows, confirms the preceding statement, by repeating it for substance, but in a form more intelligible and specific. First, we have the general declaration:

What I do, I disapprove. Next, the specific one, which illustrates and confirms it: *Not that which I desire do I perform, but I do that which I hate.* If there be any thing paradoxical here, (and as being so, the first view of the case would seem to present it), it is occasioned entirely by the plan of the writer to represent the two contrary selves in one and the same person. *Κατηγορέομαι* belongs to the *carnal* self; *γινώσκω* to the *νοῦς* or *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος* and thus in succession, it is the conscience and reason, i. e. the internal moral man, which disapproves (*οὐ θέλω*) and hates (*μισῶ*); while the carnal man *does* (*πράσσω, ποιῶ*) the thing which is disapproved and hated.

All speculative metaphysical questions would here be entirely out of place. One might ask: 'Is it true, then, that a man does what he is unwilling to do, and hates to do?' This would be not only to represent him as acting against predominant motives, but as a machine who could not follow his own inclination.' And on the ground of some systems of metaphysical philosophy, the whole would indeed be an unaccountable affair, as it is here represented by the apostle; although such philosophy is not unfrequently insisted on, and urged as being all-important in theology. But still the apostle might make the appeal, for his own triumphant vindication, to the breast of every man on earth, where the moral warfare has been carried on, as he describes it, between conscience and passion. And a most exact and striking picture it is too. The demonstration of its correctness is *internal*, in the very consciousness of the soul; it depends not on metaphysics or ratiocination.

It is not true, indeed, that a man does what, on the whole, he is unwilling to do; nor is this what the apostle means to affirm. But it is true, that men often do what reason and conscience disapprove; and which he here expresses in the strong language of *οὐ θέλω* and *μισῶ*, i. e. it is the *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος* of whom this is predicated. And even this, in a contrast like the present, is not to be urged to its highest point of possible meaning. Thus, for example, *μισῶ* does not always mean *positive hatred*, but a *not loving*, or merely a *comparatively not loving*, i. e. a *less loving*; for so the examples in Matt. 6: 24. Luke 16: 13. 14: 26, teach us. The last example here is perfectly in point, to shew that *μισῶ* may mean (as it certainly does here) merely *a less loving* of some than others; comp. as exegetical of it, Matt. 10: 37. That *θέλω* and *μισῶ*, then, can both be affirmed of the conscience enlightened by the divine law (comp. v. 9), when they are understood in this qualified sense, (and a *qualified* sense, on any ground of exegesis, is absolutely necessary), is sufficiently manifest. Any one who undertakes to urge the sense of words employed in such a contrast as is here presented, to the highest meaning of which they are capable, must involve himself in difficulties that are absolutely inextricable.

There is a striking passage in Xenophon (Cyrop. VI. 1), in which Araspes the Persian says, by way of excusing his treasonable designs:

"Certainly I must have two souls . . . for plainly it is not one and the same which is both evil and good, nor which loves honorable and base conduct, and at the same time wishes to do a thing and not to do it. Plainly, then, there are two souls; and when the good one prevails, then it does good; and when the evil one predominates, then it does evil." Similar to this is the sentiment in Euripides, *Medea*, 1077,

Μανθάνω μὲν, οἷα δοῦν μέλλω κακά,
Θύμος δὲ κρείσσω τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων.

I know, indeed, that such things as I am about to do, are evil; but my mind is better than my inclinations.

The same poet (as quoted by Clemens Alex. *Strom.* II. 15) says:

Ἀέληθεν οὐδὲν τῶνδε μ' ὧν σὺ γουθηεῖς·
Γνώμην δ' ἔχοντά μ' ἢ φύσις βιάζεται,

I have forgotten none of the things respecting which you have admonished me; but although I have a desire to do them, nature struggles against it.

To the same purpose, and in a manner very much like that of Paul, Epictetus says (*Enchirid.* II. 26): Ὁ ἀμαρτάνων, ὃ μὲν θέλει οὐ ποιεῖ· καὶ ὃ μὴ θέλει, ποιεῖ. So Plautus (*Trinummus*, Act. IV. Scen. 2, v. 31); Scibam ut esse me deceret, facere non quibam miser; *I knew that it was becoming, but, me miserable! I could not do it.* Seneca (*Ep.* III): Quid est . . . quod nos alio tendentes, alio trahit, et eo unde recedere cupimus repellit? Quid colluctatur cum animo nostro, nec permittit nobis quidquam semel velle? Ovid (*Metamorph.* VII. 19): Aliudque cupido, mens aliud suadet; *Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.* Seneca (*Hippol.* v. 604): Vos testor . . . hoc quod volo, me nolle.

So Lactantius also represents a heathen as saying: Volo equidem non peccare, sed vincor; indutus enim sum carne fragili. Itaque ducor incertus, et pecco non quia volo, sed quia cogor.

These quotations (for which I gratefully express my obligations to Prof. Tholuck) shew how clear and distinct the impression is upon the human mind, in all countries, that there is a struggle in the breast between conscience and carnal inclination. They also shew how much alike, men enlightened or unenlightened by revelation express themselves in relation to the struggle in question. They answer still another purpose, viz. to shew that language of this nature is used, and is to be understood, in the *popular* sense, and in this only.

(16) *Εἰ δὲ . . . καλός, if now I do that which I do not desire, I acknowledge that the law is good; i. e. if my reason and conscience disapprove that which I do, then my inward man bears testimony in favour of the law, gives assent to the goodness of it.* *Ἀέ* "orationi continuandæ inservit." *Σύμνημι*, lit. *to speak with, to confess, to acknowledge.* The appeal here in favour of the law is very strong; for even those who habitually violate it, are represented as testifying in its favour. In one point of view, this is stronger testimony than that of Christians; for if the real enemies themselves of the law feel obliged

to confess its excellence, we may well expect that the friends of the law will do the same; as indeed they of course do.

(17) *Nun̄i δὲ . . . ἁμαρτία*, now, moreover, it is no longer I who do this, but sin which dwells in me. *Δέ* continuative, "accuratius definit." Two consequences follow from the principle asserted in v. 15; viz. first, that the internal man assents to the goodness of the divine law; secondly, that it is not reason and conscience unperverted which lead men to sin, but their carnal desires. The latter sentiment is asserted in v. 17. *Ἐγώ*, therefore, is the moral self, the *νοῦς* or *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος* here; while *ἡ ἁμαρτία* (here personified) means, the sinful passions and affections of men. The distinction here made, between the higher moral self of reason and conscience, and the lower one of carnal passions and appetites, is very striking. In like manner Seneca says: *Mens cujusque is est quisque, non ea figura quæ digito monstrari potest; the MIND of a man is HIMSELF, not that part which may be pointed out with one's finger, i. e. not the body.* So Augustine: *Magis ego in eo quod in me approbabam, quam in eo quod in me improbabam, Confess. VIII. 5.*

(18) *Οἶδα γὰρ . . . ἀγαθόν*, for I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, there dwelleth no good thing.—*Γὰρ explicantis*; for the present verse is designed to explain the preceding one. There the apostle had said: *It is sin who dwelleth in me.* But what is meant by me? The answer in v. 18 is: *The carnal man.* To say that *sin dwells in me*, and to say that *no good thing dwells in my flesh*, is one and the same thing here. Let the reader compare, in order to ascertain the meaning of the writer, vs. 5, 14.

But this is not all. The apostle goes further than merely to assert, that the carnal part of himself is destitute of any thing spiritually good. He maintains, also, that it has a predominant power over him who is still "under the law and not under grace." *Τὸ γὰρ . . . εὐρίσκω*, for to will that which is good, is in my power; but to do it, I do not find [in my power].—*Τὸ θέλειν* here is of course employed in the same sense as *θέλω* in v. 16, i. e. to designate the approbation or desire of reason and conscience. *Γὰρ* is inserted before a clause designed to illustrate and enforce the preceding declaration.—*Παράκειται*, lit. *lies by me or before me*, i. e. is accessible, is possible, is in my power.—*Οὐκ εὐρίσκω*, I do not find, is an elliptical expression. The complement here would seem to be thus: *Οὐκ εὐρίσκω [παράκειμένον μοι]*, i. e. I do not find it in my power. But no metaphysical nicety of expression is here intended. The writer evidently

means to say, that the carnal part is altogether the predominant self; just in the same manner as he says, that "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God . . . neither *can he know* them." So again: "The carnal mind is enmity against God, and is not subject to the law of God, nor indeed *can it be*," Rom. 8: 7. As *σαρκικός*, i. e. as swayed and directed by carnal desires and affections, the sinner finds no power to do good. The assertion of the apostle does not respect men in a mere psychological or physiological point of view, with simple reference to the powers and attributes of their nature; but it respects them as *σαρκικοί*, as *ἐν σαρκί*, and as acting agreeably to this predominating part of themselves.

Τὸ καλόν stands in the original after *κατεργάζεσθαι* but I have arranged it in the translation, so as to make the sense as explicit as I can.

(19) *Οὐ γὰρ ὃ θελω κ. τ. λ.*, appears to be a repetition of v. 15. It is so in fact; but it is not designed to be merely a repetition. First, the form is a little varied; for here we have *ἀγαθόν* and *καλόν*. But secondly, the sentence here commences with a *γὰρ confirmantis*, and it appears to be designed to confirm the preceding declaration. What is the proof that my reason and conscience approve that which is good, and that I find myself unable to effect it? It is, that I in fact leave undone the good which I approve, and do the evil which I disapprove.

(20) This verse is a summary repetition of vs. 16, 17, omitting one clause of them; as may be seen by comparison. The assertion here is again, that as the *moral I*, viz. the conscience and reason, disapproves of evil, the commission of it is not occasioned by the *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος*, but by the *ἄνθρωπος σαρκικός*.

(21) Next follows a deduction from the preceding representations, of which *ἄρα, then, therefore*, is the sign:

The grammatical construction of the verse is difficult, and has been a matter of contest among critics. Only two methods of explanation seem to me worth discussing. (a) 'I find *τὸν νόμον*, a law or constitution, viz. of my nature, that when I would do good, evil is near at hand.' So Calvin, Venema, Limborch, Michaelis, Bolten, Ammon, etc. It is charged as a difficulty upon this mode of interpretation, that the article in *τὸν νόμον* cannot well be accounted for; for *νόμον* in v. 23 has it not. But this objection has little weight indeed; for *νόμος* in v. 21 is surely a *particular, specific νόμος* but in v. 23, *τὸν ἕτερον νόμον* would give a sense which the writer does

not intend, for he means here only to say that there is another law, i. e. some other law, in opposition to the law of his mind. Ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι does indeed specificate the νόμος in question; but in such a case, the article may be either inserted or omitted. A comparison, moreover, of v. 23 with v. 21, seems to render it quite plain, that τὸν νόμον in the latter is the same as the ἔτερον νόμον in the former. I take the meaning of the writer to be, that he finds it to be a custom or law with him, resulting from his carnal nature, that when his reason and conscience decide in favour of doing good, evil comes in and prevents it; i. e. his carnal affections and desires interpose and hinder his doing good; in other words, he finds the doing of evil so habitual with himself, that he must regard it as a controlling law of his carnal nature.

(b) The second method puts a comma after ἄρα, and construes the intermediate clause thus: Ἐμοὶ τῷ θελοντι ποιεῖν τὸν νόμον, [sc. ποιεῖν] τὸ καλόν· thus making τὸ καλόν a synonyme with τὸν νόμον, and supposing ποιεῖν to be virtually repeated before it. So Tholuck, Knapp, et al. This explanation is a possible one; but I can hardly bring myself to feel that it is probable. In sense it does not differ materially from the other; and therefore it offers no special inducement to adopt it.

Ἐμοὶ τὸ κακὸν παράκειται, evil is at hand, evil is near or in readiness. The meaning here is, as v. 23 shews, that evil stands ready to usurp the place of good, and does in fact usurp it.

(22) Συνήδομαι γὰρ . . . ἄνθρωπον, for I delight in the law of God, as it respects the internal man. Γὰρ illustrantis. The sentiment is, for substance, the same as in vs. 15—17; but the costume in which it appears, is diverse. That the sentiment, moreover, is epeexegetical of v. 21, is quite plain. Hence the γὰρ with which it is introduced.

In regard to the words; συνήδομαι here corresponds to σύμφημι in v. 16; and ἔσω ἄνθρωπον here, corresponds to ἐγὼ in v. 17. If any one is disposed to urge here the strength of the expression συνήδομαι τῷ νόμῳ, as being inconsistent with an unregenerate state, he will do well to look back on v. 14 and ask, whether the expression there, on the other side, is not still stronger. The truth is, in a contrast like this, where the mind of the writer is wrought up to a high pitch of feeling, the mere forms of expression cannot in themselves go very far toward establishing any principle of doctrine. It is to the object at which the writer is aiming, that we must look; and this

object has been already brought to view. But if any one insists on urging the *form* of expression, I must ask him first to construe v. 14 by the rule which he himself here adopts; and then to compare Mark 6: 20. John 5: 35. Matt. 13: 20. John 2: 23—25. Acts 8: 13, comp. vs. 20—23. Isa. 58: 2, where it is said of the wicked, that “they delight to know my ways,” and “they take delight in approaching to God.” Comp. also 1 K. 21: 27—29. 1 John 3: 9. Ps. 119: 3. Many other passages of the like tenor could be adduced, in order to show that a *qualified* sense is to be put on such expressions. Above all, John 15: 22—24. Matt. 6: 24. Luke 16: 13 and 14: 26, shew that very strong expressions of this kind are to be modified according to the nature of the case which is under consideration.

With such examples before us, and with the whole context (at least so it plainly appears to me) to remind us of the necessity of taking *συνήδομαι* in a *qualified* sense, I cannot hesitate to say, that v. 22 only expresses in a more intense form and with more feeling, what is simply expressed in v. 16, *σύμφημι τῷ νόμῳ*. The approbation, complacency (so to speak), which reason and conscience yield to the divine law as holy and good, is the truth intended to be expressed. It is strongly expressed, indeed; but not more so, than in the cases to which the reader is referred above, and about the exegesis of which there can be no disagreement. In fact, the very next verse shews, that the apostle cannot here be understood to mean the pleasure which a regenerate and filial spirit takes in the divine law; for this, as chap. 8: 1—17 most clearly shews, would lead the person who might possess it, to “walk after the Spirit,” and not “after the flesh;” while here, the very individual who “delights in the law of God after the inner man,” is at the same time represented as being ruled over by the law of sin and death, and led to destruction by it. Is this the real state of a child of God? Comp. 8: 9—14.

(23) *Βλέπω δὲ . . . μου*, but I perceive another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind. *Δέ* adversative or disjunctive; i. e. notwithstanding my reason and conscience strongly approve of the divine law, yet I do not obey it; for there is another law directly opposed to it, viz. the law dictated by my carnal passions and desires.—*Μέλει* as in v. 5. This law not only wars against the law of the inner man, but actually overcomes it;—*αἰχμαλωτίζοντά με . . . μου*, lit. making me a captive to the law of sin which is in my members, i. e. reducing me to entire subjection unto, placing me altogether at the disposal of, the law of sin or carnal self. Captives

taken in war were put to death, kept as slaves, or sold as slaves, at the pleasure of the victor. The meaning therefore is, that the law of sin had entire rule or control, notwithstanding the *inner man* decided against it. And can such be the habitual state of any real Christian?

(24) *Ταλαίπωρος . . . τούτου, Wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body which occasions this death or condemnation?* No wonder that the sinner, whose conscience has been awakened by the law of God, and who has been brought by bitter experience to see, that all which reason and conscience do for him, proves ineffectual as to the actual control of his lusts and passions—no wonder that he should be constrained, in view of the dreadful condemnation which seems to await him, to exclaim, “Wretched man that I am!” Well may he express a wish, too, for deliverance from the predominating power of his bodily carnal lusts and inclinations; which, in spite of all the remonstrances that his awakened conscience makes, continue to expose him to the curse of the divine law, yea, to its aggravated penalty.

Τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου is construed by some, as equivalent to *σῶμα θνητόν*, i. e. *frail, dying body*. The sentiment would then be: ‘O that I might die, or be liberated from this mortal body!’ This would, in the connection here presented, be the language of despair; like that of Job when in deep distress, 3: 3—11. 10: 18. But, although this is a *possible* sense, it does not seem to be a probable one; as the comparison of it with chap. 8: 2 shews. *Σῶμα* I understand here (so not unfrequently elsewhere) as equivalent to *σάρξ*, i. e. as designating the seat of the *carnal* and *sinful* principle. In such a sense *σάρξ* stands opposed to *πνεῦμα*, in John 3: 6. Rom. 8: 9, 5, 6. *Θανάτου* is the Genitive of *effect*, as grammarians say, i. e. it is a Genitive which marks or designates the effect produced by *σῶμα* and this latter word designates the agent, viz. *the carnal principle* in natural men, which leads to *death* or *condemnation*; comp. 8: 6.

(25) *Εὐχαριστῶ . . . ἡμῶν, I thank God, through Jesus Christ our Lord*, viz. that there is deliverance; an exclamation from sympathy for the guilty and wretched sufferer, who had just been described. It should be read as in a parenthesis; for to parenthesis it clearly belongs, inasmuch as it breaks in altogether upon the thread of discourse, and is simply an anticipation of what is about to follow in chap. VIII.

Ἄρα οὖν . . . ἀμαρτίας, wherefore I the same person serve with

the mind the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin. A summary of the whole preceding representation, as ἄρα οὖν denotes, in respect to the contest which he had been describing. The sum of all is: 'While my *mind*, i. e. reason and conscience, takes part with the law of God and approves its sanctions, my carnal part obtains the predominance, and brings me into a state of condemnation and ruin.' *Αὐτὸς ἐγώ, the same ἐγώ*, i. e. I the same person have two minds or inclinations in me, etc.

But what follows from all this? Just what the writer set out to prove, viz. (1) That the law of God, which has reason and conscience on its side, is not to be accused as being the efficient cause of sin; but that the indulgence of the sinner's own evil passions is the direct cause of his guilt and misery. (2) That the law, with all its holiness and justice and goodness, and even with reason and conscience on its side, is unable to control the person who is yet under it and is destitute of the grace of the gospel. From all this, follows the grand deduction which the apostle intends to make, viz. that we must be "under grace," in order to subdue our sinful passions and desires. In other words: 'Christ is our *ἀγιασμός*, as well as our *δικαιοσύνη*.'

And now, at the close of this whole representation we may well ask: What stronger proof could the apostle produce, than that which he has brought forward, in order to shew that the law is ineffectual as the means of subduing the power of sin and of sanctifying sinners? The law with all its terrors and strictness, even when reason and conscience are on its side, cannot deliver ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τοῦτου. On the contrary, its very restraints are the occasion of the sinner's guilt being aggravated, because his passions are excited by them to more vehement opposition. Does not all this fully and satisfactorily establish the assertion in v. 5, τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου? And yet, with what admirable caution and prudence is the whole of this nice and difficult discussion conducted! The law stands fully vindicated. Even the sinner himself, who abuses it to his own aggravated guilt and ruin, is obliged to concede that it is holy and just and good. But with all its excellence and glory, with all its promises and threatenings, it never did and never can redeem one soul from death, nor "hide a multitude of sins." Christ is, after all, our only, our all-sufficient Saviour; his is "the only name given under heaven among men whereby we can be saved." He is "our wisdom, our *justification*, our *sanctification*, and our redemption." What then becomes of all the vain and selfish hopes of the legalist? The apostle has scattered them to the winds, and shewed that 'no man can come unto the Father, except by the Son.'

That there is after all, help for the poor perishing sinner, the apostle next proceeds to shew. What the law could not accomplish, Christ

has effected. That control over the carnal passions and desires, which no legal penalties and no remonstrances of reason and conscience would give to him, the grace of the Holy Spirit, given through the gospel, does impart. No longer does he live to the flesh; no more does sin have a habitual and supreme control over him. Such is the happy state to which the perishing sinner comes, by being brought ἐπὶ χάριν and this, he has abundant assurance, will be a permanent state, his 'grace will be crowned with glory.' Such is the theme of the next chapter; but before we proceed to the consideration of it, it will be proper to take, in this place, a brief and compressed view of the grounds on which chap. VII. 5—25 has been interpreted, as having respect to a person who is *under the law* and *not under grace*. For this, I must refer the reader to the *Excursus* upon this chapter.

CHAP. VIII. 1—11.

In the preceding chapter (vs. 7—25), the apostle has illustrated and enforced the proposition made in 7: 5, viz. that while in a carnal state, our sinful passions are not only exercised, but they are even rendered more vigorous or energetic by reason of the restraints which the divine law puts upon them; and consequently, that they 'bring forth fruit unto death.' The law, then, being thus abused by our unholy inclinations and desires, and made the occasion of increasing our sin and enhancing our condemnation, can never be the means of our salvation or deliverance from that very penalty which itself pronounces on all transgressors.

The present chapter exhibits the *antithesis* of all this. It is a commentary upon 7: 6, or at least an enlargement and illustration of the sentiment there exhibited. As v. 6 there, is the antithesis of v. 5; so here, 8: 1—11 is the antithesis of 7: 7—25.

(1) " Ἄρα νῦν, now then, i. e. now agreeably to this. " Ἄρα is usually *illative*, but not always. It is so here, at least in part. But it does not stand connected with the next preceding sentence. The reader must go back beyond the illustration in 7: 7—25, to 7: 6 and 7: 4, in order to find the connection of the Ἄρα νῦν here. The course of the sentiment is thus: 'Since ye have been absolved from your legal state, i. e. since ye have quit your hope of being sanctified and saved by the law, and have become united to Christ, in order that you may bring forth fruit unto God and serve him in newness of spirit, there is no condemnation to you in your present state.' This of course implies, that there would have been condemnation to them, had they remained under the law.

Οὐδὲν . . . κατάκριμα here means, of course, *no condemnation* which is to be carried into execution, *no penalty* actually to be inflicted. The gospel condemns all sin either in believers or others, with even more strictness than the law (see Matt. V.); but under it,

a way of pardon is provided, by which the condemned may obtain remission of the penalty that they have incurred.

The reason why the apostle here mentions the subject of condemnation, is, because he had just called the attention of the reader to it, by the exclamation: *Τίς με ῥύσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου*; Besides, sin and condemnation are inseparably connected; and hence it is, that in v. 2 the apostle speaks of "deliverance from sin and death," by the power and grace of the gospel. The subject of *death* or *condemnation* is, however, merely *secondary* here; for chaps. I—V. fully treat of this. It is *sanctification*, and not justification, which as has been repeatedly remarked, is the main subject of discussion here. This is made quite plain, by vs. 3, seq.

Τοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, i. e. to those who are truly and spiritually united to Christ; comp. 2 Cor. 5: 17. Rom. 16: 7—11. Phil. 1: 1. Erasmus rightly: *Qui in Christo insiti sunt*. The ground of this idiom, is the *spiritual union* which exists between the Head of the church and its members; comp. Eph. 5: 30. 1 Cor. 6: 15. 12: 27. Eph. 4: 15, 16. John 17: 11, 21, 23. 14: 20. 1 John 4: 13. 3: 24.

Μὴ κατὰ . . . πνεῦμα, is marked by Knapp as spurious, and is omitted by Mill, Semler, Bengel and Griesbach. Many critics regard it as being spurious. It is omitted in manuscripts C. D. F. G.; also in many versions and fathers. Only the last clause, however, i. e. *ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα*, is omitted in manuscripts A. B.; also in the Vulgate, Syriac, and Armenian versions; likewise in Basil, Chrysostom, and many of the fathers. It is a matter of little or no importance whether the words are received or rejected, either in whole or in part, so far as the sense of the whole passage is concerned. Besides, the very same words occur again in v. 4; which is the reason why many critics have supposed that they are not genuine here. But this argument cannot be of much weight; or if it is, then we may as well prove the spuriousness of v. 4 by assuming that it is a mere repetition of this, as the spuriousness of this by assuming it to be a repetition of v. 4. On the whole it is quite clear, that there exists in the connection of the discourse here, no imperious reason for rejecting the clause in question. Only the *external* evidence makes the genuineness of it doubtful.

If the clause be retained, the sense of it is: 'Who do not live in such a manner as to gratify the desires of the flesh, but walk in such a manner as accords with the desires which the spirit imparts.' The

whole clause is to be regarded as an epexegetis, added in order to characterize *those who are in Christ Jesus*.

(2) Ὁ νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος κ. τ. λ. The word νόμος here will be best understood by referring back to 7: 21, 23, 25, where, in νόμον, ἔτερον νόμον, and νόμῳ ἁμαρτίας, the word means *dictate* (as we say), *dominatio, jussum, præceptum*. As νόμος ἁμαρτίας means, *dictate of sin*, so νόμος πνεύματος (the opposite of νόμος ἁμαρτίας) must mean, *dictate of the Spirit*, i. e. inclination resulting from the influences of the Spirit.

Πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, *of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus*, i. e. of the Spirit which imparts true, quickening, Christian influence, or a Christian disposition; comp. as to the influences of the Spirit, vs. 9, 11 below; also 1 Cor. 2: 10, 12. 12: 4, 7, 11. 2 Cor. 13: 13. That something different from the natural powers or the natural conscience of men, is meant, seems to be quite plain, from comparing the antithesis here with what is asserted of the natural conscience in 7: 15—25. In this latter passage, we see how inefficacious natural conscience is, to control the passions and to free the sinner from the condemning sentence of God's holy law. I take ζωῆς to be *abstract* for *concrete*, i. e. a noun designating quality and holding the place of an adjective; the meaning of which is *life-giving, quickening*. Ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ means the same as in v. 1. The sentiment then is this: 'The dictate of, or the inclination imparted by, the Spirit, who quickens those that once were dead in trespasses and sins, and who are now united in a spiritual manner to Christ.'

This influence of the Spirit, Paul goes on to say, *frees them from the law of sin and death*. Here (as this is the antithesis of the former clause of the verse) *the law of sin and death* means, *the dictate [jussum or impetus] of sin which leads to death or condemnation*. The apostle does not mean to say, that Christians who are under the influences of 'the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus,' are perfectly sinless; but that they are freed from the *predominating* power of sinful inclinations, such as is described in the preceding chapter, vs. 7—25, and such as subjects them to the penalty of the divine law. More than this need not be attached to his words; and more than this cannot be properly attached to them, when the antithesis in the preceding chapter is taken into the account, or when facts themselves are regarded.

(3) Τὸ γὰρ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου, *for that which the law could not effect, or that which was impossible for the law, viz. that which*

the law of works could not effect or accomplish. *Γάρ* is prefixed to a clause, introduced for the sake of illustration or confirmation.

Ἐν ᾧ ἡσθένει διὰ τῆς σαρκός, because it was weak through the flesh, i. e. because, through the strength of our carnal inclinations and desires, it was unable to regulate our lives so that we should be perfect or entirely free from sin; comp. 7: 14—25. *Σάρξ* here, as often elsewhere, designates carnal appetites or inclinations.

What the law of works could not effect, *ὁ θεὸς . . . ἁμαρτίας*, God sending his own Son in the likeness of our sinful flesh, i. e. God, sending his Son, clothed with a body like that of corrupt and sinful men, i. e. with a fleshly or corporeal nature like to theirs, [did accomplish]; comp. John 1: 14. Heb. 2: 14, 17. Phil. 2: 7. 1 John 4: 2, 3. 1 Tim. 3: 16. The phrase *ἐν ὁμοιώματι* does not mean, as the Docetae construed it, merely an *apparent* likeness of human nature, and not a real one. That Jesus possessed a nature *really* and *truly* like our own, is established beyond all doubt by the passages above quoted, and others of the like tenor. Equally certain is it, that although he took on him *the likeness of sinful flesh*, yet he did not on that account become a sinner; see Heb. 4: 15. 2 Cor. 5: 21. Heb. 7: 26. The amount therefore of the expression before us, is, that Christ participated in our fleshly nature, that he took on him such a *physical* nature as sinful men possess.

Καὶ περὶ ἁμαρτίας, i. e. *καὶ προσφορᾷ περὶ ἁμαρτίας*, and by an offering for sin. *Ἁμαρτία* itself, in Hebrew-Greek, often corresponds to *חַטָּאת*, *sin-offering*. The phrase *περὶ ἁμαρτίας* appears here to be elliptical; the full form would be (as above) *προσφορᾷ περὶ ἁμαρτίας*, by an offering for sin. But the *elliptical* phrase *περὶ ἁμαρτίας*, is frequently used instead of the entire one; comp. Heb. 10: 18, with 10: 8, 6. Lev. 4: 3. Num. 8: 8. Ps. 39: 6 (Sept.). There can be no serious difficulty in regard to such an ellipsis. Moreover, that *ἁμαρτία* alone is sometimes used for *sin-offering* (*חַטָּאת*), seems to be quite probable from 2 Cor. 5: 21, *ἁμαρτίαν ἐποίησε*: also Heb. 9: 28, *χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας*.

Κατέκρινε . . . σαρκί, condemned sin in the flesh; i. e. condemned the sin which fleshly appetites occasion, condemned our carnal appetites and desires. The word *κατέκρινε* has occasioned much difficulty among critics. The reason why it is employed here, seems to be, that the writer had just used *κατάκριμα* in v. 1. The antithesis stands thus: 'There is now no *κατάκριμα* for Christians;

but there is a *κατάκριμα* of their carnal appetites and desires;’ i. e. Christians are delivered from the penalty of death, but their sinful lusts are condemned to death or slain, in consequence of the provision made by Jesus Christ for their deliverance. This antithesis seems to have escaped the notice of most commentators; and thus much perplexity has attended the exegesis of *κατέκρινε*. As to sin’s being *put to death*, *condemned*, or *punished* in Christians; comp. chap. 6: 2—11, where the meaning of the writer is, not that sinners are punished by inflicting on them the penalty of the law, but that the *carnal mind* is, by the grace of the gospel, *mortified*, *subdued*, *crucified*, and as it were *put to death*. This bears upon the point in question, and makes all plain. For what is the consequence of the *κατέκρινε ἁμαρτίαν* here? Plainly, that Christians yield obedience to the divine precepts; *ἵνα τὸ δικαίωμα κ. τ. λ.*, v. 4. As plainly, this is the direct consequence of their carnal affections *being put to death*, i. e. as it were, *taken off by capital sentence* or *κατάκριμα*, if I may so express it. All this is effected by the sin-offering of Christ, who came to save his people from the *power* as well as the penalty of sin.

In looking back upon this verse, the reader will see that the first clause of it has no proper grammatical sequel, as there is no verb to govern τὸ ἀδύνατον, nor any to which it can be the subject or Nominative case. I take this to be one of those cases of *anacoluthon* in construction, in which the [Acc.] case *absolute* is employed; comp. Luke 21: 6. 2 Cor. 12: 17. The shape of the sentence would seem to be thus: ‘What the law could not do . . . God condemned sin, sending his own Son, etc.’; i. e. what the law could not do, God [did; for] sending his own Son, he condemned sin, etc. If the Greek were filled out, it should probably be done in this manner: *Τὸ γὰρ ἀδύνατον . . . τῆς σαρκὸς, ὁ θεὸς [ἐποίησε] τὸν [γὰρ] ἑαυτοῦ υἱὸν κ. τ. λ.* See Winer, Gramm. § 64. d.

(4) *Τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου, the precept of the law.* So in the Septuagint it is used to translate כִּי, כִּי־עָשָׂנוּ, and כִּי־עָשָׂנוּ. *Πληρωθῆν ἔν ἡμῖν, might be accomplished or done by us*; viz. that we might be obedient, we who are no longer devoted to the lusts of the flesh, but are influenced and guided by the Spirit.

Here, then, we have a view of the end which is accomplished by the death of Christ; not the only end, but one great end, viz. the sanctification of believers. This is one of those passages, which shews the whole drift of the discourse in chap. 7 and 8: 1—11. *Ἐν ἡμῖν* may be rendered *by us*, or *in us*. In the latter case it would desig-

nate the internal spiritual influence of the death of Christ upon believers, inasmuch as it causes a conformity of spirit or heart to him.

(5) Οἱ γὰρ . . . φρονοῦσιν, for they who are in a carnal state, have regard to carnal things. *Γὰρ illustrantis.*

Οἱ δὲ . . . πνεύματος, but they who are in a spiritual state, have regard to spiritual things. Comp. vs. 2 and 9—11.

(6) Τὸ γὰρ . . . θάνατος, for the carnal mind is death. *Γὰρ illustrantis* again, where we might naturally expect δέ. However, I take v. 6 to be co-ordinate with v. 5, and the γὰρ here to indicate an illustration of what is said in v. 4. The connection seems to be thus: 'The precepts of the law are obeyed by those who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit; but carnal men will not give heed to spiritual things, and their pursuits lead to death; while the *spiritual mind*, i. e. a mind conformed to the dictates of the Spirit, stands connected with life and peace; or life and peace, i. e. eternal happiness, are the consequence or fruits of it.' This is not direct confirmation of what is asserted in v. 4, but is an illustration of the condition there described, by shewing its connections and results, and also those of the opposite condition.

(7) Next follows the ground or reason why this is and will be so. *Αἰοτι . . . εἰς θεόν*, because the carnal mind is enmity toward God, i. e. is inimical to God, or (in plain terms) hates him, dislikes his precepts, his character, and his ways. So the sequel, *τῷ γὰρ κ. τ. λ.* The abstract noun *ἔχθρα*, is here used for the adjective *ἐχθρά* (with accent on the ultimate), *inimical, unfriendly*. The proof that the sentiment just uttered is correct, follows in the next clause.

Τῷ γὰρ . . . δύναται, for it is not subject to the law of God, nor indeed can be; i. e. it does not obey the precepts of God's law, nor can it obey them. The very nature of a carnal mind, is to gratify *carnal* and *sinful* desires, viz. those desires which the law of God prohibits. Of course, this mind or disposition, just so far as it prevails, leads to the very opposite of subjection to God's law, i. e. leads to disobedience. From its very nature, this cannot be otherwise.

The first γὰρ here, in *τῷ γὰρ νόμῳ*, is γὰρ *illustrantis* vel *confirmantis*, i. e. it stands before a clause designed to illustrate and confirm the preceding declaration. If the carnal mind does not subject itself to the law of God, then it must be *enmity* to him; for his law is merely an expression of his will and character. A want of subjection, then, to this law, is a plain indication that the carnal mind dislikes it, i. e. hates it. But why? The *fact* is plainly asserted; and the fact, as plainly, is evidence of what had been before asserted. But how shall the fact

be accounted for, viz. the fact that it is not subject to the law of God? The apostle gives the ground of it: οὐδὲ γὰρ δύναται, i. e. οὐδὲ γὰρ δύναται ὑποιάσσεσθαι κ. τ. λ. Here then is a passage, on which the advocates of metaphysical reasoning with respect to *ability* in men have speculated, and about which they have disputed, not a little. What is the *cannot*? One answers: It is *a will not*; another, that it is to be literally understood, without any abatement. So Luther, *de Servo Arbitrio*; and so many others. That the phrase stands in the way of Pelagianism, and indeed of all *unqualified* assertions of ability in the carnal man; at least, that it may be easily and naturally so construed; it is not difficult to see. After all, however, nothing can be farther from correct principles of interpretation, than to suppose that the apostle had here any reference in his own mind to the psychological metaphysics of the present day. What the natural and physiological powers of the sinner are, is not here the subject of discussion. Thus much the writer appears to say, and no more, viz. that the φρόνημα σαρκός is not subject to God's law, and cannot be subject to it. And is not this plainly and obviously true? So far as φρόνημα σαρκός goes, it is directly the opposite of subjection in its very nature. "How," says Augustine (and much to the point), "can snow be warmed? For when it is melted and becomes warm, it is no longer snow." And so it is with the carnal mind. Just so long as it exists, and in just such proportion as it exists, it is and will be enmity against God, and disobey his law. But whether the sinner who cherishes this φρόνημα σαρκός, is not actuated by other principles also, and urged by other motives, and possessed of ability to turn from his evil ways—ability arising from other sources—does not seem to be satisfactorily determined by this expression. So much, however, does seem to be decided by it, viz. that so long as this φρόνημα σαρκός is the predominant principle within him, so long he will continually disobey the law of God. Such a disposition is in itself utterly incompatible with obedience.

(8) Οἱ δὲ . . . δύναται, *those then who are in the flesh, cannot please God.* The particle δέ creates a difficulty here. It seems to be employed in a sense analogous to that of γὰρ or οὖν. One use of it is, to introduce clauses *continuative* of the narrative or reasoning, which clauses are at the same time *explicative*, either by adding some circumstance, or by resuming a declaration before made, but now stated in somewhat different terms, etc.; comp. δέ in Rom. 8: 28. Mark 16: 8. Acts 23: 13. Rom. 3: 22. 1 Cor. 10: 11. 15: 56. James 2: 15. So

here, οἱ δὲ ἐν σαρκὶ κ. τ. λ. is resuming the sentiment contained in τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς ἐχθρα κ. τ. λ., and repeating it in another form. Moreover, this latter form has special reference to 7: 5, 18.

But who are those that are ἐν σαρκί? They are those, "who are not led by the Spirit of God," comp. vs. 9, 13, 14; who follow fleshly desires and appetites. In other words, all men who are not regenerated or sanctified, who are in a natural state, are ἐν σαρκί, *carnal*, and therefore are influenced and guided by their carnal desires and affections; comp. John 3: 6. 1 Cor. 2: 14. Eph. 2: 1—3. Col. 2: 13. Consequently, as may well be supposed, θεῶ ἀρέσαι οὐ δύνανται, *they cannot please God*; i. e. while they live in such a state, and are led on by such carnal desires, they can do nothing which is pleasing to God. The οὐ δύνανται here is to be understood in the same way as the οὐ δύναται in the preceding verse.

(9) The opposite character is now brought into view, in order to render the sentiment more striking. Ὑμεῖς δὲ . . . ὑμῖν, *but you are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, provided the Spirit of God dwells in you*. The δέ here is *distinctive*. If the Spirit of God dwells in any one, he cannot be in a carnal state; for the Spirit dwells in and guides only those, who are *the sons of God* (v. 14), and therefore his friends, v. 17. Such cannot be at enmity with God.

The πνεῦμα θεοῦ which is here mentioned, is the same as that to which the writer has all along referred. In the next verse it is called πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ. As to the *dwelling* of the Spirit in Christians, comp. 1 Cor. 3: 16, 17. 6: 19. 2 Cor. 6: 16; and with these texts comp. John 17: 23. 14: 23—26.

Πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ is the Spirit which Christ imparts, or the Spirit which makes us like to Christ. Either sense is good here. The first is perhaps the more probable meaning; at least a comparison with John 14: 15—18, 26. 15: 26, would seem to render it so. It is remarkable that in this short paragraph (vs. 9—11), πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ, Χριστός, and τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἐγγεραντος Ἰησοῦν (i. e. πνεῦμα θεοῦ πατρὸς), should be exchanged for each other, and plainly stand for one and the same thing. Is not this evidence, that the apostle saw and felt no inconsistency in speaking of Christ, and of the Spirit of God or of Christ, as *in some respects* distinct, and yet in others, as constituting a unity of nature? There seems to me to be an entire simplicity in the mode in which Paul has treated this subject; a subject which has unhappily been made so complex and intricate, by the subtilities of the schools. The simple *facts*, that Christ and the

Spirit are *divine*, are one in nature with God, and yet in some respect distinct from the Father, seem to be the basis of the apostle's language here and elsewhere; while all speculation on the subject, all attempts to make out nice distinctions or metaphysical definitions, are entirely neglected. Whenever the time shall come, that Christians are content with simple facts relative to this great subject, much that has proved to be injurious to the prosperity of religion, will be done away.

Οὐκ ἔχει, *possesseth not*; i. e. if the Spirit of Christ does not habitually dwell in and influence any one.—*Οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ*, *he is not his*, i. e. he is no Christian, he is not a true disciple or follower of Christ. The *δέ* at the beginning of the clause is *continuative*, and should be translated *now*.

(10) *Εἰ δὲ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν*, *but if Christ be in you*, i. e. if he dwell in you by his Spirit, if ye have the Spirit of Christ, if ye are habitually influenced by him in your lives and conversation. The *δέ* here is *adversative*.

Τὸ μὲν σῶμα . . . δικαιοσύνη, *the body indeed is mortified on account of sin, but the spirit lives on account of righteousness*; a passage about which (including v. 11) critics have been greatly divided. There are three methods in which it has been interpreted; each of which must be briefly noticed.

(a) *Νεκρόν* means *spiritually dead*, (as often elsewhere); and the general sentiment will then be: 'If the Spirit of Christ dwell in you, then, although your bodies (i. e. you) are spiritually dead, that is, are still the seat of diverse carnal affections and lusts (v. 10), yet you shall spiritually live; for the Spirit of him who raised up Jesus from the dead will subdue these forbidden affections and desires, and gradually make you entirely conformed to his will, v. 11.' To this effect, Chrysostom, Erasmus, Piscator, Locke, C. Schmid, and others.

The objection made to this exegesis is, that in v. 11 the apostle speaks of the quickening of those bodies which are *θνητά*, *mortal, frail, dying*; an epithet that seems to be given to our frail, *physical* body as such, and not given to it merely as the corrupt seat of lusts. As it does not appear that *θνητός* of itself ever has the same figurative sense which *νεκρός* often has, i. e. *morally dead or corrupt*; so one might be prone to conclude, that *ζωοποιήσει* in this case does not indicate the *spiritual* vivification which the exegesis already mentioned assigns to it, but rather the restoration of the body to life at

the period of the resurrection. I shall take further notice of this exegesis in the sequel.

(b) Another class of interpreters explain thus: 'The body is dead *in respect to sin*, i. e. sin has no more power to excite its evil appetites and desires. The soul has, moreover, the principle of spiritual life; and he who raised up Jesus will also give to your bodies [viz. at the resurrection], a new principle of spiritual life or animation.' So for substance, Origen, Theodoret, Clarius, Grotius, Raphael, Taylor, Melancthon, Bucer, and others.

The objection to this is, that it renders it necessary to construe *διά* before the Accusative as meaning *in respect to, in reference to*. Moreover it destroys the antithesis in v. 10. It renders quite insipid, also, the antithesis between *σῶμα νεκρόν* in v. 10, and *ζωοποιήσει τὰ θνητά σώματα* in v. 11.

(c) Another method of interpreting the phrase in question is this: 'The body must die [physically] because of sin; but the spiritual part lives; and even the body itself will be made to live at the period of the resurrection; i. e. it will be raised up and become like Christ's own glorious body.' So Tholuck, Flatt, Calvin, Augustine, Beza, and others.

Understood in this way, the passage may be regarded as designed to foreclose an objection which might arise in the mind of some reader, who might ask: 'Are *all* the consequences of sin, then, removed by the death of Christ?' To this the apostle may be viewed as replying, in the verses before us: 'No, not absolutely and entirely all. Natural death still remains. But a glorious resurrection will follow this; so that in the end, all its consequences will be done away.'

The view which I entertain of the passage, agrees substantially with the first of the above interpretations. I understand *σῶμα νεκρόν* in v. 10, as not indicating [physical] death; nor yet as meaning *death* in the sense of being *dead in trespasses and sins*, i. e. destitute of spiritual life, or in a state of death or condemnation. I take it to be used in the same sense as *θάνατος* in 6: 4, 5; as expressing an idea exactly kindred with *συνεσταυρώθη* and *καταργηθῆναι τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας*, in 6: 6; the same with *ἀποθανών* in 6: 7; *ἀπεθάνομεν* in 6: 8; and *νεκρούς* in 6: 11. That the writer did connect 8: 10, 11, in his own mind, with 6: 4—13, appears quite plain from his diction and general course of thought. In 6: 12 he calls the body *θνητόν*, just as in 8: 11; and in the former passage he evidently

means to designate by it, a corporeal, material, perishable body ; which is also the sense, for substance, in 8: 11.

But all the words above mentioned, in chap. VI., serve merely to characterize what we call *the mortification* [the putting to death] *of the body*, i. e. the subduing and mortifying our carnal desires and affections, which are cherished by, or originate from, the body. I understand *νεκρόν* in 8: 10 (as I do *νεκρούς* in 6: 11), to designate this state or condition, viz. a state in which *the old man is crucified*, in which the carnal desires of the body are mortified and subdued. This exegesis has, at least, analogy on its side.

Thus interpreted, the sentiment of the whole passage would run thus : ' If the Spirit of Christ dwells in any one, his body is indeed dead on account of sin, i. e. the old man is crucified, or he undergoes mortification as to his bodily sinful appetites ; but *his spirit* is rendered *happy on account of righteousness*, i. e. because of conformity to the requisitions of the gospel. Yea, if the Spirit of him who raised up Jesus from the dead, dwells in any man, that same Spirit will quicken, i. e. impart life to, his mortal body ;' in other words, he will not suffer it to remain a mere *σῶμα νεκρόν*, but make it an instrument of righteousness (6: 12, 13, 19), and give it a power of being subservient to the glory of God.

By degrees, the Christian "brings under his body," and keeps it in subjection. At first it is, as it were, *crucifying the old man* ; but in the sequel, the grace of God makes conquest easy and even delightful. It is such a quickening of our bodies, a converting of them into "instruments of righteousness," to which the apostle seems to me here to refer. One circumstance appears to be conclusive, in regard to this exegesis ; which is, that the apostle here describes the Spirit which "quickens the bodies" of Christians, as being the Spirit which *dwells in them*, *ἐνοικοῦν ἐν ὑμῖν*. Where is the resurrection at the last day, of our physical bodies, attributed to the sanctifying Spirit in believers ? Very different is the statement in Col. 2: 12, 13. Eph. 1: 19, 20. 2: 5, 6. Rom. 6: 4. It is, then, the Spirit who dwells in believers, that is to quicken them, in the sense which is here meant ; and what can this be, except the one designated in 6: 12, 13, 19 ?

The body is often the occasion of sin and sorrow, it is a *σῶμα θανάτου*. It requires to be mortified, and crucified. But the Spirit of God, in believers, by degrees brings them to yield their members as instruments of righteousness. Then is the old man, the body of sin, dead ; and the body itself, like the spirit, is *quicken*ed in the

service of God. Verse 13 seems clearly to indicate that the present passage is to be thus understood; for there, *τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος θανατοῦτε* appears plainly to convey the same meaning as *σῶμα νεκρόν*. The object of the writer, as I apprehend it, is to shew Christians, that although mortification and self-denial must be practised in order to subjugate carnal desires, yet even here they may expect relief in due time. Victory repeated becomes easier. The enemy, often vanquished, becomes weaker. The Spirit of Christ, in fine, brings the believer at last, fully and freely to dedicate all that he has and is to the service of his Lord and Master; so that no discouragement should be felt, because the way is at first rough and difficult. It is a path which conducts to life.

(11) *Εἰ δὲ τὸ . . . ὑμῖν*. *The Spirit of him who raised up Jesus from the dead*, is the Spirit of God the Father, or the Spirit of God; comp. v. 9, also Col. 2: 12, 13. Eph. 1: 19, 20. 2: 5, 6. Rom. 6: 4. *Αἰ* here is a *continuative*; *εἰ δέ*, *if also, if moreover*. *Ζωοποιήσει*, *will give life to, will animate*, i. e. will make them active instruments. *Διὰ τὸ ἐνοικοῦν . . . ὑμῖν*, i. e. the same Spirit who dwells in you, will enable you to quicken the *θνητὸν σῶμα* or *σῶμα θανάτου*, which now occasions so much pain and mortification, and to make it a willing instrument of righteousness.

CHAP. VIII. 12—17.

In the preceding verses, the apostle has consummated his argument to prove that Christians, who are under grace, are the only persons who possess means adequate and ample, of living devoted to the service of God, and of renouncing sin and mortifying all their sinful desires. What those under the law could not do, God, sending his Son for a sin-offering, and pouring out his Spirit, and giving a filial and obedient temper of mind, has accomplished. The mind is thus filled with desires of conformity to Christ, and even the body, the seat of carnal appetites and sinful desires, will be so quickened as to become an instrument of righteousness.

And what now follows? Just that which we should expect from an apostle so zealous of good works as Paul, and so grateful for the blessings of redemption; viz. an animated exhortation to live in a manner accordant with Christian obligation, and a view of the consequences which will ensue, from the believer's being united to Christ.

(12) "*Αρα οὖν . . . ζῆν*, therefore, brethren, we are not under obligation to the flesh, to live in a carnal manner; i. e. since such a spirit is given to us, and we have such privileges, we must not obey the lusts of the flesh. The manner of expression is what rhetoricians call *λιτότης*, i. e. where less is said than is meant. The writer means,

that we are bound not to obey the dictates of carnal appetites and desires.

(13) *Εἰ γὰρ . . . ἀποθνήσκειν*, for if ye live in a carnal manner, ye shall die; i. e. if ye live carnally, ye shall come under the penalty of the divine law, which threatens death to the soul that sins. See on *θάνατος*, in chap. 5: 12.

Εἰ δὲ . . . ζήσεσθε, but if, through the Spirit, ye mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live; i. e. if, yielding to the influence of the Spirit which dwelleth in you, ye crucify the old man with his lusts, if you suppress those deeds to which your carnal affections would lead, then ye shall live, i. e. enjoy the spiritual blessedness which the gospel promises to the obedient.

(14) The *γὰρ* at the beginning of this verse, shews that what follows is *illustration* or *confirmation* of the declaration just made. The apostle has just said, that those who mortify their sinful appetites and desires, *shall live*, i. e. shall enjoy the happiness which the gospel proffers. What is the proof of this? One convincing evidence is, that such persons are led by the Spirit of God; consequently they must be the children of God; and if so, he will give them the portion which belongs to children, viz. the heavenly inheritance. Such is the course of thought that follows in the sequel of *γὰρ*, and such the confirmation of the promise implied in *ζήσεσθε*.

Ὅσοι γὰρ . . . θεοῦ, for so many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. That a *special* divine influence is here implied in *ἄγονται*, would seem to be plain; for if nothing but the simple means of moral suasion is employed in guiding the children of God, how do they differ from others, who enjoy the same means? If you say: 'The difference is that the former *obey* the suasion, while the latter *resist* it;' I answer: The fact is true; but then it does not reach the point of difficulty. How comes the one to *obey* the suasion, and the other to *resist* it? What is the *first* occasion of this? If you say: 'A corrupt nature leads the impenitent to resist;' then I ask: Had not the regenerate the like corrupt nature, before their change? What then was the efficient cause, why one obeys and the other disobeys? The passage before us ascribes it to the influence of the Spirit of God. That this influence is *special*, follows from the fact, that if we suppose it to be common to all men, it would be difficult to account for it why all men are not converted. Since, however, the fact is that they are not, it would seem to follow that where they do become converted, the influence of the Spirit is *special*.

Ἰοὶ θεοῦ, *sons of God*, a term of endearment; comp. Matt 5: 9, 45. Luke 6: 35. 20: 36. Rom. 8: 19. 2 Cor. 6: 18. Gal. 3: 26. 4: 6, 7, et alib. comp. Hosea 11: 1. Ex. 4: 22, 23.

(15) Οὐ γὰρ . . . εἰς φόβον, *for ye have not received a servile spirit, that ye should again be afraid*; i. e. ye have not the spirit of slaves, who being in bondage, are fearing and trembling before the dreaded severity of a master; in other words, ye are not, through fear of condemnation or death, all your life-time ἔνοχοι δουλείας, Heb. 2: 15. *Γὰρ illustrantis et confirmantis.*

Ἄλλὰ . . . ὁ πατήρ! *but ye have received a filial spirit, by which we cry: Abba, Father!* That is, instead of the timid, cowering spirit of slaves, who tremble before their masters, we are endowed with the spirit of children, so that we may approach God with affection and confidence. The word Ἀββᾶ is the Chaldee אבא, sc. πατήρ! Augustine and Calvin think that the design of using both Ἀββᾶ and ὁ πατήρ here, is, to shew that both Jews and Greeks, each in their own respective language, would call on God as a Father. But the objection to this is, that the same idiom is exhibited in Mark 14: 36 and Gal. 4: 6, where such a distinction is out of question; at any rate, in the first of these two cases it is out of question. If ὁ πατήρ here be designed for any thing more than a translation of Ἀββᾶ, we may suppose the repetition to be designed for expressing *intensity* of child-like feeling, for this naturally prompts to a repetition of the name of a parent. So Theodoret.

(16) Αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα . . . θεοῦ, *this same Spirit testifies to our minds, that we are the children of God*; i. e. (as many interpret the passage) this filial, confiding, affectionate spirit, imparted by the Spirit of God who dwells in us, affords satisfactory evidence to our minds that we are the children of God. Συμμαρτυρεῖ here may mean no more than the simple verb μαρτυρέω for so, beyond all doubt, συμμαρτυρέω is employed in Rom. 2: 15. 9: 1, al. The sentiment of the passage thus construed, would be, that the affectionate spirit which the children of God possess, is an evidence to their minds of their standing in a filial relation to him. Τοῦ πνεύματι ἡμῶν means, *to our minds, animis nostris.* On any ground of exegesis, this sense (for substance) is here to be attributed to this expression.

There is, however, another method of interpreting this verse, which makes αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα to mean *the Spirit of God*, the Spirit mentioned in vs. 9, 14. This is certainly not an improbable exegesis; and many distinguished interpreters have followed it. Very recently, Flatt and Tholuck have both defended it.

For a long time I was doubtful respecting this interpretation, and rather preferred the other. But repeated and attentive study of the whole passage in its connection, has of late brought me to a pretty full persuasion that *αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα* is the same as *πνεῦμα θεοῦ* in v. 14. And if the question be urged, as it is natural that it should be; 'How then does the Spirit bear witness to our minds or souls, that we are the children of God?' The answer is, by imparting the *spirit of adoption* or a *filial spirit* to us. It is this, then, which affords the evidence to our minds of being in a state of *filiation*, i. e. of bearing the relation to God of spiritual children. And as this spirit comes from the Spirit of God, so he may be said, in this case, *to bear witness*, because he is the author of that spirit, which affords the evidence of our *filiation*. Those who adopt the first method of interpretation, refer *αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα* to the *πνεῦμα υἰοθεσίας* of the preceding clause; and compare this with vs. 26, 27, which they construe in the like way.

That the world deny any such testimony in the hearts of believers, and that they look on it with scorn or treat it with derision, proves only that they are unacquainted with it; not that it is an illusion. It was a sensible and true remark of the French philosopher, Hemsterhuys, in regard to certain sensations which he was discussing: "Those who are so unhappy as never to have had such sensations, either through weakness of the natural organ, or because they have never cultivated them, will not comprehend me." *Oeuvres*, I. p. 208. Paul has, on another occasion, expressed himself relative to the point in question, with still more power: "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him," 1 Cor. 2: 14.

(17) *Εἰ δὲ τέκνα κ. τ. λ.* i. e. if we sustain the relation of sons, then shall we be treated as such, i. e. we shall be *heirs*. *Κληρονόμοι θεοῦ*, *heirs of God* means, possessors of that inheritance which God bestows. *Δέ* *continuative*.—*Συγκληρονόμοι Χριστοῦ*, *joint heirs with Christ*; i. e. as Christ endured sufferings and was advanced to glory, in like manner shall we also be advanced to glory. We shall be made like him, be united to him, be with him, in possession of the heavenly inheritance. For the manner in which Christ obtained this heritage, see and comp. Phil. 2: 8, 9. Heb. 2: 9, 10. 5: 7—9; and for the comparison of believers to Christ, see 2 Tim. 2: 11, 12. Heb. 12: 2. Rev. 3: 21. John 17: 22—24. These texts sufficiently explain the sequel of the verse, *εἰπερ κ. τ. λ.*

CHAP. VIII. 18—25.

These verses constitute one of those passages, which the critics call *loci reatissimi*. The *general* object of the passage, however, cannot fail to be evident to every considerate reader. In v. 18 the apostle asserts, that *the sufferings of the present life are not worthy of any comparison with the glory which is to be revealed*; i. e. future glory is great beyond all comparison or expression. Such is the proposition to be illustrated or confirmed. But how is this effected? I answer, that the theme being thus introduced by the apostle, he proceeds in the following manner: 'Now that such a glory is yet to be revealed, (in other words, that there is a world of surpassing glory beyond the grave), the whole condition of things or rather of mankind, in the present world, abundantly proves. Here a frail and perishable nature serves to shew, that no stable source of happiness can be found on earth. From the commencement of the world down to the present time, it has always been thus. In the midst of the sufferings and sorrows, to which their earthly existence exposes them, mankind naturally look forward to another and better world, where happiness without alloy and without end may be enjoyed. Even Christians themselves, joyful as their hopes should make them, find themselves still compelled by sufferings and sorrows to sigh and groan, and to expect a state of real and permanent enjoyment only in heaven; so that they can only say, for the present, that they are *saved*, because they hope or expect salvation in another and better world. The very fact that here they, like all others around them, are in a state of trial, and that they only hope for glory, shews that the present fruition of it is not to be expected.'

The practical conclusion from all this the apostle now proceeds to draw, viz. 'that Christians, in the midst of sufferings and trials, ought not to faint or to be discouraged, inasmuch as a glory to be revealed is in prospect, which should make them regard their present temporary sufferings as altogether unworthy to be accounted of.'

(18) *λογίζομαι* here means, *I count, reckon, regard, estimate*. The classical Greek writers employed this word rather in the sense of *computing or reckoning*, e. g. a sum of numbers, or of *estimating* a conclusion drawn from premises by the act of reasoning.

It is difficult, at first sight, to account for the *γάρ* here, which, in nearly every instance where it is employed, (if not always and necessarily), has reference to a preceding sentiment, fact, etc. Here it seems to be merely a particle of transition. But, although I have translated it as such, viz. by our word *moreover*, yet this word does not express the full force and design of the Greek particle. The apostle had said, in the preceding verse: "If we suffer with Christ, we shall also reign with him," i. e. we shall be exalted with him to a state of happiness and glory. In reference to our suffering with Christ, he then goes on to say in v. 18, *I regard not the sufferings*, etc. Now as this passage was evidently suggested to the mind of the writer, by the *συμπάσχομεν* in the preceding verse, so *γάρ* intimates such a connection. Yet as the writer passes on, in verse 18 seq., to a new turn of thought, and a commentary as it were on the words

συναπάσχομεν and συνδοξασθῶμεν in verse 17, so γάρ in verse 18, also indicates a transition to something which may more fully illustrate or explain these words. *Γάρ explicantis sive illustrantis.*

That this particle, in itself, should necessarily denote a connection with what precedes, and at the same time serve as a convenient particle of transition, shews well the nature of the Greek particles, and the exquisite relations of speech which they are employed to express. Our English word *moreover*, is a tolerable translation of γάρ when employed in this way, inasmuch as it indicates that something had preceded, and also indicates transition. But the superior nature of the Greek γάρ is disclosed in this, viz. in indicating not simply that something had preceded, but that this was of such a nature that the sequel was designed to explain or illustrate it.

Παθήματα τοῦ νῦν καιροῦ means suffering, such as Christians were then called to endure, or sufferings such as all men are exposed to endure, in the present life. The latter seems to be the preferable sense; because the reasoning of the apostle, in the context, has respect not to time then present only, but to the whole period of the present life down to its close, when a glorious reward succeeds a life of sorrow.

The latitude in which the Genitive case is employed should be noted from the phrase before us. *The sufferings of the present time* surely does not mean, the sufferings which *time* endures as the subject of them, but those which Christians endure while they continue in the present world. The Genitive here, as often elsewhere, is the *Genitivus temporis*, i. e. it marks the time belonging to the noun which precedes it, the designation of which is intended to qualify that noun.

Οὐκ ἄξια, *non acquiparanda sunt*, are not to be put on a level, or are not to be reputed, not to be counted or regarded. The first seems rather the more apposite sense; and then πρὸς, which follows in the construction, may be rendered in its usual sense, *with*. But if the second sense be preferred, viz. *reputed, regarded*, then πρὸς has the sense of *compared with, in comparison of*. So this preposition is sometimes used; e. g. Ecclus. 25: 19, *Every evil is small πρὸς κακίαν γυναικός, compared with the malignity of a woman*. Joseph. cont. Apion. II. 22, *All matter is worthless πρὸς εἰκόνα τὴν τούτου, compared with the image of this [god]*.

The phrase τὴν μέλλουσαν δόξαν ἀποκαλυφθῆναι, is equivalent to ἀποκαλυφθησομένην. The Greek could use his regular future

without a helping verb; or he could, as here, use the verb μέλλω and the infinitive, instead of a regular future. The word δόξα, which here signifies *future happiness*, is used by the New Testament writers in a sense quite different from the classic one; which is, *opinion, fame, reputation*, etc. But the New Testament meaning of δόξα is borrowed from the Hebrew כְּבוֹד or הֵדָר, *splendor, magnificence, excellence*. The idea of δόξα in the presence of God, seems to be founded upon being there in the *light* or *splendor* of his presence. Hence light is used so often in the Bible as the image of happiness. Hence too, we may see something of the plenary meaning which δόξα has, when used to describe a state of future happiness. In the present world, "eye hath not seen;" but when another world bursts upon the vision of Christians, after death shall have rent away the veil of mortality, there, 'in God's light they will see light;' there too, they shall enjoy "everlasting light, for God will be their glory."

(19) Here we have another γὰρ which sustains a relation to the preceding verse, like that which γὰρ in v. 18 sustains to v. 17. The apostle in v. 18 has introduced, as an object of attention, *the glory which is to be revealed*. That there is such a glory he now proceeds to shew, or at least to adduce reasons why Christians should confidently expect it. Γὰρ, therefore, is in v. 19 prefixed to a clause added by way of confirming the sentiment of the preceding assertion.

Ἀποκαριδοκία, *earnest expectation*, the German *Ahndung*. The etymology favours this meaning; for the word comes from ἀπό, and κάρα *head*, and δοκέω *to observe, look after*. The Etymologicum Magnum explains it by τῇ κεφαλῇ προβλέπειν, *to thrust forward the head and see*, i. e. to look with anxiety or eagerness; like the Hebrew בְּיָדָהּ. The same sense the word has in Phil. 1: 20. Ernesti observes, that the word is not intensive in the New Testament (Inst. Interpr. I. § 2); but in this he seems to be plainly mistaken, if we may judge either from the composition of the word itself, or from the nature of the passages in which it stands.

We come now to the principal word, on which very much of the difficulty of the passage before us turns, viz. *κρίσις*. In order to proceed in a satisfactory manner with the investigation of it, I shall consider, in the first place, its meaning in the other passages of the New Testament where it occurs, and as compared with the corresponding Hebrew words; and then, in the second place, I shall propose and examine in order the various meanings which have been

assigned to the word in this place, and endeavour to vindicate that sense to which the preference seems to belong.

I. In regard to the meaning of *κτίσις*, in all the other passages of the New Testament where it is found, excepting the one before us, they may be distributed into two classes; viz.

1. It means *the act of creation, creating*.

In such a sense it is generally conceded that it is employed in Mark 10: 6. 13: 19. Rom. 1: 20. 2 Pet. 3: 4. But the two first and the last of these significations might well be referred to No. 2, which follows. This is the proper and primary meaning of the word, according to the usual principles of the Greek language, in which words of this class commonly denote *the act of doing any thing*, they being what grammarians call *nomina actionis*. So in the Greek classics, the sense of *making, constructing, building, creating*, etc., is the one attached to this word. But in the majority of examples in which *κτίσις* occurs in the New Testament, the meaning is different from this.

2. It means *creature, created thing, any product of creating power, creation* as an existing thing.

Such a deflexion from the primary meaning of a word, is very common, not only in the Greek, but in all other languages; the abstract (*nomen actionis*) passing, as grammarians say, into the concrete sense; i. e. the word which denoted action, being also used to denote the consequences or effects of that action. So here, *κτίσις*, *the act of creating*, is more commonly employed in the New Testament to signify the effects of this action, viz. *a thing created, res creata*.

But this second signification being in its own nature generic, is either used generically, or is also employed to designate any of the several *species* of meanings that may constitute a part of the generic one.

(a) It is used in its generic sense, i. e. as meaning *created things, creation, any created thing*, in Rom. 1: 25. 8: 39. Col. 1: 15. Heb. 4: 13. Rev. 3: 14, perhaps also in Mark 10: 6. 13: 19, and 2 Pet. 3: 4. In a sense very nearly allied to this, it is used in Heb. 9: 11 to designate the *material* creation as such, in distinction from the *spiritual* one. This distinction, however, results rather from the exigency of the passage, and the distinction made here by the word *ταύτης*, than from the force of *κτίσις*.

(b) *Κτίσις* is also used in a specific sense, and means *the rational*

creation, man, men, the world of mankind. Thus in Mark 16: 15, *Go preach the gospel πάση τῇ κτίσει, to all men, to every man.* Col. 1: 23, *which [gospel] has been preached ἐν πάση τῇ κτίσει, among all nations, or to every man.* 1 Pet. 2: 13, *Be subject then πάση ἀνθρωπίνῃ κτίσει, to every man, to every human being, for the Lord's sake,* i. e. out of regard to the Lord Christ. What the meaning of this is, the explanation immediately subjoined informs us; viz. *εἴτε βασιλεῖ, ὡς ὑπερέχοντι· εἴτε ἡγεμόσιν, ὡς δι' αὐτοῦ κ. τ. λ.;* i. e. 'Be subject to every man placed in authority, whether he be a king who has pre-eminence, or a governor appointed,' etc. These examples make it clear, that *κτίσις* is employed to designate a *specific* class of created beings, as well as created things in general.

(c) The word is sometimes employed in a more specific and limited sense still, viz. to designate the *new rational creation, those who are created anew in Christ Jesus, Christians.* Such is the meaning in 2 Cor. 5: 17, *If any one be in Christ, he is καινὴ κτίσις, a new creature.* Gal. 6: 15, *In Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor uncircumcision avails any thing, but καινὴ κτίσις.* This rather seems to mean, *a new act of creating,* i. e. the power of the Spirit in renovating the soul. But in both of these cases, the *special* meaning depends on *καινή*, rather than upon *κτίσις*.

These are all the cases in which *κτίσις* occurs in the New Testament, excepting those in the passage under examination. From these we gather the conclusion, that the *usus loquendi* allows us to assign to *κτίσις* either of the three meanings ranked under no. 2, i. e. it may be interpreted as meaning *things created* or the *natural creation, men or mankind,* or lastly, *Christians.* But this last meaning is made, as we have seen, by the addition of the epithet *καινή*.

I have only to add here, as a confirmation of the above meanings assigned to *κτίσις*, (which however are not altogether peculiar to the New Testament, see Judith 9: 12. 11: 14. Wisd. 2: 6. 16: 24. 19: 6), that the Chaldee and the Rabbinic Hebrew coincide with the usage just exhibited. The words in these languages which correspond to *κτίσις*, are בְּרִיאָה, בְּרִיָּה, בְּרִיָּה, בְּרִיָּה, which all mean *creatio, creatura, res creata,* i. e. the act of creating, and the thing created, just in the same way as *κτίσις* does. Moreover, in Rabbinic Hebrew, the plural form בְּרִיּוֹת sometimes means *homines, men,* specially *the heathen.* All this, we see, corresponds with the New Testament use of *κτίσις*, and explains it when a reference to the Greek classics would not. In regard to the last particular of all, viz. that בְּרִיּוֹת

sometimes means the heathen, by way of degradation or contempt; it is singular that we have adopted, into vulgar English, the very same meaning of the word *creature*, and applied it in a derogatory sense to human beings; e. g. 'the creature refused to obey.'

II. We have seen what meanings are assigned to *κτίσις* by the writers of the New Testament, and what belonged to the corresponding Chaldee and Hebrew words. Which of all these, now, shall be applied to *κτίσις* in the passage before us?

That the reader may see how variously this question has been answered, I will lay before him the different interpretations given to it. These are, 1. The Angels. 2. The souls (the animating principle) of the planetary worlds. 3. Adam and Eve, because they were the immediate work of creative power. 4. The souls of believers, in distinction from their bodies. 5. The bodies of believers, i. e. their dead bodies, in distinction from their souls. 6. Christians in general. 7. Christians in particular, i. e. either Jewish Christians, or Gentile Christians. 8. Unconverted men in general. 9. Unconverted men in particular, i. e. either unconverted Jews, or unconverted heathen. 10. The material creation, inanimate and animate, exclusive of rational beings. 11. The rational creation or men in general, mankind.

All these supposed meanings I have canvassed in an exegesis of vs. 18—25, printed in the *Biblical Repository*, Vol. I. pp. 363, seq. I deem the first five too improbable to need discussion here; and therefore proceed with the others.

The sixth and seventh opinions may both be ranked under one head, viz. that of *Christians*. Can *κτίσις*, then, here mean Christians, either in general, or in particular?

(a) The *usus loquendi* is wanting, to render this probable. The word *κτίσις* in 2 Cor. 5: 17 and Gal. 6: 15, does not, as I have already remarked, of itself mean Christians. In both these cases it is connected with *καινή*. It is *καινή κτίσις*, then, and this only, which usage authorizes us to believe is employed in order to designate Christians. This argument alone would render the exegesis in question doubtful.

(b) But we have another argument, which has been generally deemed a still more weighty one. This is, that in vs. 19, 21, the word *κτίσις* designates those who are distinguished from the children of God, and who belong not to such as are now entitled to their privileges. But I cannot consider this argument to be so decisive as

Flatt, Tholuck, and others, think it to be. My reason is, that the expressions in vs. 19, 21, are not much unlike that in v. 23, where, beyond all doubt, Christians are represented as groaning within themselves and waiting for their filiation (*υιοθεσίαν*), i. e. for the consequences of it, viz. the redemption of their bodies from their present, frail, painful, and dying state. I see not, therefore, but that it is quite possible, in itself considered, to suppose that in vs. 19, 21, Christians may be represented as waiting for the glory which will be given to the children of God; although if v. 23 were struck out, the expressions there might well be taken for antithetic ones; I mean, that *κτίσις* might, in such a case, naturally and well be understood, to designate a class of men distinct from the *υιοὶ τοῦ θεοῦ* in v. 19, and from the *τὰ τέκνα τοῦ θεοῦ* in v. 21.

(c) A more conclusive argument, however, is deducible from v. 23, where *υιοὶ τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ἔχοντες* seems plainly to mean Christians, as I shall in due time endeavour to shew. Conceding this, then it is quite plain, that *κτίσις* in the preceding verses cannot mean Christians, because the class of men designated in v. 23, is very clearly distinguished from the preceding class in vs. 19—21, designated by *κτίσις*.

On the same ground, viz. that *κτίσις* cannot be regarded as meaning Christians in general, it must be excluded from meaning Christians in particular, i. e. either Jewish Christians or Gentile Christians. How are these to be distinguished from "those who had the first-fruits of the Spirit?" Even supposing that *ἀπαρχή* means here *special, miraculous gifts*, (as some believe), we may ask: Were there no Jewish Christians who possessed these? Surely they above all others possessed them. But still, were there no Gentile Christians who possessed them? This will not be denied. If we look into the first epistle to the Corinthians, we find there a graphic account of the special gifts of the Spirit, which leaves no room to doubt that they were distributed to Gentile as well as to Jewish Christians. Still stronger is the argument, if we suppose (as I shall endeavour hereafter to shew that we must suppose) *ἀπαρχήν* here to mean, *the prelibation, the foretaste, the earnest* of future glory, which is common to all Christians. For as those who have this *ἀπαρχήν*, are here plainly and explicitly distinguished from those denominated *κτίσις* above; so, if these are Christians in general (as they clearly seem to be), it follows that *κτίσις* above is not used to designate Christians, either Christians in general, or Jewish or Gentile Christians in partic-

ular. Neither of these classes were distinguished from other Christians, by the exclusive possession of miraculous gifts, or the exclusive possession of the earnest of the heavenly inheritance; and there seems, therefore, to be no ground for making a distinction of such a nature. It must necessarily follow, that if *κτίσις* means either Jewish Christians, or Gentile Christians, as such, then this class of Christians did not partake of the *ἀπαρχὴν τοῦ πνεύματος* for those who did partake of it, are clearly distinguished from those indicated by *κτίσις*. But inasmuch as both these classes of Christians did partake of the gift in question, so neither of them can be designated here by *κτίσις*.

I should not have dwelt so long on this head, had not such critics as Le Clerc, Nösselt, Schleusner, and others (*magni nominis*) defended the exegesis in question.

The eighth and ninth opinions may also be classed under one head. These are, that *κτίσις* means either unconverted men in general as such, or unconverted men in particular, viz. Jews, or Gentiles. In regard to the specific meaning here assigned to *κτίσις*, I cannot see any tolerable ground of support for it. Why should unconverted Jews be represented as peculiarly exposed to a frail and dying state? Or why should unconverted Gentiles be so represented? Surely there is no good reason for any distinction here, as all are equally exposed to the miseries of life. We cannot therefore admit the exegesis which here gives a specific meaning to *κτίσις*, limiting it either to unconverted Jews or to unconverted Gentiles.

More probable is the interpretation, which assigns to *κτίσις* the meaning of *unconverted men in general*. In this case, it is easy to make a plain and evident distinction between *κτίσις* in vs. 19—22, and *οἱ τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ἔχοντες* in v. 23. Substantially I think this to be the right meaning. But I would not assign to it the signification simply of *unconverted men*. I apprehend the meaning to be the same as in Mark 16: 15. Col. 1: 23. 1 Pet. 2: 13, i. e. *man, men, mankind in general*. But of this, and of the objections urged against it, I shall say more in the sequel.

On the whole, then, we have reduced our multiplex interpretations down to two, viz. *the material creation in general*, animate and inanimate; and *the rational creation, or mankind in general*. These remain to be carefully examined. Critics of high rank and great abilities, are divided between these two interpretations.

I commence with the first of these two meanings, that of *the material creation, the world in general, or the universe*, exclusive of ra-

tional beings. This has had many defenders both in ancient and modern times. Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Oecumenius, Jerome, Ambrose, Luther, Koppe, Doddridge, Flatt, Tholuck, and a multitude of others have been its advocates. Flatt and Tholuck, in their recent commentaries, have collected all which has been said in its favour, besides advancing some things peculiar to themselves. What they have brought forward, deserves a serious examination.

That *κτίσις* might be employed to indicate the natural creation around us, consisting of things animate and inanimate, may be seen by examining the *usus loquendi* of the word under no. 2. a, p. 328 above. On this part of the subject, there can be no just ground of controversy among philologists. But is it so employed in the passage before us? This is the only question that affords any room for dispute.

Tholuck argues that it is so employed, from two sources; first, from the connection in which it stands, and the predicates which are assigned to it; and secondly, from both Jewish and Christian belief respecting the renewal of the natural world, at a future period.

Under the first head of argument, he says, that the more usual meaning of *κτίσις* is the *natural world*. If he means by this to aver, that the word has this signification in a majority of the instances in which it is employed in the New Testament, an inspection of p. 328, seq. above, will convince the reader that he is mistaken. But still, the fact that the word may very naturally, in itself considered, be employed in such a way, I freely concede, and this I have already more than once intimated.

His next argument is, that *αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις* in v. 21, indicates a descent from the noble to the ignoble part of creation. He means that *αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις* signifies as much as to say: 'Not only does the nobler part of creation long for a disclosure of the glory which is to be revealed, but even *this inferior creation*, of which I am now speaking, also longs for the period when this disclosure shall be made.'

The answer to this is, that such an exegesis of *αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις* would necessarily imply, that a higher and nobler *κτίσις* had been already mentioned in the preceding context, with which this inferior one is now compared. Had such mention been made, there would be some ground for the remark of Tholuck. But as there is no mention of any thing of this nature, I do not see how we can give a *comparative* sense to *αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις*. In order to do this, must not something have been mentioned, with which we may compare it? The expectation of the *nobler* part of creation, is first mentioned in v. 23, *υἱο-*

θεσίαν ἀπεκδεχόμενοι. The force of αὐτὴ ἢ κτίσις, I apprehend, must therefore be made out in another way. Paul had just said, ἡ κτίσις is made subject to a frail and perishing state (ματαιότητι), with the hope, i. e. in a condition or in circumstances in which it is permitted to hope, that καὶ αὐτὴ ἢ κτίσις, even this very same creature may be freed, etc. Tholuck does not seem to have noted, that the expression is not simply αὐτή, but καὶ αὐτή, which necessarily refers it to the preceding κτίσις, and means even the very same κτίσις, viz. the frail and perishing κτίσις which had just been described, is still placed in a state in which it may indulge the hope of deliverance, etc. The force of καὶ αὐτή, then, seems to consist in designating that very same perishing κτίσις which the writer had just described, as being in a state to indulge a hope of obtaining freedom from this wretched condition. If this be correct, then its force does not consist in any implied comparison with a nobler κτίσις, which indulged the like hopes.

A third reason of Tholuck for the signification which he here assigns for κτίσις, is that in v. 22, πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις is mentioned.

But why the apostle could not say πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις, if he meant the world of *rational* beings, just as well as he could if he meant the world of *nature*, I am not aware; and more especially so, since in Mark 16: 15 and Col. 1: 23, this very expression is made use of (πάση τῇ κτίσει—ἐν πάση τῇ κτίσει), in order to denote the universality of the rational world.

Finally, Tholuck avers, that the predicates ματαιότης and δουλεία τῆς φθορᾶς (vs. 20, 21) more naturally belong to the material creation.

But this I cannot see. Above all, I cannot see it, when the apostle says, that the κτίσις was made subject ματαιότητι, οὐχ ἐκούσα, not voluntarily, not of its own choice. Does this belong more naturally, then, to the material than the rational creation? Of which is choice more naturally predicated? Then again, is not ματαιότης, a frail and dying state, as easily and naturally to be predicated of men, as it is of the material world? And taken as a whole, is not the latter far less subject to ματαιότης than the race of men? Once more, is not δουλεία τῆς φθορᾶς, the bondage of a mortal or perishing condition, as naturally predicated of men, as it is of the material world? Rather, is it not much more naturally applied to human beings, than it is to the world in which they live?

None of the reasons, then, assigned by Tholuck for the exegesis

which he defends, that are drawn from the exigency of the passage, seem to be well grounded. So much is true, viz. that the *usus loquendi*, in itself considered, would admit the sense which he gives to *zrlous*. But that the *exigentia loci* renders probable this meaning, does not seem in any good degree to be made out.

We come, next, to the second class of reasons assigned by Tholuck in defence of his interpretation; viz. those derived from the Jewish and Christian belief respecting the renovation of the natural world, at a future period.

The passages of Scripture mainly relied on, are 2 Pet. 3: 7—12. Rev. 21: 1. Is. 11: 6, seq. ^{24: 6, 53: 12} 65: 17, seq. ^{24: 12: 4} Heb. 12: 26, seq. Hints of the same doctrine are supposed to be contained in Matt. 13: 38, seq. 19: 28, and Acts 3: 21. Brief suggestions respecting passages of such a nature, are all which any reader will here expect.

All the force of argument from these and the like passages, must rest on a *literal* interpretation of them. But how can passages of this nature be urged as having a literal meaning, after reading Rev. chap. xxi. and 22: 1—5? Or if this does not satisfy the mind, then compare passages of a similar nature, viz. those which have respect to the Messiah's kingdom on earth, his spiritual kingdom *before* the end of time, and during the gathering in of his saints. What immeasurable absurdities and contradictions must be involved in a literal exegesis here! For example; from Is. 2: 1—4 and Micah 4: 1—3, one might prove that in the time of the Messiah, the temple of the Lord is to be built on a mountain, placed upon the top of the highest mountains any where to be found, and that there all the nations of the earth will assemble to offer their devotions. Is. 11: 6—9 would prove that all the brute creation are to experience an absolute change of their very nature; the lion is to eat straw like the ox; the asp and the cockatrice are no more to retain their venomous power. Is. 9: 7 would prove, that the literal throne of David is to be occupied by the Messiah, and that he is to rule in his capacity as literal king, without intermission, and without end. Is. 25: 6—8 would prove, that a feast of fat things and of rich wines is to be made for all nations, and that all suffering and sorrow and death are to be abolished. Is. 35: 1—10 would prove that the deserts of the earth are to be filled with living streams and exuberant herbage and trees, and that all the ransomed of the Lord are to repair to the literal mount Zion, where they will have uninterrupted and everlasting pleasure. Is. 43: 18—21 would prove the same thing respecting

the deserts; and also that the beasts of the field, the dragons, and the owls, shall be among the worshippers of God. Is. 55: 1—13 would prove, not only that wine and milk are to be had, in the days of the Messiah, without money and without price, but that the mountains and the hills will break forth into singing, and all the trees of the field shall clap their hands! Is. 60: 15—22 would prove that Israel is to feed on the milk of the Gentiles, and to be nourished by the breasts of kings; and also that there will be no sun by day, nor moon by night, but God himself, by his own splendor, is to make their everlasting light, so that no more night will ever be known. (The very same things are said respecting the new Jerusalem, in Rev. 21: 23; are they literal there?) Is. 66: 22—24 would prove, that all nations are to come, from one new moon to another, and from one sabbath to another, and worship before the Lord in Jerusalem.

Why now are not such passages just as reasonably construed in a literal manner, as those which have respect to the kingdom of God *after* the general resurrection? Must it not be true, that in its very nature this kingdom will be still more spiritual, than that of the Messiah during its preparatory or disciplinary state? This will not be denied. Is there not reason *a fortiori*, then, why we should understand the language respecting this kingdom as figurative; in just the same manner as we are obliged to do, with regard to all the descriptions in the Bible of the heavenly world? Nay, I may add, that the idea of Flatt, Tholuck, and many others, about a renewed earth becoming the literal abode of the blessed, after the resurrection, is directly at variance with other declarations of the Scriptures. Paul represents Christians at the general resurrection as *caught up to meet the Lord in the air*, i. e. as ascending to heaven, and as so, *being ever with the Lord*, viz. in heaven, 1 Thess. 4: 17. So all the Bible; believers are to dwell with God, to be with him, to see his face, to enjoy his presence, to stand at his right hand. The apostle Paul says, that at the resurrection this mortal will put on immortality, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, that this natural body is to become a spiritual body, and be made like unto Christ's glorified body, 1 Cor. 15: 44, 50, 53; and all this, that saints may be glorified with Christ. But where is Christ's body? And where does he dwell? And where do believers go, when they are "absent from the body," in order that they may be "present with the Lord?" Our Saviour represents the saints at the resurrection, as becoming incapable of all earthly pleasures, and as being made

like to the angels of God in heaven, Matt. 22: 29, 30. And must we believe, after all this, that the present earth, when it has undergone an emendation, is still to be the abode of spiritual bodies, of saints made like to their Lord and Redeemer? Believe it who may, I must first see all these and the like texts blotted out from the Bible; nay, my whole views respecting the very nature of future happiness must undergo an entire transformation, as great as the earth itself is supposed by the writers in question to undergo, before I can admit such an exegesis as they defend. It contradicts analogy; it contradicts the nature of the case; it contradicts the express declarations of the Saviour and of his apostles.

I have a difficulty, also, as to the logical commentary of the passage, provided we adopt the interpretation defended by Tholuck. Let us examine this for a moment. The apostle begins by saying, that present afflictions should not be laid to heart by Christians, because of the future glory which is reserved for them. What now is demanded, in order that this should be believed, and that Christians should regulate their thoughts and conduct by it? Why plainly nothing more is required, than that they should cherish a confirmed belief of it, a steadfast hope that such glory will be bestowed. Such is the conclusion in v. 25. But how is this hope to be animated and supported? Plainly by considerations which add to the assurance, that future glory is in prospect. And what are these? They are, that God has enstamped on our very nature the desire of such a state; he has placed us in such a frail and dying condition, that the whole human race naturally and instinctively look to such a state and hope for it. The present is manifestly a state of trial; even Christians, who have the earnest of future glory within themselves, are not exempt from this. But the very fact that we are in a state of trial and probation, naturally points to an end or result of this. And what is such an end, but a state of *future* happiness? for here, happiness in a higher sense is not to be attained.

But suppose now that the material world is that which sighs after and hopes for deliverance from its present frail and perishable state; has this a direct bearing on the subject in question? The answer must be in the negative; so thought Turretin, as his notes most clearly shew. But then it may be said, that it has a bearing upon it by way of implication; because the renovation of the material world is necessarily connected with the future happiness of the saints. In this point of view, I acknowledge it would not be irrelevant. But

is not this less direct, less forcible, less convincing, than the appeal to the wants and desires of which every human breast is conscious? Of two modes of exegesis, either of which is possible, I must prefer that which imparts the most life and energy to the reasoning and argument of the writer.

I have another substantial difficulty with the interpretation under examination. It is this; if *κτίσις* means the material or natural world, on the one hand, and *ἀντοὶ τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ἔχοντες* means Christians on the other, (which Tholuck and Flatt both avow), then here is a *lacuna* which cannot well be imagined or accounted for. Christians are subject to a frail and dying state, but are looking for a better one; and the natural world is in the same circumstances; but the world of men in general, the world of rational beings who are not regenerate, have no concern or interest in all this; they are not even mentioned. Can it be supposed now, that the apostle has made such an important, unspeakably important, omission as this, in such a discourse and in such a connection? The *natural, physical* world brought into the account, but the world of perishing men left out! I must have confirmation "strong as proof from holy writ," to make me adopt an interpretation that offers such a manifest incongruity.

Such are my reasons for not regarding as weighty, the arguments offered by the advocates of the interpretation I am examining; and such are my positive grounds for rejecting it.

I come, at last, to the interpretation which I have supposed above to be the correct and proper one, viz. that *κτίσις* most probably means *men, mankind in general*, as stated on p. 328 above, no. 2. *b*. That such an interpretation is agreeable to the *usus loquendi*, is clear from the statement there made. It only remains then to inquire, whether it accords with the nature of the passage in which the word stands, and whether it can be vindicated from the objections made to it.

As to its accordance with the nature of the passage, and with the argument which the writer purposes to employ, I must refer the reader (in order to save repetition) to my general statement of the meaning of the passage on p. 325 above, and also to p. 337, where I have had occasion briefly to recapitulate the same thing, in order to compare this statement with the claims made by a different exegesis.

It remains, then, only that I take some notice of the objections urged against this interpretation. Flatt has done most justice to the side of objections; and I shall therefore first examine the arguments which he produces.

1. 'Κτίσις in vs. 19—21, is distinguished from *ἄνθρωποι θεοῦ*. How then can it mean *all men*, of which *ἄνθρωποι θεοῦ* constitute a part?"

The answer to this is, that there is not an *antithesis* here of *κτίσις* to *ἄνθρωποι θεοῦ*, (which the objection assumes), but only a distinction of species from genus. 'Mankind,' says the apostle, i. e. men in general, 'have always been in a frail and dying state, have felt this, and have longed after a higher and better state.' In v. 23 he goes on to say: 'Even those whom one might expect to be exempt from this, i. e. Christians themselves who already have an earnest of future glory, have not been exempt from such a condition.' Here is indeed a distinction, but no antithesis. In fact, the nature of the case does not admit antithesis; for both the *κτίσις* and *οἱ τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ἔχοντες*, are partakers of the same frail and dying state. The distinction therefore is of a different nature from that of antithesis. It is made, I apprehend, in the manner stated above.

2. 'How could the apostle represent *κτίσις* in this sense, i. e. heathen men and all unconverted men, as seeking and sighing after *the liberty of the children of God*, when he every where avers that they are estranged from God, and at enmity with him, and are ignorant of the things of the Spirit?"

But here the *argumentum ad hominem* may be applied to good purpose. How could the apostle represent the natural or inanimate creation as longing after such a happiness, or any other like to it? You reply: 'It is a prosopopeia.' It is so, truly, if you interpret it rightly; and personification of the boldest kind, so bold that I know not how we can admit it, while it has so much of incongruity in it.

I quit this part of the subject, however, and proceed. Is there not, in the human breast, a longing and sighing after immortality? Hear Cicero, who puts these words into the mouth of Cato, when speaking of Elysium: "O praeclarum diem, cum ad illud divinorum animorum concilium coetumque proficiscar, cumque ex hac turba et colluvione discedam! Proficiscar enim, non ad eos solum viros, de quibus ante dixi; verum etiam ad Catonem meum, quo nemo vir melior natus est, nemo pietate praestantior;" *De Senectute*. Listen also to Seneca: "Juvabat de aeternitate animorum quaerere, imo mehercule credere. Credebam enim facile opinionibus magnorum virorum, rem gratissimam promittentium, magis quam probantium. Dabam me spei tantae." In other passages the same writer descants upon the meanness of affairs pertaining to the present life, unless one rises in his views above human objects. "Sic creatura," adds

Turretin, to whom I am indebted for these quotations, "sic creatura abhorrebat a *vanitate* cui subjecta est. Sic sperabat se aliquando a servitute illa liberatum iri;" Opp. II. 361.

Who can refuse to see how applicable all this is to our present purpose? Tholuck and Flatt would themselves say, that this sighing after immortality is one of the most convincing of all arguments, that men are truly immortal. Does not the fact, that all nations have had their Elysium, establish the allegation that such a longing is innate, i. e. pertaining to our rational nature? Or if this be questioned, is it not certain, that the present unsatisfying, frail, dying condition of the human race, does lead them to feel their need of a better state, and to sigh after it?

This does not prove, indeed, that they long for the heaven of the Christian, principally as a place of purity and freedom from all sin. That they have specific views of this, and desires after it, is not true; and if they had, we could not suppose them to desire it in respect to its holiness. But it is not necessary to suppose this, in reference to the object of the apostle's argument. It is not a specific view of heaven simply as a place of purity and holiness, which he here represents Christians themselves as entertaining; for in v. 23, he adverts to them as hoping for *the redemption of their bodies*, i. e. an exemption from the pains and sufferings to which their frail bodies are continually exposed. May not the unconverted long to be delivered from suffering and sorrow? Do they not, in this respect, desire future happiness? I acknowledge that they are unwilling to employ the proper means of obtaining it; and that there are actually, as the Christian revelation holds it up to view, things in it which would not of themselves be at all desirable to the unconverted; but do they not, after all, in some definite and important sense, hope and wish for another and better world? This will not be denied, after reading the above extracts from Cicero and Seneca; and this being admitted, it is all which the apostle's argument here demands.

What he means to say, I take to be in substance this: 'The very nature and condition of the human race point to a future state; they declare that this is an imperfect, frail, dying, unhappy state; that man does not, and cannot, attain the end of his being here; and even Christians, supported as they are by the earnest of future glory, still find themselves obliged to sympathize with all others in these sufferings, sorrows, and deferred hopes.'

I acknowledge that if one insists on construing the *revelation of*

the sons of God, and the glorious liberty of the children of God, as being so specific that they cannot be predicated of the hopes of the world at large, he may make difficulty with the exegesis which I am defending. So Platt and Tholuck have done. But how should they both have overlooked the fact, that this same rigid interpretation applied to their own mode of construing *κτίσις*, makes a difficulty still greater? For in what possible sense can the natural world be hoping for, or expecting the glorious liberty of the children of God? I mean, if these expressions be interpreted, (as they in making their objections insist that they must be), in their specific and rigid sense.

If there be any difficulty here, then, it is evidently less on the ground which I take, than on the other. It is not enough to make objections to a particular mode of interpretation; but one should shew that his own is not liable to objections still greater. And surely it must be deemed a greater difficulty, to represent the natural world as expecting *the glorious liberty of the children of God*, than it is to suppose that immortal beings, made in the image of God, and made sensible of the insufficiency of the present world to render them happy, should anxiously look for another and better state. It is not necessary for the apostle's argument, to shew that they look for this in the way that Christianity would direct them to do, nor even that they have any good grounds in their present state to expect personally a happier condition in future. If even the wicked, who love this world, are not satisfied with it, and are made to sigh after another and more perfect state, then follows what the apostle has designed to urge, viz. the conclusion that God has strongly impressed on our whole race, the conviction that there is a better state, and that it is highly needed.

The ground which Noesselt and others take respecting *κτίσις*, viz. that it means Christians in general, would indeed free the whole passage from any objections of the kind under consideration, inasmuch as they might be said, without any limitation, to expect *the revelation of the sons of God*. But this interpretation is pressed with other insuperable difficulties, as has already been stated. It makes no distinction between *κτίσις* and *υἱοὶ θεοῦ* or *τέκνα θεοῦ* in vs. 19, 21, when the writer has plainly made one; and then it understands *αὐτοὶ τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ἔχοντες* of the apostles only, or such Christians as were endowed with miraculous gifts; which can not, in any tolerable manner, be defended.

I come then, by virtue of such considerations as have been sug-

gested, to prefer the interpretation which assigns to *κτίσις* the sense of *mankind, men in general*, to any other of the proposed methods of explanation. But in so doing, I do not aver that there are no difficulties in the way, or that an ingenious critic can raise none. This is not the question. The more proper question is, whether the difficulties that lie in the way of this interpretation, are not less than those which can be thrown in the way of any of the other methods which have been discussed? I can only say, that they seem to me clearly to be less; and therefore I feel compelled to embrace this exegesis, until a more probable one is proposed. It has been defended by Lightfoot, Locke, J. A. Turretin, Semler, Rosenmüller, Ammon, Usteri, Keil, and many others. This indeed is in itself no reason for receiving it; but it shews, at least, that the difficulties attending it have not been regarded as insuperable, by men of very different theological views, and of no small attainments.

Τὴν ἀποκάλυψιν τῶν υἱῶν τοῦ θεοῦ ἀπευδέχεται, *expects*, or *waits for the revelation of the sons of God*; i. e. the period when the sons of God, in their true state, endowed with all their honors and privileges, shall be fully disclosed. This will be at the general judgment; when the Father who seeth in secret will reward them openly. Here they are in obscurity; the world knoweth them not. They are like to the seven thousand of old, who had not bowed the knee to Baal, but who were not known even to the prophet Elijah. However, it will not always be so. The day is coming, when they will shine forth as the sun in his strength, and as the stars forever and ever, in the kingdom of their God and Father.

In what sense the *κτίσις ἀπευδέχεται*, *expects* or *waits for* such a revelation, has been already stated, more than once, in the preceding pages, and therefore it needs not to be here repeated. I take the generic idea of future happiness to be the main design of the writer in this case, although the special import of the expression goes, as I have intimated before, much farther.

(20) *Τῇ γὰρ ματαιότητι ἣ κτίσις ὑπετάγη*, *for the creature*, i. e. *mankind, was subject to a frail and dying state*. That *ματαιότης* here has the sense thus assigned to it, is clear from the epexegetis of it in v. 21, viz. *δουλεία τῆς φθορᾶς*, which is there used instead of repeating *ματαιότης*. Such as wish for further confirmation as to this sense of the word, may consult in the Sept. Ps. 61: 9. 38: 5. Ecc. 1: 2, 14.

As the Heb. *בְּהִיּוֹת* *vanity*, to which *ματαιότης* in the Septuagint

corresponds, sometimes designates *an idol*; so some commentators have here interpreted *ματαιότης* in a corresponding manner, viz. mankind became subjected to idolatry, or the natural world was employed as the object of idolatry. So Tertullian, Luther, Mark, Baumgarten, and others. Consequently they interpreted the succeeding clause, *not voluntarily, but through him who subjected it*, as having reference either to Satan, or to Adam as concerned in the original fall of man. But *δουλεία τῆς φθορᾶς*, v. 21, seems to remove all probability of this interpretation of *ματαιότης* and of course *ὑποτάξαντα* can be applied only to God the Creator of man. Compare Gen. 3: 17—19.

Οὐχ ἐκούσα, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν ὑποτάξαντα, not voluntarily, but by him who put it in subjection, viz. to a frail and dying state. That is, the creature did not voluntarily choose its present condition of sorrow and pain, for this cannot well be imagined; but God the Creator has placed it in this condition; it is by his sovereign will, by the arrangements of his holy providence, that man is placed in a frail and dying state. But this is not to be considered as an irretrievable misfortune or evil. Distressing and frail as the condition of man is, it is still a state of *hope*. So we are assured in the next verse.

(21) *Ἐπ' ἐλπίδι, in hope*. Here the Dative designates the state or condition in which the *κτίσις* is, although subjected to *ματαιότητι*. It is a state in which a hope of deliverance can be indulged. It is not a state of despair.

Let the reader now ask, whether it is not doing violence to the word *κτίσις*, to construe it here as meaning *natural world*, and then to predicate of it, *ἐκούσα* and *ἐπ' ἐλπίδι*? It would be an example of *prosopopeia*, which I believe even the most animated poetical parts of the Scriptures nowhere present.

But what is the hope in which the creature is permitted to indulge? It is, *ὅτι καὶ αὐτὴ ἢ κτίσις ἐλευθερωθήσεται ἀπὸ τῆς δουλείας τῆς φθορᾶς*, that *this very same creature*, viz. the one which is subjected to a frail and dying state, *shall be freed from the bondage of a perishing condition*. *Φθορά* comes from *φθείρω*, to *corrupt, to destroy*. Here it plainly means *a state of corruption*, i. e. a frail and dying state. Such a state the apostle calls *δουλεία, bondage*; first, because the creature was *not willingly* subjected to it; secondly, because it is not only a state of pain and misery, but it places us at the disposal of masters, who inflict upon us suffering and sorrow while

we cannot resist or control them. The word ἐλευθερωθήσεται is fitly chosen as the antithetic correlate of δουλεία.

Εἰς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τῆς δόξης τῶν τέκνων τοῦ Θεοῦ, [and shall be introduced, καὶ εἰσαχθήσεται] into the glorious liberty of the children of God. Εἰς, put before the Accusative here, shews the state into which the creature is to be brought, after being freed from bondage; i. e. εἰς stands before the object unto which the creature is to attain, by being delivered from the bondage of a frail and dying state. That εἰς very often stands before nouns designating the event or effect of any thing, is a well known Greek idiom; and the proofs of it may be seen at large in the various lexicons. The phrase, however, I take here to be a *constructio prægna*, as the grammarians call it, i. e. an elliptical expression, which implies some verb before it, and probably the one which I have supplied above. Δόξα here is used as an adjective, qualifying the preceding noun, by an idiom which is very common throughout the Scriptures. In what sense men in general may be said to hope for this state, has been already explained above. If there be any objection to predicate this of men in general, is there not a still stronger one to predicating it of the natural world?

Verses 20, 21, thus explained, render a reason why the creature looks with ἀποκαρδοκία to another and better state; which is, because men are born with an instinctive, unquenchable thirst for happiness, and cannot find what they desire, in this frail and perishing condition. This explains the reason why γὰρ is prefixed to v. 21; “γὰρ orationi rationem reddenti praefiguratur.”

(22) Οἶδαμεν γὰρ, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις συστενάζει καὶ συνωδίνει ἄχοι τοῦ νῦν, for we know that every creature, i. e. the whole human race, has sighed and sorrowed together, until the present time. In other words, it has been the lot of man, from the beginning down to the present time, to be subject to a frail and dying state, which has cost much sighing and sorrow. The force of οἶδαμεν is, *no one can have any doubt, we are all assured, no one will call it in question.* Of course it seems to take for granted, that the thing to which it refers is well and familiarly known to all. But suppose, now, that the *natural* world is here represented as sighing and sorrowing, from the beginning of the world down to the time then present, and this because it waited for its renovation, which will take place only at the end of the world, or after the general resurrection; was this a thing so familiar to all, that the apostle could appeal to it by saying οἶδαμεν? I cannot but think, that the advocates themselves of this in-

terpretation must hesitate here. *Γάο* is prefixed, in the present case, to a clause which confirms what the writer had said, in v. 21, of our frail and dying state; "*γάο illustrantis sive explicantis.*"

The verbs *συστενάξει* and *συνωδίνει* denote the mutual and universal sighing and sorrowing of mankind. No one part is exempt; there is a mutual correspondence between them all, in regard to the subject in question. Those who construe *κτίσις* of the natural world, of course lay an emphasis on the *σύν* here compounded with the verbs, as indicating the correspondence of the natural world with the rational one. But the difficulty with this interpretation is, that it leaves a great part of rational beings wholly out of the account; a thing exceedingly incredible.

(23) *And not only so, but we ourselves who have the first fruits of the Spirit, even we groan within ourselves; i. e. not only have mankind in all ages, down to the present hour, been in a frail and suffering state, but even we, who are permitted to cherish the hopes of a better world which the gospel inspires, we who have within us an earnest of future glory, a pledge that we are the children of God, who are to receive the inheritance of his beloved,—even we, who, as one might naturally suppose, would on account of our privileges be exempted from the common lot of sinful men, we also, like all others, are in distress, and sigh for deliverance from it.*

The phrase *καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ἔχοντες*, has been very diversely understood. Some interpret it of *special and supernatural gifts*, limiting it to the apostles only; while others explain it in the like way, but extend it to all Christians who were endowed with such gifts. Others regard *ἀπαρχή* as meaning *gift or present* merely, in a general way; while most interpret it as meaning the *earnest*, or *first fruits*, or *pledge*, of that which is afterward to be given in a more complete manner.

It becomes necessary, therefore, to investigate the word *ἀπαρχή* with special care. I can find but one meaning of it throughout the New Testament; and this is, *that which is first of its kind*, or *that which is first in order of time*, *πρώτος*. It is applied both to persons and things, in a sense compounded of both of these, viz. *first in respect to kind and time also*; e. g. Rom. 16: 5. 1 Cor. 16: 15. James 1: 18. 1 Cor. 15: 20, 23. Rev. 14: 4. Bretschneider suggests, in his lexicon, that in this last passage it may have the general sense of *sacrifice or offering*, inasmuch as the Septuagint puts it for the Hebrew *תְּרוּמָה*, which conveys such a meaning. This is possible;

but on the whole I should prefer the other sense. I take the meaning of the writer in Rev. 14: 4 to be, that the persons there named may be considered in a light resembling that of the ἀπαρχή in ancient times, as the first fruits of a glorious Christian harvest.

I understand ἀπαρχή to have the same sense as the Hebrew ראשית, for which it so often stands; *caput, princeps, first in its kind, first in point of time*, etc. Comp. ראשית in Gen. 49: 3. Prov. 8: 22. Lev. 2: 12. 23: 10. Deut. 18: 4. 26: 10. 33: 21. Num. 24: 20. Amos 6: 6.

In the passage before us, all the Greek fathers appear to have attached one and the same meaning to ἀπαρχή, viz. that of *first fruits*, in the sense of *earnest, pledge, foretaste*, of joys to come. So Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, and Basil. This accords well, too, with the nature of the case. The apostle represents Christians as the habitation of God by his Spirit, Eph. 2: 22, comp. 1 Cor. 3: 16. 6: 19. The Spirit of God dwells in them, 1 John 3: 24. 4: 13. This Spirit, thus conferred on them, is the ἀρῶαβών, *the pledge* of future glory, 2 Cor. 5: 5. Eph. 1: 14.

What hinders now, that with all the Greek fathers, we should understand ἀπαρχή as meaning, *the pledge, foretaste, first fruits*, of future glory? The *usus loquendi* of the word does not seem to admit of any other exegesis. Nor do we need any other; as this is altogether congruous with the nature of the passage.

With Keil then, in his admirable explanation of this passage, (Opusc. p. 294, seq.), I would interpret it in the manner exhibited above. And if this be correct, then it follows, that the ἀπαρχή here spoken of is common to all true Christians; and that the interpretation which limits this verse to the apostles, or to a few of the primitive Christians endowed with miraculous gifts, has no stable foundation.

That Christians were subject to sorrows, needs not to be proved. That they were exposed to more than ordinary ones, may be seen in 2 Cor. 5: 2, 3. 1 Cor. 15: 19. That they longed and sighed for deliverance, followed from their very nature. That even the *earnest* of future glory did not exempt them from sufferings, is certain. But there is a peculiar energy and delicacy in the expression which marks the consequences of their sufferings; *we GROAN within ourselves*, i. e. internally, not externally. We suppress the rising sigh; we bow with submission to the will of God which afflicts us; we receive his chastisement as children; our frail nature feels it, and we sigh or groan inwardly; but no murmuring word escapes us; we

suppress the outward demonstrations of pain, lest we should even seem to complain.

Is this imaginary on my part? Or did the writer mean to convey what I have attributed to him? So much, at least, we can say, viz. that such a sentiment was worthy of Paul, and of all Christians who suffered with him. It is worthy of being carried into practice at the present hour; it commends itself to the conscience of every one, who thoroughly believes in the holy, just, and benevolent providence of God.

Υιοθεσίαν ἀπεκδεχόμενοι, waiting for [our] adoption or filiation. There is a twofold *filiation* spoken of in the New Testament. The first is that which takes place, when believers are born again, John 1: 12, 13. 3: 3—5. Rom. 8: 14, 15, represents believers as possessing *πνεῦμα υἰοθεσίας*. 1 John 3: 1, 2. But there is another and higher sense in which believers are to become the children of God, viz. they are to be so, when they shall be perfected in the world of glory, when they become “the children of the resurrection,” when they are made “like to the angels,” Luke 20: 36. Their first adoption or filiation is secret, in regard to the world; their second is the *ἀποκάλυψις τῶν υἱῶν τοῦ θεοῦ*, when “he who seeth in secret, shall reward them openly.” It is probably because the word *υἰοθεσίαν* here used, is in itself dubious, that the apostle adds an explanatory or exegetical clause, which he places in apposition with it, viz. *τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν*, the redemption of our body, i. e. its redemption from a state of frailty, disease, and death. It is, at the resurrection, to be like to Christ’s glorious body, Phil. 3: 21; it is to be a *σῶμα πνευματικόν*, 1 Cor. 15: 44; this mortal is to put on immortality, this *σῶμα φθαρτόν* is to become a *σῶμα ἄφθαρτον*, 1 Cor. 15: 53, 54. Such is the *ἀπολύτρωσις* of this frail and dying body, which believers now inhabit. Comp. *ἀπολύτρωσις* in Luke 21: 28. Eph. 1: 14. 4: 30. Heb. 11: 35.

The reader will note, as I have had occasion already to intimate, that the expression *ἀπολύτρωσιν τοῦ σώματος* here is equivalent to the *ἀποκάλυψιν τῶν υἱῶν τοῦ θεοῦ* in v. 19, and to the *ἐλευθερίαν τῶν τέκνων τοῦ θεοῦ* in v. 21. It therefore serves to show what those expressions mean, in the connection in which they stand.

Christians then, in their present state, must long and wait for their second and final adoption or filiation. They must wait with confidence; yea, with assurance; for “he who cometh will come, and will not tarry.” But let them not regard the present world as

their home. It is not the Canaan in which they are to rest. They must "seek a city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God." Then the agitated breast, the heaving sigh, the groaning within, will no more annoy or distress them. Let not the child of God complain, then, that his final reward is not anticipated and distributed to him here, in the present world, while he is in a state of trial. He must wait until he comes to the goal, before he can wear the crown of a victor in the race. He must defer his expected laurels, until his combat is over. Then he shall receive a crown of glory, which fadeth not away.

(24) That the Christian cannot expect a reward here, the apostle goes on most explicitly to declare. *Τῇ γὰρ ἐλπίδι ἐσώθημεν*, for we are saved in hope, i. e. we have as yet obtained salvation only in hope; we have only attained to a condition in which we indulge a hope of future glory. This is all which can be rationally expected or accomplished in the present life. He had said, in the preceding verse, that Christians are in the attitude of waiting for their filiation. Verse 24 is designed to illustrate and confirm this; hence the *γὰρ illustrantis* at the beginning of it.

Ἐλπίς δὲ βλεπομένη, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐλπίς, now hope which is seen, is no longer hope; i. e. the object of hope (*ἐλπίς* here means this) is no longer such, when one attains the actual possession of it. *Ἄέ orationi continuanda in servit*, as the lexicographers say, i. e. it stands before a clause which is designed to continue the subject already introduced.

Ὅ γὰρ βλέπει τις, τί καὶ ἐλπίζει; for what a man sees, how does he still hope for it? That is, what a man has actually attained or come to the enjoyment of, how can he be said to look forward to it with hope or anticipation? *Γὰρ rationem rei dictae reddit*, i. e. it stands in a clause designed to explain or confirm the preceding assertion; for such is the nature of the present clause.

(25) *Εἰ δὲ ὃ οὐ βλέπομεν, ἐλπίζομεν, δι' ὑπομενῆς ἀπεκδεχόμεθα*, but if now we hope for that which we do not enjoy, then we patiently wait for it. That is, if it be true, as all will concede, that in the present life we attain not to our final reward, but can be called the heirs of salvation, only because we have obtained a well-grounded hope of it; if it be so, that we cannot rationally expect an exemption from trials and troubles here, but must take our part in them with all around us; if it be true also, that a great and glorious reward is reserved in heaven, for all who endure patiently until the

end of their probation; (and that this is true, the very nature that God has given to men, which is here so imperfectly developed, and which therefore points to a state of greater perfection, satisfactorily shews); then it becomes Christians to endure with all patience and meekness the trials and sufferings of the present life. Time is short; eternity is long. Our sufferings are slight and momentary, when viewed in a comparative light. Who can place them beside that glory, "which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, and of which it hath not entered into the heart of man to conceive," and which is to endure as long as the God who bestows it, and yet make any serious account of them? *Christian brethren*, says the apostle, *let us patiently wait the appointed time of our deliverance.*

CHAP. VIII. 26, 27.

In this our weak and suffering condition, we are greatly aided by the Spirit who dwells in us; so that even when we are so much perplexed and distressed that we know not what to ask for, or what to say in our prayers, our internal sighs which are not uttered by words, and which arise from his influence on our souls, are noticed and understood by the Searcher of hearts, whose ears will be open to them. Such is the course of thought in these verses; the natural inference from it is: 'Christians, be not discouraged, even in your deepest distresses. He who seeth in secret, counts every groan, hears every sigh, and will be a very present help in time of need.'

(26) Such is the general sentiment of the passage. Particular words, however, present some difficulties. *Ὡσαύτως*, *in like manner, in the same way*. But in what way? Like to what? A difficult question. Some critics, (Grotius, Koppe, Flatt and others), render *Ὡσαύτως* by *praeterea, überdiess*, i. e. *moreover, besides*. This would do well, if philology would allow it. It seems, however, to be making a new meaning for the word. The true answer to the question: Like to what? seems to be this: 'In like manner as hope supports, strengthens, cheers us, and renders us patient, so do the influences of the Spirit aid us, in all our distresses; i. e. as hope aids us amidst all our sufferings and sorrows, so does the Spirit likewise.'

Τὸ πνεῦμα, *the Spirit*. But what Spirit? Our own mind? A filial Spirit? Or the Spirit of God? Each of these methods of exegesis has been defended. I was once inclined to regard the second meaning as the most probable; principally on account of the 27th verse. It is natural to ask: Does not the epithet, *ὁ ἐρευνῶν τὰς καρδίας*, designate him who knows the secrets of the *human breast*,

and not him who knows the secrets of the Spirit of God, i. e. his own secrets? Then again, φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος, in the same verse, seems to mean, *the mind, will, design of the human heart or spirit*; and again, Where in all the Scriptures is the Spirit of God represented as *making intercession* (ἐντυγχάνει) for the saints? These difficulties led me, as they have done many others, to construe πνεῦμα as meaning πνεῦμα υἰοθεσίας, comp. v. 15. But a re-investigation of this subject, has now, on the whole, made me to doubt this exegesis; and this for reasons which will be specified in the sequel.

Let the reader first compare πνεῦμα in vs. 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 13, 14, 23, where it clearly means the Spirit of God or of Christ, and he will feel the weight of probability that the writer here uses πνεῦμα in the like sense. That Spirit which sanctifies Christians, which subdues their fleshly appetites, which gives them a filial temper, which bestows a foretaste of future glory,—this same Spirit, aids Christians in all their sufferings and sorrows; and consequently they ought patiently to endure them. It cannot be denied, that *intensity* of meaning is given to the whole passage, by this exegesis.

Συναντιλαμβάνεται, *helps*; but in the Greek, σύν augments the signification, so that one might translate, *greatly assists, affords much help*,—Ἀσθενείαις ἡμῶν, *our infirmities*, seems to mean, our frail, infirm, afflicted, troubled state; and this accords entirely with the context.

Τὸ γὰρ κ. τ. λ., γὰρ *illustrantis* again; for the sequel shews what our condition is, and how the Spirit aids us. Τὸ γὰρ . . . οὐκ οἶδαμεν, *for we know not what we should pray for as we ought*; i. e. in our perplexities, weaknesses, ignorance, and distresses, we are often at a loss what would be best for us, or most agreeable to the will of God respecting us. Καθὸ δεῖ, i. e. the object for which we should pray καθὸ δεῖ, viz. κατὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ (comp. 1 John 5: 14), is frequently unknown to us.

In this state, *the same Spirit, αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα*, the same who sanctifies us, dwells in us, and helps our infirmities—this same Spirit *intercedes for us, ὑπερεντυγχάνει ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*, where ὑπὲρ in composition with the verb, augments the force of it.

Prayer or supplication, however, made by the Spirit, i. e. the Spirit of God as such and by himself, is not here intended. So the sequel clearly shews. *The Spirit makes intercession for us στεναγμοῖς ἀλαλήτοις*, *in sighs or groans which are unutterable*, i. e. the full mean-

ing of which cannot be spoken in words. Or ἀλαλήτοις may mean, *that which is not uttered, that which is internal, suppressed sighs*. Either sense is good; and either gives an intense meaning. In this way, then, the Spirit intercedes for the saints, viz. by exciting within them such longing and high desires for conformity to God, and for deliverance from evil, and for the enjoyment of future blessedness, that these desires become unutterable; no language can adequately express them. What is thus done in the souls of believers through the influence of the Spirit, is here attributed to him; i. e. he is said to do, what they do under his special influence.

In accordance with such a sentiment, Fenelon, in his Essay entitled, *Que l'Esprit de Dieu enseigne en dedans*, [That the Spirit of God teaches internally], says in a very striking manner: "The Spirit of God is the soul of our soul." So Augustine, with equal correctness and concinnity: "Non Spiritus Sanctus in semetipso apud semet ipsum in illa Trinitate gemit; sed *in nobis gemit, quia gemere nos facit*, (Tract. VI. in Johan. § 2); that is, 'the Divine Spirit does not groan or intercede in and by himself, as God and belonging to the Trinity; but he intercedes by his influence upon us, and by leading us to aspirations which language cannot express:' a sentiment equally true and striking.

(27) Ὁ δὲ ἐρευνητὴς τὰς καρδίας, a common appellation of God who is omniscient; comp. Ps. 7: 9 (10). Jer. 11: 20.—Οἶδε τὸ φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος, *knoweth the desire of the Spirit or the mind of the Spirit*, i. e. what is sought after, willed, or desired, when these στεναγμοὶ ἀλαλήτοι, excited by him, arise. In other words: 'The Searcher of hearts does not need that desires should be clothed or expressed in language, in order perfectly to understand them and to listen to them.'

It is not *the mind of the Spirit of God*, in itself considered and as belonging to the Godhead, that the Searcher of hearts is here represented as knowing. It is *the mind or desire of the Spirit*, as disclosed ἐν στεναγμοῖς ἀλαλήτοις τῶν ἁγίων, that the writer means to designate. In this way, there is no difficulty in applying πνεῦμα to the Spirit of God.

"Οτι κατὰ . . . ἁγίων, because he intercedes for the saints agreeably to the will of God. To construe κατὰ θεόν, *to God*, as if it were πρὸς θεόν here, the *usus loquendi* of the language absolutely forbids; for ἐντυγχάνει κατὰ . . . means *to accuse*; in which case, also, κατὰ must be followed by the Genitive. Κατὰ θεόν, then,

must mean *secundum Deum*, i. e. *κατὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ*, comp. 1 John 5: 14. So the Syriac version, Chrysostom, Tholuck, Flatt, and others. Comp. for this sense of *κατά*, Rom. 8: 4. 2 Cor. 11: 17. Rom. 2: 2. Luke 2: 22, 24, 27, 29, et al.

Sentiment: 'The Searcher of hearts knows all that the sighs of his children mean, when these are excited by his Spirit; for the Spirit excites in them unutterable desires, in accordance with the will of God, i. e. desires for what is agreeable to his will or proper for him to grant; to which, therefore, he will readily listen.'

In this mode of exegesis, all difficulties seem to be removed, and one is enabled to maintain a uniform and consistent meaning of *πνεῦμα* throughout the whole chapter.

The Christian who reads this passage with a spirit that responds to the sentiments which it discloses, cannot avoid lifting up his soul to God, with overflowing gratitude for his mercies. Here, we are poor and wretched and miserable and blind and naked, and in want of all things; we are crushed before the moth; we all do fade as a leaf, and the wind taketh us away; we are often in distress, in darkness, in perplexity, in straits from which we can see no escape, no issue; even in far the greater number of cases, we know not what will be for our ultimate and highest good, and so "know not what we should pray for *as we ought*:" but then, the Spirit of the living God is present with all the true followers of the Saviour; he excites desires in their souls of liberation from sin and present evil, of heavenly blessedness and holiness, greater than words can express. The soul can only vent itself in sighs, the meaning of which language is too feeble to express. Often we do not know enough of the consequences or designs of present trials and sufferings, even to venture on making a definite request with regard to them; because we do not know whether relief from them is best or not. The humble Christian, who feels his need of chastisement, will very often be brought to such a state. Then what a high and precious privilege it is, that our "unutterable sighs" should be heard and understood by Him who searches our hearts! Who can read this without emotion? Such are the blessings purchased for sinners by redeeming blood! Such the consolations which flow from the throne of God, for a groaning and dying world!

CHAP. VIII. 28—39.

To crown the whole, the apostle now goes on to assure those to whom he is writing, that 'all things,' i. e. the sufferings and sorrows and trials of the present life, will prove to be instruments, in the hand of a wise and powerful God and merciful Redeemer, of promoting the final and greatest happiness and glory of all true saints. The accomplishment of this end cannot fail. The purpose of God in respect to the saints, can never be disappointed. Nothing can ever separate them from the care and kindness and affection of the Saviour, who has redeemed them. The inference to be drawn from all this, is, that Christians have no reason to despond or to be discouraged, while suffering the evils and trials of life. Their hopes and expectations should be elevated above the world, and be in accordance with the glorious inheritance that awaits them.

(28) *Οἶδαμεν δέ*, we know now, or we know then or moreover. *Δέ orationi continuandae inservit.* What follows, is an addition to what had gone before, of the like in kind or relating to the same subject.

Πάντα συνεργεῖ, all sufferings, sorrows, trials, etc., shall cooperate, mutually contribute, for the good, for the final and highest good, of those who love God, i. e. of the saints, of true Christians. So the sequel describes them.

Τοῖς . . . οὖσιν, to those who are called according to his purpose or design. *Κλητοῖς*, in the New Testament, is used twice in the sense of invited, bidden, viz. Matt. 20: 16. 22: 14. In all other cases it means, not only such as were invited, but such as had accepted the invitation; e. g. 1 Cor. 1: 2, 24. Jude v. 1. Rom. 1: 6. Rev. 17: 14. It seems, therefore, to be employed as the equivalent of *ἐκλεκτος*, and means a true Christian. Plainly this is the sense in the verse before us; for the persons here designated are those who love God.—*Κατὰ πρόθεσιν*, those who are called or chosen in conformity with the purpose [of God]. This *πρόθεσις* is κατ' ἐκλογήν, Rom. 9: 11, i. e. free, without any merit or desert on the part of the sinner, or of obligation (strictly speaking) on the part of God; it is the *πρόθεσις* of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will, and hath before ordained that Christians should have a heavenly inheritance, Eph. 1: 11; it is a *πρόθεσις τῶν αἰώνων*, an eternal purpose, Eph. 3: 11; or it is a *πρόθεσις . . . πρὸ χρόνων αἰώνων*, a purpose before the ancient ages, i. e. before the world began, 2 Tim. 1: 9.

That the purpose of God is here meant, and not the purpose or will of man, (as Chrysostom, Theophylact, Cyril, Pelagius, Suidas, Hammond, Le Clerc, and others, have maintained), is rendered entirely clear by the sequel, v. 29, seq. See Excursus VII.

(29) *Ὅτι οὖς προέγινω*. The course of thought seems to be thus: 'All things must work together for good to Christians—to such

as are called to the privileges of a filial relation, and were chosen before the world began, to be conformed to the image of God, and to be advanced to a state of glory. The everlasting love and purpose of God cannot be disappointed.' "Ὅτι κ. τ. λ. introduces the reasons, why it is certain that all things will work together for the good of true Christians.

Προέγνω, *foreknew*, or *before decreed* or *constituted* or *determined*, (viz. as *κλητοί*, *elect*, *saints*, *chosen*, see on v. 28), a word endlessly disputed. But whether *theology* or *philology* has been the predominating element in the dispute, it is not difficult for an impartial reader to decide. My object and argument shall be *philological*. I would seek for what the apostle *does* say; not for what I may conjecture he ought to say.

Πρό, in composition, gives the additional signification of *previous time*, *formerly*; the action designated by the verb remaining the same as is signified by the simple form of the word. What then does *γινώσκω* mean? It means, (1) *To know* in any manner generally; *to know* by the aid of any of the bodily senses, by hearing, etc., or by experience, trial; Lat. *cognoscere*, *sentire*. (2) *To be acquainted with*, *to perceive so as fully to apprehend*, *to take knowledge of*, *to make one's self acquainted with*. (3) *To recognize one as a known friend*, *a familiar acquaintance*; Matt. 7: 23. Mark 7: 24. 1 Cor. 8: 3. Gal. 4: 9. 2 Tim. 2: 19. Heb. 13: 23. To the same purpose is the corresponding Hebrew עָרַךְ employed; i. e. it means *to love*, *to regard with affection*, *to treat with favour*; e. g. it is said of God in respect to the saints, Ps. 1: 6. 144: 3. Amos 3: 2. Nah. 1: 7; of men in respect to God, Hos. 8: 2. Ps. 36: 11. 9: 11. Job 18: 21. The first and second classes of meaning above given are so common, and so easily confirmed by any of the lexicons, that I have deemed it superfluous to adduce examples, which every one may find in abundance by consulting his lexicon.

Προέγνω then *may* mean, *he before loved*, *he before regarded with affection*, *he before looked on with favour*. In this sense many have here understood the word; e. g. Origen, Erasmus, Mosheim, Baumgarten, E. Schmidius, and generally the Arminians.

On the other hand; Theophylact, Oecumenius, Ambrose, Augustine, Bucer, Balduin, Hunnius, Calovius, Heumann, and others, have construed *προέγνω* here as meaning, *he foreknew*, understood in the literal and primary sense of the word; i. e., say the Lutheran commentators in general: 'God foreknew that the *κλητοί* would freely

believe.' In the same way, many at the present day construe this text. But the question on which all turns, as to this interpretation, is: Does the apostle here represent the calling and justification and glorification of the *κλητοί*, as the result of God's love to them, or of their love to him? That is, did God bring them by his Spirit into a state of grace, *because they loved him first*, or before they were brought into this state; or did he *by his mercy* bring them into this state, so that they might love him? This question is finally and fully settled by such texts as 1 John 4: 10, 19. John 15: 16. Rom. 5: 6—10. Jer. 31: 3. 2 Tim. 1: 9, *οὐ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα ἡμῶν—ἀλλὰ κατὰ πρόθεσιν καὶ χάριν τὴν δοθείσαν . . . πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνίων*. It is settled by the nature of the case. The Spirit of God "breathes on the valley of *dry bones*;" he "quickens those who are *dead* in trespasses and sins;" he "calls the *dead* to life;" he "creates anew in Christ Jesus;" sinners are "born of the Spirit;" and it is in this way, and in this only, that they come to love God; for "the carnal mind is enmity against God, and is not subject to his law, nor indeed can be;" and that "which is born of the flesh is flesh." It is God who first loves us (1 John 4: 10, 19), before we come to love him. There is no setting aside declarations so plain, so full, so often repeated as these.

We cannot embrace that view of *προέγνω*, then, which makes the manifestation of God's love to his children to depend on his foresight of their meritorious obedience, or their love towards him. It is undoubtedly true, it must be so, that God foresees and perfectly knows all the love and obedience which his children will ever exhibit; and it is equally certain, that he has before determined to reward these in proportion to their desert. But this cannot be the ground of his causing them, when they are his enemies and dead in trespasses and sins, to become *συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνης τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ*. It must forever remain true, that we are brought "to love him, because he *first* loved us."

It should also be observed, in regard to the exegesis now in question, that it gives a ground or reason of God's foreknowledge in this case, which the text does not give. The text does not say *why* or *how* God foreknew; but merely *that he did so*. Of this more in the sequel.

In the sense of No. 3 above, viz. that of *approving, loving, regarding with approbation* or *affection*, Origen, Martyr, Calvin, and many others take *προέγνω* here. But those who embrace this senti-

ment respecting *προέγνω*, are divided; some saying that God *before loved* his saints, *because he foresaw their character and good works*; others, that *out of his mere good pleasure he set his love upon them*. In the latter way, Calvin, Beza, the Westminster Catechism, and most of the Calvinistic writings take it. But our text, it should be observed, assigns neither the one reason nor the other; it states the *simple fact*, and no more.

I do not see that any conclusive objections can be urged against adopting the sense of *before loving or regarding with affection*; because the like sense of the verbs *γινώσκω* and *ᾔδειν* is common. It is only when the *reason* for doing this is forced upon us, as being disclosed in the text itself, that I should object to such an exegesis.

With Tholuck, however, I prefer a sense of *προέγνω*, different from any yet mentioned; and this merely from the philology of the passage. It is well known in respect to *γινώσκω*, that it sometimes means, *volo, constituo tecum, I will, I wish, I determine with myself, I resolve or determine or decide*; and of course, *I ordain, constitute, decree*. So Rom. 7: 15. So Josephus: *ὁ θεὸς ἔγνω τιμορίσασθαι αὐτούς*, *God hath determined to punish them*, Antiq. I. 2; comp. also Antiq. II. 4, 5 and III. 12, 3. So Psalt. Sal. 17. 47: *ἣν ἔγνω ὁ θεὸς ἀναστῆσαι*, *which God hath determined to establish*. In like manner Plutarch: *ἔγνω φυγεῖν ἀποδημίᾳ τὴν ὑπόνοιαν*, *he determined to avoid suspicion by going abroad*, Lyc. c. 3. Polybius: *ἔγνωσαν διὰ μάχης κρίνειν τὰ πράγματα*, *they have determined to decide matters by appeal to arms*, V. 82.

That *προγινώσκω* may have the like sense, is clear from 1 Pet. 1: 20; where *προεγνωσμένου πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου* (said of Christ) means plainly, *before decreed, before constituted or determined*. In the like sense (as many think) is it used in Rom. 11: 2, *God hath not cast away his people ὃν προέγνω*, *whom he chose to be his or constituted his*, viz. before the foundation of the world; comp. 1 Pet. 1: 20. Eph. 3: 11. 2 Tim. 1: 9. And in accordance with this, *πρόγνωσις* is used; e. g. Acts 2: 24, where it is the equivalent of *ῥωσιμένη βουλή*. So also in 1 Pet. 1: 2; and it is the same as *πρόθεσις*, in 2 Tim. 1: 9. Eph. 3: 11.

In this view of the subject, *ὃν προέγνω* is to be regarded as a *resumption* of the idea expressed by *κατὰ πρόθεσιν κλητοῖς* in v. 28, i. e. those who by his purpose were *κλητοί*, those whom *προέγνω*—i. e. whom *he had before chosen or constituted his κλητοί*—*προώρρισε κ.τ.λ.* That *πρό* in composition here means, *before* the foundation of the

world, may be seen by comparing 1 Pet. 1: 20. 2 Tim. 1: 9. Eph. 3: 11.

The objections to this view of the subject do not seem to be weighty; and they lie equally against translating *προέγνω*, *he foreknew*, or *he loved before*. If God did actually *foreknow* who were to be his *κλητοί*, then it was not *uncertain* whether they would be or not. If he *LOVED* them *before* the foundation of the world, then it must have been, that he did *foreknow* that they would be his *κλητοί*—and this again makes the same *certainty*. If he *determined* before the foundation of the world that they should be his *κλητοί*, then again the same *certainty* existed, and no more. Nay even if we could abstract God and his purposes from the whole, and suppose the order of the universe to move on in its constituted way, the same *certainty* would still have existed. I do not see, therefore, in what way we can avoid the conclusion, that *certainty* must exist by the divine purpose and counsel, in regard to the *κλητοί*—a *certainty* not merely that they will be saved, provided they believe and obey and persevere in so doing; but a *certainty* that the *κατὰ πρόθεσιν κλητοί* will be brought to believe and obey and persevere, and will therefore obtain salvation; for such is the manifest tenor of the whole passage.

Still, all those of any party in theology, who draw from *προέγνω* the conclusion that God *fore-ordained* or *chose* or *loved*, out of his *mere good pleasure*, on the one hand; or from his foresight of *faith* and *good works* on the other; deduce from the text what is not in it, for it says neither the one nor the other. It avers merely, that the *κατὰ πρόθεσιν κλητοί* were *foreknown*, or *fore-loved*, or *fore-determined*. Construe this in whatever way you will, if there be any objection against the one, there is the same against the other, unless you remove it by adding a condition which the apostle has not added. It lies on the face of the whole paragraph, that *certainty* of future glory to all the *κλητοί Θεοῦ*, is what the writer means to affirm; and to affirm it *by shewing that it is part of the everlasting purposes of God*.

Καὶ προώρισε, *he also fore-ordained, predestinated, decreed before*, viz. before the foundation of the world. So, clearly, the word is used in Acts 4: 28. 1 Cor. 2: 7, expressly *πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων*. Eph. 1: 5, 11. Bretschneider (Lex.) says, that the *decree* here has respect merely to the *external privileges* of the gospel, and not to *eternal salvation*; which is directly contradicted by 1 Cor. 2: 7—*εἰς δόξαν*

ἡμῶν by Eph. 1: 5—εἰς υἰοθεσίαν διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ . . . ἐν ᾧ ἔχομεν τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν . . . and v. 11, ἐν ᾧ ἔκκληρώθημεν, προορισθέντες κατὰ πρόθεσιν κ. τ. λ. In like manner, the whole tenor of the passage before us clearly contradicts this; for here the subject is, *final and future glory*, not merely present opportunities and external advantages for acquiring Christian knowledge. The only remaining passage where the word is used (Acts 4: 28), employs it in an entirely different connection, but with the plain sense of *before decreed*. The sense of the whole is: 'Those who are κλητοί according to the purpose of God, those whom he determined from everlasting to save, he did at the same time *predestinate to be conformed to the image*,' etc.

Συμμόρφους is here used as a noun, having the Gen. after it; if employed as an adjective, it would require the Dative; συμμόρφους . . . αὐτοῦ, *to be of the like form with the image of his own Son*, i. e. to be like him, to resemble him in a moral respect. God has not then, (as is often objected to the doctrine of predestination), decreed that men should be saved whether they be sinful or holy, i. e. without any regard to the character which they may have; but he has determined, that all who are conducted to glory must resemble, *in a moral respect*, him who leads them to glory, i. e. the great Captain of their salvation.

Εἰς τὸ εἶναι . . . ἀδελφοῖς, *that he [the Son] should be the first-born among many brethren*; i. e. that the Saviour should, in his office as Lord of all and Head over all things for his church, still sustain a *fraternal relation* to those whose leader he is, they being made to resemble him by being made partakers of the like qualities or affections; comp. Heb. 2: 11—18. On πρωτότοκος, comp. Ps. 89: 27, (28). Ex. 4: 22. Heb. 1: 6. Col. 1. 15.

(30) Οὓς δὲ προώρισε, *and whom he fore-ordained, or predestinated*, viz. to be conformed to the image of his Son. In other words, whom he before determined to regenerate and sanctify, to purify from sin, and to make holy in some measure as the Saviour is holy.

Τούτους καὶ ἐκάλεσε, *the same did he also call*. Is this the so named *effectual calling*; or does it mean nothing more than the *external invitation* of the gospel, the moral suasion of it addressed to the heart and understanding of sinners? That the external call is often designated by the word καλέω, is clear enough from such passages as Matt. 9: 13. Mark 2: 17. Luke 5: 32. Gal. 1: 6. 5: 8, 13. Eph. 4: 1, 4 etc. But the word καλέω may also be applied to *effectual*

calling, i. e. such a calling as ensures acceptance. In such a way κλη̄σεις and κλητός are, beyond all doubt, usually applied to *effectual calling* or *election*. So here, ἐκάλεσε manifestly means, such a *calling* as proceeds from the πρόθεσις, from the *fore-knowledge* and from the *predetermination* of God in respect to the objects of it, and which is followed by justification or pardon of sin, and final glory. If this be not *effectual calling*, what is? Such a call as proceeds from the everlasting purpose and love of God, and ends in heavenly glory, is something more than an *external* motive or suasive argument, merely addressed to the mind.

Τούτους καὶ ἐδικαίωσεν, *the same he also justified*; i. e. pardoned, acquitted, absolved from the penalty of the divine law, accepted and treated as righteous.—Οὓς δὲ . . . ἐδόξασε, *and those whom he justified, the same he also glorified*; the work, begun in accordance with his everlasting love and purpose, he carries through and consummates, by bestowing endless glory in heaven upon the κατὰ πρόθεσιν κλητοί.

How then can the mere *external* invitations and privileges of the gospel be here meant? Is it indeed true, that *all* to whom these are extended are κλητοί? If so, then what is to be the lot of those, to whom the gospel is not made known? Whether it be true, moreover, that all who *hear* the gospel will be saved, may be determined from such texts as John 15: 22—24. 9: 41. 3: 19. Heb. 2: 1—3. 3: 18, 19. 6: 4—6. 10: 26—30. Mark 16: 16. It may, with equal certainty, be determined from vs. 1—11 of the present chapter, where the distinction between σαρκικοί and πνευματικοί is broad and clear. If now all who enjoy the external privileges of the gospel, are not κλητοί or κεκλημένοι in the sense of the present passage, then must it be true, that such only as are *conformed to the image of Christ* will be saved. And that all who enjoy the external privileges of the gospel, are conformed to the image of Christ, will not, I trust, be asserted by any considerate person. See Excursus VIII.

(31) Τί . . . ταῦτα; *what shall we say in respect to these things?* i. e. what shall we say, now, in reference to the facts and principles which I have just mentioned, viz. the purposes of God in respect to the κλητοί, and the manner in which he deals with them? The sequel answers this question; the sum of which is, that 'such being the purposes of God, none of the sorrows or troubles of life, yea none of the spiritual enemies and opposers of the children of God, will be able to disappoint or frustrate their hopes.'

Εἰ ὁ θεὸς . . . ἡμῶν; If God be on our side, i. e. espouse our cause, who can contend with success against him?

(32) "*Ὁς γέ κ. τ. λ., even he who spared not his own Son. Τέ, quidem, German eben;* "*γέ . . . vim verbi auget, i. e. intensiva est.*" — *Ἰδίου, his own, his genuine, in opposition to, or in distinction from, υἱοῦ θεοῦ, an adopted son;* e. g. Abraham prepared to offer up *his own* son as a sacrifice, instead of selecting a supposititious or adopted heir. Yet by *own* here, we are not to understand a son *more humano*, but a Son *μονογενής*, in a sense stated by Luke, 1: 35; *Son* being evidently used here not for the divine Logos as such, but for the Messiah clothed with our nature; as the sequel plainly shews.

Οὐκ ἐφείσατο, he spared not, i. e. he did not withhold; a *λιτότης*, i. e. a negative form of expression, which has an affirmative meaning equivalent to *ἐχαρίσατο, he gave.* So the sequel; *ἀλλ' . . . αὐτόν, but gave him up for us all, i. e. gave him up to suffering and death, devoted him to be a sacrifice for our sins;* comp. John 3: 16. Luke 22: 19. Gal. 1: 4. *Πάντων* is plainly the same here as *ἡμεῖς, i. e. all Christians.*

Πῶς οὐχὶ . . . χαρίσεται, how [can it be] that with him he will not bestow even all things upon us? That is: 'How can we possibly suppose, that, after having bestowed the greatest of all gifts upon us, viz. his own Son, he will refuse to bestow those gifts which are smaller and less costly?'

Tholuck says here, that "the apostle has assured Christians [in the paragraph before us], that nothing shall hurt them, unless they injure themselves." And again: "If the Calvinistic idea [of perseverance] had been intended to be conveyed [by the apostle], he must also have said, that neither *apostasy* nor *sin* would, under any circumstances, have rendered their *calling* uncertain, or disappointed it." That this may be rendered uncertain, he thinks is shewn by 2 Pet. 1: 10.

But if exhortations, commands, and threatenings of a most awful nature, addressed to Christians, are to be considered as implying an uncertainty whether the work which God has begun in Christians will be completed; then the Bible is indeed full of proof that they may fall away and finally perish; for it is filled with passages of such a nature. Above all, does the epistle to the Hebrews abound in them. But, while it is impossible to deny this; or even to deny, that if Christians were left to themselves they would fall away every day and hour of their lives; one may still, without any just cause of reproach, be permitted to believe with the apostle, that "*whom God calls, he justifies and glorifies;*" he may believe, with the same apostle, that "if Christ died for us while we were yet sinners, while we were *ἀσθενεῖς καὶ ἄσεβεῖς, MUCH MORE, being justified [i. e. obtaining pardon through his blood], shall we*

be saved from wrath," Rom. 5: 6—10. How can we then put a construction so frigid, on this most animated and energetic passage which is now before us? 'The purposes of God,' says the apostle, 'will not be disappointed in bringing his elect to glory.' Why? 'Because, since God hath given his own Son, the greatest possible gift, to redeem them from sin, therefore their redemption remaineth not uncertain, but will be accomplished.' This reasoning we can see and feel. But how is it with the exegesis of Tholuck? 'God will save you from the power of external causes of disappointment, if you only take care yourselves of the internal ones.' Indeed? But I have great difficulty to find, in all this, the consolation or assurance which I need. It is offering me only a single drop of water, when I am ready to faint with thirst and need a copious draught. Ten thousand thousand enemies *without*, are not half so strong as the one *within*; and if God's gift of his own Son has not secured *sanctifying* and *restraining* grace for his children, which shall enable them to 'crucify the old man with his lusts, and to put on the new man,' then is the work not only incomplete, but it will most certainly fail of being finally accomplished. The world and the devil would have little influence over us, indeed, were our hearts altogether right toward God; and certain it is, that all other combats are mere skirmishes, compared with the warfare that is going on within us, by reason of our *internal* enemy, a corrupt heart. But did not Christ die to redeem us from the dangers of this most powerful of all enemies, so well as from other dangers? If not, then we may abandon all hopes which the gospel inspires, and give ourselves up, after all, for lost. But no, no! This exegesis does not meet the object which the apostle has in view. It is and must be true, that "if when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, MUCH MORE, being reconciled, *we shall be saved by his life*," Rom. 5: 10.

But all this purpose (which belongs only to the counsels and mercy of God), does not hinder Paul, nor any other sacred writer, from reproving, warning, and threatening Christians, just as if they were liable, every day and hour of their lives, to fall away and to lose the glorious reward of the saints. *In themselves considered*, they are liable to this; and God employs the very means in question, to preserve them against apostasy. Thus, while we admit that the promises of Christ will not fail, nor the efficacy of atoning blood be frustrated; while we believe that "where God has begun a good work, he will *carry it into execution* (*ἐπιτελέσει*) until the day of Jesus Christ" (Phil. 1: 6); we admit in the fullest manner the importance and duty of warning, reproving, exhorting, and threatening Christians, just as we should do were there no direct assurances that "whom God calls he justifies, and whom he justifies he glorifies." We admit all this, because the sacred writers evidently admit it, and write constantly in a manner that accords with this admission.

(33) *Τίς . . . θεοῦ; Who shall bring an accusation against the elect of God?* That is: 'Who shall prefer an accusation against them, of crimes that would occasion their condemnation, when they

come before the tribunal of God?' *Ἐκλεκτῶν*, Heb. בְּחֵרָה, בְּבִחָרָה, בְּחֵרָה, *chosen, dear, beloved, precious*; comp. 1 Pet. 2: 9. Luke 23: 35. 1 Pet. 1: 1. Matt. 24: 22, 31. Mark 13: 20. Luke 18: 7. Col. 3: 12. Tit. 1: 1. Rev. 17: 14; also Matt. 20: 16. 22: 14, (where *ἐκλεκτοί* is used in distinction from *κλητοί*). That *ἐκλεκτῶν* here means something more than merely *ἀγαπητοί*, may be seen from comparing v. 28 above—*κατὰ πρόθεσιν . . . κλητοί*: also 1 Pet. 1: 1, 2, *ἐκλεκτοῖς . . . κατὰ πρόγνωσιν θεοῦ πατρὸς*.

Θεὸς ὁ δικαιοῶν, *it is God who justifieth*. So I prefer to render and to point it, viz. by making this phrase an answer to the preceding question. So Luther, Tholuck, our English version, and most commentators. On the other hand, Augustine, Erasmus, Locke, Schöttgen, Griesbach, Knapp, and others, put an interrogation point after *δικαιοῶν*, and likewise after all the succeeding clauses; with diminished emphasis, as it seems to me, and certainly with no great probability; for how can we well suppose that *seventeen* successive questions are here put, without any answer or intervening matter? as Dr. Knapp's and Griesbach's pointing represents them to be. *Θεὸς ὁ δικαιοῶν* means, *God acquits, pardons, forgives* the sins *τῶν ἐκλεκτῶν*. Now as God is the supreme and final judge, how can any accusation against them occasion their condemnation?

(34) *Τίς ὁ κατακρίνων*; *Who shall condemn, or be the condemner?* i. e. who shall pass sentence of condemnation? God acquits; can any besides him condemn? No; Christ has prevented all condemnation by his death; *Χριστὸς ὁ ἀποθάνων*, i. e. his death having made expiation for the sins of believers, no sentence of condemnation can now be passed. I construe *Χριστὸς ὁ ἀποθάνων* as an answer to the preceding question; so Tholuck and Flatt.

Μᾶλλον δὲ . . . ἡμῶν, *yea rather, who is also risen, and is at the right hand of God, and intercedes for us*; i. e. Christ not only died to make atonement for our sins, but he is risen from the dead, and is exalted to the throne of Majesty in the heavens, in order that he may complete the glorious work which he began by his death. In regard to the phrase *ἐν δεξιᾷ τοῦ θεοῦ*, see my Comm. on Heb. 1: 3.

Ἐντυγχάνει conveys the general meaning of *aiding, assisting, managing one's concerns for his advantage*, etc.; comp. Heb. 7: 25. 9: 24. 1 John 2: 1.

In construing the passage in this way, I remove the interrogation points after the respective clauses, and substitute a comma after the first and second, and a period after the third.

(35) *Τίς . . . Χριστοῦ*; *Who shall separate us from the love of Christ?* i. e. from that love which he cherishes for us; for so the tenor of the passage plainly demands that we should construe it. Calvin remarks on *τίς* here (instead of *τι*), that the apostle uses *τίς*, because he considers all creatures and trials here as so many *athletae*, striving against the efforts of Christians.

Θλίψις, ἢ στενοχωρία, ἢ διωγμός; i. e. shall *vexation* from without, or *anxiety* from within, or *persecution* by the enemies of the Christian religion, effect a separation from the love of Christ? *Θλίψις* is strictly applicable to any strait or pressure which comes from *circumstances*, i. e. from external causes; *στενοχωρία* (lit. *narrowness of place*), is applied more especially to *anxiety of mind*; *διωγμός* is sufficiently plain, as it obviously designates distresses arising from the rage and malice of persecutors. All three words together designate intensively the general idea of trouble or distress.

Bodily sufferings and dangers next follow; for to these, Christians, who live in periods of persecution, must of course be peculiarly exposed. *Famine* and *nakedness* are the natural result of being driven from home, and made to wander in deserts and desolate places. *Peril* and *sword* are necessarily connected with the bitter hostility of persecution.

(36) The quotation here comes from Ps. 44: 23 (Sept. 43: 22), and is applied to the state of Christians in the apostle's times, as it was originally to those whom the Psalmist describes; in other words, the apostle describes the state of suffering Christians, by the terms which were employed in ancient days to describe the suffering people of God.—*Ὁλην τὴν ἡμέραν, ἡμέραν ἡμέραν, continually, unremittingly.*

Ἐλογίσθημεν ὡς πρόβατα σφαγῆς, we are counted, i. e. we are reckoned, regarded, dealt with, as sheep for the slaughter, i. e. we are killed as slaughter-sheep, unremittingly and without mercy.

(37) *Ἀλλά, but, still, i. e. notwithstanding these severe pressures and trials.—Ἐν τούτοις πᾶσιν, in all these, viz. all these sufferings and sorrows.—ὑπερνικῶμεν, we are more than conquerors, an intensive powerful form of expression, used with great appropriateness and significance here.—Διὰ . . . ἡμᾶς, i. e. through Christ who loved us, viz. in consequence of the strength and courage which he imparts; comp. Phil. 4: 13.*

(38) *Θάνατος . . . ζωή, death, here seems plainly to mean, a violent death by the hands of persecutors. Ζωή, on the other hand, seems to be life on condition of recanting a profession of the Chris-*

tian religion. It was customary with persecutors, in order to win Christians over to heathenism, to terrify with threats of death in case they persevered in their profession; and also to allure with promises of life, in case they abjured it. To this usage the words *θάνατος* and *ζωή* here very naturally refer.

Οὔτε ἄγγελοι, οὔτε ἀρχαί . . . οὔτε δυνάμεις, *neither angels, nor principalities, nor powers.* The separation of *δυνάμεις* here from *ἀρχαί*, by an intervening clause, has been a matter of difficulty among critics of all ages. But as this separation does in fact exist in all the best manuscripts, and in the Coptic, Armenian and Syriac Versions, we are obliged, as critics, to receive it as it stands, and to interpret it in the best manner we can.

The principal difficulty has arisen from the supposition, that *δυνάμεις* must have been intended by the writer here, to designate *an order of angels*, either good or bad. This supposition was natural, because we find words of the same and the like kind, elsewhere ranged together to designate such classes or orders; e. g. Eph. 1: 21, . . . ἀρχῆς, καὶ ἐξουσίας, καὶ δυνάμεως. Col. 1: 16, εἴτε θρόνοι, εἴτε κυριότητες, εἴτε ἀρχαί, εἴτε ἐξουσία. 1 Pet. 3: 22, ἀγγέλων, καὶ ἐξουσίων, καὶ δυναμέων. The Seventy often render נִבְזָ (exercitus) by *δύναμις*. And this seems to give us a key to the meaning of the word, when it is applied to the angels. However, in the passages just cited, different *ranks* or *orders* of angels would seem to be designated. Is this in accordance with the Jewish *usus loquendi*?

So far as we can gather, from the Old Testament and from the Rabbins, what this usage was, we may answer in the affirmative. Thus in Dan. 12: 1, Michael is called *the great prince*. In Isaiah 6: 1, seq., the Seraphim are represented as *presence-angels* (so to speak) of Jehovah. In Matt. 18: 10, the guardian angels of little children are also represented, by our Saviour, as *the presence-angels* of Jehovah. And with regard to the Rabbins, it is well known that they made a great many different orders of angels; e. g. כְּרֻבִים, אַפְרַיִם, שְׂרָפִים, אֲיִשִּׁים, בְּנֵי הַאֱלֹהִים, הַשְּׂמַיִם, תְּרַשִּׁימִים, שְׂאֲרָיִם; and also שְׂרִימִים, מְלָכִים, and כְּסָאִים, i. e. *κυριότητες, ἀρχαί, and θρόνοι*.

From all this it appears, that *angels and principalities and powers* correspond exactly to some of the Jewish orders of angels; and that, so far as the *possibility* of meaning is here concerned, there lies no difficulty in the way of applying these three words to angels. Nay, we may advance still farther, and say, that in respect to *ἀρχαί* at least, it

is quite improbable that it should have been intended to designate *magistrates* of any kind. "Ἄγγελοι and ἀρχαί may very naturally be taken as designating *angels* and *archangels*; comp. Jude v. 9. 1 Thess. 4: 16. Dan. 10: 13. 12: 1. If we understand here these two great divisions of angels, it will be in accordance with the *usus loquendi* of the Old Testament. The fact that ἄγγελοι and ἀρχαί are joined together by juxta-position, renders it probable that they belong to the same category of meaning; for so words of this class are commonly employed.

But allowing this; are *good* or *evil* angels here meant? That evil angels were also distributed by the Jews into classes, is as clear as that good angels were classified; e. g. Eph. 6: 12. 1 Cor. 15: 24. Col. 2: 15, where they are called ἀρχαί καὶ ἐξουσίαι, and in 2 Pet. 2: 4 they are also called ἄγγελοι. Moreover Satan is styled ὁ ἄρχων, Matt. 9: 34. 12: 24. John 12: 31. 14: 30. 16: 11. Eph. 2: 2, which implies *precedence*, i. e. rank among evil angels. The passage in Eph. 6: 12 seems to be most direct to our purpose, where the apostle represents Christians as in violent contest πρὸς τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἐξουσίας. So in the verse before us, I understand the apostle as averring, that neither *angels* nor *archangels* with whom we are contesting, i. e. neither the inferior evil spirits, nor Satan himself, (or it may be, Satan and others of similar rank), shall be able, by all their assaults and machinations, to separate true Christians from the love of their Saviour.

Tholuck supposes the *good angels* to be meant here; but how can those, "who are sent forth to minister to such as are the heirs of salvation" (Heb. 1: 14), be well supposed to be the *opposers* and *enemies* of Christians? Accordingly, with Flatt, I understand ἄγγελοι and ἀρχαί of *evil spirits*.

Δυνάμεις appears not to be associated in meaning with ἄγγελοι and ἀρχαί, because it is not associated with them by juxta-position; for it has juxta-position in all other instances, where it means *angels*. I must interpret it, therefore, as designating *magistrates*, *civil powers*, viz. persecuting kings and princes. That δύναμις means *auctoritas*, *imperium*, is beyond all doubt; see Luke 4: 36. Acts 4: 7. 1 Cor. 5: 4. Rev. 13: 2; also Rev. 4: 11. 5: 12. 7: 12. 12: 10. And that the *abstract* sense may become *concrete*, i. e. that δύναμις may designate those *persons* who are clothed with civil power, is clear from 1 Cor. 15: 24. Eph. 1: 21, as also from comparing its synonyme ἐξουσία, in Rom. 13: 1—4.

Οὔτε ἐνεσιῶτα οὔτε μέλλοντα, *neither* [troubles] *present nor future*; comp. 1 Cor. 3: 23, where the same words are employed in the same sense. The connection demands such a sense here.

(39) Οὔτε ὕψωμα οὔτε βάθος, lit. *neither height nor depth*. But a great variety of explanations have been given to these words; e. g. Origen: 'Evil spirits in the air and in Hades.' Ambrose: 'Neither high and haughty speculation [in doctrine], nor deep sins.' Augustine: 'Idle curiosity about things above us and below us.' Melancthon: 'Heretical speculation of the learned, and gross superstition of the vulgar, etc.' So likewise: 'Honour and dishonour,' 'high place and low place,' 'happiness and misery,' 'the elevation of Christians on the cross, and the submersion of them in the sea,' have all had their advocates. The meaning *happiness or misery, honour or dishonour*, is a possible one; but the animated and glowing spirit of the whole passage naturally leads the mind to expect something more elevated than this. Ἦψος may mean *heaven*; so כְּרוֹם, and so ὕψος in Luke 1: 78. Eph. 4: 8. As to βάθος, it has been taken to mean *the earth*, and Eph. 4: 9 is appealed to as sustaining this interpretation. But Ps. 139: 15, תַּחְתִּיּוֹת הָאָרֶץ, *the lower parts of the earth*, τὰ βάθη τῆς γῆς (comp. Eph. 4: 9), would be a more apposite appeal, inasmuch as here the meaning plainly is, *earth or secret recesses of the earth*. On the whole, however, βάθος, as the antithesis of ὕψωμα, more appropriately designates *the under-world*, אֲדָמָה, אֲבυσσος.

Thus understood, the sentiment of the apostle ends in a climax; viz. neither heaven, nor hell, i. e. neither the world above, nor the world below, οὔτε τὸς κτίσις ἐτέρα, *nor any other created thing*. The whole summed up together, and understood after the Hebrew manner of speaking, stands thus: 'The universe shall not be able to separate Christians from the love of Jesus, who died for them;' heaven above and Sheol below and other created things making, in the language of Scripture, *the universe*.

This is indeed "an anchor sure and steadfast, entering into that within the veil;" A BLESSED, CHEERING, GLORIOUS HOPE, WHICH ONLY THE GOSPEL AND ATONING BLOOD CAN INSPIRE!

CHAP. IX. 1—33.

With the eighth chapter concludes what may be appropriately termed the *doctrinal* part of our epistle. What follows, is either by way of forestalling or of removing objections, or of justifying what has been said; or else in the way of practical exhortation and caution. In previous and different parts of the epistle, the apostle had already advanced sentiments on the subject of salvation by grace—a salvation proffered in the same manner and on the same terms to Gentile as well as Jew—which he well knew would be very obnoxious to many of his kinsmen after the flesh, not excepting some of those who by profession were converts to the Christian religion. In chaps. II. and III., he had formally and at length laboured to shew, that the Jews were not only in a state of condemnation by the divine law, but even more guilty than the Gentiles; and this, because they had enjoyed greater religious privileges. At the close of chap. III. he had come out fully and plainly with the declaration, that God is the God of the Gentiles as really and truly as of the Jews; and in the succeeding chapter, he had laboured to shew that such was the principle or doctrine which is taught in the Old Testament Scriptures themselves. "The seed of Abraham," in the highest and noblest and only really important sense of the phrase, means his *spiritual seed*; which comprises all who imitate the faith of Abraham, and like him believe implicitly in the divine declarations.

In chap. V. the apostle had implicitly justified the extension of the gospel privileges and blessings to all men indiscriminately, inasmuch as all were affected by the fall of Adam their common progenitor. Then, in chaps. VI—VIII., he had shewn that Christ and his grace are the only effectual ground of our *sanctification* as well as justification; that all objection to the scheme of grace, on the ground that it will encourage sin, not only is destitute of foundation, but that the sinner has no hope of resisting sin with success, but through the grace of the gospel; and finally, that the *sanctification* of believers will issue in their *salvation*, with the same certainty as their justification does.

But how could the Jew, accustomed as he was to pride himself in his descent from Abraham, to regard God as his peculiar and covenant God, and to expect acceptance in consequence of his lineage and of the peculiar favours which had been shown to the Hebrew nation—how could he receive with approbation a doctrine, which not only went to prostrate all the hopes that he had cherished of preëminence in this world and of happiness in the world to come, and to place the very heathen on a level with himself, but which even advanced still farther, and made him more guilty than the heathen, and consequently involved him in higher condemnation, because he had sinned against peculiar light and love? Nay, the very privileges, which had been the ground of his greatest confidence that he must be regarded with divine approbation and entitled to the favour of God, had become, according to the representation of the apostle, the occasion of his peculiar and aggravated condemnation.

The apostle well knew, that the haughty spirit of his countrymen could not easily brook all this. He expected they would accuse him of having become alienated from his kinsmen after the flesh, and partial to the Gentiles, since he was an apostle to them. It is evidently with such anticipations, that he wrote the chapter now before us. For he begins this, by a most solemn profession or declaration of his sincere and ardent affection for his own nation. He protests against the idea, that in declaring God to be the God of the Gentiles, as well as the Jews, he has therefore abjured every kind of preëminence to his own people. He allows that they have enjoyed special and distinguished *external* privileges; above all, that the Messiah himself has come from the midst of them, vs. 1—5. He then proceeds to shew, that God in selecting the heirs of his grace where he pleases, i. e. in making the Gentiles the *κατά πρόθεσιν κλητοί* as well as Jews—in doing all this, he had violated no promise. His word *ὅτι ἐπέστωις* (v. 6), i. e. his promise made to Abraham and *his seed* is not frustrated or annulled, because he has given up unbelieving Jews to perish, and granted to believing Gentiles the privilege of being called the

sons of God. God has always exercised the right of choosing the recipients of his favours, when and where he pleases; as the Jewish Scriptures themselves do testify. Abraham, for example, had several children; but in Isaac only was his seed called, vs. 7—9. To Isaac two sons were born, Esau and Jacob; yet Esau was rejected and Jacob received; and the decision respecting this, was made even before they were born, vs. 10—14. God's declaration to Moses, and his dealings with Pharaoh, exhibit the same truth in a striking manner, vs. 15—18. All objection to this on the ground of partiality or injustice, is without any good support; inasmuch as the sovereign Lord of the universe has a perfect right to dispose of his own as seems good in his sight, vs. 19, 20. He does injustice to none; for those whom he passes by, are left to the course of justice and equity, vs. 21—23. The Hebrew Scriptures have not only displayed, in this way, God's sovereignty in his dealings with his people, but they also contain express declarations that the Gentiles shall be brought into the church and become the children of God, vs. 24—26. Equally certain is it, also, that they predict the unbelief and rejection of the natural descendants of Abraham, vs. 27—29. Finally, the apostle sums up the whole matter in discussion, by declaring, that 'the Gentiles are admitted to the gospel privilege of justification by faith, but that the Jews in general remain in a state of unbelief and rejection, because Christ crucified is to them a stumbling-block, and none but believers on him can be saved, vs. 30—33.

It is in this way, that the apostle justifies what he had already advanced respecting the Jews and the Gentiles; and in particular, what he had said in the eighth chapter, about the highest blessings of the gospel being bestowed on the *κατὰ πρόθεσιν κλητοί*. The amount of the justification is this: 'God has always dealt in the like manner by his people. The Old Testament is full of the same doctrine, or it exhibits facts which illustrate and confirm it. It contains predictions concerning the very things of which the Jews now complain.'

Viewed in this light, (and I am unable to see in what other light it can be fairly viewed), there can be no great difficulty in deciding the question: What is the *object* of the chapter before us? Plainly the object is to illustrate, and defend against objections, the affirmations which the apostle had been making. What were these? The consummation of the whole is, that 'the *κατὰ πρόθεσιν κλητοί* are predestinated, called, justified, and glorified; and these, both Jews and Gentiles.' But the Jew objects, that this amounts to a breach of the promises made to Abraham and *his seed*. The apostle denies this. He states that the *natural seed*, as such, are not the specific objects of this promise; and that God has always, in times past, as now under the gospel, chosen the objects of his favour where he pleased, without regard to any external privileges, advantages, or relations.

What then has the apostle in reality been asserting in the eighth chapter, which he justifies and defends in the ninth? Surely the question in the eighth chapter is not one of *external* privileges or advantages; it is one of *calling, justification, and glorification*. It is one which respects the everlasting and inseparable love of Christ. Defence, therefore, of the sentiments inculcated in respect to these topics, occupies the ninth chapter. In itself, it contains not the great doctrine in question, that is, it does not *directly* reveal or inculcate it. The *examples* of God's sovereignty produced in it are of various kinds, some of them having respect to temporal advantages or disadvantages; and some to both spiritual and temporal. But the *principle* illustrated and confirmed by all these, is the main and all-important question; and the principle is that which is avowed in the eighth chapter, viz. that the *κατὰ πρόθεσιν κλητοί* are the certain heirs of *future glory*. It is the eighth chapter then, which is the key of the ninth; and without keeping this in view, one may look in vain for the object of the various examples and illustrations which the ninth chapter exhibits. In a word, the apostle shews in the ninth chapter, that *God in calling, justifying, and glorifying οὓς προέγνω, does only what he has a perfect right to do*; what is analogous to examples of his dealing as exhibited by the Jewish Scriptures, and what accords with the doctrines and predictions which they contain. In this way, and in this only, can we fully see the scope, object, and connection of the ninth chapter.

CHAP. IX. 1—5.

(1) First of all, the apostle proceeds to the most solemn assurances of his affectionate regard for his own nation, in order to prevent the apprehension that he believed and taught as he had done respecting the Gentiles, on account of being alienated in his affections from the Jews. The expression of his feelings is made in glowing terms.

Ἀλήθειαν . . . Χριστῷ, *I speak the truth in Christ.* Most interpreters regard ἐν Χριστῷ as the formula of an oath; and they appeal to the Hebrew form of an oath, which prefixed ע (ἐν) to the object or person by whom any one swore. So also ἐν in the New Testament; e. g. Matt. 5: 34—36. Rev. 10: 6. Dan. 12: 7 (in Theodotion's Greek Version). In this way I was early accustomed to construe the expression; and so Flatt interprets it in his Commentary. But Tholuck has made this interpretation very doubtful. Compare, for example, ἐν κυρίῳ in Eph. 4: 17, where it follows μαρτύρομαι, and where the formula of an oath is out of question. It is only solemn declaration, such as Christ or the Spirit of Christ prompts or suggests. In like manner we have χάρις ἐν Χριστῷ, ἀγάπη ἐν Χριστῷ, &c., where an oath is of course out of all question. Indeed, the phrase ἐν κυρίῳ, ἐν Χριστῷ, etc., occurs so often, in the sense of *agreeably to what the Lord or Christ requires, or in accordance with what Christ by his Spirit suggests*, that abundant analogies are at hand to justify the exegesis which is given to ἐν Χριστῷ here, when we construe it as meaning, *in accordance with Christ, or agreeably to what becomes one who is in Christ, or who belongs to him.*

Ὁὐ ψεύδομαι repeats the affirmation and strengthens it, although the negative form or λιτότης is used. Comp. John 1: 21. Eph. 4: 25. 1 Sam. 3: 18, for the negative form of the expression; and 1 Tim. 2: 7, for the like words.

Συμμαρτυρούσης . . . ἁγίῳ, *my conscience bearing me witness, in the Holy Spirit.* I must connect these words together, in the method of exegesis which is here preferred, and not join οὐ ψεύδομαι with ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ, as Dr. Knapp and most other critics have done, making the latter phrase a part of the formula of an oath. The repetition of an oath here, would seem rather unlooked for and excessive; besides that no example elsewhere of Christians swearing by the Holy Ghost, can be produced. Conscience is the voice of

God in man; or at least, the faculty on which the influence of the Spirit of God seems to be specially exerted. It was a conscience moved and enlightened by this Spirit, which, the apostle here solemnly declares, testified his affectionate regard for the Jewish nation; ἐν πνεύματι ἀγίῳ meaning, *agreeably to the influence of the Holy Spirit.*

(2) "Ὅτι . . . μου, *that I have great sorrow and continual anguish in my heart.* For the like expressions of sympathy and affection towards others, comp. 1 Cor. 1: 4. Phil. 1: 3, 4. Eph. 1: 16. 1 Thes. 1: 2. Rom. 1: 9, 10. Philem. v. 4. 2 Tim. 1: 3, 4. 2 Cor. 11: 29. 12: 15.

(3) A much controverted verse, and which therefore needs particular illustration. Nearly every word has been the subject of different and contested exegesis.

Ἡγόμην γὰρ αὐτός, *for I myself could wish.* Compare Acts 25: 22, ἐβουλόμην, *I could wish*; Gal. 4: 20, ἤθελον, *I could desire.* But why not translate, *I did wish*, i. e. I did wish, when I was an unconverted Jew? Because, (1) The apostle designs to shew his *present* love to the Jews. Who questioned his strong attachment to them, when he persecuted Stephen and others, before his conversion? Or to what purpose could it be now to exhibit this, when his love to them since he became a Christian, is the only thing that is called in question? Then, (2) Neither the present εὔχομαι, nor the Optative εὐχοίμην, would accurately express what the apostle means here. Εὔχομαι (Ind. present) would mean, *I wish* by way of direct and positive affirmation, and with the implication that the thing wished might take place; εὐχοίμην (Opt.), *I am wishing with desire*, implying the *possibility* that the thing wished for would take place. On the other hand, (ἠγόμην) as here employed *I could wish*, implies, that whatever his desires may be, after all the thing wished for is impossible, or it cannot take place; which is doubtless the very shade of thought that the writer would design to express.

Ἀνάθεμα εἶναι, *to be an anathema, to be devoted to destruction, or to be excommunicated.* This difficult and controverted word needs a full and satisfactory illustration. In *classical* Greek ἀνάθεμα and ἀνάθημα were originally altogether equivalent or synonymous; just as εὔρεμα and εὔρημα were, and also ἐπίθεμα and ἐπίθημα, etc. (1) The proper and original meaning of ἀνάθεμα or ἀνάθημα was a *setting out* or *setting up* of any thing consecrated to the gods, in their temples; such as tripods, images, statues, inscriptions, etc. The

exposure of such things in the temples, in any way, whether they hung up, stood up, or lay down, was *ἀνάθεμα*: the action of exposing them, or the exposure itself, was called *ἀνάθεμα*. Hence, (2) *The thing itself exposed, the thing consecrated or devoted* to the gods, was called *ἀνάθεμα*: by a very common principle of language, applicable to a great multitude of words. Then, (3) As any thing devoted or consecrated to the gods, was irrevocably given up to them, and was no more subject to common use; so when any *living* thing, beast or man, became an *ἀνάθεμα*, it was of course to be slain in sacrifice, and offered to the gods mostly as a piacular victim. In like manner, under the Levitical law, every *הָרָמָה* or *ἀνάθεμα* devoted to God, was incapable of redemption; Lev. 27: 28, 29, *πᾶν ἀνάθεμα . . . ἀπὸ ἀνθρώπου ἕως κτήνους . . . οὐ λυτρωθήσεται, ἀλλὰ θανάτῳ θανατωθήσεται*; comp. Judg. 11: 30, 31 and 39; which, however, is the only instance on record in the Scriptures of a *human ἀνάθεμα*, and which at all events, is not encouraged by the laws of Moses. And in consequence of such a custom or law, cities, edifices, and their inhabitants, which were devoted to *excision* or *entire destruction*, were called *הָרָמָה*, i. e. *ἀνάθεμα* as the Seventy have rendered it. So Jericho was *הָרָמָה*, Josh. 6: 17, comp. v. 21; and so the cities of the Canaanites that were *utterly destroyed* by Israel, were named *הָרָמָה*, *destruction*. Any thing in fact, whether man, beast, or any species of property or ornament, *which was to be utterly destroyed*, was called *הָרָמָה* (*ἀνάθεμα*) by the Hebrews; see Lev. 27: 28, 29. Deut. 13: 15—17, and comp. 1 K. 20: 42. Is. 34: 5. Zech. 14: 11.

The Greek words *ἀναθεματίσω* and *ἀνατιθεμι* correspond, in like manner, to the Heb. *הִרְרָה* (Hiph of *הָרָה*), and mean, *to pronounce to be an ἀνάθεμα, to give up as an ἀνάθεμα, i. e. to set apart or deliver over to destruction*.

But to what destruction? To natural death or spiritual, i. e. to sufferings in the present world, or those of everlasting death? Those who construe the word in the first way, say, that *ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ* means, *by Christ*; in which case the whole sentiment would seem to be: 'I could wish to suffer temporal death inflicted by Christ, provided this would exempt my countrymen from it.' But there are some weighty objections to this; for the apostle is not here discussing the subject of the Jews' *temporal* punishment or excision, but of their excision from the blessings of a future world, by reason of their unbelief; comp. 9: 25—33. It is the fearful doom, then, which unbelief is to bring on the Jews, that the apostle wishes could be averted;

and it is his deep concern for them in respect to this, which he desires to testify. It is a חָרֵם of this kind, then, that he would consent to take upon himself, could they be saved by it. That ἀνάθεμα may be used to signify the *second death*, is clear from 1 Cor. 16: 22. The whole tenor of the passage makes clearly against the supposition, that *temporal excision* merely is meant.

In respect to ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, (if the whole be construed as I have here supposed it must be in order to follow the strict principles of exegesis), it must mean, *by Christ*, i. e. it is equivalent to ὑπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ. So clearly ἀπό may be used, and is often employed; e. g. Mark 8: 31. Luke 9: 22. 17: 25. Matt. 11: 19. Luke 12: 58. Acts 2: 22. 10: 17, et saepe; see Bretschn. in verbum.

In regard to ὑπὲρ τῶν . . . σαρκῶν, *on account of* or *in the room of my brethren, my kinsmen after the flesh*, it plainly means, for the sake of my natural brethren, my kinsmen by natural descent or generation, i. e. the Jews.

Tholuck gives a little different turn to the passage, but the same sense in substance. He compares ἀνάθεμα to חָרֵם in the later Hebrew; which was used to denote *excommunication*, separation from the Jewish community or קְהָל. The Rabbins make *three* gradations of excommunication, which they call, (a) בְּדֵרִי, *seclusion*, which lasted a month, and obliged a man to keep four ells distant from all his household. (b) The חָרֵם, which forbade all intercourse, action, eating, drinking, etc., with any one, and all approach on the part of the excommunicated person to the synagogue. (c) The שְׁמֵתָהּ (from שָׁמַת, *excludere*), which designated utter exclusion on the part of God and man, and the being given up to destruction. A tremendous example of the Rabbinic חָרֵם is produced by Buxtorf, Lex. Rabb. p. 828. I subjoin it below, for the information of the curious reader.*

* "By the authority of the Lord of lords, let A. B. be an *anathema* (חָרֵם) in both houses of judgment, in that above and that beneath; let him be *anathema* by the holy beings on high, by the Seraphim and Ophanim [שְׁפָרַיִם, *wheels*, see Ezek. 1: 16, seq., a superior order of angels]; let him be *anathema* by the whole church, great and small. Let plagues great and real be upon him; diseases great and horrible. Let his habitation be that of dragons; let his star be darkened with clouds. Let him be an object of wrath, indignation, and anger; let his corpse be given to wild beasts and serpents. Let his enemies and adversaries exult over him; let his silver and gold be given to others; let his children be exposed at the door of his enemies; and let posterity be astonished at his fate. Let him be cursed by the mouth of Addirion and Achtiariel, by the mouth of Sandalphon and Hadrauiel, by the mouth of Hansasiel and Patchiel, by the mouth of Seraphiel and Sagansiel, by the mouth of Michael and Gabriel, by the mouth of Raphael and Mesharctiel. [These are the names of angels.] Let him be cursed by the mouth of Zabzabib, and by the mouth of

In this way, ἀνάθεμα ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ would mean, *one banished, cut off, separated from Christ*; which would involve, however, all the consequences that are involved in the preceding exegesis.

But on the whole, as the preceding sense is most consonant with Scriptural and classical usage, I should give it the preference. The sentiment then is: 'Such is my love for my kinsmen after the flesh, that, were it possible, I would devote myself to the destruction which threatens them, could they but escape by such means.'

In respect to the objections urged against this sentiment, they do not seem to be weighty. It is asked: 'How could the apostle be willing to be forever cast off and separated from Christ? How could he be willing to become a sinner and to be miserable forever?' I answer, (1) The possibility that such could or would be the case, is not at all implied in what he says; no more than the possibility that "an angel from heaven should preach another gospel," is implied by what is said in Gal. 1: 8. It is merely a case supposed or stated, for the sake of illustrating or expressing a feeling or sentiment. (2) Even supposing the actual possibility of the exchange in question was believed by the apostle, it would not imply that *in itself* he was willing to be a sinner, or to be forever miserable. It would imply merely, that he would be willing, in case he could save the whole nation, to take on himself the *miserics* to which they were hastening. And a sentiment like this, is surely capable of a rational and sober defence. If benevolence would lead Paul to undergo any assignable degree of suffering, in the present life, in order to promote the everlasting welfare of the Jewish nation; would not the like benevolence lead him to undergo any assignable degree of misery in a future world for the same purpose, provided such a purpose could be answered by it? Who can draw the line where benevolence would stop *short*; except it be, where the evil suffered was to be equal to the good accomplished, or even greater? Could Paul have the genuine spirit of his Lord and Master, unless he could truly say what he has said in the passage before us? But, (3) The inference that Paul "was willing to be damned," or that Christians must come to such a state of willingness, is made without any ground from the verse in question. If Paul's being cast off by the Saviour could occasion the reception and salvation of the whole Jewish people, this apostle expresses his readiness to submit to it. But as such a thing was impossi-

Habhabib, who is the great God, [these names are Cabbalistic ones of the Divinity]; and by the mouth of the seventy names of the great King [Jehovah]; and on the part of Tsortak the great chancellor, [another mysterious name]. Let him be swallowed up, like Korah and his company; with terror and trembling let his breath depart. May the rebuke of Jehovah slay him; may he be strangled, like Abithophel, by his own counsel! May his leprosy be like that of Gehazi; and may there be no resurrection of his remains! Let not his sepulchre be with that of Israel. Let his wife be given to others; let them embrace her, while he is giving up the ghost.—In this *anathema* let A. B. remain; and let this be his inheritance. But on me, and on all Israel, may God bestow peace with his blessing!"

ble; and as he really knew it to be so; all that we can well suppose the passage teaches, is, that the apostle possessed such a feeling of benevolence toward the Jewish nation, that he was ready to do or suffer any thing whatever, provided their salvation might be secured by it. In other words, this is a high and glowing expression, springing from an excited state of feeling, which the use of common language could not at all satisfy. And in making use of such an expression, Paul did not depart from a mode of speaking which is still very common in the East. The Arabians, for example, very commonly, in order to testify strong affection, say, *بِقَسْبِي الْفِدَاءَ لَكَ*, *let my soul be a ransom for*

thee. So Maimonides (Sanhed. fol. 18. 1), in explaining the Talmudic expression *בְּפִרְתִּי בְּפִרְתֶּךָ*, *see, I am thy ransom*, states, that this is a common expression of strong affection.

So in the verse before us, the whole is evidently and necessarily designed to express *strong affection*. But what expression of this would be uttered, if we suppose the apostle merely to say, (as not a few critics maintain), that he once was desirous of being cut off from Christ, viz. before his conversion, when he persecuted the church. But how could he be *cut off* from him, who never had been joined to him? And what evidence was this of *present* affection? Or if it be construed as meaning, 'cut off, destroyed, i. e. put to death, by Christ;' did the apostle actually wish this before he was converted? And if he did, what had this to do with the salvation of his brethren and kinsmen?

It is possible, indeed, to construe *ἀνάθεμα* as implying *temporal death* or *destruction*; and to suppose the apostle to say: 'I could wish that I might suffer the punishment which Christ is about to inflict on the Jews, in their stead.' The emphasis would not be wholly destroyed by this interpretation. But it would be greatly diminished. And then, the context nowhere leads us to consider the subject of *temporal* destruction, as being here agitated in the mind of the apostle. It is only the 'wrath of God which is revealed from heaven' against the impenitent and unbelieving, to which he considers them in this place as exposed. He is writing to Jews at *Rome*, not in *Palestine*.

I must adopt then the *exegesis* above given of the verse before us, viz. 'Such is my affection for my Jewish brethren after the flesh, that could I put myself in their stead, and take on me the consequences of unbelief to which they are exposed, I would willingly do it, in order that they might be saved.' Truly, "a love stronger than death, which many waters could not quench, nor floods drown!"

(4) *Ἰσραηλιταί*, *Israelites*, i. e. who bear the honourable or far-famed name of Israelites; comp. Gen. 32: 28. 2 Cor. 11: 22. Phil. 3: 5. This however is only an *external* privilege; for they are not all Israelites in truth, who are of Israelitish descent, Rom. 9: 6; comp. 3: 28, 29.

Ὦν ἢ υἱοθεσία, *whose is the sonship*, i. e. the relation of sons or

children; comp. Ex. 4: 22, 23. Deut. 32: 5, 6. 14: 1. Hos. 11: 1. The meaning is, that God bore a special relation to Israel; or rather, that Israel stood in a special relation to him, and was treated with distinguished and peculiar affection. This last circumstance forms the special ground of the *υιοθεσία*. But this *υιοθεσία* was *external*, and consisted with the Jewish nation's being in a very imperfect state; comp. Gal. 4: 1—3. 2 Cor. 3: 6—18. As the antithesis of this, comp. Gal. 4: 4—7. Rom. 8: 14—17.

Δόξα may have the sense here of *glory*, and be joined with *υιοθεσία* in the way of Hendiadys, so that the meaning would be, *glorious adoption* or *sonship*, i. e. one which is worthy of praise, which deserves to be mentioned with honour. And this method Tholuck prefers. But the objection to this is, that the epithet *δόξα* appears to be too strong for a mere external *υιοθεσία*, and besides all this, all the other nouns which precede and follow, stand single. On this account I must prefer giving to *δόξα* the sense of *כבוד*, and regard it here as designating the visible splendor which was the symbol of Jehovah's presence, and which was peculiarly manifested in the *sanctum sanctorum* of the temple; comp. Ex. 25: 22. 40: 34, 35. Lev. 9: 6. Ezek. 1: 28. 3: 23. 8: 4. It is true indeed, that in all these passages we have *כבוד יהוה* (*δόξα θεοῦ*), and not simply *כבוד*. But the Targum, which employs *יהוה יתקא* for *כבוד יהוה*, also employs *יתקא* (*Shechinah*) *alone* in the same sense. Paul then may have here used *δόξα* elliptically, in a corresponding manner; and so (with Beza, Turretin, Heumann, and others) I suppose that he has employed it. The sentiment then is: 'To the Israelites belonged the *visible splendor* or *glory*, which was indicative of the immediate presence of Jehovah.'

Διαθήκαι seems here to indicate the covenants made at different times, with Abraham, Jacob, Moses, etc.—*Νομοθεσία*, *legislation* or *system of laws*, viz. the Mosaic legislation or laws; as to the distinguished privilege of these, comp. Deut. 4: 5—8. Ps. 147: 19, 20. Rom. 2: 18, 19.—*Λειτουργία*, *service*, *כבוד*, *rites* of the temple, priesthood, etc.—*Ἐπαγγελίαι*, *the promises*, viz. those which had respect to the Messiah; comp. Gal. 3: 16.

(5) *Ἦν οἱ πατέρες*, *whose are the fathers*, i. e. whose progenitors were the fathers, Abraham, etc., to whom so many promises (*ἔπαγγελίαι*) were made, and who are so distinguished in sacred history.

Ἐξ ὧν . . . σάρκα, *from whom* [descended] *Christ*, *in respect to the flesh*, i. e. in respect to his human or inferior nature, or so far as

he was man ; comp. Rom. 1: 3. But if he had no other nature, why should such a distinction as is implied by *κατὰ σάρκα*, be here designated? Would a sacred writer say of David, for example, that he was descended from Abraham *κατὰ σάρκα*? If this should be said, it would imply that *κατὰ πνεῦμα* he was not descended from Abraham, but from some one else. But here, the other nature of Christ is designated by the succeeding phrase, *ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων θεός*.

Ὁ ὢν . . . ἀμήν, who is God over all, blessed forever, Amen. *Ὁ ὢν* is equivalent to, or the same as, *ὅς ἐστι, who is*; for so the article followed by a participle is often employed in the Greek language; see John 1: 18. 3: 13. 12: 17. 2 Cor. 11: 31, *ὁ θεός . . . ὁ ὢν εὐλογητός κ. τ. λ.*—*Ἐπὶ πάντων*, being placed here between the article *ὁ* and the noun *θεός* to which this article belongs, is of course an *adjective* as to meaning, and designates the idea of *supreme*. Some indeed have understood *ἐπὶ πάντων* as meaning *ἐπὶ πάντων πατέρων* but this is plainly a forced and frigid exegesis. In Hebrew, *יהוה* and *יהוה* are epithets of Jehovah, the supreme God; and to these *παντοκράτωρ* in the Septuagint corresponds; e. g. 2 Sam. 5: 10. 1 Chron. 11: 9. Jer. 5: 14. Amos 3: 13. Zach. 1: 3, seq., et alibi. So in the Apocalypse, *παντοκράτωρ* often appears as an epithet of Jehovah, e. g. Rev. 1: 8. 4: 8. 11: 17. 15: 3, etc. Now *παντοκράτωρ* is for substance the equivalent of *ἐπὶ πάντων* as to meaning; so that *ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων θεός* must be altogether equivalent to *θεός παντοκράτωρ*.

Εὐλογητός is equivalent to the Hebrew *בָּרֵךְ*. The Jewish Rabbies, from time immemorial, have been accustomed, whenever the name of God is mentioned, to add *יהוה בָּרֵךְ*, *blessed is he*. So Paul here, after calling Christ, as to his higher nature, *ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων θεός*, adds, *εὐλογητός εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας*, i. e. *בָּרֵךְ לְעוֹלָם וָעֶד*. Compare now the same appellation given to God in Mark 14: 61. Whether an ascription of divine honour to Christ is intended, by applying to him here the word *εὐλογητός*, the reader may satisfy himself by comparing the use of this word in 2 Cor. 1: 3. 11: 31. Eph. 1: 3. 1 Pet. 1: 3. Luke 1: 68. That divine honour is ascribed to Christ by the heavenly hosts, (and the same too which is rendered to the Father), appears from Rev. 5: 13, 14. Nor can it be objected that it is contrary to the usage of Paul, to name Christ *θεός*: for so he is called in Tit. 1: 3, and *the great God* in Tit. 2: 13; moreover he is represented as *ἰσα θεῶν* in Phil. 2: 6; and as *θεός* in John 1: 1; not to mention the controverted, but seemingly well authenticated reading (*θεός*) in

1 Tim. 3: 16. Nor is it any objection to this, that in 1 Cor. 15: 24—28, the apostle represents the Son as renouncing or laying aside his supremacy or dominion, at the final consummation of all things; for the office of the Messiah, and *the dominion of the Messiah as such*, must of course cease, when all the objects of that office and that dominion shall have been fully accomplished. In reference to this kind of dominion, Christ is called *κύριος* in 1 Cor. 8: 6; and it is such a dominion which is represented as bestowed on him in Phil. 2: 9—11. Col. 1: 17, 18. Heb. 1: 3. 2: 5—9. 8: 1.

Neither the grammatical arrangement of the text, then, nor the sentiments of the apostle elsewhere, require us, (may I not say?) permit us, to give a different interpretation to the words of the verse in question. Nor do any various readings of the verse occur, which are of any authority at all. It has been conjectured, indeed, that we should read *ὅν ὁ κ. τ. λ.*, i. e. *whose is the God over all*, etc.; so Whitby, Crellius, Taylor, and others. But not to say, that taking such liberties with the text is fairly out of question, (which surely must be granted), it will be enough to compare the sentiment which the passage thus modified would give, with Rom. 3: 29, 30. This then is one of the cases, in which Paul has directly asserted Christ to be *supreme God*, and has accordingly rendered to him the sacred doxology.

The efforts to evade this conclusion have been many and strenuous. The interpretations which have resulted from them, may be divided into two classes; viz.

I. Those which put a full period after *σάρα*, and make the remainder of the verse a doxology to God the Father. So Erasmus, in the enlarged edition of his Notes; so Enjeddin, Whiston, Semler, and others. But, (a) It was long ago noted by Bengel, (with whom Faustus Socinus also agrees), that in all classes of doxology, *ברוך* in Hebrew, and *εὐλογητός* in Greek, precede the name of God who is blessed. So the laws of grammar beyond all doubt demand; for *יהוה ברוך* would mean, *the blessed Jehovah*, i. e. *the blessed Jehovah does this or that*; for both words (thus arranged) make out merely the *subject* of a sentence. On the contrary, *יהוה ברוך* means, *blessed is or blessed be Jehovah*; *Jehovah* being the *subject* of the sentence, and *ברוך* the *predicate*. So, more than thirty times, the words *ברוך* in Hebrew and *εὐλογητός* in Greek are placed in the Old Testament; as any one may see by consulting Tromm's Concordance under *εὐλογητός*. The same is the case with all the examples in the New Testament. Only *one* that I can find, in all the Bible, differs from this; and this is Ps. 67: 19 (Sept); where however the repetition of *εὐλογητός* is plainly an error of the scribes, as it has no corresponding repetition in the Hebrew, and is against all analogy; I mean in respect to the first instance in

which it here occurs. (b) Construed in this way, ὧν is entirely useless and destitute of meaning, and the addition of it is altogether unaccountable. The natural and only proper order of the text would be: *Ἐὐλογητός ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός κ. τ. λ.* (c) In this mode of interpretation, there is no antithesis to *κατὰ σάρκα*, which plainly requires one; as the natural inquiry is: If Christ be descended from David only *κατὰ σάρκα*, what is he as to his higher nature?

II. Another class of critics, viz. Locke, Clarke, Justi, Ammon, and others, put a full period after *πάντων*, and then make a doxology of the sequel. In this way the difficulty last suggested, with regard to the interpretation No. I, is in a measure removed, as a kind of antithesis is made out by ὁ ὧν ἐπὶ πάντων, sc. *πάντων πατέρων*, i. e. Christ in his human nature was a descendant of David, but still was a personage of exalted dignity, being elevated above all the Jewish fathers who are the objects of so much encomium in sacred history, and of so much veneration among the Jewish people. But still there are weighty objections against this mode of pointing and explaining the text; for (a) The difficulty in regard to the *position* of *εὐλογητός*, is the same here as has been already described above, under No. I. a. If it were doxology, it must be written, *εὐλογητός ὁ Θεός κ. τ. λ.* But as there are no authorities, either of manuscripts or versions, for such an arrangement, so we are not at liberty to make it; and if we do so, we must do it arbitrarily. (b) In such a case the noun *Θεός* must have the article, as being the *subject* of the sentence, and in its own nature customarily requiring it. So uniformly in the Sept. and in the New Testament, where *Θεός* is the subject in a doxology with *εὐλογητός*, it takes the article; e. g. Gen. 9: 26. 14: 20. 24: 27. 1 Sam. 25: 32. 2 Sam. 18: 28. 1 K. 1: 48. 5: 7. 8: 15. 2 Chron. 2: 12. 6: 4. Ez. 7: 46. Ps. 17: 50. 40: 14. 65: 19. 67: 20. 38. 71: 19. 105: 47. 143: 1. Dan. 3: 29. Luke 1: 68. 2 Cor. 1: 3. Eph. 1: 3. 1 Pet. 1: 3. In regard to *κύριος*, the usage of the Sept. varies; e. g. 1 Sam. 25: 39, *εὐλογητός ὁ κύριος*, according with the usage of *Θεός* but in other passages the article is omitted, e. g. Ex. 18: 10. Ruth 4: 14. Ps. 123: 5. 134: 21. But no instance of the like variation can I find, in respect to *Θεός*. The example in our text must stand *alone*, if it be one, of *Θεός* in a doxology with *εὐλογητός*, and yet without the article. (c) To break off a sentence with ὁ ὧν ἐπὶ πάντων, seems at least to make it very abrupt and incomplete. To what can *πάντων* refer, in such a connection, except to the *fathers*? And to say that the Messiah was exalted above the Jewish patriarchs, although it might be saying something, would not seem to be saying very much, considering the efficacy which Paul had been ascribing to his love and sufferings and death, and the greatness which he had ascribed to his power. (d) There is something incongruous in a doxology here to God the Father; which even Crellius himself suggests, (*Artemon. Init. Eyang. Johan.*) The apostle is here expressing the deepest and most unfeigned regret of his soul, that notwithstanding the exalted and peculiar privileges of the Jewish nation; they had by their unbelief forfeited them all, and made themselves obnoxious to a most terrible condemnation. To break out into a doxology here, would be (as Flatt suggests) like saying: ‘These special privileges have, by being abused,

contributed greatly to enhance the guilt and punishment of the Jewish nation; God be thanked that he has given them such privileges! It is a duty, indeed, to be grateful for blessings which are bestowed; but—all in its proper place. Doxologies are not appropriate to paragraphs, which give an account of mercies abused, and deep guilt contracted. (e) Besides all this, the abruptness of a doxology here, which could contain no reference to God as mentioned in the preceding context (for he is not there mentioned), is plain and striking; and also, as Noesselt, Flatt, Koppe, and Ewald have observed, it would be without example. Comp. Rom. 1: 25. 11: 36.

The remark of Eckermann and Justi, that εὐλογητός is required to stand before θεός in a doxology, only when this doxology stands at the beginning of a sentence, is not true in point of fact; e. g. Gen. 14: 20, where καὶ shews that εὐλογητός is not at the beginning of a sentence. 2 Sam. 22: 47. Ps. 17: 46. 67: 35. In the last case, one might contend and say, that εὐλογητός begins a new sentence; but then, where does it not, on the same ground? The burden of proof lies on those, who assert that εὐλογητός need not be prefixed, except it stand at the beginning of a sentence; and where are the instances in which it is not prefixed? The only one (except an instance of a manifestly corrupt text, Ps. 67: 19), is the very verse in question. To assume the principle in question then, is to take for granted the very point in dispute.

The remark of Döderlein, that ἀμήν necessarily implies an Optative doxology, (sc. εὐλογητός εἶη θεός), is disproved by Rom. 1: 25, where ὅς ἐστιν εὐλογητός . . . ἀμήν, are the words of Paul, i. e. the apostle speaks in the Indicative mode, and not in the Optative. The same is the case in 1 Pet. 4: 11, ᾧ [sc. θεῷ vel χριστῷ] ἐστὶν ἡ δόξα κ. τ. λ. And in other cases where no verb is supplied, e. g. Rom. 16: 27. Gal. 1: 5. 1 Tim. 1: 17. 6: 16. 2 Tim. 4: 18, etc., it is not by any means certain, (as the above explicit instances of Indicative usage show), that the Optative εἶη, rather than the Indicative ἐστὶ, is to be supplied.

Nor does the remark of Erasmus, that in some of the manuscripts of Cyprian, Hilary, and Chrysostom, Deus or θεός is wanting, in the citations of Rom. 9: 5, prove any thing; for these are evidently omissions of copyists, since all the manuscripts of these fathers insert Deus or θεός.

Grotius is still more unsuccessful, in asserting that the Syriac version, (the Peshito) omits θεός; for this version has ܕܘܫܘܫܘܢܐ ܕܘܫܘܫܘܢܐ ܕܘܫܘܫܘܢܐ Deus super omnia. Stolz, in his celebrated German version, has left out θεός; whether on the authority of Grotius as above, or because he thought it a disagreeable appendage to the text, does not appear. After all these proposed changes, however, of punctuation, of the order of the text, and of the substance of it, the text, as it now stands, remains in reality untouched by any criticism which can have any considerable weight with men of ingenuous and candid minds. That those who deny the divinity of Christ, should be solicitous to avoid the force of this text, is not unnatural; for while it remains in the records of the New Testament, it stands an irrefragable evidence of what Paul believed,

asserted, and taught, relative to this subject. The only way in which any avoiding of its force is practicable, seems to be, to assert that ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων θεός is meant to designate the supremacy of Christ as Mediator, in which capacity he is quasi Deus, and is styled יהוה in the like capacity, in Ps. XLV. In pursuing this course, more probability than is now exhibited in the various evasions that I have above noticed, and also more ingenuousness, might be shown. But still the general and spontaneous feeling of an unprejudiced reader must always be, (at least so it seems to me), that God over all means SUPREME GOD, and that εὐλογητός εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, ἀμήν, can be applied only to him who is truly divine.

CHAP. IX. 6—13.

The apostle, having expressed his strong affection toward his own nation, and described the claims to preëminence which they had hitherto enjoyed, now proceeds to shew that all these do not make out any good grounds of preference in a spiritual respect. He teaches them clearly, that it is not the simple fact of natural descent from Abraham, which makes them his children in the higher and Scriptural sense of this word. 'They are not all Israel, who are of Israel;' and even among the natural descendants of Abraham, God did in ancient times make a wide distinction. Consequently, the mere fact of natural descent can prove nothing, as to the point of spiritual rights or claims, vs. 6—13.

(6) Οὐχ οἶον δέ, a controverted expression; which however may be rendered plain in two ways; either, (1) Οἶον is to be taken as ὡς or ὡσπερ, to which it is very often equivalent, (see Passow on οἶος, No. 6); and then we may translate: *It is not so that*, etc.; just as we translate μὴ ὡς ὅτι, 2 Thess. 2: 2. (2) Οἶον in classic Greek often stands for ὅτι τοῖον (Passow, No. 2. b); in which case, we may render: 'No such thing [do I assert], viz. ὅτι ἐμπέτωκεν κ. τ. λ. The former method I prefer, as being most simple. The meaning is: 'But what I have said in respect to the defection of Israel, does not at all imply that the promises of God are not sure and certain.' Δέ, but, continuative and adversative.

Tholuck is mistaken, when, in objecting to οἶον δέ being here used as equivalent to οἶόν τε, he says the latter must always have the Infinitive after it. Οἶός τε with an Infinitive, has indeed the meaning, *possibile est*, etc.; but οἶός τε is often employed without an Infinitive, and in the sense of *so as, such as, like*; and even without an Infinitive it sometimes means, *possible*; see Passow on οἶος No. 2. c. No. 3. c. However, I do not find οἶον δέ employed in the sense of οἶόν τε, *possible*. Consequently I must prefer the rendering given above.

Λόγος, *promise, word*, in the sense of *something promised*; so, of-

ten, in English, e. g. *he has given his word.*—*Ἐκπέπτωκεν*, failed, been frustrated, *irritum factum est*. So the Hebrew לִפְתּוֹן, which corresponds in sense with *ἐκπέπτωκε* e. g. in Josh. 21: 45. 1 K. 8: 56. 2 K. 10: 10.

Οὐ γὰρ . . . Ἰσραήλ, for not all who are of Israel, are Israel; i. e. not all the natural descendants of Abraham, are Israelites in the true, spiritual, scriptural sense of the word. The Talmud, Tract. Sanhed. cap. 11, expresses the feelings and views of the Jews relative to their claims of preëminence: *אֵלֶּיךָ יְהוָה יִשְׂרָאֵל יִשְׁבְּעוּן בְּיָמֵינוּ*, i. e. *all Israel have their portion in the world to come*. But such claims are rejected by our text and the sequel; as well as by Rom. III. John 8: 39. Matt. 3: 9. Gal. 3: 9, 28, 29. *Γὰρ* here shews, that what follows is designed for illustration and confirmation.

(7) *Σπέρμα*, natural descendants.—*Τέκνα*, children, here in the higher spiritual sense, like that of *Ἰσραήλ* above, in the second instance.—*Ἀλλ' ἐν Ἰσαὰκ . . . σπέρμα*, but, “*In Isaac shall thy seed be called:*” i. e. in the person of Isaac, thy seed, viz. thy descendants who are to stand in a covenant relation to me, shall be chosen or selected. These same *τέκνα* are, in the next verse, called *τὰ τέκνα τῆς ἐπαγγελίας*. In v. 5 above, *ἐπαγγελίαι* (יְרִיבֵי) are reckoned among the external privileges which the Israelites enjoyed. But even these, only a part of Abraham's natural descendants enjoyed. Ishmael, Abraham's eldest son, was excluded from the covenant relation; and so were Abraham's six sons by Keturah, Gen. 25: 1—5.

Ἐπαγγελίας in v. 8, however, refers to the promises in Gen. 15: 4, 5. 17: 15, 16, 19, 21, (see v. 9). Isaac was in a special sense the son of promise; and his natural descendants, therefore, may be styled *τέκνα τῆς ἐπαγγελίας*.

(8) *Τοῦτ' ἔστιν*, that is, i. e. which signifies, which means.—*Οὐ τὰ . . . θεοῦ*, it is not the natural descendants [of Abraham] who are the children of God. *Τὰ τέκνα τῆς σαρκός* plainly means *physical* or *natural descendants*, children in the first and literal sense. But the sense of *τέκνα τοῦ θεοῦ* is not so obvious. Is it here used to designate the children of God in the highest spiritual sense of this term? I think not; for it is Isaac and his descendants as such, who are here contradistinguished from Ishmael and the other six sons of Abraham and their descendants. The point here insisted on is, that *natural* descent from Abraham did not of itself entitle any one to the high *spiritual* privileges of the gospel; that the Jew had no more right than the Gentile, to expect any peculiar favour to himself merely

on such a ground. But how does the apostle illustrate and confirm this principle? By shewing that in ancient times, the promise of a numerous seed who should stand in a covenant relation to God, and enjoy peculiar external privileges on this account, was not made to the natural descendants of Abraham as such, but only to those natural descendants who would spring from Isaac the son of peculiar promise. In other words; Ishmael and the sons of Abraham by Keturah, had no share in the covenant-engagements made with the promised seed.

The deduction from all this is, that God does not dispense his blessings or favours according to claims grounded on mere natural descent or external privileges, but according to his own infinite wisdom and pleasure. In other words, the claims of men on the ground of birth, or external privilege, or merit of their own, are not the ground of decision on the part of God, with respect to the blessings which he may bestow upon them. The first two of these constitute no ground at all of claim; and the last, also, has no foundation, inasmuch as all men are sinners and are deserving of the divine displeasure. Of course, the reasons why God gives to these, and withholds from those, are with himself; they are not grounded on our claims or merits. Reasons he doubtless has, and these of the best kind; for who will venture to tax infinite wisdom and goodness with doing any thing without good and sufficient reason? But then these reasons God has kept to himself; he has not revealed them to us. When this is the case, the apostle speaks of him as acting *κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν αὐτοῦ*—*κατὰ τὴν ὀρισμένην βουλήν καὶ πρόγνωσιν αὐτοῦ*, etc. But nothing can be farther from truth, than to suppose that a Being of infinite wisdom and goodness ever acts *arbitrarily*, or without the best of reasons; although they may be, and often are, unknown to us.

That *τέκνα τοῦ θεοῦ* may mean, 'the children of promise in respect to the external privileges and blessings of the ancient covenant or dispensation,' is clear from the manner in which *τέκνα* (טַרְנָא) is applied to the whole body of Israelites, in Deut. 32: 5, 6. 14: 1. Hos. 11: 1. Ex. 4: 22, 23. Of the same nature is *τὰ τέκνα τῆς ἐπαγγελίας*. It designates those on whom the promised blessings were bestowed, which are mentioned above in vs. 4, 5; or else those who were the descendants of Isaac, himself a *τέκνον τῆς ἐπαγγελίας*. In the same manner *σπέρμα*, at the close of the verse, is to be understood, i. e. as equivalent to *τέκνα θεοῦ* in the sense just explained, or as טַרְנָא in Gen. 17: 8.

The argument and illustration of the apostle, according to this explanation, stand thus: 'All claims of the Jews to the spiritual privileges and blessings of Christ's kingdom, on the ground of natural descent from Abraham, are futile. Even in ancient times, God did not confer the blessings and privileges of his ancient dispensation on such a ground. Only one of Abraham's sons was selected as the object of God's peculiar covenant. Consequently, it is no strange thing that God should deal in like manner with Abraham's natural descendants, at the present time.'

The question is not, whether the distinction made in ancient times among the natural descendants of Abraham, and to which the apostle here refers, was one which had direct respect to their condition in a future world, i. e. to the highest spiritual blessings; for most clearly this is not the case. Surely all the natural descendants of Isaac were not *called* in this sense. The distinction adverted to here, must be that which had respect to the *external* covenant-relation of the Israelites, as a nation, to God. But the essential question, in respect to the meaning of the whole passage, is: Why does the apostle adduce such an example here of God's bestowing blessings *κατὰ πρόθεσιν αὐτοῦ*; The answer to this must be, that he adduces it in order to justify the principle which is concerned with *the fore-ordaining, calling, justifying, and glorifying* the *κλητοί* described in chap. VIII. But this surely does not pertain to mere *external* privileges in the present world.

The amount of the whole is, that Paul in order to illustrate and defend God's proceedings in respect to bestowing spiritual blessings of the highest kind, adduces examples from the Old Testament Scriptures, where the *principle* concerned is exactly the same, as that which is concerned with the calling and glorifying of the *κλητοί*, viz. where the blessings bestowed are not conferred on the ground of being a natural descendant of Abraham, nor on the ground of merit or desert, but *κατὰ πρόθεσιν θεοῦ*. Now certainly God can no more be unjust in great things than in small ones; and if he was not unjust in selecting the objects of his temporal favours *κατὰ πρόθεσιν αὐτοῦ*, why should we regard him as unjust in selecting the objects of his highest spiritual favours in the same way; that is, not according to *claim* or *merit* on the part of men, (for these belong not to them), but according to reasons, good and sufficient ones, known only to himself? Such as are inclined to feel that this would be wrong on the part of God, and that it is in any measure proper for

us to complain of this, will do well to read the sequel of this chapter with a candid, humble, inquiring mind.

(9) Ἐπαγγελίας γὰρ . . . υἱός, for this was the word of the promise: "According to this time will I come, and Sarah shall have a son," Gen 18: 10, 14. This shows who the children of the promise were, that are described in the preceding verse, viz. the descendants of Isaac the son thus promised. Hence the γὰρ at the beginning of the verse.

Κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον, according to this time. In Hebrew the whole phrase runs thus: שׁוֹב אֲשׁוּב אֶלֶיךָ כִּי־עַתָּה תָּקֵה, I will surely return or come back to thee, when the time shall be renewed, Gen. 18: 10. The word תָּקֵה seems to be simply an adjective, as the text now stands, and to mean *living again*, in the sense of being *renewed*. So Gesenius and Tholuck; comp. Gen. 17: 21 and 18: 14, מוֹיֵד. The Sept. reads in this last case, εἰς τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ἀναστρέψω πρὸς σέ εἰς ὥρας. What is meant by εἰς ὥρας, unless it be *exactly, at the very hour*, I am unable to conjecture. In regard to τοῦτον (which seems to be put for תָּקֵה), one almost spontaneously falls upon the conjecture, that the Sept. and Paul must have read תָּקֵה in Gen. 18: 10, 14, instead of תָּקֵה; which is by no means improbable, considering that the ancient manuscripts were destitute of vowel points, and that the two words הִיהָ and הִזָּה are so nearly alike.

(10) The apostle having thus shewn, that the promised seed was not *all* the natural descendants of Abraham, but only a *select* part of them, he now advances a step farther, and goes on to shew, that not only did God make a distinction κατὰ πρόθεσιν αὐτοῦ among the natural descendants of Abraham, but that even among the descendants of him who was "the son of promise," he made a like distinction; and this too, in a case where the respective merit or desert of the parties could not possibly be the ground of distinction. Thus, in respect to the descendants of Isaac; Jacob his younger son was chosen as the object of favour, and Esau the elder son, who according to the custom of the patriarchs had higher rights, was rejected. Yea, this reception of the one to special favour, and rejection of the other, was determined on before the children were born, i. e. before they could have done either good or evil, or in other words, before they could have possessed any merit or demerit. Consequently the πρόθεσις of God was according to his ἐκλογή, and not ἐξ ἔργων or on the ground of merit.

The reason why the apostle adds this example of God's *selecting*

the objects of his favour, to the one which he had already produced, seems to be, in order to prevent the objections which might not unnaturally be made in respect to the force of that example. The Jews might say: 'As to Ishmael, he was only the son of a bond-woman, and therefore had no good title to be an heir of promise. And as to the sons of Keturah, they were much younger than Isaac, who of course was entitled to the rights of primogeniture. On these grounds we may suppose the preference was given to Isaac.'

In order to foreclose every thing of this nature, the apostle now produces an example of ἡ κατ' ἐκλογὴν πρόθεσις, which effectually accomplishes his object. Esau was not only the son of Rebecca, the lawful, proper, and only wife of Isaac, but he was the elder son, and therefore entitled by usage to the rights of primogeniture. Yet notwithstanding all this, Jacob was preferred to him, and was chosen as the τέκνον τῆς ἐπαγγελίας.

The bearing which all this has on the main subject of the apostle, is plain. 'If God did, κατ' ἐκλογὴν, make such distinctions among the legitimate and proper children of Isaac, the *son of promise*, then the same God may choose, call, justify, and glorify those who are κλητοί in respect to the heavenly inheritance. If it is not unjust or improper, in one case, to distribute favours κατὰ πρόθεσιν αὐτοῦ, then it is not in another.'

Οὐ μόνον δέ, *and not only*; an incomplete or elliptical expression, which has been filled out in different ways by different critics. The most natural of these seems to be, to supply τοῦτο. Then the sentiment is simply: 'Not only was such the case with Abraham, but also in respect to Rebecca, etc.'

Ῥεβέκκα forms here a kind of *anacoluthon*, i. e. the beginning of a sentence, the construction of which is afterwards changed, or in other words, the sentence is not finished in the same manner in which it was begun. Here, the natural grammatical construction would be, οὐ μόνον δέ [τοῦτο], ἀλλὰ καὶ Ῥεβέκκα, ἐξ ἐνὸς κοίτην ἐχούση . . . ἐρρόήθη . . . ὅτι κ. τ. λ. Instead however of Ῥεβέκκα (Dat.), we have in the text Ῥεβέκκα (Nom.), with which ἔχουσα agrees. But the construction thus begun in the Nominative, is not carried through. Instead of associating the Nom. Ῥεβέκκα, with some following verb of which it might be the subject, the verb ἐρρόήθη is afterwards employed, and the Dative required by it is made by a pronoun referring to Ῥεβέκκα, viz. by αὐτῇ. This mode of construction is frequent in Hebrew, where what is called the Nom. absolute is employed, to

which a pronoun in the sequel refers, being put in the case in which the verb or the nature of the sentence requires it to stand.

Ἐξ ἑνὸς κοίτην ἔχουσα, *accipiens semen unius viri*. Literally *κοίτην* means *cubile, bed*; figurately however it is employed to designate *semen concubitus*; like the Hebrew וְרַע חֶבְבָּהּ, *concubitus seminis*, Lev. 15: 16, 32. 18: 20, 23. 22: 4. In Lev. 18: 23, חֶבְבָּהּ alone is employed to designate the same idea. A clear case of such a usage, is in Num. 5: 20, (Sept.). Bretschneider is the first, so far as I know, who has satisfactorily illustrated this word. The idea is, *having conceived by one*, i. e. by Isaac our ancestor.

(11) *Γὰρ, illustrantis*.—Γεννηθέντων, sc. παιδων, which the mind spontaneously supplies, by recurring back to ἐξ ἑνὸς κοίτην ἔχουσα. The whole phrase in the verse, is a construction with the Genitive absolute, i. e. a species of *anacoluthon*.

Μηδὲ . . . κακόν, *neither having done any thing good or evil*; a very important declaration in respect to its bearing on some of the controverted questions about hereditary depravity or original sin. It appears, that when the words related in the next verse were spoken to Rebecca, the children in her womb had arrived to such a state of growth, as that life and motion in them were perceived by the mother, Gen. 25: 22, 23, i. e. to the age of some five months, comp. Luke 1: 24. At this period, then, the apostle declares that they *had done neither good nor evil*, i. e. they had as yet no positive moral character; there was, as yet, no development of their moral powers. The assertion is so clear and direct here, that I see not how we can evade the force of it. And with the principle here developed, the tenor of other texts agrees; e. g. Is. 7: 15, 16, comp. 8: 4. Deut. 1: 39. Jonah 4: 11. That some knowledge of law and its obligations should exist, in order that sin can be committed, seems to be clearly decided by Rom. 4: 15, and to be plainly implied by James 4: 17. John 9: 41. 1 John 3: 4. Every man's consciousness of the nature of moral guilt, moreover, seems spontaneously to decide in accordance with these texts. But *when* children do arrive at such a growth of moral nature, that they begin to sin, the Scripture does not seem to have decided; I mean, that I have yet discovered no text where this point is fixed. Ps. 51: 5, when compared with Ps. 58: 3, will hardly establish the doctrine which many have supposed it to establish. Gen. 8: 21 decides no more, than that men begin *very early* to commit sin; and John 3: 6. Eph. 2: 3, and other texts of the like nature, decide only that men in a *natural* state, i. e. in an unregenerate or unsanctified

state, are children of wrath, and carnal; but they do not definitely fix the time when they begin to sin.

The apostle, however, has told us *when sinning had not begun*, in respect to Jacob and Esau. That they possessed *powers* or *faculties*, even in the womb, which were afterwards employed in committing sin, when they were more fully developed, is undoubtedly true. But the *power* or *faculty* of sinning is one thing; the commission of sin, another. Adam in paradise, before his fall, certainly possessed the power or faculty of sinning; but he was not guilty of sin because he possessed such a power, but for the abuse of it. It is not therefore the powers which the Creator has given us, that make us sinners; it is the abuse of them. God may be, and is, the author of our *power to sin*; but he is not therefore the author of our sins. So young children may have all the powers adapted to sinning, without having yet sinned; for it will not be denied that Jacob and Esau had the embryo of such powers, in their early state, at the period when the apostle says that they had not committed any sin. But I refer the reader to what is said relative to these topics, in my remarks on chap. 5: 12—19, in Excursus V.

The object of the apostle, in here saying that *the children had done neither good nor evil*, is very plain, viz. to cast light on, or to confirm, the truths which he had disclosed in 8: 28—39. There all things are represented as contributing to the good of the *κατὰ πρόθεσιν κλητοί*, v. 28, seq. Now if the Jew should object to this, as being unaccountable, or as evincing partiality on the part of God, the apostle could of course foreclose this objection, by shewing him that instances of the like nature, (so far as the *principle* of them was concerned), are recorded in the Old Testament. In the case before us, the decision of God in respect to the future lot and privileges of Jacob and Esau, was not made by reason of any claims of merit, or any grounds of demerit; for it was made before the children were born, and before they had done either good or evil. It was so decided, moreover,

"*Ἴνα ἡ . . . καλοῦντος*, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth. *Ἡ κατ' ἐκλογὴν πρόθεσις* means, a purpose which proceeds from one's own free choice, one to which he is moved by *internal*, not by *external*, causes or motives. It means here, a purpose which God did not entertain because he was moved to it by any thing which Jacob or Esau had done, or would do (*οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων*), but for reasons which

he has not disclosed, and which pertain merely to himself. But let the reader beware, how he represents, or even imagines, these reasons to be *arbitrary* or *ungrounded*. This would be to represent the divine conduct, as utterly inconsistent with infinite wisdom and goodness.

Οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων, *not of works*, i. e. not because of merit, not because of obedience yielded to the law of works, i. e. the law requiring good works.— Ἀλλ' ἐκ καλοῦντος, *but of him that calleth*; i. e. the admission of the one to privileges, and the rejection of the other from them, proceeded not from their personal desert, but from him *who calls*, i. e. chooses or selects men to be the objects of his special favour, for reasons within himself. That such is the sentiment here, seems very plain; for the apostle has just asserted, that the decision of God in respect to the future destiny and privileges of Jacob and Esau, was made before they were born, and before they had done either good or evil; and that it was so made, in order that God's *κατ' ἐκλογὴν πρόθεσις* might be stable, μένη, Heb. רַבְרַבָּה.

(12) But what is the thing decided in this case? Ὁ μείζων . . . ἐλάσσωνι, *the elder shall serve the younger*; or rather, *the first-born shall serve the younger*, i. e. he who by right of primogeniture would take the precedence, he shall in fact be inferior or take the lower place. Both the words μείζων and ἐλάσσων, however, relate rather to the *posterity* of Esau and Jacob, than to their own individual persons. The *precedence* then of Jacob is established by this declaration; but in what respect?

(13) In a *temporal* one, no doubt, so far as this instance is concerned. Τὸν . . . ἐμίσησα, *Jacob have I loved, and Esau have I hated*; i. e. on Jacob have I bestowed privileges and blessings, such as are the proofs of affection; I have treated him, as one treats a friend whom he loves; but from Esau have I withheld these privileges and blessings, and therefore treated him as one is wont to treat those whom he dislikes; comp. Mal. 1: 2, 3, from which the quotation here is made, and where the prophet adds to the last clause (Ἡσαῦ ἐμίσησα), the following words: *And laid his mountains and his heritage waste*. That the whole refers to the bestowment of temporal blessings and the withholding of them, is clear not only from this passage, but from comparing Gen. 25: 23. 27: 27—29, 37—40. As to ἐμίσησα, its meaning here is rather *privative* than *positive*. When the Hebrews compared a stronger affection with a weaker one, they called the first *love*, and the other *hatred*; comp. Gen. 29: 30, 31.

Deut. 21: 15. Prov. 13: 24. Matt. 6: 24. Luke 14: 26 comp. with Matt. 10: 37. Glass. Rhet. Sac. lib. III. tr. 3. can. 19.

After all, this does not answer the question: What is the object of the apostle, in making his appeal to such an instance of *καὶ ἐλογητὴν προθέσεις*? Must not this answer be, that he does so in order to justify and support what he had said in chap. 8: 28—39? And surely, what he has there said does not relate to *temporal condition* or privileges, but to *effectual calling*, to *justifying* and *glorifying*.

All however which is decided is, that God, in either case, does not bestow his blessings on the ground of merit, (for how can any sinner be blessed on such a ground?), but for reasons known only to himself, and which are *ab intra*, not *ab extra*.

Those who contend against this sentiment, contend against what is every day exhibited before their eyes. Why was this man born white, and that one black? Why is this child born and nurtured in the bosom of a pious family, and that one in the midst of robbers and murderers? The children had "done neither good nor evil," when their lot was decided. This no one can deny. Then, in the next place: Is not their eternal condition connected with their means of grace, their pious nurture, their present condition and associations in life? And who placed them in their present condition?

How easy now to multiply such questions indefinitely; and the answer must at last resolve the whole into *divine sovereignty*. The world is full of that which teaches this doctrine. All nature speaks it, and speaks it loudly too; not less so than the Bible itself. Yet with all this, the Bible plainly recognizes the *freedom* of men, and attributes to themselves their own destruction. The world say, that there is contradiction here; but if there be, the naturalist has as really to contend with its difficulties, as the advocate for revelation. However, there can in reality be no contradiction or absurdity in two things which are *both true*. All the difficulty lies in us. Being ignorant of the *manner* in which predestination and free-agency can be reconciled, we are prone to think that they are irreconcilable. When will men learn, that their ignorance is not the measure of truth!

One cannot but contemplate with regret, the efforts of some critics to evade the plain, philological, (and for my own part I must say, inevitable) meaning of the chapter on which we are commenting. It seems to me, however, that I perceive in nearly all, who are sober-minded and judicious men, a radical mistake in their conceptions respecting *predestination*. They transfer to it analogies from the *material* world; and then they seem to feel, that it is but another name for *fate* or *destiny*. They conceive of a *decretum absolutum* as involved in it, which, as they view it, is neither more nor less than a decree *without any reason*, a mere *arbitrary decision*. With such views, they reject the doctrine of predestination; and rightly, if it does indeed involve all this. That this

however is a very imperfect and erroneous view of the subject, is what I fully believe; and what I have endeavoured to exhibit in the statements above.

CHAP. IX. 14—29.

In carefully estimating the sentiments advanced in vs. 14—29, the sum of them appears to be this: 'No one has any right to call in question the disposal which the Creator, Governor, and rightful Lord of all things makes of his creatures, or to charge him with injustice on account of it. It does not become the creature to find fault with his maker, in respect to the manner in which he has been made. But not to make the appeal solely to the *right*, as a sovereign, which God has over all his creatures; what ground of objection can be alleged against the divine proceedings, when God endures with much long suffering the rebellious and contumacious, not speedily cutting them off as they deserve, but waiting, and giving them space for repentance? Comp. Rev. 2: 21. 2 Pet. 3: 9. Ezek. 18: 23, 32. 33: 11. Lam. 3: 33. 1 Pet. 3: 20. Why should we complain, if God, in order to display his abounding mercy, chooses from among the perishing, both Jews and Gentiles, those on whom he will bestow his grace? The ancient Scriptures do repeatedly testify, that he would do this.

All this is by way of answer to the objection of the Jew, against the assertions and arguments of the apostle. Paul affirms, that 'God is at liberty to choose, and does choose, the objects of his grace when and where he pleases; that he selects these from among the Gentiles as well as the Jews; that he is bound by no promises or covenant, to confine his goodness to the natural descendants of Abraham; and that in abandoning some of the impenitent to the just reward of their deeds, in permitting them to become hardened under the dealings of his providence or his grace, and waiting with long suffering for their amendment, God does nothing to which any one can justly object, or with which he can reasonably find fault.'

All this, too, is plainly connected with the subject discussed in 8: 28, seq.; and it is designed as an illustration and defence of the principle there avowed, viz. the sovereignty of God in selecting the objects of his mercy, not his *arbitrary* choice of them, but a choice which rests on grounds unknown to us. Surely v. 23 here does not respect the mere *external* call or privilege of the saints; for how can *ἡ προητοιμασεν εἰς δόξαν* be so construed? If this is clear, (and I cannot think any one will venture to deny that it is), then it follows of course, that the antithesis in v. 22 has respect, not to temporal *ἀγαθῶν* merely, but to future misery also, i. e. to the whole penalty of sin. If all this be clear, then is it equally so, that the object of the apostle in this chapter, is not merely to vindicate the divine proceedings in regard to giving or withholding favors in the present world, but also in respect to the future lot of both saints and sinners. When saints are made the objects of grace, the exceeding richness of that grace is displayed; and when sinners are hardened and become prepared for destruction, under the dealings of God's providence and grace with them, it is still true that the long suffering of God is manifested in deferring their punishment. So the texts cited above lead us to conclude, respecting God's dealings with them; and so all the views of his benevolent character which the Bible gives, would naturally lead us to conclude.

Whatever then may be the nature of his agency in regard to the hardening of sinners and fitting them for destruction, we are necessarily led to the conclusion, that it is not such as makes him chargeable with the guilt of their sins in any manner or measure; it is not such as detracts from their *free agency*, the *voluntariness* of their transgressions, the moral guilt which they incur, or the responsibility which follows it. The Scriptural doctrine of *reprobation* (as it is called) seems then to be this, viz., that God, for reasons not given to

us, does bestow his special grace on some, i. e. *hath mercy on whom he will have mercy*, while he leaves others voluntarily to harden themselves and to become ripe for destruction, although he waits long to be gracious, and does not execute his judgments as speedily as they deserve them.

If any still decline to receive this as the sentiment of the present chapter, and maintain that the whole has reference merely to the distinctions made by Providence in the *present* world, it is incumbent on them to shew that the context, e. g. chapter 8: 29, seq., leads to such a discussion. It is also incumbent on them to shew, how God can any more be justified for such a distributing and withholding of his favours in respect to the *present* world, than in respect to the future world. The Saviour says (Luke 16: 10): "He that is unjust in the least, is unjust in much." If the distributing and withholding favours in the manner stated by the apostle, be in itself unjust, God can no more be vindicated for so doing in respect to the present world, than in respect to the future world. Indeed we cannot separate the one from the other. In respect to those who deny that the present chapter has a reference to a *future* state, let me ask, whether the circumstances in which men are placed in the *present* world, have not a bearing on the *future* world? One is born and nurtured in the bosom of a pious family, and lives surrounded by pious influence, all of which is the ordering of Providence in respect to his lot; another is born in a family of thieves and murderers, and nurtured among them, and lives without God and without hope in the world. Has the eternal state of these individuals no intimate connection with such circumstances? One is born in a heathen land, and another in a Christian; surely not by their own act. Has this no bearing on their eternal condition? Is God *just* then, who makes such distinctions? It is a question we must meet; substantially we have to meet it, if we resort even to *Theism* for a refuge from difficulties. And when those who hold to the mere *temporal* relation of the chapter before us, can clear up the difficulties that attend this, even on their own principles; then it will be time to speak with more confidence, than they can now with propriety feel, against the views of such as differ from them.

(14) *Τὶ οὖν ἐροῦμεν*; language which Paul puts into the mouth of the objecting Jew.—*Μὴ ἄδικία παρὰ τῷ θεῷ*; A very natural question for one whose mind is perplexed and offended with the doctrine of divine sovereignty, and the dispensation of favours on the part of God, *κατὰ πρόθεσιν αὐτοῦ*. If God has dispensed them independently of any merits on the part of man, and for reasons known only to himself, it seems to an unhumiliated and carnal man, that he has dispensed them in a merely arbitrary manner, without any regard at all to justice or propriety. How easy it is to feel difficulties and raise questions on 'this perplexing subject, fact shews. From the time of the apostle down to the present hour, the same questions have been repeated, and the same difficulties felt. That some of those who have maintained the doctrine of divine sovereignty, have, at times, given occasion for their opponents to charge on them representations of such a nature as make *predestination* amount to *fate* or *destiny*, and *κατ' ἐκλογὴν πρόθεσις* to amount to *arbitrary* decision, —is what I feel unable to deny. In some treatises on *reprobation*, enough that stands exposed to such a charge, or to something very much like it, may be found. But to argue from such expressions as

τὸν Ἐσαῦ ἐμίσησα, an actual hatred, like that which men cherish toward one another, would be a great abuse indeed of the sound principles of exegesis. On the same ground, one might prove that it is our duty actually and positively to hate father, mother, wife, children, brethren, sisters, yea, and our own lives or ourselves also, and that we cannot be Christians without so doing, if he should urge the literal meaning of Luke 14: 26, and other texts of the same tenor. God cannot hate, *more humano*, any thing which he has made; and therefore he cannot hate man, who is made in his own image. Consult for a moment, Rom. 5: 8—10. John 3: 16, 17. Tit. 3: 4, 5. So the Wisdom of Solomon, 11: 24: "Thou lovest all beings, and abhorrest nothing which thou hast made, neither hatest any thing which thou hast created." But still, God may and does hate sin; he may and will punish it; he may treat sinners therefore as if he hated them, i. e. he may inflict evil or suffering upon them. In the future world, he never does this but in consequence of actual guilt, and in proportion to that guilt; but in the present world, trouble and sorrow may be brought on men as the instruments of trying them, of purifying them, of humbling them, and this without being proportioned by the simple principles of *retribution*; for sufferings and trials here, are not always in the way of retribution. In all this, God acts *κατὰ πρόθεσιν αὐτοῦ*: certainly *not* in an *arbitrary* manner and without any good reason, (therefore not on the ground of a *decretum absolutum* in the rigid sense of this phrase); but still, in a manner which we cannot explain, because the reasons are unknown to us. But can our want of knowledge establish against him a charge of injustice? Most surely not.

That God does dispense his favours without being moved thereto by any *merit* on the part of him who receives them, is clearly established, and is designed to be confirmed, by the quotation which Paul makes from the Old Testament.—*Μὴ γένοιτο . . . οἰκτιρῶ*, *not at all; for he saith to Moses: "I will have mercy on whomsoever I will have mercy; and I will shew compassion to whomsoever I will shew compassion."* In other words: 'I choose the objects of favour where I please, for reasons known only to myself. None of the human race have merited my approbation and reward; and none being entitled to them on the ground of merit, but all having deserved my displeasure, I may properly bestow my favours where and when I please.' Why is not this both true and just? Is there any *ἀδικία* here? Out of a hundred criminals who have all justly deserved death, may not a

wise and benevolent government, for reasons entirely within itself, choose some as the objects of pardon, while others are given up to the punishment which the law enjoins? I am fully aware of the opposition made, by the natural heart, to such a proceeding on the part of God; but I am not aware, how the fact that God does this, can be *reasonably* denied, or how injustice can with any propriety be charged upon him because he does it.

The quotation is from Ex. 33: 19. The reasoning of the apostle is simply this: 'God cannot be unjust because he distributes his favours *κατὰ πρόθεσιν αὐτοῦ*, and without reference to the merits of the individuals concerned. The Old Testament inculcates the same doctrine; and to the decisions of their own Scriptures the Jews surely will not object.' The *γάρ* at the beginning of the verse, intimates that the writer applies the quotation in this manner.

(16) *Ἄρα οὖν . . . θεοῦ, consequently, or it follows, therefore,* [that favours are not obtained] *by him that willeth, or him that runneth, but through the mercy of God.* That is, God bestows his favours not because they are first merited or acquired by effort, either of strong desire or of strenuous action, but because he has mercy on those who are the objects of his favour. This does not imply, (as it has frequently been thought to imply), that let men merit ever so much, i. e. desire salvation ever so much, or labour for it ever so strenuously, all this will be of no account with God; and that he will bestow mercy in a manner merely arbitrary, and irrespectively of all works or character on the part of the sinner. On the contrary, it implies, that *before* sinners are made the objects of his special mercy, they are "dead in trespasses and sins," that they are "by nature children of wrath and disobedience," that "what is born of the flesh is flesh," that "the carnal mind is enmity against God, is not subject to his law, nor indeed can be;" consequently, that the case here supposed (of *previous* merit and effort) never exists. And in fact, it never does exist. It is God's mercy which *first* disposes sinners *to will and to do*, (Phil. 2: 13. Eph. 2: 1. Rom. 5: 6—10). How then can his mercy be bestowed *in consequence of* their *previous* merits? The thing is plainly beyond reasonable question; it is impossible.

All this, however, does not disprove the doctrine that good works will be rewarded; which is certainly and plainly a Scripture doctrine. But what are *good works*? Those which are done *before* conversion, or *after* it? Surely the latter. But in respect to the reward of *Christians* or *evangelical* good works, the apostle is not here speaking.

What he says, has respect to the *fore-knowing*, *fore-ordaining*, *calling*, *justifying*, and *glorifying*, mentioned in 8: 29, seq. All this is not on the ground of merit, but of pure gratuity; and consequently is τοῦ ἐλεοῦντος θεοῦ. The fact that good works themselves are rewarded, is itself a part of this pure system or plan of grace; for it is only the works of those who are sanctified, which are reputed good in the Scripture sense, i. e. holy, acceptable to God; and even the best of these are imperfect, so that they could not claim any reward on their own account and on principles of legal merit. The law allows of no imperfection. It requires us "to love God with *all* the heart, and our neighbour as ourselves." Now as no man on earth has ever done this, (Jesus only excepted), so no man has ever been in a condition to advance a *claim* to reward *on the ground of law*, in any age or country of the world. Consequently, the fact that the good works of saints are rewarded, is a matter of *gratuity*, and not of *legal claim*. But still, this part of the subject is not what the apostle is here discussing; and consequently what he says here, is not to be regarded as at all interfering with or contradicting what he says on the subject of good works being rewarded, in other parts of his writings.

As to θέλοντος, it indicates *desire*, *wishing*. Τρέχοντος is used to designate *strenuous effort*. In such a sense it often designates Christian efforts; e. g. 1 Cor. 9: 24, 26. Heb. 12: 1. Phil. 2: 16. 3: 14. Gal. 2: 2. 5: 7, etc. Ἐλεοῦντος here is designed to convey the idea, that our blessings originate from God's compassion, love, and mercy, and are not bestowed on account of our own deserts. To construe this in such a manner as to exclude the idea of gratuitous reward for obedience and good works, in the sense above stated, would be to depart widely from the meaning of the writer; whose design is to affirm, that man's salvation is to be attributed solely to the *mercy* of God, and not to any merit of his own.

(17) The preceding verse, although comprising a sentiment which is very disagreeable to the natural heart and to the pride of unsanctified men, is still more easily acquiesced in than the one now before us, which has been the theme of great contention, and the occasion of not a little unguarded and hazardous assertion. Let us first investigate the language.

Λέγει γὰρ ἡ γραφή τῷ Φαραώ· *for the Scripture saith to Pharaoh*, instead of the formula, *for God saith to Pharaoh*. So Gal. 3: 8, 22. 4: 30. What the Scripture says, God says, for πᾶσα ἡ γραφή θεόπνευστος, i. e. it is *the word of God*. So the Rabbins frequently

exchange the two formulas of quotation, אָמַר הַשֵּׁם , *the Name* [God] *says*, and אָמַר הַכְּתוּב , *the Scripture says*; both of which are designated by the abbreviation אָמַר .

"*Οτι εις . . . δύναμιν μου, for this very purpose have I roused thee up, that I might exhibit my power.* Paul has departed from the Septuagint version, which runs thus: *ἐνεκεν τοῦτο διετηροῦθης, ἵνα ἐνδείξωμαι ἐν σοὶ τὴν ἰσχύν μου*: so that Paul substitutes *ἐξήγειρα* for *διετηροῦθης*, *ὅπως* for *ἵνα*, and *δύναμιν* for *ἰσχύν*. The apostle seems plainly to have made a translation of his own, independently of the Septuagint; and one which, on the whole, was better adapted to the purpose of his argument here, and equally accordant with the original Hebrew, or rather, more strictly accordant with it.

For ascertaining the sense then of *ἐξήγειρα*, (on which the tenor of the whole passage depends), we must not take *διετηροῦθης* for a commentary on it here, inasmuch as the apostle has rejected this, and preferred another verb; for the sake (as it would seem) of a nearer accordance with the meaning of the original Hebrew in this particular passage. What then is the sense of *ἐξέγειρω*, as employed in Hellenistic Greek? Passow has not inserted this word in his classical lexicon, although it is certainly a *classical* word, for Xenophon employs it, *Cyrop.* VIII. 7. 2. In the Septuagint it is a very common word, being used some seventy times. In none of these cases does it mean *to create, to produce, to raise up*, in the sense of *bringing into being*, etc.; so that those who construe *ἐξήγειρά σε, I have created thee or brought thee into existence*, (Beza: *Feci ut existeres*), do that which is contrary to the *usus loquendi* of the Greek language.

In the Septuagint, *ἐξέγειρω* is employed throughout in the sense of *arousing, exciting, rousing up, waking up from*, etc., with slight shades of variation in meaning, according to the connection and the adjuncts of the verb. So it is employed by the Septuagint to translate the Hebrew הִקְיָה , *to rouse up*, or *to wake up*, i. e. from sleep, *Ps.* 3: 5. 72: 20. 138: 18. *Jer.* 31: 26. 51: 39. *Dan.* 12: 2. In the like manner it stands for וַיִּקְץ , *to wake up* or *rouse up* from sleep; *Gen.* 28: 16. 41: 22. *Judg.* 16: 15, 21. *Ps.* 77: 71. But the principal use of it is, to designate the idea of *rousing up* one's self to action, *exciting* or *rousing up* others to action, *exciting* or *rousing up* any thing, animate or inanimate, to do this or that; e. g. *Judg.* 5: 12. *Ps.* 7: 7. 34: 26. 56: 11. 79: 3. 107: 2. *Cant.* 4: 16. *Jer.* 50: 41. *Joel* 3: 9. *Zech.* 13: 7, etc.; and so in the like manner forty-two times; see Trommii,

Concord. in verbum, No. 11. In all these cases, it corresponds to the Hebrew עָרַר, הִעִיר, etc. In *seven* other cases it corresponds to קָרָם, when this word is used in a sense altogether synonymous with that of עָרַר, e. g. Num. 10: 35. 2 Sam. 12: 11. 1 K. 11: 14. Est. 8: 5. Ps. 118: 62. Hab. 1: 6. Zech. 11: 16. Throughout all these, the idea is uniform, viz. that of *rousing, exciting, stirring up, rendering active, urging to activity*, in a word, in the sense of bringing out of a state of rest or inaction or inefficiency, into a contrary state, i. e. in the sense of *exciting*.

Twice only have the Seventy employed ἐξήγειρα, where the meaning might perhaps be thought doubtful. In Prov. 25: 24, ἄνεμος . . . ἐξέγειραι νέφη, *the wind raiseth up clouds*. The Hebrew verb is הוֹלִיחַ, *begetteth or bringeth forth*. But the sense of ἐξέγειρω here in the Septuagint, is plainly the usual one. So also in Ezek. 21: 16 (Heb. 21: 21), ἐξέγειραι corresponds to מְעָרוֹה (from יָעַר); but still it has the sense of *excite*, this meaning corresponding substantially with the Hebrew, although not literally.

In the New Testament we have only one example besides that before us, where ἐξέγειρω is used, viz. 1 Cor. 6: 14, where it is clearly used to designate the action of *rousing* from the sleep of death, *raising* or *exciting* from a state of inaction or death.

On the whole, then, the sense of the Greek word is clear, and subject to no well grounded doubt. It means *to rouse up, to excite, to stir up*, in any manner or for any purpose. But does the Hebrew word in Ex. 9: 16, which corresponds to ἐξήγειρα, admit of such a sense?

The Heb. word is הִעֲמִידָהּ, Hiphil of עָמַד; which usually means, in Kal, *to stand, to stand fast, to continue, to stand up*, etc. In Hiphil (הִעֲמִיד), it means *to make to stand, to place, also, to keep standing, to preserve or continue in standing*. Tholuck and others have laboured to show that הִעֲמִידָהּ has this latter signification in Ex. 9: 16. That the Hebrew word *might have* such a sense, is sufficiently plain from 1 K. 15: 4. 2 Chron. 9: 8. Prov. 29: 4. 2 Chron. 35: 2. And so the Kal conjugation not unfrequently means *to continue, to remain in standing*; e. g. Ex. 9: 28. Lev. 13: 5. Dan. 10: 17. But although the Hebrew word הִעֲמִידָהּ might have the sense which Tholuck and others assign to it, yet the Greek word ἐξήγειρα, which Paul uses, can hardly have such sense put upon it. I have been able to find no example of a *usus loquendi*, that would justify this exegesis.

The main question remains, however: Has הִעֲמִידָהּ the sense of *ex-*

citing, arousing, awaking, like the ἐξήγειρα of the apostle? If so, then we may presume the apostle chose this Greek word, in deliberate preference to the διετηροήθης of the Septuagint.

Instances of this nature are clear. So in Neh. 6. 7, הָרַעְמֵךְ, *thou hast roused up or excited* the prophets, etc. So Dan. 11: 11, 13, הָרַעְמֵךְ, *and he shall excite or rouse up* a great multitude, etc. We can have little reason, then, to doubt that the apostle had such a meaning of הָרַעְמֵךְ in view, when he rendered it ἐξήγειρα; for this Greek word is fairly susceptible of no other meaning. In accordance, therefore, with this result (respecting the meaning of ἐξήγειρω), I have translated thus: *For this very purpose have I roused thee up.*

"Ὅπως . . . τῆ γῆ, *that I might shew forth my power, and declare my name, in all the earth or in all the land*, viz. of Egypt. The consequence of Pharaoh's conduct was, that the Hebrews were brought out of Egypt by signal divine interposition, viz. in the various plagues inflicted on Egypt after the declaration recorded here, i. e. the hail, the locusts, the extraordinary darkness, the smiting of the first born among the Egyptians, the drowning of Pharaoh and his host in the Red Sea, etc., Ex. 9: 16, seq. Such interpositions caused the power and glory of Jehovah to be known through all the land of Egypt. Or if this last expression be construed as having a *more extensive* sense, one might justify this by observing, that the Scriptures themselves now diffused so widely through the world, the Koran read and revered by many millions, the Greek author Artapanus (Euseb. Praep. Evang. IX. 29), also Diodorus Siculus (Bibl. III. 39), and the Latin Trogus (Justin. Hist. XXXVI. 2), all speak of the wonders which were done in Egypt, and the overthrow of Pharaoh there.

(18) "Ἄρα οὖν . . . σκληροῦναι, *therefore hath he mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth*. A conclusion of the apostle's, and not the words of the objector, as some have intimated. This is clear from what is immediately subjoined by Paul: Ἐρεῖς οὖν μοι, κ. τ. λ.; which of course implies, that what precedes had been spoken by the apostle, and not by the objector.

On the nature and force of the conclusion here drawn, I have already remarked in commenting on the preceding verse. As to σκληροῦναι, Rambach, Carpzov, and Ernesti have endeavored to shew that it means here, *to deal hardly with*. They appeal to 2 Chron. 10: 4 and Job 39: 16 in order to confirm this; but without effect, for in the first instance the grammatical construction and expression is different (an Acc. comes after the verb), in the second the Heb. is פָּשַׁעְתָּהוּ,

and the Sept. ἀποσκληρόνω, and the sense, moreover, is capable of harmonizing substantially with that in the verse before us. I see, therefore, no proper philological method of construing σκληρόνει, but in the way already intimated above.

(19) Ἐρεῖς οὖν . . . ἀνθέστηκε; *Thou wilt say to me, then: Why doth he still find fault, for who hath resisted his will?* The apostle expected, as a matter of course, that the principles which he had just asserted, would be met with objections such as he now produces. On what ground did he expect this? At least, it will be admitted, it was because he had said something which *seemed* to imply what the objector here intimates. "Whom he will he hardeneth," says Paul. 'Then why blame men for being hardened? How is this inconsistent with what God wills?' is the reply of the objector; and this contains a sentiment, which has been repeated from the time when Paul wrote his epistle, down to the present hour. The objection *seems* to be formidable, at *first* view; yet all its seeming importance is derived from carrying along to the consideration of the divine dealings towards us, analogies borrowed from cause and effect in respect to *material* things. It does not follow, because God, by his infinite goodness and almighty power, will convert the wicked deeds of the sinner into means of promoting his own glory, that the sinner may not be called to an account and punished for the evil which he intended. It does not follow, because a wise and benevolent government may convert the crime of some individuals into a means of furthering the public good, that the criminals in question do not deserve punishment. Supposing then that there is *a sense*, in which sin is made even the instrument of accomplishing the wise and holy purposes of God and the greatest good of his creatures; it does not follow, that the sinner who had malignant purposes in view, is not deserving of punishment, nor that there is not *an important sense* in which he has *resisted* the will of God.

(20) Μενοῦνγε, *enim vero, immo vero, but still, however.*—Σὺ τίς εἶ . . . θεῶ; *who art thou that repliest against God, i.e. who sayest something that charges him with acting wrongly or improperly?* It will be observed here, that the apostle, in answer to the objector, does not endeavour at all to explain *how* it may be, that God should *harden* sinners, and yet sinners be guilty of their own ruin; in other words, he does not attempt any *metaphysical* conciliation of divine sovereignty and control, with human freedom and moral responsibility. He evidently takes for granted that the facts which he had

been stating were true, and could not be contradicted. Hence he finds fault with the objector, for charging God rashly and irreverently, with having dealt hardly or unjustly by his creatures. He continues this remonstrance in the sequel, by quoting from the Old Testament, and applying to the object before him, passages which serve strongly to confirm the right of the Creator on the one hand to dispose of his creatures, and the duty of his creatures on the other to bow in submission before him.

Would it not be well for those who are to teach the doctrines of Paul, at the present time, to walk in his steps, and to deal with objectors in the same manner as he has, by shewing them their *presumption* from the Scriptures, rather than to appeal to metaphysical explanations in order to remove the difficulties suggested?

Μὴ ἐρεῖ . . . οὐτως; *shall the thing formed say to him who formed it, why hast thou made me thus?* A quotation *ad sensum* from the passage in Is. 45: 9, or 29: 16; for it does not literally follow the words of either. The design of this quotation is, to stop the mouth of the objector who inquires: "Why doth he find fault, then, for who hath resisted his will?" The implication in this, of wrong on the part of God, in bestowing blessings on some which he withholds from others, and in advancing some to glory while he leaves others to hardness of heart and to the punishment consequent upon it,—this implication the apostle meets by appealing to the language of the Scriptures, in regard to the sovereignty of God over the works of his hands: 'Has the creature a right to call in question the Creator, by whose power he was formed, and by whose goodness he is preserved and nurtured? Should he reproach his Creator, because he has endowed him with the nature which he possesses?' It is as much as to say: 'Even supposing there was some ground for the objection which you make, I might reply, in the language of Scripture, and ask whether it is proper and becoming for a creature to summon the Creator before his tribunal, and to pass sentence of condemnation upon him.' Viewed in this light, it is a kind of *argumentum ad hominem*; applicable indeed to all who make the like objection in the like spirit, but specially adapted to stop the mouth of the haughty and presumptuous Jew, who, in Paul's time, was indignant that God should be represented as making the Gentiles the objects of his special favour. In appealing, however, to the *sovereignty* of God the Creator, Paul cannot with any propriety be considered as asserting or intimating, that God is *arbitrary* in any of his dealings with

his creatures, or that he ever makes any arrangement in respect to them, without wise and good and sufficient reasons. It would be altogether incongruous to suppose, that the apostle did ever think or assert, that a Being infinitely holy and wise and just and good, would act without the best of reasons for acting; although, indeed, these reasons might not be given to us. It should be remarked here, also, that it is only when a proud and contumacious spirit lifts up itself, like that of the Jew in the context, that an appeal to a direct and sovereign right of God, is made by the sacred writers, in order to abash and repress such arrogant assumption.

(21) But one quotation does not satisfy the apostle's ardor to repress the objector. He makes a second one (*ad sensum* again, not *ad litteram*) from Jer. 18: 6, comp. v. 4, which by another image, inculcates the same sentiment as before. "Ἡ οὐκ . . . ἀτιμίαν; Hath not the potter power over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel to honour and another to dishonour? i. e. one vessel for a use which is deemed honorable, and another for one deemed dishonorable; comp. Jer. 18: 4. 'Even so (the apostle would say) are all men in the hands of God, and at his disposal;' comp. Jer. 18: 6. In other words: 'Who can call in question his right to dispose of us, as it seems good in his sight? The indecorum and contumacy of so doing, must be apparent to all.'

The Jew, however, regarded his nation as the *φύραμα* from which none but *σκεύη τιμῆς* could be formed. But the apostle lets him know, that God could make, and had made, the Gentiles also a *φύραμα* from which the like vessels were formed. The same God also makes unbelievers among the Jews, to be *σκεύη ὀργῆς*, as well as unbelievers among the Gentiles. He chooses the objects of his mercy or of his justice, where he judges best; *not* arbitrarily, but still for reasons which are not revealed to us.

(22) *Εἰ δὲ θέλων κ. τ. λ.* It is evident to any one who will attentively read vs. 22—24, that the sense remains incomplete, i. e. the sentence (or sentences) is unfinished; which form of writing the Greeks called *ἀνακόλυθον*. But what must be supplied in order to complete the sense of these verses, is not sufficiently plain to command the unanimous consent of interpreters. Without delaying to recite different opinions, I would merely say, that at the end of vs. 22—24, it seems to me plainly, that the question in v. 20 is to be repeated, viz. *σὺ τίς εἶ, ὁ ἀνταποκρινόμενος τῷ θεῷ*; Whether you repeat this question at the end of v. 22, or here and also at the end of v. 24,

seems to be of little importance; for the sense in each case would be substantially the same. The sum of the sentiment thus explained, is: 'If God, in order that he might exhibit his punitive justice and sovereign power, endures with much long-suffering the wickedness of the impenitent and rebellious, who are worthy of divine indignation; and if he has determined to exhibit his rich grace toward the subjects of his mercy, whom he has prepared for glory, even toward us ([ἐπι] ἡμᾶς) whom he has called (8: 30), Gentiles as well as Jews; [who art thou, that repliest against the divine proceedings in respect to all this?']

The whole passage is elliptical; and besides this, there is an enallage of construction at the beginning of v. 23 (in καὶ ἵνα γνωροίσῃ), which will require further notice. I proceed from this general view, to examine the words.

Ἐὶ δέ, *if then or if now*; i. e. since God is the supreme Lord of all things, and all his creatures are at his disposal by a sovereign and entire right (vs. 20, 21); *if now*, determining to display his punitive justice and power, he has endured, etc. Δέ, '*orationi continuandae inservit.*' The connection of thought seems to be this: 'If the sovereign Lord of all creatures, who may dispose of them as he pleases, does still endure with much long-suffering the wickedness of some of them, and by all this determines to display his punitive justice, who can justly find fault with his proceedings?'

Θέλων, *willing, determining, designing, purposing*. It intimates, of course, that in 'enduring with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction,' God had a purpose or design of displaying his indignation against sin, i. e. his punitive justice and his power. Can it be a *reasonable* subject of complaint, that he is determined, or that he purposes (θέλων), to bring good out of evil?

Ἐνδείξασθαι τὴν ὀργήν, *to manifest or exhibit his indignation or displeasure*; in other words, to display his punitive justice with respect to the wicked. Ὀργή is often employed to designate the idea of *punishment*, i. e. the consequences of indignation or anger; e. g. Rom. 1: 18. 4: 15. 13: 4, 5, al. So Demosthenes: οὐκ ἴσθη τὴν ὀργὴν ὃ νόμον ἔταξε, κ. τ. λ., *the law has not sanctioned equal punishment*, etc. Reiske Demosth. p. 528.—Καὶ γνωροίσει τὸ δύνατον αὐτοῦ, *and to make known, publish, declare, his power*; comp. δύναμις in v. 17, where *the power* of God has special reference to his miraculous interpositions in order to punish Pharaoh with the Egyptians, and to deliver the oppressed Hebrews. Δύνατον, therefore, in the

connection in which it here stands, must be viewed as having a special relation to *the power of making retribution to sinners, the power of punitive justice*. But to understand and interpret this as done for purposes of revenge or vengeance *more humano*, or for the sake of display such as men make through pride and vain glory, would be to make God altogether like ourselves, and to represent him in a manner altogether reproachful and unworthy of his perfections. A being who is self-existent, immutable, and independent; who cannot even be imagined as depending in any manner or measure, for his own essential happiness or glory, on the creatures whom his power has formed and his bounty supports—such a being cannot have any purposes of revenge or vain glory to accomplish. Of what possible consequence could they be to him? *Men* are prone to revenge, from malignity and because of wounded pride; they are prone to display, because of vanity and vain glory. But the ever blessed God, who is *love*, and whose essential glory cannot be affected by the giving or refusing of homage by any of his creatures, and whose happiness cannot in any measure be affected by their opposition to him—such a God we cannot at all imagine as exhibiting his punitive justice and power, for the purposes of revenge or display. He exhibits them only for the purposes of benevolence, i. e. for the sake of doing good to the subjects of his moral government; who, while they are allured to virtue, on the one hand, by all the glories of the upper world, are deterred from sin, on the other, by the judgments that are inflicted on the disobedient and rebellious.

Ἐνεγκες, endured, bore with. The verb *πέρω* has generally the sense of *bearing* or *carrying away*, i. e. of *bearing* accompanied by *motion* in some way or other. But it is also employed in the sense of *fero, patior, to endure, to suffer*, Heb. 13: 13; or of *tolero, sustineo, to tolerate, to bear with*, as Heb. 12: 20; in the Sept. Gen. 36: 7. Num. 11: 14. Deut. 1: 12. In this last sense it is clearly used here, as the adjunct *ἐν πολλῇ μακροθυμίᾳ* shews.—*Μακροθυμία, long-suffering, longanimity*, i. e. forbearance to punish, delay to enforce the strict claims of justice. The apostle seems to have his eye here on the case of Pharaoh in particular, who, after he had nine times resisted the mandate of heaven to let the Hebrews go, was still spared and preserved in life, although he had long before forfeited all claim to forbearance. Still the design of Paul plainly is not to limit the case to Pharaoh only. He means to intimate, that God, in like manner, now (i. e. at the time when he was writing) displays his long-suffering, by

forbearing to punish those who deserve it. And what was true then, in respect to this matter, has been so ever since, and is so at the present moment.

Σκεύη ὀργῆς, *vessels of wrath* means, vessels in respect to which wrath should be displayed, i. e. wicked men who deserve punishment. The reason why the writer here makes use of *σκεύη*, may be found in the verses immediately preceding, where he has spoken of *VESSELS fitted for honourable and dishonourable use*. The language *literally* employed there, is *figuratively* used here, i. e. wicked men are called *σκεύη ὀργῆς*. So in Is. 13: 5, the Persian army is called $\text{בְּיָדֵינוּ בְּיָדֵינוּ}$, *σκεύη ὀργῆς κυρίου* comp. Jer. 50: 25. But in these examples of the Hebrew Scriptures, by *σκεύη ὀργῆς* is meant *instruments of executing the divine displeasure*; while in our text the meaning is *passive*, viz. persons on whom it ought to be or will be executed.

Κατηρισμένα εἰς ἀπώλειαν, *fitted for destruction*; another of *fendiculum criticorum*. *Κατηρισμένα fitted*; how? By whom? The text does not say. It simply designates the *actual condition* of the *σκεύη ὀργῆς*. Now whether they came to be fitted *merely* by their own act, or whether there was some agency on the part of God which brought them to be fitted, the text of itself does not here declare. The *passive* participle, in such a case, may be applied to designate what one has done for himself; e. g. 2 Tim. 2: 21, *ἐὰν οὖν τις ἐκκαθάρῃ ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τούτων, ἔσται σκεῦος εἰς τιμὴν . . . εἰς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἠτοιμασμένον*, where the *being prepared* for every good work is the consequence of the *ἐκκαθάρῃ ἑαυτὸν*. So in 2 Tim. 3: 17, *ἐξηρισμένος* denotes the *being prepared* or *fitted* for every good work, by the beneficial influence of the inspired Scriptures. But in our text, how can we avoid comparing *κατηρισμένα* in v. 22, with *ἂ προητοίμασε* in v. 23? The two verses are counter-parts and *antithetic*; and accordingly we have *σκεύη ὀργῆς*, to which *σκεύη ἐλέους* corresponds, and so *εἰς ἀπώλειαν* and *εἰς δόξαν*. How can we help concluding, then, that *κατηρισμένα* and *ἂ προητοίμασε* correspond?

The objections which can be made to such a sense of *κατηρισμένα* here, viz. a sense which makes it to designate *some agency or arrangement on the part of God*, by or in consequence of which, or under which the *vessels of wrath* become fitted for destruction, are in all respects just the same as can be brought against the *ἐξήγηρα* z. τ. λ. of v. 17, which has been so fully discussed above. The question is not, whether God is, *in any sense*, the author of sin in such a

way as throws the guilt, or any portion of it, upon him, and removes or diminishes the criminality of the sinner. The answer to this question is settled and certain from the tenor of the whole Bible, as well as from passages direct and express; e. g. James 1: 12. But the question is: Whether God, as the sovereign of the universe, has a right to dispose of, and does so dispose of, his creatures who are moral and free agents, as to place them in circumstances in which he knows they will sin; and, supposing it to be certain that in such a case what he foreknows will come to pass, whether it is proper for him to exhibit his punitive justice and power? This is precisely the attitude of the question in v. 17; and it seems plain that the apostle has not let go the subject there discussed, but that he here presents it again in a somewhat different form, and in the way of direct antithesis. If any one is still stumbled at this, I must refer him to such texts as 1 Pet. 2: 8. 1 Thess. 5: 9, *for God hath not appointed us to wrath, οὐκ ἔθετο ἡμῶς κ. τ. λ.*, i. e. the implication is, that he has appointed some others, but not *us*, to punishment, etc. Jude v. 4. Prov. 16: 4. Add to these, such as designate the antithesis to this meaning, viz. the appointment of some to life eternal; as in Acts 13: 48. 2: 47. Eph. 1: 4, 5, 11. 2 Tim. 1: 9. Rom. 8: 29, 30. Eph. 3: 11, al. If now to all these he adds such texts as 2 Sam. 12: 11. 16: 10. 1 K. 22: 22. Josh. 11: 20. Ps. 105: 25. 1 K. 11: 23. 2 Sam. 24: 1. Ex. 7: 13. 9: 12. 10: 1, 20, 27. 11: 10. 14: 8. Rom. 9: 17, 18. Deut. 2: 30. Is. 63: 17. John 12: 40, he can no longer doubt that there is *some sense*, in which the sacred writers do declare that God is concerned with evil. In what sense, I have endeavoured to shew above, on v. 17. In the same sense, and in no other, can we suppose God to be here concerned with *fitting the vessels of wrath for destruction*. At all events there can be nothing more difficult in this, than there is in all the texts just referred to; and especially in Prov. 16: 4. Jude v. 4. 1 Pet. 2: 8. 1 Thess. 5: 9. It is of no use to explain away the force of one text, while so many others meet us which are of the very same tenor; and some of which, at least, admit of no explaining away. And even if we give up the Bible itself, so long as we acknowledge a God, who is *omnipotent* and *omniscient*, we can not abate in the least degree from any of the difficulties which such texts make. The great problem is: *How* can entire free agency and accountability consist with entire dependence, and with the fact that our Creator has designs to accomplish even by our very wickedness? The *how* is the whole of the *nodus*; and, as has been repeatedly said, is plainly beyond the

boundaries of human knowledge. In the mean time, as *sin is actually in the world*, and *men are actually accountable*,—would it be any relief to the difficulties of our question, to suppose God to be so impotent that he cannot bring good out of evil; or so deficient in foresight and wisdom, as to have made a plan for the world of intelligent moral beings, which is radically defective in regard to accomplishing the ends of benevolence, and which admits evil that was neither foreseen nor can be prevented, nor even turned to the accomplishment of good? I repeat it, would this be any relief for the difficulties of our question? I think every candid and sober man will answer in the negative. It is better, then, to let the subject rest where the Bible has placed it. He who admits a God, supreme, omniscient, omnipotent, holy, and benevolent, must admit that this God will make sin the occasion of exhibiting his punitive justice and power, for the good of the rational universe; and this is enough. This is what our text, and what v. 17, plainly implies.

(23) *Καὶ ἵνα γνωρίσῃ*, an enallage of construction. Verse 22 begins with *εἰ θέλων . . . ἐνδείξασθαι . . . καὶ γνωρίσαι*, i. e. with a participle followed by the Infinitive mode. The same construction continued would require. [*εἰ θέλων*] *γνωρίσαι τὸν πλοῦτον κ. τ. λ.* But instead of this, we have *ἵνα γνωρίσῃ*. In the same manner, the apostle might have said, *εἰ δὲ θεὸς, ἵνα ἐνδείξῃ . . . καὶ γνωρίσῃ . . . ἡμεγκεν κ. τ. λ.* Now as both of these methods of expression amount to the same thing, and as both are equally good in respect to grammar, the apostle has used the one in v. 22, and the other in v. 23. The rules of modern rhetoric would indeed require, that the same construction should be carried forward, with which the writer had commenced the sentence. But I suppose it will not be doubted, that Paul frequently departs from the rules in question. That *θέλω* may be followed by *ἵνα* with the Subjunctive, as well as by the Infinitive, (like *θέλων . . . ἵνα γνωρίσῃ*), is clear from such examples as occur in Matt. 7: 12. 20: 32 (where *ἵνα* is implied); 26: 17 id. 27: 17 id. Mark 6. 25. 9: 30. 10: 51 (*ἵνα* implied), et saepe. That this may be so with the *participle* of *θέλω* as well as with the verb, appears from 2 Cor. 11: 12, *θελόντων . . . ἵνα . . . εὐρηθῶσι κ. τ. λ.* The full construction here then, is [*εἰ δὲ θέλων*] *ἵνα γνωρίσῃ κ. τ. λ.*

Τὸν πλοῦτον τῆς δόξης, his abundant glory, where the first noun stands as an adjective; comp. Heb. Gramm. § 440. b. *σκεύη ἐλέους*, i. e. vessels toward which his mercy was to be displayed; the same as the *κλητοὶ* of 8: 28, and the antithesis here of *σκεύη ὀργῆς*.—“A

προητοιμάσσε, *which he had before prepared*; comp. Acts 13: 48. 2: 47. Eph. 1: 4, 5, 11. 2 Tim. 1: 9. Rom. 8: 28, 29, 30. Eph. 3: 11, et al.—Δόξαν, *glory*, i. e. happiness, glory in heaven.—As to πλοῦτος, comp. Rom. 2: 4. Eph. 1: 7, 18. 2: 7. Col. 1: 27.

After δόξαν there is plainly something wanting, in order that the sentence may correspond with ἤνεγκε, κ. τ. λ. in the verse above. The most appropriate verb to be supplied seems to be ἠλέησε, *had mercy upon*, it being suggested by the phrase σκεύη ἐλέους. But supplying this, we read thus: “[And if desiring] that he [God] might make known his rich grace toward the *vessels of mercy* which he had before prepared for glory, [he shewed mercy to] us whom he called, etc.” In this way all runs on smoothly; and although I have not seen this exegesis of the passage in any commentator, I cannot help thinking that it is the most easy and obvious one. At all events, no one can read v. 23, with its ἤνεγκε κ. τ. λ., without feeling that some *corresponding* verb is wanting here. Tholuck has represented ἐκάλεσε as being this verb; but the οὖς καὶ seems to forbid this. And besides, ἐκάλεσε does not seem to complete the sense. Understood as above explained, the sentiment is plain, and the transition in v. 24 . . . οὖς καὶ κ. τ. λ., is facile.

The same thing is accomplished in another way, viz. by supposing the ellipsis to be completed from the former part of v. 23 thus: “*God, desiring that he might make known his rich grace toward the vessels of mercy, which he had before prepared for glory, [ἐγνώρισε τὸν πλοῦτον τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ] ἡμᾶς, οὖς καὶ ἐκάλεσε κ. τ. λ.*” This evidently comes to the same thing as the exegesis given above; and it has this preference over it, that the whole of the ellipsis is supplied in so many words from the preceding context.

That ἡμᾶς is governed by some verb implied, seems to be plain; for ἐκάλεσε governs οὖς, not ἡμᾶς. Ἡμᾶς, viewed in this light, is synonymous with σκεύη ἐλέους, or is in apposition with it, and therefore takes the same preposition (ἐπὶ) implied before it. The phrase connected stands thus, (according to the last proposed method of filling up the ellipsis): *He made known his rich grace toward or unto us, [ἐπὶ] ἡμᾶς.*

(24) Οὖς καὶ ἐκάλεσε, *whom he did indeed call; καὶ affirmantis, or καὶ intensivum*; “*καὶ intendit sive auget*” (Bretschn.); comp. 8: 28—30, and the notes on these verses.

Οὐ μόνον . . . ἐθνῶν, *not only from among the Jews, but also among the Gentiles.* Comp. 3: 29, 30. 1: 16. 2: 9, 10. 4: 9, 12.

(25) Ὡς καὶ . . . λέγει, *even so he saith by Hosea.* Ἐν Ὡσηε may mean *in Hosea*, i. e. in the book of Hosea; just as ἐν Δαβιδ (Heb. 4: 7) may mean *in the book of David*. But in both cases, it is perhaps more probable that the meaning is, *by Hosea, by David*; like the Hebrew עַיְהוָה, דָּוִד.

Καλέσω . . . ἠγαπημένην, *I will call him who was not my people, my people; and her who was not beloved, beloved*; i. e. the Gentiles, who were deemed outcasts from God and were strangers to the covenant of his promise, will I bring into a covenant relation with me, and number among my beloved family; I will make them "sons and daughters of the Lord almighty." The object of the quotation is to support the assertion just made, that the *vessels of mercy* were chosen from the Gentiles as well as the Jews, without any respect of persons.

In regard to the *manner* of the quotation, the Hebrew runs thus: "I will love her, who was not beloved; and I will say to her who was not my people, My people art thou," Hos. 2: 23 (25). The Sept. have literally rendered this in the same order: ἀγαπήσω τὴν οὐκ ἀγαπημένην κ. τ. λ. The apostle has changed the order, and put καλέσω before both phrases, instead of saying (with the Heb. and Sept.) ἀγαπήσω . . . καὶ ἐροῶ κ. τ. λ. Of course he has quoted *ad sensum*, not *ad literam*.

(26) Καὶ ἔσται . . . ζῶντος, *and it shall come to pass, in the place where it was said to them: Ye are not my people, there shall they be called the sons of the living God*; another quotation from Hos. 1: 10 (2: 1), to the same purpose as the preceding one. In both cases the original Hebrew has reference to the reception and restoration to favour of Israel, who had been rejected on account of their transgressions. What was originally said of them, thus cast away and rejected, on occasion of their being again restored to favour, the apostle now applies to the receiving of the Gentiles, who had been "strangers to the covenant of promise, and aliens from the commonwealth of Israel." It is an accommodation of the words of the prophet, so as to express his own views on the present occasion. But at the same time it is still more; for *the principle of God's dealing*, which is disclosed in the original passages, and applied to Israel who was rejected and cast off, but eventually restored, is the same which is involved in the reception to favour of the Gentiles, who had been *out-casts*.

In respect to the quotation, it accords exactly with the original

Hebrew. The Sept., instead of the ἐκεῖ κληθήσονται of the apostle, has κληθήσονται καὶ αὐτοί.

(27) Thus much for the reception of the Gentiles. Next, as to the casting off of the great body of the Jews; a point the most difficult of all, to be maintained in a satisfactory manner. In order, however, to settle the question on this point, the apostle appeals to the declarations of the Hebrew prophets themselves. Ἡσαΐας δὲ . . . Ἰσραήλ, *Isaiah moreover says, in respect to Israel. Δὲ* *continuative*, i. e. it stands before an additional clause designed to illustrate and confirm the preceding declaration.—Κράξει, *exclaims, speaks aloud or openly.*

Ἐάν, *although or if*; Heb. here, אֲנִי כִּי, *although*.—Ὡς ἡ ἄμμος τῆς θαλάσσης, i. e. so great that it cannot be reckoned, exceedingly great. Τὸ κατάλειμμα σωθήσεται, *a remnant [only] shall be saved.* Κατάλειμμα here, and the corresponding Heb. רֵשִׁיט, means *a small number, a residue only.* And correspondently with this the context obliges us to interpret the word, both here and in Is. 10: 22, seq., from which it is quoted. This sense is the only one apposite to the apostle's purpose; which is to shew that the Hebrew prophets had foretold the same thing which he affirms, viz. that *only a remnant* of Israel is to be saved. In the original Hebrew, the passage has probably the same sense as here, i. e. it relates to the times of the Messiah; as may be seen by comparing Is. 10: 20, 21. The meaning of v. 22 seems to be, that only a small remnant of them [small compared with those who had perished] will return to the Lord, so as to be received by him.

(28) Λόγον . . . γῆς, quoted *verbatim* from the Sept., Is. 10: 22, 23, with the exception that γὰρ is added by the apostle, to shew that he continues quoting for the sake of confirmation; for ποιήσει Κύριος, the Sept. has Κύριος ποιήσει and for ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, the Sept. has ἐν τῇ οἰκουμένῃ ὅλη. The original Hebrew runs somewhat differently; *destruction is decreed, which shall make justice overflow; yea, destruction is verily determined on; the Lord Jehovah will execute it in the midst of all the land.* The Sept. and the apostle both represent the *general sense* of the Hebrew, but do not follow the words. Λόγον συντελῶν means, *accomplishing his word*, i. e. his promise or threat of excision. Καὶ συντέμνων, *deciding, bringing to an end, accomplishing*, viz. his λόγον, as before.—Ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ, carrying all this into execution, so as to satisfy the demands of *justice.*

"Ὅτι λόγον συντετηρημένον ποιήσει, for [Jehovah] will execute his word decreed, i. e. his threatening determined on, or decisively made, decisively pronounced. Ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, on the land of Israel.

The object of the whole is only to show, that God of old threatened to destroy great multitudes of the Jews for contumacy; and that it is no new thing now to say, that great numbers of them will perish, while the Gentiles are received to favour.

(29) Καὶ . . . Ἡσαΐας, yea, [it happens] as Isaiah had before said. Καὶ affirmantis, imo, immo. The object of this quotation is the same as that of the preceding one, viz. to shew that it is no new or strange thing, that a part, yea a large portion, of Israel should be rejected or cut off on account of their apostasy or unbelief. Consequently καὶ was followed, in the mind of the writer, (and of course it should be in the mind of the reader), by γίνεται or ἐγένετο, it happens or has happened. Προείρηκε here does not mean predicted, (as it does in some cases), but had before said. The apostle had just cited one passage from Isaiah, viz. 10: 22, 23, and here he adds: 'To the same purpose had Isaiah spoken in a preceding part of his prophecy,' viz. in 1: 9, καὶ καθὼς προείρηκεν Ἡσαΐας.

Κύριος Σαβαώθ, the Lord of Hosts. The Hebrew name יְבָאוֹת is often added to the title יְהוָה or אֱלֹהִים (אֱלֹהֵי), and designates the Supreme Being as Lord of the hosts of heaven, i. e. of the angels, etc., in heaven. There does not appear to be any good reason for the opinion of Von Cölln, which Tholuck adopts, that this title was first given to Jehovah because he was the mighty defender (גִּבּוֹר) of Israel; and afterwards, because he was considered as the Lord of the stars, which are called the host of heaven. The Lord of the heavenly hosts, i. e. the angels, יְהוָה יְבָאוֹת, is more simple: and so Gesenius appears to understand it in his lexicon; comp. Ps. 68: 17, where the "chariots of God are said to be twenty thousand, even thousands of angels," and "the Lord to be among them;" also Deut. 33: 2, where he is said to come with myriads of his holy ones (מֵרַבְבוֹת קֹדֶשׁ); comp. 2 K. 6: 16, 17. Dan. 7: 10, "thousand of thousands ministered unto him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him." I add only, that the appellation יְבָאוֹת does not occur in the Pentateuch, nor in the book of Judges, and that it is most frequent in Isaiah, Jeremiah, Zechariah, and Malachi. The apostle appears to have retained the Hebrew word untranslated, because it is so retained in the Septuagint version of Is. 1: 9, which he here quotes.

Σπέσμα here corresponds to the Hebrew שְׂרִיר, the literal meaning of which is not *seed*, but *remnant*, i. e. that which is left or saved after a general overthrow or destruction. In Deut. 3: 3 and Is. 1: 9, the Septuagint has σπέσμα for שְׂרִיר. *Σπέσμα* often means *posterity, those who come after one*. But I apprehend the ground of the usage in this case, by the Seventy, is, that σπέσμα (*what is sown, seed*) denotes what remains of grain, after the consumption for the year, until seed time comes, which is then sown; so that, considered in this light, σπέσμα is equivalent to *residuum*, which is the sense of it here.

Ὡς Γομόρρα ἀν ὠμοιώθημεν, instead of Γομόρρα ἀν ὠμοιώθημεν, i. e. Γομόρρα in the Dative after ὠμοιώθημεν. The Greeks could employ either construction; at least the Seventy have done so; see in Hos. 4: 6. Ezek. 32: 2, in which latter case both constructions are employed in the same sentence; λέοντι ἐθνῶν ὠμοιώθης σὺ, καὶ ὡς θράκων ὃ ἐν τῇ θαλάσῃ. The Hebrew is כִּי יִהְיֶה. *To be like Gomorrha*, is to be utterly destroyed, as this city was. The sentiment therefore is: 'Isaiah said, concerning the Jews, that only a small remnant should be rescued from utter destruction.'

It is true, that in Is. 1: 9, the passage does not respect the *spiritual*, but the *temporal* punishment of the Jews. But the ground of the apostle's reasoning here is analogy. His object is, as it all along through the chapter has been, to illustrate *a principle of action*. What God did at one time, and in one respect, he may do at another time and in a different respect, *provided the principle concerned shall be the same*. And surely it is no more against his benevolence or his justice, to punish *spiritually* for transgressions of a spiritual nature, i. e. for continued impenitence and unbelief, than it is to punish *temporally* for sins against himself. His promises to Abraham and his seed, i. e. his *literal* descendants, are only and always *conditional*, either as to temporal or spiritual blessings. Of course, the same *principle* of action applies to both, when God punishes. It is on this ground, then, that the apostle adduces instances of threatening *temporal* evil, in order to illustrate and confirm *spiritual* threats.

Overlooking this obvious principle of analogical reasoning, many commentators on Rom. ix. have very strenuously maintained, that all which is there said pertains only to the present world and to things of a merely temporal nature, or at most, only to the external privileges of religion; and all this, because the instances here produced, are

mostly of such a kind. But let any one look back first on chap. 8: 28—39, which most plainly gives rise to the whole discussion in chap. ix.; then contemplate the resumption of this theme in chap. 9: 6; and above all, let him view the summing up of the main object in chap. 9: 18—23, and then glance forward to vs. 30—33; and it does seem to me, that unless he has made up his mind in an *a priori* way, before he comes to the study of the text, he cannot entertain any doubt what the object of the writer is. That extravagant positions have been advanced, on the ground of Rom. ix., which are revolting to piety and to right views of God and of human liberty, I should be among the last to deny. How easy it is for ardent polemicists, when engaged in controversy and hardly pushed by subtle and able antagonists, to venture on extravagant positions, positions which depend on an exegesis *ad literam*, and not upon one *ad sensum*, need not be shewn, when the melancholy examples of such facts stand out so boldly *in relief*. But why all this should be charged to Paul, and why those who differ in sentiment from speculative critics of this class, should go so far over in the opposite direction, as to lose all sight of the apostle's object and aim, and make him discuss things of a merely *temporal* nature, when he begins, continues, and ends with a *spiritual* theme;—why all this is so frequently done, should be well looked to by those who are engaged in doing it. They may be very sincere in their opinions; and this I would by no means call in question. But a man may be *sincerely wrong*, as well as sincerely right; and when he is so through prejudice, through the heat of dispute, through reliance on mere human authority, through want of diligence and candour in studying the word of God, and judging with respect to its meaning; then it is but just, that his divine Lord and Master should consider him as accountable for his wrong judgment, and for the mischief which he does to others by it. If I am myself in the very predicament which I am here describing, may God in mercy open my eyes to see the truth as it in reality is, that I may not wander and perish myself, nor be the occasion that others should do the same!

CHAP. IX. 30—33.

Having thus completed the illustration and confirmation of his views respecting the sovereign dispensations of God, as to his mercy and his justice, the apostle now repeats in substance a leading sentiment of his epistle, viz., that justification being wholly gratuitous, and by faith in Christ, it is extended to all who will receive it as such, and so brings the Gentiles within its reach; while the Jews, rejecting this method of salvation, have failed to obtain justification; for they have stumbled at the doctrine of the cross, and been unable to find acceptance with God on the ground of merit, or by deeds of law. As no doctrine of the gospel was more repulsive to the Jews, than the truth that preference would be given to believing Gentiles over them, or at least a full admission to the same privileges in all respects; so Paul takes occasion frequently and solemnly to impress this important principle upon them.

(30) *Τὴ οὖν ἐροῦμεν*; a preface or transition to a summary of what he had been inculcating in the preceding context. It is as much as to say: 'How then may all that has been said on the point under consideration, be summed up? What in brief is the whole matter?' The answer follows:

Ὅτι . . . ἐκ πίστεως, that the Gentiles, who did not seek after justification, have obtained justification, even that justification which is by faith. That is, one principal thing which I have maintained, (when I have averred that the Gentiles have become the children of Abraham by faith and are received in the place of the unbelieving Jews), is, that those *who did not seek after justification*, i. e. who were once estranged from God and his law, were enemies to all which is good, and utterly regardless of spiritual blessings—these have now obtained justification by faith, i. e. they are admitted by the mercy of God, without any merit on their part, to participate in the blessings of the gospel, even in the justification which Christ has procured. *Διότι* is frequently used, even in the classic authors, in a sense like *ζητεῖν* and so in Hebrew, *הִרְבָּה* for *בָּקַשׁ*.

(31) *Ἰσραὴλ . . οὐκ ἐφθάσε*, but Israel, who sought for a law of justification, have not attained to a law of justification. That is, Israel, who, confiding in their own merit and good works, betook themselves for justification to their supposed complete obedience to the divine law, or betook themselves to the law as a means of justification, have not found or attained to such a law as would justify them. In other words: 'The Jews, who trusted in their *obedience* and *merit* as the ground of their acceptance with God, have failed in obtaining acceptance or justification in this way.' The reason or ground of this is fully stated in Rom. I—III. The law demands *perfect* obedience to *all* its precepts, which no one ever did, or ever

will exhibit; and consequently, no one can obtain acceptance on the ground of legal obedience, or by works of law. The apostle proceeds briefly to state the ground of what he had just asserted.

(32) *Διατί; ὅτι . . . νόμου.* Why? because [they sought] not by faith, but by works of law; i. e. Israel did not seek for justification in a *gratuitous* way, but by legal, i. e. *meritorious* obedience. That *ἐκ πίστεως*, by faith, necessarily involved, in the mind of the writer, the idea of *gratuitous* justification, is certain from Rom. 4: 4, 5, and especially 4: 16. From a comparison of 3: 20—28, it is equally clear, that *ἐξ ἔργων νόμου* means, *meritorious* obedience, i. e. a complete obedience to every precept of the law, in such a way that the reward consequent on perfect obedience can be claimed. Such a reward, the apostle maintains, it is now impossible for any one of the human race to obtain, "because all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God."

Now as the Jews were self-righteous and proud, they of course lacked that humility and sense of ill-desert which the gospel demands, and without which its salvation is not to be had. This pride and self-righteousness led them to reject the Saviour of lost sinners, and to refuse all trust or confidence in him. Here it was, that they stumbled and fell, yea, even to their own perdition; as the apostle goes on to say:

Προσέκρουσαν γὰρ . . . γέγραπται, for they stumbled on the stone of stumbling, as it is written. *Γὰρ* here is *causal*, i. e. standing before a clause which assigns the *cause* or reason why Israel had not obtained *δικαιοσύνην*. To the question, *διατί; why?* viz., Why did not Israel obtain justification? the apostle answers, (1) Because they sought it by legal obedience and not by faith. (2) As subordinate to this he says: They did not exercise faith, because they were offended with the Messiah, as he appeared among them; they were stumbled at his character and claims. The *γὰρ* stands as *causal*, before this last clause.

(33) *Ἴδού . . . κατασκευνθήσεται*, behold I lay in Zion a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence; but every one who believeth on him, shall not be ashamed. A peculiar quotation, made up of Is. 28: 16 and 8: 14. The former passage runs thus: "Behold, I have laid in Zion a stone, a corner stone, tried, precious, a firm foundation; he who confides in it shall not be afraid."—The latter passage thus: "And he shall be for a refuge, and for a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence to both houses of Israel." It appears, then, that the

stone of stumbling and rock of offence, in Rom. 9: 33, comes from Is. 8: 14, while the rest of the verse is taken from Is. 28: 16.

It is a very common practice among the Jewish Rabbies, in citing the Scriptures, to mix passages together that are of the same tenor; and I may add, this is done by writers every day, without any consciousness of doing violence to the Scriptures, or of using an improper liberty; see Surenhusius' *Βιβλος Καταλλάγης*, Par. V. p. 43. But however this may be, the fact that the apostle has done so, seems to be plain. The reader will observe, that in Is. 28: 16, the predicates of the *stone that was to be laid in Zion*, are, that it is *tried, precious, a firm foundation*; but one of the predicates in Is. 8: 14 is, that it is *a stone of stumbling or a rock of offence*. This is just what would coincide with the design of the apostle in the passage before us. He is describing the unbelief of the Jews, their rejection of the Messiah. Of course the *stone of stumbling* is best adapted to the description of their case.

It would seem to be clear, from the manner in which Paul cites both of these passages, that he applied them both to the Messiah; or at least, that they were, in his view, capable of such an application in the way of analogy. Tholuck and many others understand them in the former way. The Chaldee Targum, on Is. 28: 16, translates thus: "See, I place in Zion a King, a mighty and powerful King;" meaning the Messiah. Also the Babylonish Talmud (Tract. Sanhedrin. fol. 38, 1), the book of Zohar, and Jarchi. Kimchi also speaks of such an interpretation being given. In the New Testament, if the reader will compare Matt. 21: 42, 44. Luke 20: 17, 18, and 1 Pet. 2: 5—7, he will find that Ps. 118: 22 ("the stone which the builders refused is become the headstone of the corner"), and Is. 8: 14 are joined together, on account of their resemblance and their reference to the same object. Peter has not only joined these two passages, but added a third, viz. Is. 28: 16, and referred them all to the Messiah. This casts light, therefore, on the intermingling of texts by Paul, in the passage under consideration.

In regard to the text in Is. 8: 14, it seems evident from Luke 2: 34, that the pious part of the Jews, to say the least, were accustomed to give it a *Messianic* interpretation; for thus does the aged Simeon, when he takes the child Jesus in his arms, and says: "This child is set for the fall and rise of many in Israel, a sign that shall be spoken against." So the Gemara (Tract. Sanhedrin) also interprets Is. 8: 14, of the Messiah. That the Messiah would be rejected by the

Jews, is plainly enough predicted, (as their own ancient Rabbies acknowledge), in Ps. xxii. Is. liii. Zech. xi. xii., etc. So the Bere-shith Rabba, (a mystical commentary on Genesis, written about A. D. 300, by Rabbi Bar Nachmani), says: "One will sing no song, until the Messiah shall be treated with scorn; as it is written in Ps. 89: 52."

The objection against the Messianic interpretation of Is. 8: 14. 28: 16, viz. that 'circumstances then present are referred to, the threatening of present punishment uttered, and excitement to present hopes and confidence then proffered,' cannot weigh much against such an interpretation. The prospect of the *future* was then held out by the prophet to the wicked as a matter of *dread*; to the pious, as a matter of *hope* and *joy*. Let us see, now, how this matter stood. The Jews looked forward to a great deliverer, to a period of great prosperity and glory in the days of their Messiah. What says the prophet? He says: 'The days of the Messiah himself shall bring no liberation of the *wicked* from evil; they shall be consolatory only to the *good*; for even the Messiah himself will be only a *stone of stumbling and a rock of offence* to the wicked.' This is both *prediction* and *preaching*. It threatens and consoles, while it discloses what is yet future.

Who can venture to say, now, that the prophet could not, or did not, entertain such views as these, and speak in such a manner? After the interpretation of Christ himself and of his apostles, in such a way as to support this view, we may venture to embrace it without any hazard.

Οὐ κατασχυυθήσεται, in the Hebrew לֹא יִחַיֵּשׁ . Paul seems to have read (and so the Seventy also), לֹא יִבּוֹשׁ or לֹא יִבִּישׁ . The present Hebrew text, לֹא יִחַיֵּשׁ , means literally, *he shall not make haste*; but a secondary and derived sense of this same verb, is, *to be afraid, to be agitated with fear so as to betake one's self to flight*. In this latter sense, it comes in substance to the same sense that κατασχυυθήσεται expresses, viz. that of disappointed expectation and hope, failure of obtaining security and happiness. "Non refert verbum, sed res."

CHAP. X. 1—21.

Having thus shewn that the casting off of Israel cannot be alleged as a wrong on the part of their sovereign Lord and Ruler, and that the Scriptures contain many examples of the like dealing with individuals, as well as predictions respecting the rejection of the Jews; having also declared very explicitly that this rejection is because of their unbelief in respect to the Messiah, and their confidence in their own merits; the apostle now proceeds again to testify (as he had done in chap. 9: 1—5) his strong affection for his kinsmen after the flesh, and his ardent desires and prayers for their salvation. Nothing can be more appropriate than the expression of so much kind and deeply interested feeling, on his part, for the Jews, whom he is obliged to denounce and threaten because of their character and conduct. It serves to shew, that he does not do this in the spirit of revenge, or because he loves denunciation; but that he does it with a sorrowful heart and eyes full of tears, that his bowels yearn over them, and that he retains for them all the affection which he once had when acting with them, yea, even more, and that too of a higher and better nature.

He had just said, that Israel was *διόκων νόμον δικαιοσύνης . . . καὶ οὐκ ἔφθασε*. Here he resumes the theme, and explains himself more at large. He states the reason why they did not attain justification, vs. 2, 3, and goes on to shew, that Moses himself confirms the same ideas which he had disclosed to them relative to faith and works, vs. 4—8. The sentiment, that *belief in Christ is necessary for all*, both Jew and Greek, is still further confirmed by vs. 9—12.

The apostle next presents the Jew, as objecting thus: 'If we allow what you say as to the necessity of faith or belief in Christ, yet how are we to be blamed for rejecting him, in case he has never been preached or declared to us?' vs. 13—15.

To this the apostle answers, (1) That not all who have heard the gospel, believe it; as Isaiah himself declares, vs. 16, 17. (2) But further; the objection cannot be truly made, that the Jews have not heard the gospel, at least enjoyed the opportunity of hearing it; for one may apply to them, in this respect, the words of Ps. 19: 4; or the words of Moses, in Deut. 32: 21; or of Isaiah, in 65: 1, 2: so that they are left without any just apology for their unbelief, vs. 18—21.

(1) *Ἡ μὲν εὐδοκία τῆς ἐμῆς καρδίας*, the benevolent or kind desire of my heart; i. e. his sincere and hearty wish, (as we say), is, etc.—*εἰς σωτηρίαν*, for salvation, i. e. for their salvation. Literally *my prayer to God for them [is] unto or in respect to salvation*. But *εἰς* is frequently used in the New Testament in the same sense as *בְּ* in Hebrew; e. g. Rom. 16: 6, *εἰς ἡμᾶς*, for us; 1 Cor. 8: 6, *εἰς αὐτόν*, for him, i. e. for his honour and glory; 2 Cor. 8: 6, *εἰς ὑμᾶς*, for your advantage; and so often. The phrase *ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν [ἔστιν] εἰς σωτηρίαν*, is altogether equivalent, then, to *ἵνα σωθῶσι*, or *ὑπὲρ τῆς σωτηρίας αὐτῶν*.

(2) *Μαρτυρῶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς*, for I bear them witness. *Γὰρ illustrantis*, i. e. standing before a clause that suggests some consideration which has a bearing on the preceding declaration. The apostle means to say, that he retains a strong affection for the Jews, and prays sincerely and ardently for their salvation; and specially so, as they have much feeling and zeal in respect to the subject of religion.

Αὐτοῖς is the Dative after *μαρτυροῦν* for this verb commonly takes the Dative of the person or thing, for whom or which testimony is given.

"*Οὐ ζήλον θεοῦ ἔχουσι, that they have a zeal for God; θεοῦ* being the Genitive of the object to which *ζήλον* stands related. So in John 2: 17, *ὁ ζήλος τοῦ οἴκου σου, zeal for the honour of thine house; comp. Ps. 69: 10 (9), קִנְיָהּ בְּבֵיתֶךָ, also Acts 22: 3, and John 16: 2. The apostle means to say, that the Jews had much zeal for objects of a religious nature, for such objects as had a relation to God; or in other words, that they possessed strong feelings and sympathies of a religious nature. And with this representation all accounts of them agree. Philo, Josephus, the various writers of the New Testament, by the facts which they disclose, most abundantly confirm the correctness of this declaration.*

Ἀλλ' οὐ κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν, but not according to knowledge; i. e. not an intelligent, discerning, enlightened zeal; not a zeal regulated by a proper understanding of what was really religious truth. They persecuted Christians, for example, unto death, and yet thought themselves to be doing service for God, λατρείαν θεῷ, John 16: 2. There may be zeal without knowledge, which is superstitious, persecuting, hostile to the peace and happiness of the community; and there may be knowledge without zeal, which is cold, skeptical, unfeeling, and which devils may possess as well as men. An actual union of both is accomplished only by sincere piety; and a high degree, only by ardent piety.

(3) *Ἄγνοοῦντες γὰρ . . . δικαιοσύνην, for being ignorant of that justification which is of God. Θεοῦ* here is *Gen. auctoris*, i. e. a Genitive designating the author of that which the preceding noun signifies. *Τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην* is that method of justification, viz. gratuitous or by faith, which God has established, appointed, or revealed in the gospel. It stands opposed, here, to *τὴν ἰδίαν δικαιοσύνην*, i. e. justification on the ground of merit or by the works of law. *Γὰρ causal*, i. e. standing before a clause which gives the reason or ground of the assertion, *ἀλλ' οὐ κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν*, and consequently it may be rendered *for*.

The apostle does not mean by *ἀγνοοῦντες*, to imply that the Jews had enjoyed no opportunity to become acquainted with the *δικαιοσύνην θεοῦ* for this would contradict what he says in the sequel, v. 18, seq. He means only to say, that whatever their opportunities of knowledge had been, they were in fact still ignorant, and criminally ignorant, of the gospel method of justification.

*Καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν . . . στήσαι, and seeking to establish their own justification. To establish, στήσαι, means here, to render valid, to make good one's claims. The Jews sought for and expected justification by their own merit, i. e. by obedience to their laws, specially the ceremonial ones. How defective their views were, on the subject of what is required by the law of God, particularly in a spiritual respect, is manifest from the whole of the New Testament, but specially so from the declarations of the Saviour in his *Sermon on the Mount*, Matt. V. seq. That justification in the way of merit was impossible, the apostle had before shewn in chaps. II. III.*

Οὐκ ὑπετάγησαν, they have not submitted themselves; in which rendering we give to the second Aor. of the Pass. voice, the reflexive sense of the Middle voice. So the Aorists of the Passive are frequently used; see Buttm. Gr. Gramm. § 123. 2. Winer's N. Test. Gramm. 2 edit. § 33. 2. But if we render οὐκ ὑπετάγησαν passively, they have not been subjected, the sense will be substantially the same.

Sentiment of the verse: "Having no correct views of justification by grace, and being earnestly desirous of justification on the ground of their own merit, they reject the justification which God has proffered to them in the gospel."

(4) *Τέλος γὰρ νόμου Χριστός, for Christ is the end of the law; i. e. belief in Christ, receiving him by faith and thus attaining to δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, accomplishes the end or object of what the law would accomplish, viz. which perfect obedience to the law would accomplish. In this simple way, and consonant with the context, I interpret this long agitated and much controverted text. That τέλος has often the same meaning, substantially the same, which is here given to it, may be abundantly shewn. It is frequently used to denote exitus rei, the event, end, ultimate object or design of a thing; e. g. Matt. 26: 58, ἰδεῖν τὸ τέλος, to see the event, final end; Rom. 6: 21, τὸ τέλος, the end or final event of those things, is death; 2 Cor. 11: 15, ὧν τὸ τέλος, whose end, final state or condition, i. e. reward, shall be according to their works; Phil. 3: 19, ὧν τὸ τέλος, whose end or final state, shall be destruction; 1 Tim. 1: 5, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς παραγγελίας, now the ultimate end, object, design of the commandment, etc.; Heb. 6: 8, ἧς τὸ τέλος εἰς καῦσιν, whose end or final reward is burning. See also James 5: 11. 1 Pet. 1: 5, τὸ τέλος, the end or event of your faith, is the salvation of your souls; 4: 17. So in other Greek writings; e. g. τὸ τέλος τοῦ πράγματος εἰς κακίαν ἄγει, Test. XII.*

Patriarch. p. 689, *τό τούτου τέλος ἐν θεῷ ἦν*, *the end or event of this matter was with the Divinity*, Demosth. 292. 22. So in the phrases *τέλος λαμβάνειν, παρέργεσθαι εἰς τέλος, ἐκ τοῦ τέλους γνωρισθέντα, κ. τ. λ.*

From all this, there remains no good reason to doubt, that *τέλος* may mean here, *exitus, the end, final object, the result*; i. e. the end which the law was intended to accomplish or bring about, has been brought about or accomplished by Christ. Now the *end* of the law, was the justification of men, i. e. their advancement to happiness and glory in a future world. So the apostle himself states in the sequel: "The man that doeth these things shall live by them." But inasmuch as "all men have sinned and come short of the glory of God," so "no flesh can be justified by the deeds of the law;" in other words, legal justification on the ground of merit, is now impossible. But what the law cannot accomplish, Christ does accomplish; for through him the justification of sinners is brought about, which would otherwise be impossible. Christ then is *the end of the law*, i. e. he accomplishes or brings about that which the law was designed to accomplish—the acceptance of men with God, and their admission to the happiness of the future world.

That v. 4 is only expegetical of the last clause of the preceding verse, seems to me quite plain; and the *γάρο* intimates this. Christ then is asserted, in v. 4, to be the *end* of the law, i. e. to answer the same end which the law perfectly obeyed would answer, as to justification.

But *τέλος* has been very differently construed; viz. (a) As meaning *end* in the sense of *ending* or *completion*. In this case *νόμος* is interpreted as meaning the *ceremonial law*; so that the sentiment is: 'Christ has, by his coming, made an end of the ceremonial law.' But it is a sufficient objection to this interpretation, that it is wholly *irrelevant* to the subject now under discussion; which is, whether justification is by *merit*, as the Jews believed, or by *grace*. This interpretation, however, has been defended by Augustine, Gregory Thaumaturgus, Schlichting, Le Clerc, Limborch, and some others.

(b) Christ is the *τελείωσις* or *πλήρωμα* of the Jewish law, i. e. Christ perfectly fulfilled or obeyed it. But this explanation, although defended by Origen, Pelagius, Ambrose, Melancthon, Vatablus, Calvin, etc., fails in being able to make out a *usus loquendi* in favour of such a sense of the word *τέλος*. And moreover; what is it to the purpose of the apostle? To say that Christ obeyed the whole law,

ritual, or moral, or both, is saying what indeed is true; but then it has no direct or visible bearing on the subject immediately before the mind of the writer. There are *two* ways of justification, one *wrong* way and one *right* one; this it is his object to shew. Now the Jews, having chosen the wrong one, viz. their own works of law, i. e. their own merits, have of course missed the right one, i. e. that by faith on Christ.

(c) Chrysostom, Theodoret, Beza, Bucer, S. Schmidt, Bengel, Turretin, Heumann, Tholuck, etc., understand *τέλος* in the sense of *end, design, final object*. Tholuck explains it thus: viz. that the law teaches us our sinfulness and our need of a Saviour, and this was what it was designed to accomplish; and thus it leads us *in the end* to Christ, or to Christ as its *final end*. He finds an exact parallel in Gal. 3: 24: "The law is our *παιδευγωγός* to bring us to Christ." But why we should give the passage this turn here, I cannot see; for the writer has expressly told us in what respect he means that Christ was the *end of the law*, viz. *εἰς δικαιοσύνην*. And in accordance with this, Flatt has expounded the passage thus: 'Christ is the *τέλος νόμου* in respect to *δικαιοσύνη*: he has brought it about, that we should not be judged after the strictness of the law. He has removed the sentence of condemnation, from all those who receive the gospel.'—Well and truly.

Εἰς . . . πιστεύοντι, in respect to the justification of every believer. This designates, as I have before observed, the very respect in which Christ was *τέλος νόμου*. He is so to every *believer*; but not so to others, i. e. not so while they are unbelievers, although he is proffered to them as mighty and willing to save all who will come unto God through him. *Παντὶ κ. τ. λ.* in the Dative, as the person for whom.

(5) *Μωϋσῆς γάρ, γάρ illustrantis* again; for the whole of the quotations which follow are plainly designed to illustrate the two different methods of justification which the apostle had just brought into view. *Γράφει describeth, delineateth*; often used in such a sense.—*Τὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου, legal justification*, i. e. meritorious justification, one which a man may claim as the proper reward of his own good deeds or obedience. The apostle makes this appeal to Moses, both to confirm and illustrate his own declarations, and to shew also that he is inculcating no new doctrine.

"*Οτι . . . ἐν αὐτοῖς*, that the man who doeth these things, shall live by them. "*Οτι* is prefixed here to a quotation, as usual, and has

the sense of our *viz.*, namely, or as follows. The Greek word itself seems in reality to be the neuter of ὅστις, ὅτι = ὁ τί, i. e. *this thing, videlicet.*

Ποιήσας αὐτά, viz. the things spoken of in the preceding context. The quotation is from Lev. 18: 5, which has a reference to preceding ordinances and statutes recorded in Leviticus. Ποίω is very frequently employed in the sense of *performing, obeying*, a statute, ordinance, etc., or *obeying* the will of another.—Ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς, he shall be rendered happy by them, i. e. by obedience to such statutes, etc. Obedience, i. e. entire obedience, shall render him happy, shall entitle him to the rewards that are proffered to the obedient. That the Jews understood something more than *happiness in the present life*, by the יָחַי (ζήσεται) in Lev. 18: 5, seems probable from the version of Onkelos: "He shall live in eternal life by them." So the Targum of Pseudo-Jonathan: "He shall live in eternal life, and have a part with the righteous."

(6) Ἡ δὲ . . . λέγει, but justification by faith speaketh thus. Αὐ, but, here in distinction from, or in opposition to, the preceding declaration. Δικαιοσύνη is here personified. The sense is the same as to say: 'One who preaches justification by faith, might say, etc.'

Μὴ . . . σου, say not in thine heart, i. e. within thyself. To say *within one's self*, is to think, imagine, suppose. So the Greek φῆμι is sometimes used for *internal saying*, i. e. thinking. Ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου, בְּלֵבָא, where לֵב (heart) is used like נַפְשָׁא (soul), for self; and so very often, in the Hebrew language.

ὅς . . . οὐρανόν; who shall ascend to heaven? etc. The whole appeal and method of reasoning is in an analogical way. Moses, near the close of his life, in a general exhortation to obedience, which he addressed to the Hebrew nation, assigns as one reason why they should obey, that the statutes of the Lord which he had given them, were plain and intelligible; they "were not hidden from them, neither were they afar off," Deut. 30: 11. In order to enforce this last thought the more effectually, he dwells upon it, and illustrates it in several ways. "The commandment," says he, "is not in heaven, that thou shouldest say: Who shall go up for us to heaven, and bring it unto us, that we may hear it and do it. Neither is it beyond the sea, that thou shouldst say: Who shall go over the sea for us, and bring it unto us, that we may hear and do it?" That is: 'The law which you are required to obey, is plain, and intelligible; it is accessible to all men, and not difficult to be procured or understood. It needs no mys-

senger to ascend the skies and bring it down from heaven; for it is already revealed. We need not send abroad for it, nor search after it in distant or inaccessible lands that lie beyond the ocean. In other words: 'It is plain and easy of access.' Nay one may say: "The word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it," Deut. 30: 14. That is: 'The commandment is in language which thou dost speak, and is such as thou canst comprehend with thine understanding;' which last circumstance is only repeating or amplifying, in another form, the idea that had preceded.

The whole may be summed in one word, omitting all figurative expression; viz. *the commandment is plain and accessible*. You can have, therefore, no excuse for neglecting it.

So in the case before us. *Justification by faith in Christ* is a plain and intelligible doctrine. It is not shut up in mysterious language, nor concealed from the eyes of all but the *initiated*, like the heathen mysteries. It is like what Moses says of the statutes which he gave to Israel, plain, intelligible, accessible. It is not in the books of countries which lie beyond the impassable ocean; not in the mysterious book of God in heaven, and yet undisclosed; not in the world beneath, which no one can penetrate and return to disclose its secrets. It is brought before the mind and heart of every man; and thus leaves him without excuse for unbelief.

Such is the general nature and object of these quotations, and such the method of reasoning in respect to them. It is apparent, therefore, that *ne quid nimis* is very applicable here, in regard to commentary on the words which are employed. It is the *general nature* of the imagery, in the main, which is significant to the purpose of the writer. Paul means simply to affirm, that if Moses could say that his law was intelligible and accessible, the doctrine of justification by faith in Christ, is even still more so.

Τοῦτ' ἔστι . . . καταγάγειν, *that is to bring down Christ*. The τοῦτ' ἔστι here designates the reference which the apostle makes of the *sentiment* just quoted, viz. that he means to apply it to Christ, and not to the law of Moses. Χριστόν here means, *Christ* in the sense of v. 4, where he is called τέλος νόμου . . . εἰς δικαιοσύνην.

(7) Τίς . . . ἄβυσσον, *who shall go down into the abyss*. In the Hebrew, Deut. 18: 13, the phrase is, לֹא מֵעַבְרַת יָם הַיָּם, *not beyond the sea is it*. The *expression* differs from that of Paul in *words*, but not in *sense*. To go beyond the *sea*, which is of boundless width (Job 11: 9) and impassable, is employed by Moses as the image of

what is difficult or impossible. In the same way Paul employs ἄβυσσος. No one returns from the *world beneath*, לְיַמֵּינֵי or הַיָּמִינִים; (for לְיַמֵּינֵי and הַיָּמִינִים are occasionally synonymous, being the antithesis of הַיָּמִינִים, see Gen. 49: 25. Ps. 107: 26. Sirac. 16: 18. 24: 5, and comp. Ps. 139: 8. Amos 9: 2. Matt. 11: 23). As ἄβυσσος is the opposite of οὐρανός, so the general idea conveyed by the expression is one of the same nature; viz., 'Say not that an insuperable difficulty is to be overcome, in order to be a believer; such a difficulty as would be in the way, if one must ascend to heaven in order to bring Christ down, or into the world beneath in order to bring him up.

The quotations before us are clear examples of the liberty which Paul takes, of accommodating the *spirit* of the Old Testament to the objects and truths of the gospel, without any slavish subjection to the mere form of words.

Τοῦτ' ἔστι . . . ἀναγάγειν, *that is, to bring up Christ from the region of the dead*, viz. from the sepulchre or the world of the dead, to which, after his death, he descended. In other words, Christ, as proffered to perishing sinners in the gospel, is not to be sought in heaven, nor in the abyss; for he is near at hand. Sentiment: 'Justification by faith in him is intelligible and accessible.'

(8) Ἀλλὰ τί λέγει; i. e. what saith ἡ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνη? It saith: *Ἐγγύς σου . . . σου, the word is nigh to thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart.* Ῥῆμα here means ῥῆμα πίστεως, i. e. the gospel, as the sequel shews; comp. 1 Tim. 4: 6. *In thy mouth*, in thine own language, i. e. a subject of conversation and teaching. *In thy heart*, i. e. a subject of meditation and thought. Sentiment: 'The doctrine which I inculcate, is so far from being an obscure and inaccessible and forbidden mystery, that it is daily a subject of reflection and of conversation.'

That the apostle means the doctrine of faith which he taught and preached, is clear from the following τοῦτ' ἔστι . . . κηρύσσομεν.

(9) Ὅτι, *because*, i. e. what I have said is true, *because if*, etc.

Ἐὰν ὁμολογήσης . . . Ἰησοῦν, *if thou shalt openly profess with thy mouth, that Jesus is Lord.* The verb ὁμολογέω means literally, *eadem loqui, to speak what consents or agrees with something which others speak or maintain.* But it is frequently used to denote *speaking* or *professing openly*, i. e. proclaiming openly one's belief in Christ, which was speaking in accordance with what other Christians had avowed. Ἐν τῷ στόματι, *by word of mouth*, in words, or by the use of language. Κύριον I take to be the *predicate* of the sentence,

in this case, i. e. a true believer is to confess *that Jesus is Lord*; comp. Acts 2: 36. 5: 31. Phil. 2: 9, 10, where the order of the words is, *κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός*, the same as here, but where it is certain that *κύριος* must be a *predicate*, viz. that *Jesus Christ is Lord*.

Καὶ πιστεύσης . . . νεκρῶν, and shalt believe in thy heart that *God hath raised him from the dead*; i. e. shalt sincerely, *ex animo*, believe that God has raised him from the dead, and exalted him to the throne of universal dominion. It is not the simple fact of a resurrection of Jesus' body from the tomb, which in the apostle's view is the great and distinguishing feature of Christian belief; it is the exaltation, glory, and saving power that are consequent on the resurrection, which he evidently connects with this event. So in Phil. 2: 8—11. So in Acts 2: 24, 31—33, where the whole connection is very explicit; comp. also Heb. 2: 9. 2 Cor. 4: 14. Acts 17: 31. Rom. 4: 25. 1 Cor. 15: 17—20.

Σωθήσῃ, thou shalt be saved; i. e. a bold and open profession of the Christian faith, united with a sincere and hearty belief of it, will secure the salvation of him who makes such a profession; all which shews that the way of salvation is open and easy of access.

The reader will observe, that the apostle has here followed the *order* of the quotations which he had made from the law of Moses (v. 8) in stating the conditions of salvation. Independently of this, we might naturally expect that belief of the heart would be first mentioned, and then confession of the mouth, i. e. by words; for this is the order of nature. And so, in the explanation immediately subjoined, the apostle does in fact arrange his declarations; viz.

(10) *Καρδίᾳ γὰρ . . . σωτηρίαν*, for with the heart there is belief unto justification, and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation. *Πιστεύεται* and *ὁμολογεῖται*, if regarded as being in the Mid. voice, may be rendered in an active sense; but both may be taken *passively* and rendered as above; or we may translate: *Belief is exercised, confession is made*, etc. Our English version takes the first verb *actively*, and the last *passively*; which does not seem to have been intended by the writer. *Γὰρ illustrantis*, i. e. before a clause which assigns a ground or reason for what had just been said. *Εἰς δικαιοσύνην* and *εἰς σωτηρίαν* mean, so that justification is attained, and so that salvation is attained. *Εἰς* here, as often, stands before a noun designating the object or end to be obtained, and may be called *εἰς objectivum*.

The sentiment of the verse is the same as before; viz. sincere

belief in Christ, and open profession of him, are essential conditions of salvation, and such as, being complied with, will certainly secure it. The design of the apostle in repeating it, is merely to make an appeal, respecting this point, to the feelings and convictions of those whom he addressed. This is an important point, in the course of his argumentation.

(11) This is still further confirmed by again bringing into view a text, to which he had before made an appeal in chap. 9: 33. *Πᾶς ὁ . . . κατασχυνθήσεται*, *no one who believeth on him shall ever be disappointed*; i. e. salvation is certain to every true believer. *Πᾶς . . . οὐ* I have put together and rendered *no one*. The form of the Greek is *Hebraistic*. The Hebrews had no method of saying *none*, except by using כָּל (every one) with a negative לֹא (not). *Not every one*, כָּל לֹא, פֶּאֶס . . . οὐ, means of course *none*, i. e. no one; and so I have rendered it. *Κατασχυνθήσεται*, כָּל לֹא, *none shall be put to shame by a failure of his hopes, none shall be disappointed*.

(12) The word *πᾶς*, which the above quotation from Is. 28: 16 exhibits, gives occasion here for the apostle to bring into view a point which he had often insisted upon in the previous parts of his epistle, particularly in chaps. III. IV., viz. that the salvation of the gospel is proffered to all men without distinction, and on the same terms. *Οὐ γὰρ . . . Ἕλληνας*, *for there is no difference between the Jew and Greek, or there is no distinction of Jew and Greek*; i. e. no distinction as to the proffers of salvation and the terms on which it may be had. *Γὰρ illustrantis*, viz. illustrating the *πᾶς* of the preceding assertion. In fact, there is a singular succession here of clauses, arising one out of another, to all of which *γὰρ* is prefixed. Thus in v. 10, *καρδίᾳ γὰρ κ. τ. λ.*, assigns a ground or confirmation of the preceding declaration; v. 11, *τέλει γὰρ κ. τ. λ.*, assigns a ground of confirmation, in respect to what had been advanced in v. 10, i. e. it appeals to the Scripture in confirmation of it; v. 12, *οὐ γὰρ κ. τ. λ.*, is again a confirmation of the declaration *πᾶς . . . οὐ ἐπαισχυνθήσεται* and this last declaration is, in its turn, confirmed by two succeeding ones, viz. *ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς κ. τ. λ.*, and *πᾶς γὰρ ὅς κ. τ. λ.*, the first of which contains a declaration of the apostle, and the second an appeal to the Scriptures confirming this declaration: so that here are no less than *five* clauses in immediate succession, all of which have a *γὰρ* prefixed, and in the same sense throughout, i. e. each *γὰρ* stands in a clause which serves to confirm or illustrate the preceding assertion. This is altogether characteristic of the manner of Paul; who

in the course of making a single declaration, often throws out words, which suggest whole trains of thought that are but indirectly connected with the main object of the declaration, but which the apostle stops to express; and in expressing them, he is often led again to other thoughts connected with these subordinate ones; and these other thoughts again lead to a third series (if they may be so named); and after expressing all these, the writer returns again, and resumes his main subject; comp. for example, Rom. 1: 1—7, where vs. 1 and 7 belong together; Rom. 5: 12—18, where v. 18 is a resumption of the subject in v. 12, and a *completion* of the comparison there begun. So in Eph. 3: 1—4: 1, where 3: 1 is immediately connected with 4: 1, while there is a parenthesis (so to speak) of twenty verses between. It is this manner of unfolding his thoughts, which gives birth to so many instances of γάρ, whose proper use is, to stand before a clause that is added, in order to assign a reason of what precedes, or to exhibit an illustration or confirmation of it. Now inasmuch as the apostle Paul often writes in the way above described, where one thought grows out of another in succession (as in the case above); so it is not strange that we have a γάρ that corresponds with declarations of this nature, and therefore often repeated; a circumstance, I may add, which has not been duly noticed by the great body of commentators.

Ὁ γὰρ . . . πάντων, for there is the same Lord of all; i. e. the Jews and Gentiles have one common Lord and Master; comp. Rom. 3: 29, 30. 4: 16, 17.—Πλουτιῶν . . . αὐτόν, abounding [in goodness] toward all who call upon him. Πλουτιῶν means being rich, having abundance, viz. of wealth. But here the connection shews, of course, that the apostle means, rich in spiritual blessings, abounding in spiritual favours towards men.—Ἐπικαλουμένοις ἐπ' αὐτόν, like the Hebrew בְּשֵׁם יְהוָה, means making supplication to him, performing acts of devotion to him. Πάντας here again shews, that the goodness of God is not limited to the Jewish nation, but equally proffered to all.

(13) This is confirmed again by another quotation which exhibits the same πᾶς. Πᾶς γὰρ . . . σωθήσεται, for every one who calls on the name of the Lord, shall be saved. Here we have the full Hebrew form, viz. בְּלִי אֱשֶׁר יְקָרָא בְּשֵׁם יְהוָה, every true worshipper of God; ὄνομα being pleonastic, as in “the name of the God of Jacob defend thee,” “the name of the Lord is a strong tower,” etc.

In regard to the quotations in vs. 11 and 13, from Is. 28: 16 and Joel 3: 5 (2: 32), it has been frequently remarked, that the original

Hebrew, in either place, does not exhibit *Christ* as the object of supplication and the author of salvation. In a certain sense this is true; i. e. it is true, that the sacred writers of the Old Testament, in these passages, seem to have had principally in view, confidence placed in God in a season of danger and distress, and the promise that such confidence should not be in vain. But here again, as in a multitude of other cases of the like nature, it is the *principle of action* which is the main question, not the *special relation* of it in ancient times. Is the *principle* the same under the Christian dispensation, as it was under the Jewish one, viz. that those who are exposed to danger and distress, and who put their trust in God, shall obtain deliverance? Is this true in a spiritual, as well as in a temporal respect? Or rather, is there not a *πλήρωσις* to this promise, under the gospel? This will not be denied. Paul did not expect his readers to deny it; and consequently he has made appeals in vs. 11, 13, which apply *especially* to Christ; although the passages, in their *original* connection, do not seem to have had such a special reference. But in doing this, (vs. 13—15 shew clearly that he has done it), he has authorized us to apply to Christ the same divine worship and honour, which the saints of ancient days applied to Jehovah. Otherwise how could he make such an application of the words before us? He must have known that his readers would of course see, that he applied the very same things to Christ, which the writers of the Old Testament referred to Jehovah; and consequently, that he considered him as entitled to the same honours and confidence. I see not any way, in which we can make less out of the passage than this, viz. that all who believe in Christ shall be saved; all who pray to him, shall be saved. Of course, *sincere* belief and supplication are here intended.

(14) The apostle here anticipates an objection which he expected the Jew would make to his argument, which urges the necessity of calling on Christ in order to be saved: 'How shall one call on him, unless he is first a believer in him, i. e. first persuaded that he is the proper object of religious invocation? And how shall he believe this, provided no declaration of it has been made to him? And how can such a declaration be made, unless by a messenger or preacher duly commissioned? For the Scripture itself bestows its encomiums on such messengers, and thus impliedly recognizes the importance of them.' To all this, the apostle answers in the sequel, vs. 16, seq.

It seems to me almost a matter of indifference, whether (with Grotius) we suppose the apostle to introduce an objector as speaking here, in the person of an unbelieving Jew; or whether (with Tholuck and most commentators) we suppose the apostle himself to utter the words in question. If we attribute them to the apostle, we must suppose him to be uttering what an objector would naturally say; and this is the substantial part of the whole matter. It can be of no consequence, by whom it is uttered.

Nor is it necessary to suppose, that all which comes from an objector is false. The speciousness of the objection consists in the claims of some part of it to be considered as true. We may concede, therefore, that the *reasoning* of the objector here is correct, if you allow him his premises; i. e. it is true, that men must first believe on a Saviour, before they will call upon him; and that he must be preached to them, before they can believe on him; and that in order to this, there must be some one to preach. It is true that the Scripture recognizes the importance of such messengers. But then, the main question here after all is, whether the fact assumed as a basis of all this reasoning, viz. that *the Jew had not heard the gospel*, is true. The apostle proceeds in the sequel to shew, that this is not the case; and therefore the whole objection falls to the ground.

Πῶς οὖν . . . ἐπίστευσαν, *how, now, shall they call [on him] in whom they have not believed?* i. e. how shall they pray to him, do religious homage to him, who is not the object of belief or confidence? *Οὖν* marks here a relation to the foregoing assertions. "It is used," says Passow, "in interrogative sentences, with reference to preceding assertions, which are conceded." So here, the objector (or Paul in his place) concedes, that "the same Lord of all abounds in goodness to all that call upon him," (as had been asserted); but he has some questions to ask, that are raised by this declaration, and by which he aims to apologize for the unbelief of the Jews. *Πῶς οὖν*, etc., is as much then as to say: 'Conceding all this, still I ask,' etc. This delicate shade of *οὖν* is not noted in the lexicons of Wahl and Bretschneider.

Εἰς ὃν here must mean *the Lord Jesus Christ*; for surely he is the specific object of faith or belief, about which the apostle is here discoursing.

Πῶς δὲ πιστεύουσιν [εἰς αὐτὸν] οὐ οὐκ ἤκουσαν; and *how shall they believe [on him] of whom they have not heard?* That is, before one can believe on a Saviour, he must have some knowledge

of him ; this Saviour must be proclaimed to him. *Oὗ* here is the Genitive governed by *ἤκουσαν*. “*verba sensūs gaudent Genitivo.*”—*Κηρύσσοντος*, a preacher, is one who proclaims in public any matter, who publishes aloud ; in the Hebrew *רַשְׁמֵי*.

(15) *Πῶς δὲ . . . ἀποσταλῶσι* ; *And how shall they preach, except they be sent ?* i. e. unless they are divinely commissioned ; comp. Jer. 23: 21.

Καθὼς γέγραπται, even so it is written. The connection of the sentiment which follows with that which precedes, I have found exhibited in no commentator so as to satisfy me. Most critics do not appear to have felt any difficulty with the passage, and have said little or nothing to the purpose upon it. But in my own mind there has always been a serious difficulty, in seeing how the sequel here either illustrates or confirms the declaration immediately preceding. I am not able now to see that this is effected in any other way than the following ; viz. ‘the importance of the heralds of salvation, in order to bring men to believe on a Saviour, is implied in the high commendation which the Scripture bestows upon them.’ This is truly implied by the words quoted ; for why should these heralds be spoken of with high and joyful commendation, if they are not important instruments in the salvation of men ? So the apostle in making this quotation, (for I suppose him, and not the objector, to cite the words of Isaiah), concedes, for substance, what had been implied in the questions just asked.

Ὡς ὄρατοι . . . τὰ ἀγαθὰ, how beautiful are the feet of those who publish salvation, who proclaim good tidings ! The Septuagint translates thus : *ὡς ὄρα ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρέων, ὡς πόδες εὐαγγελιζομένου ἀκοῆν εἰρήνης, ὡς εὐαγγελιζόμενος ἀγαθὰ* ! So the Codex Vaticanus ; but what the sense of such a text can be, it is difficult indeed to make out. The Hebrew runs thus : “How beautiful on the mountains, are the feet of him who proclaims glad tidings, who publishes peace, who makes proclamation of good !” Is. 52: 7. Paul has evidently made a new translation, in his quotation ; but he has abridged the original Hebrew.—*Οἱ πόδες*, feet, i. e. a part of the person taken for the whole ; as often in Hebrew, and so in other languages ; comp. Acts 5: 9. The reason why *οἱ πόδες* is here chosen rather than any other part of the body, to be the representative of person, would seem to be, that the heralds who proclaim any thing, *רַשְׁמֵי*, travel from place to place in order to discharge their duty.

Εἰρήνην, *עֲרֵבָה*, good, salvation, good in its most extensive

sense.—*Εὐαγγελίζω* means primarily, according to its etymology, *to publish good news*. But secondarily, it conveys only the general idea, *to publish*; consequently it takes after it a noun indicating the thing published, as here *εἰρήνην . . . τὰ ἀγαθὰ*.

(16) *Ἄλλ' οὐ πάντες . . . εὐαγγελίῳ*, *but all have not obeyed the gospel*; i. e. all to whom it has been published, have not become obedient to it. So I feel compelled to explain this passage; on the connection of which I have been able to find no commentator who has given me satisfaction. The connection I take to be thus. The objector, in vs. 14, 15, pleads by way of apology for his unbelieving countrymen, that it could not be expected they would believe without the gospel being preached to them; thus intimating that many of them had not heard it proclaimed. To this the apostle answers, (1) That many who had heard it, viz. such as the objector himself must concede had heard it, did not believe it; and he quotes Is. 53: 1, in order to shew that the great prophet had predicted this same thing.

To this the Jew replies, that the very quotation which he makes, contains an implication of the sentiment, that men must hear the gospel before they can believe it; meaning thereby to intimate, that a part of his kinsmen after the flesh, at least, are not to be involved in the charge of criminal unbelief. This last intimation the apostle immediately takes up, and replies to it, (2) In vs. 18—21, by repeated quotations from the old Testament, shewing that they all had heard the glad tidings of the gospel, or at least shewing that what was said in ancient times of the Jews, in respect to the warnings and promises of God, may now be said with equal truth and propriety. It is the *principle* of the apostle's assertion or reasoning, which he designs to support and justify, by these quotations.

In both ancient and gospel times, it could never have been strictly and literally true, that to every individual Jew the message of life and salvation had been actually proclaimed. Nor was this necessary to the apostle's purpose. It was enough, if the proclamation had been openly, and repeatedly, and perseveringly made among the Jews, so that *all who would*, had opportunities of hearing it. Their ignorance, in such a case, would of course be *voluntary*; and therefore, altogether without excuse.

It is so at the present hour. Thousands in this land have never heard a gospel sermon, or read a book which disclosed the truths of the gospel, in their whole lives. But why? The sound of the gospel

is gone out into all the land, its words even to the end thereof; and ignorance is, certainly for the most part, voluntary and criminal; nor can it be justly alleged as making at all against the general assertion, that the terms of salvation are published to all.

With this explanation of the course of thought, our future way will be comparatively easy and plain.

Ἡσαΐας . . . ἤμῶν, for Isaiah saith, Lord, who hath believed our report? Is. 53: 1. That is, the prophet complains, that the declarations which he had made respecting the Messiah, were not credited by those who heard them. Here then is an example of Jews who hear and believe not; and one to the apostle's purpose, who had just said, that *not* all the Jews who did hear, believed the gospel. The same *thing* is asserted by Isaiah, which the apostle now asserts; so that he could not be accused of producing a new or strange charge.

(17) *Ἄρα . . . θεοῦ, faith then does come by hearing, and hearing by the word of God; i. e. the very quotation you make concedes the principle, that the gospel must first be published before men can be taxed with criminality for unbelief; for Isaiah complains of those to whom it had been published.—Ἡ δὲ ἀκοή διὰ ῥήματος τοῦ θεοῦ, i. e. the word of God, the gospel, must first be proclaimed before it can be heard, understood, and believed. The verse I take, without any doubt, to be the suggestion of the objector. He means to insist by it, that many of the Jews are not culpable for unbelief, inasmuch as they have not heard the gospel, and hearing it is necessary to the believing of it.*

(18) The apostle admits the correctness of the principle, viz. that faith cometh by hearing; but he denies the fact which was implied in the statement of it, viz. that there was a part of the Jewish nation who had not heard, i. e. who had not enjoyed the opportunity to hear. So the sequel:

Ἀλλὰ λέγω . . . ἤκουσαν; but I reply: Have they not heard? Μενοῦνγε, yes, verily; compounded of μέν, οὖν, and γέ. Μενοῦν asserts, and γέ increases the intensity of the assertion.

Εἰς πᾶσαν . . . τὰ ῥήματα αὐτῶν, quoted from Ps. 19: 5, in the words of the Septuagint, which here follows the Hebrew. Ὁ φθόγγος αὐτῶν, in the original Psalm, means the voice or sound of the works of nature, which shew or declare, in all the earth, that he who made them is God, and the God of glory. The apostle uses the words, in this place, simply as the vehicle of his own thoughts, as

they were very convenient and appropriate. The expressions *πάσαν τὴν γῆν* and *τὰ πέρατα τῆς οἰκουμένης*, are common and figurative expressions, to designate what has gone far and wide, what is unlimited in extent, etc. As originally employed by the Psalmist, they may be taken in their greatest latitude. As used by the apostle, they may be taken in the like latitude, so far as the Jews are concerned; for it is of them, and them only, that he is here speaking.

(19) *Ἀλλὰ λέγω*, *I say moreover*, i. e. in addition to what I have said of the opportunity of the Jews universally to hear the gospel; *I say also*. “*Ἀλλά* transitum facit, . . . cum res augenda sit.”

Μὴ Ἰσραὴλ οὐκ ἔγνω; *Doth not Israel know? What*—is not said; but it is to be gathered from the subsequent context; and if so, it is clear that the sentiment is: ‘Doth not Israel know, (as I have before said vs. 11, 12), that the Gentiles are to be received as well as the Jews, and the Jews to be cast off for unbelief?’ The apostle now proceeds to quote passages of the Old Testament, which shew that the ancient prophets have explicitly declared the same thing. The answer to a question asked by *μὴ* . . . *οὐκ*, is *affirmative*, because *οὐκ* takes the lead in the sense.

Πρῶτος Μουϋσῆς λέγει, *first, Moses saith*. *Πρῶτος* I understand here as meaning, *first in point or order of time*; like the Hebrew *יְרֵאֵת*; comp. the Lex. under *πρῶτος*.

Ἐγὼ . . . παροργισθῶ ὑμᾶς, *I will move you to jealousy by that which is no nation, I will excite your indignation by a foolish people*; i. e. I will make you jealous, by receiving to favour those whom you regard as unworthy of the name of a people, (*ἔθνος*, *יֵגוּ*), viz. the Gentiles; I will render you indignant, by receiving to favour a *foolish people*, *יֵגוּ יֵגוּ*. The Hebrew *יֵגוּ* designates one that is spiritually foolish, i. e. a wicked, unbelieving person, who contemns God. “The *fool* (*יֵגוּ*) hath said in his heart: There is no God.” “Fools (*יֵגוּ*) make a mock at sin.” Consequently, the epithet *ἀσύνετος* here designates a wicked or idolatrous people. The meaning of the whole is: ‘I will receive to my favour the heathen whom you regard as despicable, and who are without God and without hope in the world.’

In Deut. 32: 21 (from which these words are quoted), God complains of the Jews, that they had apostatized from him and gone after idols, and thus provoked his jealousy and indignation. Because they had so done, he declares that he will, at some future period, provoke them and excite their jealousy, by receiving a heathen, idolatrous people in their stead.

Whether Moses, in Deut. 32: 21, had in view the salvation of the Gentiles in gospel-times, cannot well be determined. There is nothing in the context adapted to prove it; and, I may add, nothing which forbids this supposition. Be this however as it may, it is enough for the apostle's purpose, that the same *principle* is developed in the words of Moses, which is developed by the reception of the Gentiles into the Christian church in his time. Now as the Jews were jealous and angry, because of this reception; so the apostle might appeal to the declarations of Moses, as an exhibition of the very same views and sentiments which he had been teaching.

(20) *Ἰσαΐας δὲ . . . λέγει, but Isaiah comes out boldly and says.* In *ἀποτολμῶ*, the *ἀπό* augments the signification; and this is often, though not always, the case, when prepositions are compounded with verbs.

Ἐυρέθην . . . ἐπερωτῶσι, I was found by those who sought me not, I manifested myself to those who did not inquire after me; i. e. the Gentiles, who had been accustomed to serve dumb idols, and had no knowledge of the true God, and did not seek after him, have, through the gospel, been brought near to him, and he has, in Christ, disclosed himself to those who before were in utter ignorance of him, and made no inquiries for him. The passage is quoted from Is. 65: 1, *נִדְרַשְׁתִּי בְּקִשְׁתִּי לֹא בָקְשׁוּ אֵלַי וְנִמְצָאתִי לֹא בִשְׁאֵלָה*, which the Seventy have translated agreeably to the words of the apostle, but in citing these words Paul has reversed the order of the clauses. The translation is *ad sensum* only; the more literal and exact shade of meaning in the Hebrew, is: *I am sought after* [viz. as an object of religious inquiry and worship], *by those who have not* [hitherto] *asked after me; I am found, by those who did not seek for me.* But as the purpose of the apostle is merely to designate the general idea of the prophet, viz. that God would be worshipped, at some future time, by those who had hitherto been "strangers to the covenant of promise," and "without God in the world," so the version of the Seventy is fully adequate to his purpose.

Thus far the apostle quotes in respect to the reception of the Gentiles. There still remains an important part behind, viz. the rejection of the Jews for their unbelief; or at least their unbelief itself, which implies their consequent rejection.

(21) *Πρὸς δὲ . . . ἀντιλέγοντα, but concerning Israel he saith: All the day long, have I stretched out my hands to a disobedient and gainsaying people.* *Ὀλην τὴν ἡμέραν, בְּלִי-יָדָי, continually, constantly, without intermission;* which implies long and persevering

efforts on the part of God's messengers to the Jews, and peculiar hardness of heart and blindness of mind on their part. *To stretch out the hands*, is to address by way of inviting, beckoning, beseeching, warning; comp. Prov. 1: 24.—*Ἀπειθοῦντα* characterizes *unbelief* in what is said by God's messengers; *ἀντιλέγοντα*, *resistance* or *gainsaying*.

Thus has the apostle shewn once more, and in a way different from that which he took in chap. iv., that the Gentiles stand on an equal footing with the Jews, as to gospel privileges; that God may, in perfect consistency with his ancient promises and declarations, cast off the Jews when they persist in unbelief, and receive believing Gentiles as his people, in their stead. The repulsive nature of this doctrine to the feelings of his proud and self-righteous countrymen, seems to be the reason why the apostle recurs to it so often, and enforces it by such repeated appeals to the Old Testament.

CHAP. XI. 1—36.

The apostle, having thus plainly asserted the rejection of the Jews, and the reception of the Gentiles into their place as the people of God, and this without having yet made particular explanations or limitations, now proceeds to suggest various considerations which might serve to correct the wrong views that his countrymen would probably entertain, in regard to the declarations which he had just made. The Jew would very naturally ask, (as Paul suggests in v. 1): 'Is it true, then, that God has actually cast his people away, to whom pertained the *adoption*, and the *glory*, and the *covenant*, and the *promises*? Can this be consistent with his veracity and his faithfulness—with the numerous promises which he made to Abraham, and which he often confirmed and repeated to his posterity?'

It was natural for a Jew to ask such questions; and the apostle, anticipating them, proceeds in chap. xi. to answer them. He shews, vs. 1—5, that now, as formerly in times of the greatest declension, God has still a remnant among his people, who are true believers, i. e. belong to the spiritual seed of Abraham. But this remnant are, as he has already maintained in chaps. viii. ix., those whom the election of God according to his purposes of grace has made the subjects of his mercy, and who are not saved by their own merits; while the rest are given up to their own hardness of heart and blindness of mind, even as their own Scriptures have expressly foretold, vs. 6—10. Yet it will not always remain thus. The whole of the nation will, at some future day, be brought within the pale of the Christian church. Their present general unbelief is now the occasion of the gospel being preached to the Gentiles, and of the increase of the Christian church among them; so that even their rejection has been the occasion of blessings to others. How much more, then, is to be hoped, from their general return to God! vs. 11—15.

This return must take place. The nation, from its origin, were consecrated to God, and they must yet return to him; for although some of its branches were broken off because of unbelief, and others were grafted in to supply their place, yet in due time they will be again received. The Gentiles, therefore, who have been grafted in, can have no reason to indulge in pride and boasting on account of this. They are cautioned against such a spirit, and exhorted

to guard with the greatest watchfulness against unbelief, since this would occasion them also to be rejected. Nor ought they to demean themselves loftily toward the Jews, who were yet to be received back to the divine favour, and fully restored as the people of God, vs. 16—27. Although they are now enemies of the gospel, good comes to the Gentiles through this; and the promises made to their fathers of old are not forgotten, and will yet be fully carried into execution, vs. 28, 29. They, although now in a state of unbelief, will obtain mercy in the like manner as the Gentiles have obtained it, who were once in the same state, vs. 30, 31. For God had shewed both Gentiles and Jews, that they were included in unbelief, and justly subject to the condemning sentence of the law; and he has suffered them to come into such a state, that he might display, in the more signal manner, his mercy toward them, v. 32. The ways and judgments of God, in his proceedings with Jews and Gentiles, are beyond the reach of human wisdom; they are deep, unfathomable mysteries, which can be fully searched out and known, only by the Infinite Mind. We can admire and adore, but never fathom the depths thereof, vs. 33—36.

At last, then, the apostle comes fully to the conclusion, that there are mysteries in the divine proceedings relative to the reception of some and the rejection of others, which are entirely beyond the reach of human comprehension. God has reserved the reasons of such proceedings to himself, and not disclosed them to his creatures. If this be truly the case, then is there not something more in these awful mysteries, than what those admit or believe, who strenuously reject the doctrine of election? On the ground which they maintain, I do not see why the mind of Paul should be so deeply affected with the *mysterious* and *unsearchable* nature of the whole transaction. This is, indeed, a very obvious remark; but I must leave it to the reader, whether it has not an important bearing on the exegesis of chaps. VIII. IX. XI., and some other parts of this epistle. I can not help thinking that Paul had something more in his mind, than they have who read him in the manner stated—something different, also, from that which they admit.

(1) *Αἴτιον οὖν* the words of an objector; as much as to say: 'If this be true which you affirm, then must it not follow, that God has rejected his chosen people?' *Οὖν* is very common in questions, which have a reference to what had been before said.

Τὸν λαὸν αὐτοῦ, his own people, i. e. his own peculiar people, the Jews. And here the objector means by *λαὸν αὐτοῦ*, the *whole* of the nation, as the sequel, which exhibits the answer, evidently shews.

In reply to the question thus put, Paul answers, that a universal rejection of the Jews was not meant to be affirmed by what he had said. He adduces himself as an exception to such a rejection, and a proof that it was not meant to be asserted by him.—*I am an Israel, &c.*, i. e. a descendant of Israel; *ἐκ σπέρματος Ἀβραάμ*, is only a synonyme with the preceding expression, for the purpose of amplification, or with particular reference to the same phrase which is often repeated in the Old Testament.—*Φυλῆς Βενιαμίν*, so he describes himself in Phil. 3: 5. It is merely a circumstance of particularity in description, which serves to make it more impressive.

(2) *Οὐκ . . . προέγνω*, God hath not cast away his people whom he foreknew, i. e. whom he before determined or decided should be

his people. In other words, he has not utterly rejected the Jewish people, whom he from the first ordained to be his people. See on the word *προέγνω*, in Chap. 8: 29; and compare v. 29 below. To render *προέγνω*, *formerly acknowledged*, does not accord with the design of the passage.

Ἡ οὐκ . . . ἡ γραφή, *know ye not what the Scripture says in Elijah?* i. e. in that part or portion of it which is cited by the name of Elijah, because it contains his history. The division of the Scripture into chapters and verses, is a modern thing; nothing of this kind occurs in the writings of the ancient Fathers. Such a division of the Hebrew Scriptures was made by Hugo de Cardinalis in the twelfth century; and of the New Testament, by the famous printer and editor, Robert Stephens. Of course, reference to the Scriptures in ancient times was in a very different way from that now practised; and was, for the most part, such as we see in the verse before us. So the Rabbies cite, in the Mishna; and so the Greek authors were accustomed to cite Homer; e. g. ἐν τῷ τῶν νεῶν καταλόγῳ, *in the catalogue of the ships*, i. e. the passage which contains such a catalogue, etc.; comp. Mark 12: 26, ἐπὶ τοῦ βάλτου, i. e. in the passage which gives an account of the burning bush.

Ὡς, *when*; so it often signifies. Ἐντυγγάνει . . . κατά, *means to plead against, to make intercession against*; as ἐντυγγάνειν . . . ὑπέρ means, *to intercede for*.

(3) Κύριε . . . μου, cited from 1 K. 19: 10, *ad sensum* and with contractions; also not exactly in the order of the Hebrew text which runs thus: "And he [Elijah] said, I am very jealous for Jehovah, the God of hosts; for the children of Israel have forsaken thy covenant, they have destroyed thine altars, and killed thy prophets; and I only am left, and they seek my life to take it away." The prophet complains, in these words, of what he supposed to be the universal apostasy of Israel. Κατέσκαψαν, *lit. digged down*; for altars were usually made with stones and earth or turf, so that *digging down* characterises the kind of effort necessary to destroy them.—Τὴν ψυχὴν, *natural or animal life*; so, often, in the Hebrew; comp. Matt. 2: 20.

(4) Χρηματισμός, *divine response*, from χρηματίζω, *to do public business, to give public responses*, etc. In the New Testament, it is applied only to the response or warning of the true God. Ἐμμανὴ, *Dativus commodi*, as grammarians say, viz. the person or thing to which any thing is, or is done, is put in the Dative; *for myself* means, for my service.—Ἑπτακισχιλλοὺς ἄνδρας: the number *seven* is probably

employed here in the way of a *round number*, i. e. a definite instead of an indefinite number. So the Romans were wont to use *sexcenti*; and in like manner 70 and 40 are frequently used in the Scripture. So much, however, is to be understood by it here, viz. a very considerable number.

"*Ἐκαμψαν γόνυ*, *bowed the knee*, a part of the religious service rendered to idols. Bowing the knee is the attitude of reverence and supplication. *Τῇ Βάαλ*, with the fem. article *τῇ*; and so also in the Sept., in Hos. 2: 8. Jer. 2: 8. 19: 5. Zeph. 1: 4; also Tobit 1: 5. To solve this singular appearance, (for *Baal* generally has the masc. article), Erasmus, Beza, and Grotius suppose that *ἡ εἰκόων* is understood, so that the full expression would be *τῇ εἰκόωνι Βάαλ*. Others (e. g. Brais, Beyer, C. Schmid) suppose that there was a female deity by the name of Baal, i. e. the moon; like *𐤁𐤏𐤃* and *𐤁𐤏𐤃𐤁* (Jer. 32: 35. 44: 17, 18, 19, 25), which were symbols of the sun and moon. But the objection to this is, that in Jer. 32: 35, *ἡ Βάαλ* (fem.) is the same as *ὁ Μολόχ* (masc.). Others suppose that Baal was *ἀνδρογύνης*, a *hermaphrodite* divinity, and so might take either *ὁ* or *ἡ*; like the Latin *Deus Lunus* and *Dea Luna*; and this seems most probable. Others solve it by supposing the fem. article to be applied in the way of contempt; just as Mohammed (Koran. Sur. LIII.) speaks with contempt of the heathen Arabians, who had gods with fem. names; and so in Arabic, the name of an idol is *اللهة*, *God* (in the fem.); and so the Rabbins call idol gods, *תַּיִתִּים*, *gods* (fem.)

(5) *Οὕτως καὶ . . . γίγονεν*, *in like manner now, even at the present time, there is a remnant according to the election of grace*; i. e. as in ancient times, when it appeared to the prophet Elijah as if apostasy was universal among his countrymen, and yet there were not a few sincere worshippers of the true God, although unknown to him; so at the present time, although the unbelief of the Jews appears to be nearly universal, yet God has a people among them, viz. all such as he has of his mercy chosen to eternal life; comp. 8: 28, seq. 9: 15, 16, 23, 27.—*Λεῖμμα*, *a remnant*, i. e. a small number, a part, which though considerable in itself, is small compared with another part. So here, the number of Jewish believers, although then considerable and important, was small compared with the whole number of unbelievers. Consequently *λεῖμμα* may be used to designate it; comp. 9: 27.—*Κατ' ἐκλογὴν χάριτος*, *according to an election* which is not made on the ground of merit, but of *mercy*. God has not chosen Jewish believers unto salvation, because their obedience first made them

the objects of his choice; but he chose them because he had mercy on them; comp. the texts cited above from Rom. ix., and the commentary on them.

That the apostle means fully to convey such a sentiment, is plain from the verse that follows; viz.

(6) *Εἰ δὲ . . . ἔργων*, but if it be of grace, then it is not at all of works; i. e. if God's ἐκλογή, his choosing this λείμμα to salvation, be gratuitous on his part, and wholly unmerited on the part of man, it follows that it is not ἐξ ἔργων, i. e. that it is not meritorious, it is not on account of any desert on the part of men either seen or foreseen, that he makes them the objects of his mercy.—*Ἐπεὶ ἡ . . . χάρις*, otherwise grace would no longer be grace; i. e. if this were not so, then it would be improper to speak of grace in our salvation; for if men are chosen on account of any merit or desert, then grace is not the ground of their being chosen, but merit; which would contradict the very idea of grace.

This must be true; for men are saved either because they have wholly obeyed the divine law, or on the ground of grace merely; i. e. they are saved either because they are able to advance claims which meet the demands of the law, or else it must be on the ground of pure gratuity. Now as all men have sinned, it is not the *first*; of course it must be the *second*. If you ask: 'May it not be partly by grace, and partly by merit?' Then our text lies directly in the way of an affirmative answer, (as do many others also); and it is, moreover, a conclusive answer in the negative to this, that "every one is cursed, who continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them;" "the soul that sinneth shall die."

Εἰ δὲ . . . ἔργων, but if of works, then it is not at all of grace, otherwise work is no more work; the mere converse of the preceding sentiment, and most probably a gloss from the margin. It is omitted in Codices A. B. C. D. E. F. G. 47, and in the Coptic, Armenian, Aethiopic, Vulgate, and Italic versions; also in Chrysostom, Theodoret, Damascenus, Jerome, and generally in the Latin Fathers. Erasmus, Grotius, Wetstein, Griesbach, Tholuck, Flatt, and others, regard it as spurious. At all events, it adds nothing to the sentiment of the passage; but is merely an echo, in another form, of the preceding sentiment.

(7) *Τὶ οὖν*; what then, i. e. what is the sum and substance of that which I have been saying?—"Ὁ ἐπιζητεῖ . . . ἐπέτυχε, that which Israel sought after, he hath not obtained; i. e. the justification

which he sought to obtain by his own merit (comp. 10: 3), he has not obtained.—*Τοῦτο* is, in many manuscripts and copies, *τούτου* for *ἐπιτιγγάνω* almost always governs the Genitive in Greek, poetry only being excepted, where it sometimes takes the Accusative. Still, the weight of authority, in the present case, is in favour of *τοῦτο* and accordingly Dr. Knapp receives it into the text.

Ἡ δὲ ἐκλογή, but the election, i. e. the elect, the abstract (as grammarians say) being put for the concrete, as is often the case; e. g. Rom. 2: 26, 27 etc. The meaning is: 'Although the Jews, who have sought justification by their own merit, have altogether failed as to obtaining this end; yet those who are called, according to the gracious purpose of God (8: 28), are justified by his mercy through Christ Jesus; they have obtained justification in a way which others rejected, and therefore have not failed in the accomplishment of their object.'

Οἱ δὲ λοιποί, i. e. the unbelieving part of the Jews, those who did not belong to the *ἐκλογή*.—*Ἐπωρώθησαν*, were blinded. The word *πωρός* is equivalent to *τυφλός*: and the verb *πωρόω*, in the active voice, means *to make blind*, in the passive, *to be blind, to become blind*, etc. It is applied, in a secondary sense, to the *mind*; and so the apostle here employs it. It indicates *state* or *condition*; but not necessarily the cause or agent by which that state or condition is produced. Thus *οἱ λοιποὶ ἐπωρώθησαν* may mean merely, that the remainder (the unbelieving part of the Jews) were in a state of blindness. In itself, also, it is capable of designating the idea, that *they were made blind*, by the agency of another; and in this case, if this be the idea, the implication would be, that the agency was God's. If there be difficulty in admitting this sentiment, there is no more than is contained in chap. 9: 17, 18; and I must refer the reader to what is said on those verses, in order to avoid repetition here.—To all those who contend vehemently against such an exegesis, and regard it as dishonourable and reproachful to God, and as utterly unfounded, I can only say: Tell us ingenuously, whether the gloss you put on 9: 17, 18 is not an *explaining away* of the text, rather than an *explanation* of it? Can the conclusion be avoided, by any candid philologist, that the text does there assert, that in some sense or other the agency of God is concerned with the *hardening* of sinners? In what sense? is a very serious and very important question, and one which I have endeavoured there to answer in a Scriptural manner. And in the case now before us, if *ἐπωρώθησαν* merely designates *state*

or *condition*, (as Bretschneider, Wahl, Tholuck, Flatt, and many others maintain), then to what purpose, I would ask, is the quotation in the next three following verses? Do these also designate no *agent*? If you say: 'These are only examples for illustration, but not predictions;' I grant it. But then, how will these examples illustrate the case before the writer, unless they exhibit a *principle* which is the same as that avowed by the writer? And can v. 8 be construed without the supposition that an *agent* is designated, who is, in some way or other, concerned with the ὀφθαλμοὺς τοῦ μὴ βλέπειν, i. e. with the *ποιώσεις* of Israel? This is impossible, unless we do away by violence the most obvious sense of the apostle's words. The question whether *some agency* on the part of God is asserted to be concerned with all this, seems to be one which cannot receive a negative answer, *salvo textu et salvá fide boná*. But the question whether such an agency is concerned, as makes God the *proper author* of men's moral blindness and sins, or whether men are free agents and altogether accountable for their own actions, is a very different one, and about which the Bible leaves us no room to doubt; see James 1: 13, 14.

(8) Καθὼς γέγραπται does not of necessity mean, that what follows is a *prediction*, in the appropriate sense of the word. It is a clear case, that nothing can be decided from the mere *formula* of quotation; for very different formulas precede one and the same text, quoted for one and the same purpose. Here I take the force of καθὼς to fall upon *sameness of principle*, in the two cases which are brought into the comparison; i. e. as in ancient times God declares respecting Israel (Is. 29: 10. Deut. 29: 4), that he gives them the spirit of slumber, blind eyes, and deaf ears; so now, the same thing is true respecting unbelievers among the Jews; for *they are blinded*, ἐπωρώθησαν.

"Ἐδωκεν . . . κατανύξως, *God hath given to them a slumbering spirit*, or *the spirit of deep sleep*, תַּרְדֵּמָה. The original Hebrew runs thus, בְּי נְסָךְ עֲלֵיכֶם הִנֵּה רַחַ תַּרְדֵּמָה, which the Seventy have rendered thus: "Ὅτι πεπότικεν ὑμᾶς Κύριος πνεύματι κατανύξως" but the apostle, in rendering נְסָךְ by ἔδωκε, has translated *ad sensum*, not *ad verbum*. The Hebrew designates the idea of *pouring out*, on the hardened Jews, the spirit of profound sleep; while Paul retains only the generic idea of *communicating* such a spirit to them, dropping the particular image which the Hebrew presents. It is plain, that in this case, as in many others, the apostle makes his own translation *de novo* from the Hebrew.

ὄφθαλμοὺς . . . ἡμέρας, *eyes that see not, and ears that hear not, unto this day.* The original Hebrew in Deut. 29: 4 runs thus: "For Jehovah hath not given you a heart to understand, nor eyes to see, nor ears to hear, unto this day." If this be the passage which Paul had in his mind, he quotes merely *ad sensum*. The Hebrew declares, that 'God has *not* given Israel seeing eyes and hearing ears;' the apostle says, that 'he has given them eyes that see not, and ears that hear not;' the first being in the negative form as to the verb, and affirmative in respect to the rest of the sentence; while the second is in the affirmative form as to the verb, and negative as to the rest of the sentence. It remains, then, in order to make out a quotation *ad sensum*, merely to inquire, whether it is in substance the same thing, to say that 'God has not given seeing eyes and hearing ears,' as it is to say, that 'God has given eyes that see not and ears that hear not.' The latter sounds to our ear, as if it indicated *more active* interposition on the part of God; but not so to the Biblical writers, who, beyond all reasonable doubt, regarded these expressions as equivalent. It would be easy to prove this, from a multitude of passages which assert *agency* on the part of God, when at the very same time the wicked, (to whom this agency has respect), are represented as the cause of their own ruin, by their own voluntary sins. Comp. what is said on chap. 9: 17, 18 above.

Dr. Knapp (in his New Testament), and some other critics, suppose that Paul has quoted ὄφθαλμοὺς κ. τ. λ., from Is. 6: 10, and that ἕως τῆς σήμερον ἡμέρας belongs not to the *quotation*, but are the apostle's own words; and so Dr. Knapp has marked it in his Testament, placing the closing member of the parenthesis which includes the quotation, after μὴ ἀκούειν, thus joining ἕως τῆς σήμερον ἡμέρας with οἱ λοιποὶ ἐπωρώθησαν. But this attributes an idiom to Paul, which he seems to have made a very unfrequent use of. "ἕως τῆς σήμερον ἡμέρας belongs to the Old Testament, to writers who chronicled earlier events and spoke of earlier times, which they occasionally compared with present events and times. Moses could well make use of this expression, in Deut. 29: 4; Paul could use it, for he has once employed it (2 Cor. 3: 15 ἕως σήμερον), where it is exactly the expression which he there needed. But it is difficult to make it probable that these words are his, in Rom. 11: 8.

(9) Καὶ Δαυὶδ λέγει, *David also says*; i. e. nor are these the only passages of Scripture which speak the same sentiment, or develop the same principle. David, your most renowned king, and the

most favourite of all your sacred poets, also utters sentiments still more severe.

Γενηθήτω . . . αὐτοῖς, let their table be a snare to take them, and an occasion of falling, and a recompense to them; i. e. let their season of enjoyment and refreshment, when they expect quietude and pleasure, and feel themselves to be safe, prove to be a season of chastisement and danger, and of righteous retribution. The quotation is from Ps. 69: 23 (22), but not *ad verbum* from either the Hebrew or the Septuagint. The Hebrew, according to its present vowels, runs thus: "Let their table before them be a snare; yea, a gin to those who feel themselves to be secure." The Septuagint (Ps. 68: 22) has *ἡ τράπεζα αὐτῶν ἐνώπιον αὐτῶν εἰς παγίδα, καὶ εἰς ἀνταπόδοσιν, καὶ εἰς σκάνδαλον* so that the apostle has changed the order, and also some of the words (putting *ἀνταπόδομα* for *ἀνταπόδοσιν*), and left out *ἐνώπιον αὐτῶν*. In short, he has plainly made a version of his own, in which he has inserted *εἰς θήραν*, an addition of his own, designed to give the sense of *εἰς παγίδα* for *εἰς θήραν* means, *that they may be taken, or that they may be destroyed*, as this would follow their being taken. As to *εἰς ἀνταπόδομα* (Sept. *εἰς ἀνταπόδοσιν*), it is clear that the apostle and the Seventy read the present Hebrew *מִשְׁכַּחֲשֵׁי*, with different vowels from those now employed, i. e. they read it *מִשְׁכַּחֲשֵׁי* or *מִשְׁכַּחֲשֵׁי*, for a recompense. To this rendering and pointing no good objection can be made, as the Hebrew is clearly capable of it. The present Hebrew conveys a different sense.

Εἰς σκάνδαλον, שְׁכַחֲשֵׁי, for a net or gin. But the Seventy have frequently rendered this word by *σκάνδαλον*, which means any thing whereby another stumbles and falls to his harm. The generic idea of *שְׁכַחֲשֵׁי* is retained in *σκάνδαλον*.

(10) *Σκοτισθήτωσαν . . . σύγκαμψον, let their eyes be darkened so that they cannot see, and their back always be bowed down; i. e. let them be in a defenceless and helpless state, bowed down with troubles and infirmities, and groping in the darkness of affliction.* Instead of *τὸν νοῦτον αὐτῶν διαπαντὸς σύγκαμψον* (Paul and the Septuagint), the Hebrew has *מְהַמְּשֵׁה מְהַמְּשֵׁה מְהַמְּשֵׁה*, *make thou their loins continually to shake.* Here again, the apostle has taken the passage *ad sensum*. This expression, in Hebrew, designates the tossing of the body hither and thither on account of distress. In the like sense is *bowing down the back always* to be taken. It presents the image of one bowed down with anguish of spirit, or of bodily pain.

These repeated instances show, that the apostle was more solicit-

ous about the *general sense* and *object* of the Old Testament passages, than he was about the *costume* or *diction* of them; a principle which he, guided as he was, was not in danger of abusing; one also which may be used to good purpose by us, in sacred criticism, but which needs to be very closely watched in order to guard it against abuse.

As to the general sentiment of this passage, from Ps. 69: 23, 24, it is undoubtedly to be classed with the somewhat numerous passages in the Psalms, which contain the like imprecations. Great difficulty is found by many minds, in such passages, inasmuch as they seem to be so opposed to the tenor of those passages in the New Testament which require us "to love our enemies, to bless those who curse us, to pray for those who despitefully use and persecute us." If indeed these passages in the Psalms are to be viewed as the mere utterance of *private* and *personal* wishes and feelings, it would be utterly impossible to reconcile them with the spirit of the gospel. But is this so? Is David, for example, when he utters such things, to be viewed as doing it merely in the way of giving utterance to his own private personal wishes? It seems to me not; but David, as king and magistrate, might wish the punishment of the seditious and rebellious; nay, it would be an imperious duty on him to punish them. Now was it lawful for him to pray that the same thing might be done, which it was his duty to do? Could he not express desires of this nature, without the spirit of *revenge*? Cannot we wish the robber and the assassin to be apprehended and punished, yea with capital punishment, and this without being actuated by a spirit of vengeance and a thirst for blood? I trust such wishes are not only consistent with benevolence, but prompted by it. If so, then it may be true, that David and other Psalmists had the like views and feelings. And if this *may be* so, is it not probable that it was so? Is not the general character and spirit of their writings a pledge for this?

But I cannot here pursue this subject; which needs more illustration than has yet been given to it. It is enough to say, at present, that the apostle, in making this quotation, need not be supposed to design any thing more, than to produce an instance from the Psalms, where the same *principle* is developed as is contained in the assertions which he had made; i. e. the ancient Scriptures speak of a part of Israel as blind, and deaf, as in deep distress and under heavy punishment because of their unbelief and disobedience. What happened in ancient times, may take place again; it has in fact happened at the present time.

(11) *Λέγω οὖν . . . πέσωσι; I say then, have they stumbled, so as to fall down?* Language of the objector, who inquires with solicitude, whether such passages as Paul has quoted, can be meant to designate the final casting off of the Jews. The occasion for the form of the question *μη̄ ἔπταισαν κ. τ. λ.*, is given by the use of the word *σκάνδαλον* in the quotation above. The design of the objector plainly is, to inquire whether the apostle means to hold forth the doctrine, that Israel is now to be finally and always cast off, on account of their unbelief.—*ἵνα πέσωσι, so that they might fall down, i. e. have the Jews stumbled so that there is no recovery for them, so that they must fall entirely down?* The question being asked by *μη̄*, implies that he who puts it expects an answer in the negative.

Μη̄ γένοιτο, not at all; i. e. you must not understand me as at all maintaining their final and utter rejection and ruin. Fearful as their doom is, there are many circumstances respecting it, which are worthy of the highest consideration. For, in fact, this very lapse of theirs, i. e. their unbelief and rejection of the gospel, has been the direct occasion of its being preached to the Gentiles; comp. Matt. 21: 43. 8: 11, 12. 22: 1—14.—*Παραπτώματι, lapse, offence, stumbling* in a moral sense.—*Σωτηρία, the blessings of the gospel, the salvation which it proffers.*

Εἰς τὸ παραζηλώσαι αὐτούς, to provoke them to jealousy, i. e. to excite the Jews to be jealous, on account of the privileges and favours bestowed on the Gentiles through their belief, and to seek after the same blessings for themselves.

(12) *Εἰ δὲ . . . ἔθνον, now if their lapse has been the riches of the world, and their degradation the riches of the Gentiles.* *Δέ* “*orationi continuandae inservit.*”—*Πλοῦτος κόσμου, if their lapse has been the occasion of spiritual riches to the world, i. e. of spiritual blessings in abundance.*—*Ἡττημα αὐτῶν, their diminution, i. e. their degradation, rejection, punishment, has occasioned abundance of spiritual blessings to the Gentiles.*

Πόσῳ μᾶλλον . . . αὐτῶν, how much more their fulness! *Πλήρωμα* is here the antithesis of *ἥττημα* and of course it signifies restoration to favour, a copiousness of blessings and good things, such as would follow a restoration.

The sentiment of the whole is: ‘If now the degradation and punishment of the Jews for their unbelief, has been the occasion of rich and numerous blessings to the Gentiles; then surely their restoration to favour, their full reception, will redound still more to the spiritual riches of the world.’

Tholuck understands ἡττημα and πλήρωμα in a moral sense, i. e. their depraved and criminal state, and their restored and justified state. I prefer the more simple and obvious construction given above; comp. v. 15, from which it is plain, that ἡττημα here is equivalent to ἀποβολή, *casting off*, and πλήρωμα (the antithesis of ἡττημα) is the same as πρόσληψις, *the reception* to favour.

(13) Ὑμῖν γὰρ . . . ἔθνεσι, *I say this, however, to you Gentiles.* Γὰρ *explicantis*, i. e. here before a clause, which is introduced in order to prevent any misunderstanding or misapplication of what he had just said. The connection seems to be thus: 'When I speak of the πλοῦτος ἔθνων, and in so doing magnify my own office, inasmuch as I am ἀπόστολος ἔθνων, still I do not so speak altogether for your sakes; in doing this I have a design to excite the attention of the Jews to the things of the gospel.' The apostle is very careful, while he fully represents the unbelief and ἀποβολή of the Jews, not to give occasion to boasting or exultation on the part of the Gentiles.

Ἐγὼ ὅσον μὲν . . . δοξάζω, *inasmuch as I am indeed an apostle of the Gentiles, I do honour to my office.* Μὲν *simplex*, as the lexicons say, i. e. standing alone, and without δέ or some equivalent particle following it, as usual. In such a case it answers to the Latin *quidem*, *equidem*, *videlicet*; but oftentimes cannot be rendered at all into English, nor conveniently into Latin. It generally stands, in this way, in a clause of *explanation*, and may be called μὲν *explicantis*; but it also appears plainly to have an *affirmative* force, *auget vim orationis*; which is the case here, and so I have endeavoured to exhibit it in my version of the passage.—Διακονίαν is the *office of the ministry*, i. e. the apostolic office of Paul.—Δοξάζω, *magni aestumo, honoro, honore afficio.*

(14) Εἴπωσ . . . ἐξ αὐτῶν, *so that, if possible, I may excite to jealousy some of my kinsmen after the flesh, and save some of them.* Εἴπωσ, *si fieri potest, si quâ ratione.*—Τὴν σάρκα, *my flesh*, i. e. my relatives, οἱ συγγενεῖς κατὰ σάρκα, comp. Rom. 9: 3. So the Hebrew רַצְּפָ often means; e. g. Gen. 29: 14. Judg. 9: 2. 2 Sam. 5: 1. Gen. 37: 27. Is. 58: 7. The meaning of the apostle, in the whole passage, is: 'I extol the blessings of you Gentiles, not to lift you up with pride, but in order to excite the attention of the Jews to the distinguished favours which you enjoy, and which they have lost by their unbelief.'

(15) Ἐὶ γὰρ . . . ἐκ νεκρῶν; *if now the casting away of them be the reconciliation of the world, what shall the reception of them be,*

but life from the dead? i. e. if the rejection of the Jews on account of their unbelief, has been the occasion of reconciling many of the Gentile world to God, what shall the reception of them back to the divine favour be, but as it were a general [spiritual] resurrection? *Γάρ* marks the *resuming* of what was dropped at v. 12.—*Καταλλαγὴ* is applied to the conciliation of the heathen to God, who by their wicked works had before been *enemies* to him, and *strangers* to the covenant of his promise.—*Κόσμου* here, as often, stands for the heathen Gentile world.—*Πρόσληψις* is *reception to favour*, i. e. admission to the family or church of Christ.

Ζωὴ ἐκ νεκρῶν, some (most of the ancient commentators) have understood *literally*, i. e. the resurrection of the body; meaning thereby, that when the Jews should be brought into the Christian church as a body, the end of time would soon follow. But the time of the reign of Christ on earth, as described in the Apocalypse, and the interval of wickedness that will succeed, seem to forbid this exegesis; it has no *usus loquendi* in its favour, for the proper phrase would be, *ἀνάστασις ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν*. It is true, that we have *ζῶντες ἐκ νεκρῶν* in Rom. 6: 13; but then it is plainly figurative, i. e. it signifies a moral resurrection. I must regard *ζωὴ ἐκ νεκρῶν*, then, as a tropical expression, used in a kind of proverbial way, or as a figure of speech designating something great, wonderful, surprising, like to what a general resurrection of the dead would be. So Turretin: *Quid erit admissio eorum, nisi quoddam genus resurrectionis*; altogether to the purpose. So the Arabians speak proverbially of great agitations and changes, as of a *resurrection*. Tholuck has produced several examples, in his commentary on this passage. But what is more to the point still, is, that in Ezek. 37: 1—14, we have the moral renovation of the Jews designated at full length, by the similitude of a *resurrection*. It seems altogether probable, that the apostle had this passage in his mind; so that *ζωὴ ἐκ νεκρῶν* here is equivalent to saying: 'What shall such a *πρόσληψις* of the Jews be, but a general resurrection of them, such as Ezekiel has described, i. e. a great, general, and wonderful conversion of them to Christianity!'

(16) *Εἰ δὲ . . . ἀρόραμα*, *if, moreover, the first fruits be holy, so shall the mass be.*—*Ἀπαρχή*, like the Hebrew *רֵאשִׁית*, means the *firstling*, or *first fruits* of any kind, which were offered to God. The Hebrews called the *firstlings* of fruit and grain, in their natural state, *רֵאשִׁית בְּכֹרִים*; the *firstlings* of grain, etc., in a *prepared* state, *רֵאשִׁית תְּרוּמָה*. But the particular name given to the firstling

of *dough* or *kneaded meal*, was *קִרְיֹסוֹת רֶאֱשִׁיִּת*, Num. 15: 20, where the Septuagint renders, *ἀπαρχὴ φυράματος* which is the same expression as occurs in the passage before us, *φυράματος* being implied after *ἀπαρχή*. The comparison here lies between the small part of the mass of dough, which was taken as the *תְּרוּמָה רֶאֱשִׁיִּת* and offered up to God, and the greater part or mass of it which was left for the use of him who made the offering. After the *רֶאֱשִׁיִּת* was offered, the whole mass became *sanctified* to lawful use, i. e. was set apart for this purpose, and consecrated to it. In like manner, the apostle would here say, is the whole mass of the Jewish nation yet to be set apart for God and consecrated to him. The *ἀπαρχή* of this nation, i. e. the ancient patriarchs and fathers of it (comp. v. 28), were set apart for God in a peculiar manner; and consequently the *mass* of their descendants are yet to be consecrated to him. The whole is *illustration*, however, rather than argument.

Καὶ εἰ . . . οἱ κλάδοι, and if the root is holy, so are the branches. The same idea is here expressed, as in the former clause. A *root* bears some such proportion to the *branches* of a tree, as the *first fruits* did to the whole *mass* of bread. So here, the root represents the fathers (v. 28), and the *κλάδοι*, their descendants.

The word *ἅγιος* in both cases means, *consecrated to God, devoted to God, set apart for God, or set apart, consecrated*, viz. for the service of God.

But it should be noted, that the apostle does not design to say, that the *θύραμα* and the *κλάδοι* are holy, i. e. that they were so when he was writing. He predicts only that they *will be so*, at some future period.

(17) *Εἰ δὲ . . . ἐξεκλάσθησαν, if now some of the branches were broken off; i. e. if now some of the natural descendants of the ancient fathers have been cast off, because of unbelief (v. 20). Ἄε continuative, jam, German nun.*

Σὺ δὲ . . . ἐγένου, and thou being a wild olive, wert grafted in, in their stead, and made partaker of the root and fatness of the olive. The *ἀργιέλαιος* was often grafted into the fruitful one, when it began to decay, and thus not only brought forth fruit, but caused the decaying olive to revive and flourish. The image which the apostle here employs, is therefore a very vivid one. The Gentiles had been grafted in upon the Jewish Church, and had caused this decayed tree to revive and flourish. But still the apostle means to hold in check any exultation of the Gentiles on account of this. He reminds

them, that after all they are not the *stock*, but only *grafts*; that the root and fatness of the good olive has been transferred to them, only because they have been grafted into it.

All this shows, moreover, that in the apostle's view, there has in reality been but one church; the ancient Jewish one being only the foundation, the Christian one the superstructure and completion of the building; a sentiment which accords throughout with the representations in the epistle to the Hebrews, where only a change in rites and forms is argued, not a change of the spiritual, essential nature of the church.

(18) *Μὴ κατακαυχῶ τῶν κλάδων*, *exult not over the branches*; i. e. exult not that the Jewish branches have been broken off, and that thou hast been engrafted in their stead. *Κατακαυχάομαι* means *to exult* in one's own advantages or pre-eminence, in such a manner as to look down with contempt on others who do not possess them.

Εἰ δὲ κατακαυχᾷσαι . . . σέ, *but if thou dost exult, thou dost not support the root, but the root thee*; i. e. if thou art so inconsiderate and wanting in humility as to exult, there is no ground for such exultation; for after all, the Jewish church is the stock on which the Christian has been engrafted; it is the root from which the tree with its branches has sprung; and as thou art only a *branch*, thou canst not boast as if thou wert the *root*.

(19) *Ἐρεῖς οὖν . . . ἐγκεντρισεῖς*, *thou wilt say, then: The branches were broken off, that I might be grafted in*; i. e. perhaps thou wilt reply: 'There is at least some ground for exultation, because the branches were broken off in order to make room for me to be grafted in; which proves that I was considered as of more importance than the branches.'—*Κλάδοι* has the article *οἱ* in many copies; but A. C. E. 3. 7. 37. 46. 47. 54, Chrysostom, and Damascenus omit it; and so Dr. Knapp.

(20) *Καλῶς . . . ἔστηκας*, *be it so; they were broken off by reason of unbelief, and thou retainest thy standing by faith*; i. e. be it as thou hast said, viz. that the branches were broken off so that thou mightest be grafted in, yet the original ground or moving cause of their being broken off, was the unbelief of the Jews; and thou retainest thy present condition, only on the ground of faith or belief in Christ. Shouldest thou deny him, as the Jews have done, thou wouldest also be broken off in like manner.—*Καλῶς*, *bene*, approves of the sentiment which had been just uttered, in some respect or other, but it does not necessarily approve of it in the full extent in

which the speaker himself might have done. Here *καλῶς* concedes that the branches were broken off, so that the wild olive might be grafted in, i. e. that one object in breaking them off, was to graft in new ones; but it does not concede that the real ground or reason of their being broken off, was for the sake merely of grafting in new ones; for the sequel shews that *ἀπιστία* was the ground of this. While the apostle concedes thus much, however, to the Gentile, he at the same time reminds him, that he retains his present place and standing, on the very same condition as that on which the Jews held theirs, viz. on condition of faith or belief, *σὺ δὲ τῇ πίστει ἕστηκας*. In regard to *ἕστηκας*, the Perfect of *ἵστημι*, it is the only tense which has a *neuter* sense, viz. *to stand*, the other tenses being used actively, viz. *to establish, constitute, set up*, etc.; and consequently the Perfect is used in the sense of all the tenses, that are needed to convey the neuter sense of the active voice.

Μὴ . . . φοβοῦ, *be not high-minded, but fear*; i. e. carry yourself not haughtily as it respects the Jews who have been broken off; or rather, do not think too highly of your elevation to favour, indulge in no airs of superiority on account of this, but demean yourself as a humble believer, and one who has need to be continually on his guard, and to fear lest he may fall through unbelief, and be broken off.

(21) *Εἰ γὰρ . . . φείσεται*, *for if God did not spare the natural branches, then surely he will not spare thee*; i. e. if God did not refrain from rejecting the Jews, when they became unbelievers, then surely he will not refrain from rejecting thee, in the like circumstances; or in other words, if the natural branches were not spared, how shall those which are not the natural ones, find favour?—*Κατὰ φύσιν* means, the branches which naturally belonged to the original stock, i. e. the Jews, the natural descendants of the patriarchs to whom the promises of God were made.

(22) *Ἴδὲ οὖν . . . θεοῦ*, *behold, then, the kindness and the severity of God*; i. e. consider, on the one hand, the distinguished kindness which God has manifested toward thee who believest; and on the other, the strict regard to justice and truth which he exhibits, in the punishment of the unbelieving Jews. So the sequel of the verse; *ἐπὶ μὲν . . . ἐκτροπήσῃ*, *severity toward those who have fallen away*; but *kindness toward thee, provided thou dost maintain a state of integrity*; otherwise thou shalt be cut off. *Ἐὰν ἐπιμείνης τῇ χρηστότητι* may be rendered, *if thou dost continue in a state of favour*; so Tholuck and others; and so in the translation. But we

may attach an *intransitive* sense to *χορησιότητι* for the phrase may be taken as an antithesis of *ἐπιμείνωσι τῇ ἀπιστίᾳ* in the following verse; so that *χορησιότητι* may here designate the state or qualification of the individual concerned, and not the goodness of God toward him. That *χορησιότης* may be used to designate *probity, uprightness*, *ἡρεσῆς*, is plain from the Septuagint Ps. 13: 1, 3 (14: 1, 3). 36: 3. 118: 66' (119: 66).

(23) The present rejection of the unbelieving Jews is by no means final and exclusive. *Καὶ ἐκεῖνοι δὲ . . . αὐτοὺς, but they also, unless they persevere in unbelief, shall be grafted in; for God is able again to graft them in.* That is: 'Inasmuch as *unbelief* was the ground of their rejection, so when they shall abandon this, and become believers, they will be again received to favour; for God is able to bring them back to his favour.' The apostle means to say, that God has not so cast away the Jews, as to shut them out of all access to the kingdom of heaven, or *utterly* to reject them; but that he has left a way open, in which they may return to his favour, and he may receive them again. He speaks here only of what *can* be done; but in v. 24, seq., he speaks of what *will* be done.

(24) That the Jews *will* be again received to favour, the apostle now proceeds to shew. *Εἰ γὰρ . . . καλλιέλιον, for if thou wert cut off from the wild olive which was thy natural state, and wert grafted into the good olive which was contrary to thy nature; i. e. if thou wert introduced into a state of favour with God, from a state of enmity which was in all respects foreign to a state of favour.—Πόσω μᾶλλον . . . ἐλαίᾳ, how much more shall the natural [branches] be grafted into their own olive?* Argumentum a minori ad majus; viz. if God had mercy on Gentiles, who were out-casts from his favour and strangers to the covenant of his promise, shall he not have mercy on the people whom he has always distinguished as being peculiarly his own, by the bestowment of many important privileges and advantages upon them? Comp. Rom. 9: 1—5.

(25) The apostle now proceeds more directly to assert the future reception of the Jews. *Οὐ γὰρ . . . τοῦτο, now I would not have you ignorant, brethren, of this mystery. Γὰρ confirmantis, i. e. prefixed to a clause which is added for the sake of illustration and confirmation.* The form of expression, *I would not have you ignorant*, is a *μείωσις*, i. e. a *negative* form of expression designed to convey a *positive* idea, viz. *I am desirous that you should know.* *Μυστήριον* denotes any thing which is *hidden, concealed, unknown.*

"*ἵνα μὴ . . . φρόνιμοι, lest ye should be wise in your own conceit; i. e. lest you should be puffed up with a view of your own importance, I am going to tell you more plainly still, that you are not the exclusive objects of God's favour. "Ὅτι πώρωσις . . . εἰσέλθῃ, that blindness has come upon Israel in part, until the fulness of the Gentiles shall come in. As to πώρωσις, comp. vs. 8, 10 above; comp. also 1 Thess. 2: 15, 16.—'Ἀπὸ μέρους* is a qualifying expression, which saves the proposition from being a universal one; comp. vs. 1—5 above. Paul means to say, that 'Israel is indeed in part blinded, and will continue so, until,' etc., without designating what proportion of them continues in unbelief. It is a softened mode of expression, or as rhetoricians say, *per charientismum*, i. e. *κατὰ χάριν*.

"*Ἀχρισ οὗ κ. τ. λ.* The *πλήρωμα τῶν ἔθνων* I understand as meaning *great multitudes* or *a great multitude, an abundance*; comp. John 1: 16. Rom. 15: 29. Col. 2: 9. It cannot be denied that *πλήρωμα* sometimes means *fulfilling, completion, completing*, i. q. *πλήρωσις*; e. g. Rom. 13: 10, applied to the *law*; Gal. 4: 4. Eph. 1: 10, applied to *time*. But such a meaning would hardly be a congruous one, in the present instance. The *fulfilling* of a *law*, or of a limited *time*, is an easy and obvious expression, because there is an obvious limit to which the *filling up* or *fulfilling* is to extend; but what is this limit in *πλήρωμα τῶν ἔθνων*? As it would be difficult to answer this question, so it seems altogether more facile and congruous, to take *πλήρωμα* in the sense of *copia, an abundance, great numbers, multitudes*. How great this number or abundance must be, the apostle does not say; much less does he say, (as some have argued), that *all* the Gentiles must first be converted to Christianity, before the Jews can be brought into the pale of the church. The subject must therefore remain, as he has left it, indefinite as to the extent of Gentile conversions before the time when the Jews will return. Of course, Christians are not debarred from hope in labouring and praying for the Jews at the present period; although as yet but comparatively a small part of the Gentiles have been converted to the Christian faith. It is true, even now, that there is *a great multitude* of Gentile converts. May we not hope that the time is near at hand, when there will be a *πλήρωμα* of them?

(26) *Καὶ οὕτω . . . σωθήσεται, and then all Israel shall be saved*; when the *πλήρωμα* of the Gentiles shall have been joined to the Lord, then his ancient covenant people shall also be reclaimed. *Καὶ οὕτω* means, literally, *and so*, i. e. when it shall be so that the *πλήρωμα* of the Gentiles shall be brought in, then, etc. That *καὶ*

οὕτω is used in the same way as καὶ τότε, see Acts 7: 8. 17: 33. 20: 11. 28: 14.—Πᾶς here means *all*, in opposition to the ἀπὸ μέρους of the preceding verse. Whether this means strictly *every individual*, it would be difficult indeed to determine.

Ἡξει ἐκ . . . Ἰακώβ, *a deliverer shall come from Zion, and turn away ungodliness from Jacob.* This is apparently a citation from Is. 59: 20, where the Hebrew runs thus: "A deliverer for Zion shall come, and for those who forsake ungodliness in Jacob." The Septuagint reads ἐνεκεν Σιών, instead of ἐκ Σιών but in other respects it conforms to the quotation of the apostle. We can only say of the apostle's quotation, that it gives the *general sense* of the passage, viz. it conveys the idea, that deliverance for Zion is to be accomplished, and that penitents of the house of Jacob are to be saved. It is a very striking instance of free quotation, as to the *general sense* of a passage, while the *particular costume* of it is disregarded. Whether Isaiah, in 59: 20, had respect to the salvation of gospel times, has been called in question. But the context seems to me very clearly to indicate this. And even if he had respect to temporal deliverance, there can be no difficulty in the apostle's using his words as the vehicle of conveying his own thoughts, with regard to spiritual deliverance.

(27) Καὶ αὕτη . . . διαθήκη, *and this is my covenant with them.* This is generally supposed to come from the next succeeding verse in Isaiah, viz. 59: 21, as it agrees verbatim with the Septuagint there. But here the quotation stops, according to this supposition, and the next succeeding clause, ὅταν ἀγέλωμαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας αὐτῶν, is taken from Is. 27: 9, where the words stand in the midst of a verse, which has relation to the punishment of the Jews, and their consequent moral reformation. I should, therefore, prefer the supposition, that the apostle here quotes and abridges Jer. 31: 33, 34, (the same passage which is quoted at length in Heb. 8: 8—12). There the words αὕτη ἡ διαθήκη μου occur in v. 33; and in v. 34, Jehovah is represented as saying: ἰλιως ἔσομαι ταῖς ἀδικίαις αὐτῶν, καὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν αὐτῶν οὐ μνησθῶ ἔτι: so that nothing is easier, than to suppose that the apostle quotes *ad sensum* these last passages, when he says ἀγέλωμαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας αὐτῶν. There is this advantage also in this last supposition, viz. that the whole passage in Jeremiah most evidently refers to a new dispensation, to gospel-times; which would be altogether appropriate to the apostle's purpose, for the very point he is labouring to establish, is, that there will be a general conversion of the Jews to the Christian religion.

(28) While the apostle admits that the Jews, the once beloved people of God, have now become alienated and his enemies, he still maintains that this evil, exceedingly great in itself, has been overruled for the accomplishment of very important purposes, in respect to the salvation of the Gentiles. *Κατὰ μὲν . . . ὑμᾶς, in respect to the gospel, they have become enemies on your account*; i. e. they have become ἐχθροὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, have apostatized from him, or have been rejected by him, and are no longer treated as his friends. That θεοῦ is implied after ἐχθροί, (and not εὐαγγελίου, nor μου as Theodoret, Luther, Grotius, Cameron, Baumgarten, and others, have supposed), is clear by comparing with ἐχθροί its antithesis ἀγαπητοί for in respect to this latter word, it is clear that θεοῦ is implied after it. It follows, therefore, that the ellipsis to ἐχθροί must be supplied in the same way.

Δι' ὑμᾶς, on your account, i. e. to your advantage. In other words, the rejection of the gospel by the Jews, has been the occasion of its being more widely diffused among the Gentiles; so that, in this respect, the loss of the Jews has been the gain of the Gentiles.

Κατὰ δὲ . . . πατέρας, but in respect to the election, they are beloved for their fathers' sake; i. e. in so far as God chooses men to salvation *κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν αὐτοῦ* (8: 28), and without being moved thereto by any merit on their part (11: 5, 6), he will have special regard to the Jews, because of the many and precious promises which he made to their fathers. How Tholuck can find here only an *election to external privileges*, I am unable to see. Is the question, then, which the apostle is here discussing, one which concerns the *external privileges* of Christianity merely; or does it go deep to the very foundation of the whole, viz. to the *spiritual* blessings of the gospel? It does seem to me impossible to doubt here what the answer must be, unless one is led to do so, by other considerations than those of simple exegesis.

The apostle appears plainly to aver, that although God has mercy on whom he will have mercy (9: 18); and although men do not become the heirs of eternal life by any merits of their own, but merely by the good pleasure of his grace (11: 5, 6); yet in bestowing that grace, he may have regard to his promises made in ancient days to the distinguished patriarchs of the Jewish nation; he may have regard to his original design that the seed of Abraham by faith, and the seed which also were lineally descended from him, should be "as the stars of heaven for multitude." That salvation is *entirely* of free

grace, and not of merit, of course leaves it open for the sovereign Lord of all to choose the objects of his mercy where and when he pleases. That he always does this with good and adequate reason, yea the best of reasons, his own infinite wisdom and goodness are a sure and perfect pledge. But that men are always acquainted with these reasons, or that he has revealed them, is not asserted, and is not capable of being proved.

(29) God will not disappoint the hopes which he has excited, nor violate the promises which he has made. The blessings which he promised to bestow, and the calling of Abraham's posterity to be his spiritual seed, will surely not fail. *Ἀμεταμέλητα . . . θεοῦ*, for the gifts and calling of God, he will not repent of; lit. are not the subjects of repentance. The meaning is, that God will never repent of the promises which he made to the fathers, and therefore never change his purpose in regard to the bestowment of spiritual blessings upon their offspring.

Here again Tholuck construes *κλησις* of the external calling of the Jews; the fear of *gratia irresistibilis* urging him to the adoption of this sentiment. But the reader is desired merely to turn back and compare 8: 28—30 with this whole passage, and also vs. 5—7 above. No other answer need be given to the objection against the sense here maintained. Above all, when one compares the sequel, vs. 30—36, with vs. 28, 29, can he constrain himself to believe, that external privileges only are here the subject of the apostle's discussion? Could these excite in him such wonder, admiration, and gratitude, as he evidently expresses in vs. 33—36? And is this the obtaining of mercy, of which v. 30 speaks? Let every unprejudiced reader examine and judge!

(30) *Ὡσπερ γὰρ . . . ἀπειθεία*, but as you were formerly disobedient to God, but have now obtained mercy through their unbelief. This refers to the former heathenish and unbelieving state of the Gentiles, and to the fact that the gospel was preached to them and they became believers, in consequence of the Jews having rejected it, in the sense before explained. *Τὰρ* introduces a clause added for the sake of confirmation.

(31) *Οὕτω καὶ . . . ἐλεήθωσι*, so also they have now become disobedient, [yet] so that they also may become the subjects of mercy, through the mercy shewn to you. Here are two cases presented, parallel in some respects, but differing in others. (1) The Jews reject the gospel, and occasion its being preached to the Gentiles, who thus

become believers. (2) The Gentiles, by the blessings bestowed on them in consequence of their faith, provoke the Jews to jealousy, and occasion their seeking to be restored to their former place as the people of God; comp. vs. 13, 14. The parallelism consists in this, viz. that each party occasions the blessings of salvation to come to the other, i. e. each is (*ἀφορμετικῶς*) the cause of salvation to the other. The difference is, that the Jews give occasion to this, by their *unbelief*; but the Gentiles by their *belief*, which provokes the Jews to jealousy and leads them to seek after the privileges of the gospel. May the time speedily come, when the example of Christians will have a better tendency to excite such a jealousy among the Jews, than it has ever yet done!

The position of *ἵνα* here is somewhat peculiar. We should naturally expect to find it before *τῷ ὑμετέρῳ*; but there are examples of its standing *after* the first words that begin a sentence; comp. 1 Cor. 9: 15. 2 Cor. 2: 4. Gal. 2: 10. Eph. 3: 18.

(32) *Συνέκλεισε . . . ἐλεήσῃ*, for God hath given up all to unbelief, so that he might have mercy on all; i. e. God hath left both Jew and Gentile to fall into unbelief or disobedience, in order that the true nature of sin might fully appear, and that he might thus magnify the riches of his grace, in pardoning multiplied and aggravated transgressions; comp. Rom. 5: 20, 21, where the very same sentiment is developed.

The fathers, in speaking of this subject, compare sin to a fever, which, before it reaches a certain height, does not so develope itself that the physician applies its appropriate remedy. They also compare it to a tree, which is permitted to grow up to full height and to spread forth all its branches and leaves, before it is felled. So when sin had reached its acme, the Redeemer appeared and struck the mortal blow.

In regard to *συνέκλεισε*, it seems to be the best illustrated by a reference to the Hebrew *הִסְגִּיר לְ, הִסְגִּיר אֵל, הִסְגִּיר בְּיַד*, all of which (from *סָגַר*) mean, *to deliver over to, to give up to the power of*. — *Ἰὰς explicantis*, i. e. added to a clause which is designed to illustrate the subject under consideration.—The whole verse, and also chap. 5: 20, 21, seems plainly to teach, that God had a special purpose to answer, in giving man over to the power or dominion of sin and unbelief, viz. to expose the “exceeding sinfulness of sin,” and to magnify the riches of his pardoning mercy.

But if any are not satisfied with the sense here given to the word

συνέκλεισε, and insist that it is to be taken in a *more active* sense, they may compare it with Rom. 5: 20, and also with 9: 18. It may be understood here, in the same sense as σκληρούνει in 9: 18. I see no more objection to the one than to the other. But such a sense of συνέκλεισε does not seem to be necessary here.

(33) Here then, to say the least, is some deep and mysterious proceeding on the part of God, which the human mind cannot fathom, and which it should only wonder at and adore. Ὡς Βάθος . . . θεοῦ, *O the boundless goodness and wisdom and knowledge of God!* Πλούτου means *riches*, when literally understood. But a reference to v. 12 shews, that the apostle had in his mind the *abundant blessings* of the gospel bestowed on the Gentiles, when he chose this term; comp. Eph. 3: 8. 2 Cor. 8: 2.—Σοφίας, the *wisdom* of God, viz. the wisdom displayed in thus making the unbelief of the Jews subservient to the purpose of bringing salvation to the Gentiles, in thus educing good out of evil; and also in finally bringing the Jews back to their filial relation, through the mercy granted to the Gentiles; important ends, which no human foresight or wisdom could have accomplished.—Γνώσεως, boundless *knowledge*; for what less than omniscience could foresee the effects to be thus produced, the good effects that would flow from present and apparent evil? What human or angelic foresight could divine, that such consequences would follow from such means?

Tholuck refers the whole simply to *divine compassion*, and says that 'the words are *contra decretum absolutum* of Augustine.' This may be true, if Augustine meant what Tholuck supposes he did—*fatality*. But did he mean this? This excellent critic seems to find frequent matter of difficulty in the assertions of Paul here; so strongly is he exercised with the fear of the *decretum absolutum* of Augustine and Calvin.

Ὡς . . . ὁδοὶ αὐτοῦ, *how unsearchable are his proceedings, and his ways past finding out!* Understanding all this as of course having a reference to the preceding declarations of the apostle, we must interpret it as meaning: 'How entirely above our comprehension, that God should accomplish such ends by such means,' viz. the salvation of the Gentiles in such a way, and then that of the Jews!—Κοιμᾶτα seems plainly to mean, like the Hebrew עֲשֵׂה, *ordinance, arrangement, proceeding*; or rather *decision, counsel, determination*. Here it is for substance a synonyme with ὁδοί, which evidently has the like sense. The word ὁδοί, which literally means *way* or *track* that one makes in going, gives occasion to the adjective ἀνεξ-

εργίαστοι, whose footsteps cannot be traced, i. e. unsearchable, non vestigandae.

What can be plainer, now, than that the declaration in v. 32 gives the immediate occasion to the exclamation in v. 33? But if this be so, then *συνέκλεισε* serves to excite the apostle's feelings, as well as *ἐλεήση*. Tholuck admits only the latter.

(34) *Τὴς γὰρ . . . ἐγένετο, for who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been his counsellor? Γὰρ explicantis, i. e. placed before a clause added in order to confirm his assertion, that the ways of God are unsearchable. The verse is a quotation from Is. 40: 13, ad sensum, and nearly in the words of the Seventy. The object is, to challenge the wisdom of created beings, calling on them to shew, if there be any such case, wherein any of them has contributed any thing to enlighten or to guide the divine counsels. The question implies strong negation.*

(35) *Ἡ τίς . . . ἀντιῶ, or who hath first given him any thing, so that he must receive retribution? The sentiment of this verse may be found in the Hebrew of Job 41: 3 (11), מִי הִתְקַדְדִּי מִנִּי וְאַשְׁמֵם, who hath done me any service, that I may recompense him. This the apostle has changed to the third person, instead of the first, so as to make it congruous with the preceding quotation. The Septuagint "abit in omnia alia" here; so that the apostle (if indeed he here quotes at all, which seems somewhat doubtful), has given a new version to the Hebrew.*

This latter quotation (if it be one), is designed by the apostle to have a bearing on all *claims* to the divine favour, which can be preferred on the score of desert or of services rendered to God. How prone the Jews were to betake themselves to their own merits, and to rely on self-righteousness, every reader of the New Testament must know. The sentence before us is designed to repress this spirit; for it is as much as strongly to affirm, that no one can make any just claims upon God for his favour, as no one by his services has laid him under any obligation. The Nominative to *ἀντιποδοθήσεται* is *ἀντίο* understood, which would refer to *τί* implied after the preceding *προέδωκε*.

(36) On the contrary, instead of creatures laying God under any obligation to them, God is all and in all, i. e. he is the source of all being and blessing, by him all things come into existence and are sustained and governed, and for him, for his glory and honour, they "are and were created."—*Ὅτι ἐξ . . . πάντα, for of him, and by*

him, and for him are all things.—*Ἐξ αὐτοῦ*, of him, i. e. he is the original source, the eternal fountain whence all the streams of existence take their rise.—*Δι' αὐτόν*, he is not only the *original* source, but the *intermediate* cause of all things. It is the exertion of his power, that brings them into being, and preserves, directs, and controls them.—*Ἐἰς αὐτόν*, for him, for his honour, praise, glory; he is the sovereign Lord and possessor of all, and all exist because he wills it, and exist for the accomplishment of purposes which the Maker of all has in view. The sentence seems equivalent to saying: "God is the beginning, continuance, and end of all things."

Such is the conclusion of the *doctrinal* part of our epistle; a powerful expression of profound wonder, reverence, and adoration, in regard to the unsearchable ways of God in his dealings with men; and an assertion of the highest intensity, respecting his sovereign right to control all things so as to accomplish his own designs, inasmuch as all spring from him, "live and move and have their being in him," and are for his glory. A doctrine truly humbling to the proud and towering hopes and claims of self-justifying men; a stumbling-block to haughty Jews, and foolishness to unhumiliated Greeks. I scarcely know of any thing in the whole Bible, which strikes deeper at the root of human pride than vs. 33—36. But what emphasis there can be in these, if the apostle is discoursing merely on the *external* privileges of men, and maintaining that these only were bestowed by pure grace, I am unable to see. Every man on earth has merely to open his eyes on things around him, in order to see that distinctions of a temporal nature are coextensive with the human race. Does he need the long argument of the apostle, and the strenuous efforts he has made, in order to be satisfied of this? But when we come to the great question: Are distinctions of a *spiritual* nature made, which are eternal in their consequences; and made too according to the good pleasure of God, without any merit on the part of men? it is then we find ourselves to need all the argument and reasoning and authority of the apostle, to bring us submissively to bow, and to contemplate the whole subject (as he does) with wonder and adoration. It is then, that God's claims to be considered the GREAT ALL IN ALL, must be advanced in such a way, that "the loftiness of man may be bowed down, and the haughtiness of man laid low, and Jehovah alone be exalted."

I appeal now to all readers and critics, who, like Tholuck, refer all that is said in vs. 33—36 to the mere *goodness* and *compassion* of God, as manifested in the gospel, whether there is any congruity in the passage thus considered. Nothing can be more certain, than that vs. 34—36 do assert, in the most high and unequivocal manner, the independence of God on his creatures, and his sovereign power and right over

them. This will not be questioned. But why such an assertion here, at the close of the argumentative part of the epistle, the very climax of the whole? Is it necessary to make the deepest possible impression of divine independence and sovereign right, in order to convince us that God can exercise his *goodness* and *compassion*? I repeat it—I cannot see the *congruity* of such reasoning or rhetoric. Let those who adopt such exegesis look to this; mine is not the task to defend it.

On the other hand; if God has, for reasons not disclosed to us, and therefore in the way of what we call *the exercise of divine sovereignty*, rejected for a time the Jewish nation, and brought in the Gentiles; and if God in his own due time, shall also again bring the Jewish nation into his church; and all this in such a way as entirely exceeds our comprehension, and which of course we are altogether unable to explain; then we may exclaim, with the wondering apostle, *O the depth!* Then we may find overwhelming reason to believe, that *God is all in all*, that he is the beginning, middle, and end of all things, and that “for his glory they are and were created.” We can sympathize, therefore, while cherishing such views, with all which the apostle has here said, and find abundant reason to cherish sentiments such as he has avowed.

But to prevent all mistake here, I repeat, before I close this subject, what I have once and again expressed in the preceding pages, viz. that *sovereignty* in God, does not imply what is *arbitrary*, nor that he does any thing without the *best of reasons*. It only implies, that *those reasons are unknown to us*. While clouds and darkness are truly about him, in respect to our vision, justice and judgment are the habitation of his throne for ever. It is impossible, even for a moment, to doubt that this must be so. Infinite wisdom and goodness can never act at all without reason, nor without the very best reason. God has no possible temptation to act arbitrarily or wrongly; it cannot profit him. His creatures cannot abridge his happiness. Of course, it would be the extreme of folly to suppose, that because God acts in a way which is mysterious, he acts in an arbitrary or oppressive manner. Is he under obligation to disclose all the grounds of his proceedings to us? Enough he has disclosed, to satisfy us that he is wise and good. May there not be something left, to exercise our filial confidence, and to give us (what does indeed well become us) a deep sense of our humble and imperfect condition? Shall we prescribe to God the terms of our moral discipline? If not, then let us be content, when his mysterious ways press upon our minds and we feel straitened and in darkness, to say with the apostle: *Ὡ βλάθος πλοῦτου καὶ σοφίας καὶ γνώσεως Θεοῦ!* And if our hearts are ever tempted to rise up against the distinctions which God has made, either in a temporal or spiritual respect, in the bestowment of his favours, let us bow them down to the dust, as well as silence and satisfy them, with the humbling, consoling, animating, glorious truth, that ‘of God, and through him, and for him, are all things!’ To him, then, be the glory for ever and ever! Amen.

CHAP. XII. 1—21.

The apostle having thus concluded what may be called the *doctrinal* part of his epistle, now proceeds to the *hortatory* and *practical* part; which contains precepts both general and particular, that were specially adapted to those whom he was addressing, and the spirit of which is applicable to all times and nations. The very solemn and earnest manner in which he inculcates the practical maxims that follow, shews how deeply he felt the importance of uniting Christian doctrine and duty; yea, how necessarily the true reception of the former must lead to the latter. He begins with urging Christians to make an entire consecration of themselves to God, vs. 1, 2; he urges upon his readers humility, although they possess the special gifts of the Spirit; inasmuch as all the diversities of such gifts are possessed by those who are only parts of the spiritual body to which all Christians belong, vs. 3—5; he enjoins upon each to make a wise and diligent improvement of the special gift or office bestowed on him, vs. 6—8; and then gives, in the remainder of the chapter, a most striking and admirable series of Christian precepts; of which no equal, and no tolerable parallel, can be found in all the writings of the heathen world.

(1) Παρακαλῶ οὖν . . . θεοῦ, *I intreat you, then, by the tender mercies of God*, i. e. such being the case as I have now stated, such being the love and compassion exhibited toward sinners, and such the provision made for them, I entreat you on account of the tender mercies, etc. Οὖν has reference to all that precedes, and intimates that the writer is making a general deduction from it,—Οἰκτιρωῶν, in the plural, is an imitation of the Hebrew רַחֲמֵיךָ which has no singular. It means *kindness, benignity, compassion*, etc. Διὰ, *by, on account of*; comp. Rom. 15: 30. 1 Cor. 1: 10. 2 Cor. 10: 1.

Παραστῆσαι . . . ὑμῶν, *to present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God, which is your rational service*. Παραστῆσαι is common in classic Greek, and is employed to designate the action of bringing and presenting to the divinity, a sacrifice of any kind.—Σώματα ὑμῶν, *your bodies*, i. e. yourselves. The word σώματα, appears to be used, because it makes the nature of the representation or comparison more appropriate; for the *bodies* of animals are offered in sacrifice.—Θυσίαν ζῶσαν, *a living sacrifice*, in distinction from that of beasts which were slain. The meaning is, that the living active powers of their bodies were to be continually offered or devoted to God; or, in other words, they were to offer a *living*, enduring, lasting sacrifice, not a sacrifice once for all by self-immolation. But possibly the reference may be to the custom of the Levitical law, which forbade the offering to God what was accidentally killed. The animal must be brought alive to the altar, and slain there. But I prefer the former exegesis.

Ἁγίαν, *holy*, i. e. תְּמִימָה, *integer, without blemish, or defect*; for

no other kind of sacrifice could be *ἀγία*, i. e. consecrated to God.—*Εὐάρεστον τῷ θεῷ* is an epexegetis of the preceding *ἀγία*.—*Τὴν λογικὴν λατρείαν ὑμῶν*, *your rational service*, viz. your spiritual offering or service, or that which is mental or belongs to reason (*λόγος*), in distinction from an *external service* or *λατρεία σαρκική*, such as the Jews offered and relied on for salvation. I have rendered it *rational*, i. e. pertaining to the *reason* or *understanding*, because the word *reasonable* (as we now use it) does not necessarily convey the same idea.

(2) *Καὶ μὴ . . . νοὺς ὑμῶν*, *and be not conformed to this world, but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind*. The Codices A. D. E. F. G. and many Codd. MSS., read *συσχηματίζεσθαι* and *μεταμορφοῦσθαι*, in the Infinitive; which would imply *παρακαλοῖ* before them. The sense would be the same, in such a case, as the Imperative of the text before us makes.—*Τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ*, *the present world*, i. e. *הַיָּמִין הַזֵּה*, according to the latter usage of the word *הַיָּמִין* among the Jews. The classic sense of *αἰών* never coincides with this. See *Exegetical Essays* on *αἰών*, *αἰώνιος*, etc., § 5. By *not conforming to the world*, the apostle means, not adopting its sinful customs and practices, whether of an external or internal nature.

Ἀλλὰ μεταμορφοῦσθε, i. e. put on another form, person; exchange the *μορφή* of the world for that of Christianity. Do this *ἀνακαινῶσει τοῦ νοὸς ὑμῶν*, *by the renewing of your mind*, i. e. by renovating the *νοῦς παλαιός*, by exchanging it for a *νοῦς καινός*, such as the gospel inspires. In other words: ‘Cherish no more a spirit devoted to the world, and sinfully conforming to it; cultivate a new and different spirit, one devoted to God, one which will love and practice what is good and pleasing to God.’

Εἰς τὸ δοκιμάξεν . . . τέλειον, *that ye may learn what the will of God is, that which is good and acceptable and perfect*. *Δοκιμάζω* means (among other things), *to explore, to investigate, to search out, ἡρεσῆ*; and this for the purpose of learning or knowing. The apostle means to say, that a *renewed mind* is essential to a successful inquiry after practical and experimental Christian truth, in its whole extent. “If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God.”

Τὸ ἀγαθόν κ. τ. λ., I regard not as adjectives agreeing with *θέλημα*, but as nouns, formed in the usual way, viz. by prefixing the article to the neuter gender of the adjective; for *τό* is of course impli-

ed before εὐάρεστον and τέλειον. So Flatt and Tholuck.—Εὐάρεστον means, *acceptable* to God, τῷ θεῷ being implied. Τέλειον, that which is wanting in nothing, which has no defect, *integrum*.

The whole verse, therefore, is an exhortation to spiritual-mindedness, in order that Christians may attain to a full knowledge of what their holy religion demands.

(3) Γὰρ here makes a transition to additional matter, designed further to explain and confirm the general precepts just given; “*narrationi uberiori inservit.*” Διὰ τῆς χάριτος, *by virtue of the* [apostolic] *office* bestowed on me; comp. Rom. 1: 5. 15: 15. Eph. 3: 2, 8.—Ἐν ὑμῖν, *among you*; so ἐν frequently means, in such a connection.

Μη . . . φρονεῖν, lit. *not to over-estimate himself beyond what he ought to estimate.* Παρά is often used in such a sense, in *comparative* declarations; e. g. Luke 13: 2. 3: 13. Rom. 14: 5. Heb. 1: 9. 1: 4. 3: 3.—Ἀλλὰ . . . σωφρονεῖν, lit. *but to estimate so as to act soberly*, i. e. to think modestly, prudently, in a rational way, of himself, not being puffed up with his own attainments and gifts; the same as σωφρόνως φρονεῖν. The *paronomasia* in φρονεῖν and σωφρονεῖν can hardly escape the reader's notice.

Ἐκάστῳ ὡς . . . πίστεως, *according to the measure of faith which God hath imparted to him*; i. e. according to the measure of Christian belief and knowledge, which God has imparted. In other words: ‘Let each one estimate his gifts, by the principles which the gospel has revealed.’ But Flatt and Tholuck understand πίστις here as equivalent to χάρισμα, i. e. πίστις = τὸ πεπιστευμένον, *quod creditum est, donum*; for which I can find no adequate and satisfactory proof or example. Nor can I perceive that the meaning which this exegesis would give to the passage, is a probable one. The apostle is not exhorting men to prize their gifts according to the diverse nature of them, (which must be his meaning, if Flatt and Tholuck have rightly explained him); but he is exhorting all, whatever may be their gifts, to demean themselves modestly and humbly. All belong to *one body*, and no invidious distinctions are to be made. Consequently it is more congruous to explain μέτρον πίστεως, as indicating the measure of Christian belief, faith, i. e. of Christian knowledge which is the object of faith.

(4) To shew that no one has any reason to set up himself as superior to others, the apostle now introduces the admirable comparison of the *body of Christ*, i. e. the church, with the human body. There are various members of the latter; and they are designed for different

uses. But all belong to one and the same body; and each performs its own proper functions for the good of the whole. So ought it to be in the Christian church.—Προᾶξιν, *use, opus, negotium, office.*

(5) Οὕτως . . . μένη, *so we, being many, are one body in Christ, and are each members of others*; i. e. there is but one church, one spiritual body, of which Christ is the head. To this we all belong. In this respect there is no preëminence.—Καθεῖς for καθ' ἓνα, properly a solecism; see also John 8: 9. Mark 14: 19. 3 Macc. 5: 34, and ἀνὰ εἷς Rev. 21: 21.

(6) Ἔχοντες . . . διάφορα, *and possessing gifts which are diverse, according to the grace bestowed upon us*; i. e. we, who are many in number, and yet one body in Christ, possess gifts which are diverse, according to the diversity of the operations of the Spirit, who bestows different gifts on different persons. Ἔχοντες agrees with ἡμεῖς understood, and is a continuation of the preceding sentence.

Ἐἴτε προφητείαν, *whether prophecy*, i. e. εἴτε [ἔχομεν or ἔχοντες] προφητείαν, the ellipsis of ἔχομεν or ἔχοντες being quite plain. Προφητείαν here evidently means, χάριον προφητείας, i. e. *the office or gift of prophecy*, the prophetic office; which explanation, moreover, is rendered certain by the sequel. But why is προφητεία a public or a private office? And in either case, what were its appropriate duties?

To answer this question philologically, as well as by the analogy of the Scriptures, it is necessary to resort, in the first place, to the classic use of the word. Προφήτης, among the Greeks, generally signified an *interpreter of the will of the gods, an interpreter of those who were priests of the gods, etc.* The essence of the definition is the idea of being an *interpreter, one who explains or declares*, viz. what was before dark, or not understood, or not known. So the Greeks could say, προφήτης θεοῦ—ἰεροῦ—μάντεως—Μουσῶν, κ. τ. λ. Sometimes (but more rarely) προφήτης means, *one who himself foretells, one who predicts, etc.*; and it is then equivalent to the Greek μάντις. But in general, it differs from μάντις, inasmuch as the latter means a person who is himself under the divine *afflatus*, in such a manner as to be bereaved of his own consciousness and reason, and merely to utter (as an instrument) what the inspiring divinity causes him to utter. This, which the μάντις himself is not supposed to understand, and can not explain, it was the office of the προφήτης to interpret. Plato derives μάντις from μαινομαι, *to rave, to be out of one's senses*; and this shews the peculiar meaning of μάντις, in dis-

inction from *προφήτης*, which usually designates only such persons as are in possession of their reason.

Προφήτης, in the New Testament, corresponds well with the Hebrew *נָבִי*, which means *an interpreter of the divine will generally*, and specially one who by divine inspiration foretells future events. Of this latter sense, which all admit, it is unnecessary to give any examples; but as to the former, the reader may consult for *נָבִי*, Judg. 6: 8. 2 Sam. 7: 2. Ex. 7: 1, where Aaron is said to be a *נָבִי* to Moses, i. e. the interpreter to the people of the plans and designs of Moses, (comp. Exod. 4: 16. Jer. 15: 19). Deut. 18: 18. For the like sense of *προφήτης* in the New Testament, comp. Matt. 5: 12. 10: 41. 11: 9. 13: 17. John 7: 52. Acts 7: 48, 52. Rev. 10: 7. 11: 10, 18. 18: 24, 20. Comp. also the verb *προφητεύω* in Rev. 10: 11. 11: 3. Luke 1: 67. Acts 2: 17, 18. 19: 6. 21: 9. 1 Cor. 11: 4, 5. 13: 9. 14: 1, 3, 4, 5, 24, 31, 39; and with these texts compare Joel 2: 28. Num. 11: 25, 27. 1 Sam. 10: 5, 6, 10—13. 19: 20—24.

From all these passages it is put beyond a doubt, that *to prophesy* means, not merely *to predict*, (which is rather the predominant signification of the word), but also *to preach* (as we say), *to warn*, *to threaten*, *to utter devotional sentiment*, *to utter praise*; in short, to speak any thing by divine inspiration or afflatus. *Προφητείαν* in our text, therefore, does not of course refer to *those who predicted*; it may have another meaning. More probable is it, indeed it is almost certain, that here it has a more general sense, referring to those who publicly uttered any thing by special divine aid or inspiration, which had respect to the subject of religion.

Such, then, were *προφῆται* in the Christian church, i. e. men endowed with a supernatural gift in regard to addressing the people, either for the purposes of instruction or of devotion. The apostle directs them to perform the duties of their office, *κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως*, *according to the proportion of faith*, or *according to the analogy of faith*. According to the first method of translating it, the sense would be: 'Let the prophets speak only as they have *faith* to do it;' i. e. let them not go beyond the faith imparted to them. *Faith* here must mean, *that which is the object of their belief*, i. e. what is given to them in an extraordinary manner as the object of their belief. The apostle means then to say: 'Let not the prophets exceed what is entrusted to them. Let them keep within the bounds of their reason and consciousness, and not, like the heathen *μάντεις*, rave, or speak they know not what.' Compare 1 Cor. 14: 32, where the fact

is made clear, that Paul considered the prophets as conscious, rational, voluntary, accountable agents, while in the exercise of their gifts. And as to the solemn and conscientious discharge of the duty of a prophet, comp. Jer. 23: 25—40. Ezek. 2: 6—8. 3: 17—21.

In this manner Chrysostom, Theodoret, Oecumenius, Pelagius, Calvin, Flatt, Tholuck, and many others, have understood the phrase under examination.

At the same time, as ἀναλογίαν may signify *analogy, agreement*, (for so it means in the classics), the sense here may be: 'Prophesy in such a manner, that what you say will accord with the doctrine of faith, viz. with that which the Scripture contains.' The former sense is the most congruous here, and therefore the most probable.

It is obvious, that the elliptical construction reigns through this whole paragraph. Here we must understand προφητεύωμεν before κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν.

(7) Ἐἴτε διακονίαν, i. e. εἴτε [ἐχόμεν] διακονίαν. Διάκονος, in a general sense, means *a servant, a waiter* of any one. But as the office of a servant is elevated by the station of his master and the duties which the servant has to perform, so the word is far from being always employed in a degrading sense; nay, it is sometimes (like the Hebrew כַּהֵן) used in a most honourable sense, as *servant of God, servant of Christ, servant (minister) of the gospel*, etc. In the passage before us, διακονία probably refers to the *official duty* of the διάκονοι in the Christian church, to whom was committed the care of alms for the poor, of providing for the sick, of preparing conveniences for public worship, etc., and generally, of watching over and taking care of the *external* matters of the church. In the primitive age of the church this office was very simple, having reference only to the *alms* of the church. So the verb διακονέω very often means, *to supply one with food, to make ready or provide food* for any one, e. g. Matt. 4: 11. Mark 1: 13. Luke 10: 40. 12: 37. 17: 8. John 12: 2; comp. Acts vi. But in subsequent ages, the office was extended to all the external and merely temporal relations of the church. So in the Jewish synagogue, the ἡγούμενος, *inspector, overseer*, corresponded to διάκονος.

Ἐν τῇ διακονίᾳ, i. e. ὄμμεν or ἔστω like ἐν ταῦτοις ἴσθι, 1 Tim. 4: 15, i. e. *sit totus in illis*, let him be wholly devoted to his ministration or service, let him be deeply engaged to perform its duties with fidelity and zeal.

Ἐἴτε ὁ διδάσκων. Here the construction is varied, although

there appears no special reason for it in the nature of the sentence. We should expect *είτε διδασκαλίαν* here, i. e. the Accusative case of the abstract noun; but in its stead, we have a participial noun in the Nominative. Of course, *ἦ (sit)* is understood here after *ὁ διδάσκων*. — *Ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ*, i. e. *ἔστω* as before.

That the office of *teacher* is here distinguished from *προφήτης* on the one hand, and from *παρακαλῶν* on the other, is plain. But in what this distinction consisted, it would be a difficult matter to tell. In regard to the first distinction, it would seem that *προφήτης* indicated *one who taught by inspiration*, and only so far as inspiration prompted and enabled him to teach. It was an office created and sustained by a miraculous gift. But *διδάσκαλος* appears to have been an ordinary stated teacher, one who was so by official station, and who taught according to the degree of religious knowledge which he possessed.

(8) *Ἔτις ὁ παρακαλῶν*, i. e. *ὁ παρακαλῶν ἦ*. — *Ἐν τῇ παρακλήσει*, i. e. *ἔστω* as before. But what is *παρακαλῶν*? The verb *παρακαλέω* means, *to warn, to console*. *Παρακαλῶν*, then, would seem to indicate *an exhorter*, i. e. one who urged to practical duties, who dwelt upon the threatenings and promises of the gospel, and so aided and completed the work which the *διδάσκαλος* had begun.

How long the distinction was kept up in the church, which is here intimated, I know not. But in the original settlement of the churches in New England, many of them had two ministers, a *διδάσκαλος* and a *παρακαλῶν*, as here explained. It was believed, at that time, that these distinct offices were intended to be perpetual in the church. But why consistency would not of course lead to the maintenance of all the other offices here named, it would be difficult to say.

Ὁ μεταδιδούς, sc. *ἦ*, *he who is a distributor*, i. e. he who distributes the charities of the church, or of individuals in it. — *Ἐν ἀπλότητι*, i. e. with a simple or single regard to the good of those for whom the charity was bestowed, without any selfish or sinister purposes of his own.

But in what respect *ὁ μεταδιδούς* differed from the *διάκονος*, above mentioned, we are now unable to ascertain with precision. That there was a difference, is plain from the manner in which the whole of this paragraph is constructed. May it not have been, that the *διάκονος* was the *general overseer*, the collector and provider of alms; while the *ὁ μεταδιδούς*, was the *actual distributor* of them

among the needy? This seems quite probable, from the nature of the case, and from the fact that here are two distinct offices, both having a relation to the same class of duties.

Ὁ προϊστάμενος, ἐν σπουδῇ, let him who presides, do it with diligent attention. A question may indeed be raised here, whether ὁ προϊστάμενος means an office in the church, or only a person to whom the care of some duty or business is committed. The verb προϊστημι sometimes means, to attend with care and diligence to any thing, q. d. to stand over it, as we say in English. So in Tit. 3: 8, καλῶν ἔργων προϊστασθαι means, to be diligent in performing good works. But as ὁ προϊστάμενος stands connected with a series of other words which express some official duty, most interpreters have been inclined to construe it here as having respect to office. It seems plainly to be used in 1 Thess. 5: 12, to designate one who holds the office of a teacher; and in 1 Tim. 5: 19, it also seems to designate one who holds the office of ruling or governing in the church, as well as teaching. The context of this latter passage has been regarded, indeed, by most commentators, as shewing that there were some προϊστάμενοι, who held the double office of teacher and governor or ruler in the church; although, as some of them suppose, these offices would seem more usually to have been separate. In like manner, Justin Martyr speaks of a προεστὼς τῶν ἀδελφῶν, who (it appears) is the presbyter of the church, Apolog. I. c. 67.

In 1 Cor. 12: 28, is another account of Paul concerning the offices in the church existing at Corinth; from which it appears that there were reckoned in that church the following orders of offices and gifts: ἀπόστολοι, προφηταί, διδάσκαλοι, δυνάμεις, χαρίσματα ἰαμάτων, ἀντιλήψεις, κυβερνήσεις, γένη γλωσσῶν, διερμηνεύται· quite a different reckoning from that in our text, and yet the object of it is the very same as in Rom. 12: 8, viz. to shew Christians that the same Spirit has bestowed gifts and offices of different and various kinds, but that inasmuch as he is the author of all, and they who possess them all belong to one and the same body, so there should be no boasting or pride indulged on account of them, but every one who possesses them should exercise his own gift in the best manner he can, for the edification of the whole.

It must be obvious, that the κυβερνήσεις here mentioned, seems to accord with the προϊστάμενος in the text; but whether it accords with the same word in 1 Thess. 5: 12. 1 Tim. 5: 17, seems more doubtful. From a comparison of the whole together, it appears equally clear that

the office itself of a *προϊστάμενος*, as designated here (and in 1 Cor. 12: 28 by *κυβερνήσεις*), was one of the lowest in the church. It is ranked the *seventh*, in 1 Cor. 12: 28; and the *sixth*, in Rom. 12: 8. In 1 Tim. 5: 17 and 1 Thess. 5: 12, it is represented as entitled to *special* honour, when it is united with the person of a *teacher* or *preacher*.

‘*Ὁ ἐλεῶν ἐν ἰλαρότητι*, *he who shews compassion*, [let him do it] *with cheerfulness*; comp. 2 Cor. 9: 7.

I have, in the above paragraphs, given the reader the *usual* exegesis of the passage in question, viz. ὁ μεταδιδούς, ἐν ἀπλότητι ὁ προϊστάμενος, ἐν σπουδῇ ὁ ἐλεῶν, ἐν ἰλαρότητι. But an attentive and repeated examination of it has raised doubts in my own mind, whether there is not a radical mistake at the foundation of this whole interpretation. I refer not now to the *verbal* criticisms merely; which, it is obvious, are in general well founded and correct. But I refer to the assumption, in this case, that ὁ μεταδιδούς, ὁ προϊστάμενος, and ὁ ἐλεῶν, designate *officers* or *offices* in the church; I mean *officers* in the usual and proper sense of the word, viz. men set apart by the special designation and appointment of the church for the performance of some peculiar and appropriate duties. I have a predominant persuasion, that these words here designate duties which *individuals merely as such* were to perform, and to whom the church looked for such performance, because they had ability or opportunity to perform them, or (if it shall be thought more probable) who were specially desired by the church to perform them. In this last case it might be true, for example, that to an individual in the church who was wealthy, the church looked in a peculiar manner with expectation that he would aid the poor; or (to adduce another example) it might happen that some individual had leisure, and also particular qualifications, for visiting the sick, consoling mourners, counselling the perplexed, relieving the distressed by various personal attentions, etc., and the church looked to him as a ὁ ἐλεῶν, or they made a special request of him that he would attend to such duties. All this might be, nay, it is all very natural and probable; while, at the same time, this would not prove that there were regularly instituted *offices* in the church, designated by ὁ μεταδιδούς, ὁ προϊστάμενος, and ὁ ἐλεῶν.

These hints give the general views which I feel compelled to entertain of the words under examination. But as the whole subject has an important bearing on the polity of the Christian church, I feel obliged to assign reasons for such an opinion.

(1) It is obvious that the apostle does not here confine himself to *extraordinary* and *miraculous gifts* only, although he includes them. The *προφήτης* was one who spoke under the influence of inspiration; but ὁ διδάσκων and ὁ παρακαλῶν might or might not be inspired; for the office itself was of a permanent or general nature, and not limited to special circumstances. So the *διάκονος* might or might not be an inspired man; for Stephen (Acts VI. VII.) was “full of the Holy Ghost,” while we have no particular reason to believe that all of his brethren in office were endowed with the same gift. The same is true

of ὁ μεταδιδούς, ὁ προϊστάμενος, and ὁ ἐλεῶν for the respective individuals who performed the duties designated by these words, might, at times, enjoy special divine assistance and direction. But this belongs not essentially to the nature of the duties themselves, which may in general be performed without miraculous interposition.

(2) It is equally obvious, that the apostle, in the whole extent of his exhortation here, includes both public and private, official and unofficial duties. A bare inspection of vs. 6—21 sets this question at rest. He means to say, that inasmuch as all Christians are members of one and the same body, all their gifts and talents, of whatever kind or nature, whether adapted to the performance of public or private duties, whether they are aided by the special influence of the Spirit or otherwise—all were to be employed in the most efficient and profitable manner. Such is the evident tenor of his whole discourse. Who, for example, would seek in vs. 9, 10, seq., for directions only to men in official stations? There is no reasonable question, therefore, respecting the *general principle* which I have here laid down, in regard to the whole paragraph which contains the apostle's exhortation. But *where* does he dismiss the address to the *officers* of the church as such, and begin with individuals or laymen? This is the very gist of the question; and in order to throw some light on this, I observe,

(3) That the very construction and natural order of vs. 6—8, favour the supposition, that the last three classes of men named are *private*, not *official* persons.

In respect to the *natural order* of the passage, it would seem to be an obvious dictate of propriety, that the apostle should begin first with the officers of the church: and this he has plainly done; for we have προφήτης, διάκονος, διδάσκαλος, ὁ παρακαλῶν, before he proceeds to the rest. Now if, after παρακαλῶν, he proceeds to *unofficial* men (as I suppose), then it would be perfectly natural to select from among these, those who were particularly distinguished in the church for their usefulness; and so he seems to have done.

(4) It is difficult, if not impossible, to make out *official* distinctions through the whole of vs. 6—8. How does ὁ μεταδιδούς, as an *officer of the church*, differ from ὁ διάκονος? And again; how does ὁ ἐλεῶν differ from both, or from either? A question which none of the commentators have answered with any good degree of satisfaction. Indeed, most of them pass the difficulty over with entire silence; which is at least the most easy, if not the most instructive, method of commentary. Here then, according to them, are two supplementary offices to that of διάκονος, the main, and originally the only, duty of which was, *to take care of the poor*.

But further; who is ὁ προϊστάμενος? He who *presides* over the church? If so, how can he be placed the *sixth* in rank here, and the *seventh* in 1 Cor. 12: 28? (See κυβερνήσεις there). Then again, why should ὁ προϊστάμενος not have a place among the *teachers*, instead of being placed where it has, on the right and left hand, an office of mere *charity*? Does the *presiding* officer of a whole church ever rank in this way, in times either ancient or modern? I know of no such ex-

ample. Is not ὁ προϊστάμενος a *teacher*, in 1 Thess. 5: 12, and in 1 Tim. 5: 17?

I am aware, indeed, that the apostle has not strictly followed the order of office here, as to dignity or rank, inasmuch as he has mentioned the *deacon* before the *teacher* or *exhorter*. But there is an apparent reason for this. In speaking to the *official* classes of the Romish church, the highest and lowest office, viz. that of *prophet* and *deacon*, i. e. the *two extremes* of office occurred first; which is a very natural method of thought. These the apostle wrote down as they occurred. He then supplied the intermediate offices, viz. that of *teacher* and *exhorter*, i. e. the proper *doctrinal* instructor, whether in public or private, and *exhorter* or practical and persuasive preacher. This will account very naturally for the order of officers *here*. But in 1 Cor. 12: 28, the apostle *ex professo* recounts the natural order *seriatim*; which he makes to be, 1. Apostles. 2. Prophets. 3. Teachers. 4. Such as possessed miraculous powers in general (δυνάμεις). 5. Such as possessed the gift of healing the sick. 6. Ἀντιλήψεις. 7. Κυβερνήσεις. 8. Those who spoke various languages. 9. Interpreters (comp. v. 30).

Here then, the ὁ μεταδιδούς, ὁ προϊστάμενος, and ὁ ἐλεῶν of our text, are omitted, (unless indeed the ὁ προϊστάμενος is found in the κυβερνήσεις, of which more hereafter), and ἀντιλήψεις comes in for ὁ διάκονος. So Bretschneider on ἀντιλήψεις; “*haud dubie ad munus diaconorum et diaconissarum respicitur, ut etiam patres eccles. putarunt.*” That this last declaration is correct, one may see by consulting Suicer’s *Thesaurus*, sub. voc. ἀντιλήψεις. Vitringa thinks that ἀντιλήψεις means, *the interpreters of foreign languages* (comp. 1 Cor. 12: 30, διεγμενέουσι), *De Vet. Synag.* II. 31. p. 509. But the other exegesis is most natural; for ἀντιλήψεις means, *help, assistance, care*; and here the *abstract* (as grammarians say) being used for the *concrete*, the sense is *curatores*, i. e. δίακονοι.

It is obvious, now, that in this noted passage in 1 Cor. 12: 28, ὁ μεταδιδούς and ὁ ἐλεῶν are omitted; and this gives very strong reason to suspect, that these were not properly *offices* in the church.

But how is it with ὁ προϊστάμενος? Is he not found in the κυβερνήσεις of 1 Cor. 12: 28? This looks probable at first view; but let us examine a little more thoroughly.

First, I remark, that the word προϊστήμι and its derivates are by no means confined to designate the idea of *presiding over persons*. It sometimes conveys the idea of being placed over any *thing*, or any kind of *business*, in order to take care of it, see that it is done, etc.; i. e. the *undertaker* in any thing, the *protector* or *curator* of any person or thing, the Greeks call ὁ προϊστάμενος, ὁ προστάτης, ὁ προϊστάτης, i. q. *patron, helper*. Accordingly the word occurs in the sense of *aiding, assisting*, etc. in Rom. 16: 2, where the brethren of the Roman church are charged by the apostle to *aid*, in any manner she may need, Phebe, who had been a *προστάτις* of many Christians, i. e. a *helper, a curator*, one who had aided them by her personal attention and by her charity. The grammarian Varinus explains προστασία by βοήθεια. In the letter of Athanasius *ad Solitarios*, when speaking of the disposition of Ze-

nobia to aid Paul of Samosata, he says: *προΐστη τοῦ Σαμοσατέως, she aided him of Samosata.* So Theophylact, commenting on Rom. 12: 8, says: *Προΐστασθαι ἔστι τὸ βοηθεῖν, καὶ διὰ ῥήματων καὶ διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ τῷ βοηθείας δεομένῳ, i. e. προΐστασθαι means, TO AID, both by words and by personal services, him who is needy.*

That such a meaning then *may be given to ὁ προΐστάμενος* in Rom. 12: 8, seems clear. The *usus loquendi* allows it. What then does the context demand? Let us see what precedes, and what follows.

What precedes is, *ὁ μεταδιδούς, ἐν ἀπλότητι* which I now render, *let him who imparts* [charity], *do it with liberality.* So beyond all doubt, the words may be rendered. That *ἀπλότης* may mean *liberality*, one may see in 2 Cor. 8: 2, 9: 11, 13. James 1: 5. So Zenophon: *ἀπλουστάτου δέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι κ. τ. λ., it seems to me to be the part of a most liberal man, etc.,* Cyrop. VIII. p. 155. So Josephus, speaking of Araunah's liberal offer to David (2 Sam. 24: 19—24), says: David highly esteemed his *ἀπλότητι, liberality, etc.,* Antiq. VII. 10. So in Test. XII. Patriach, p. 624: *ὁ Θεὸς συνεργεῖ τῇ ἀπλότητί μου, God helped my liberal disposition.* See other examples in Kyrke in loc. As to *ὁ μεταδιδούς*, which is commonly applied to one who *distributes* charity, and so made for substance synonymous with *διάκονος*, it is very doubtful, to say the least, whether the word will bear this construction. Bretschneider has indeed given it such a meaning, (as others before him have often done); but, as Vitranga long ago observed (De Vet. Synag. II. 3. p. 501), "the proper Greek word for *distribute* is *διαδιδομι*." as one may see in John 6: 11. Luke 18: 22, (also in 11: 22 it has the like sense). Acts 4: 35. The like sense this verb has in the classics. But *μεταδιδομι* properly means, *to impart among others what belongs to one's self, to give of one's own to others*; which is, or at any rate may be, a very different thing from *distributing* the alms of the church.

If these words be rightly explained, we have in them a command of the apostle, that those who are able *μεταδιδόναι, to give in charity*, should do this *in a liberal manner.* That all this is congruous and appropriate, I presume no one will venture to deny.

We have seen what *precedes ὁ προΐστάμενος.* Let us now see what *follows* it. This is *ὁ ἐλεῶν, ἐν ἰλαρότητι, let him who performs deeds of mercy, do it cheerfully, i. e. let him go about this task with a willing mind, voluntarily, not grudgingly and with a forbidding demeanour.* The duty of *ὁ ἐλεῶν* may differ from that of *ὁ μεταδιδούς*, in this respect, viz., that the former consisted in personal cares and services bestowed upon the sick, and unfortunate; while the latter consisted in donations of money, food, etc. These latter duties devolved especially on the *rich*; the former could be performed by all classes of Christians.

Between these two classes of *benefactors*, then, the apostle places *ὁ προΐστάμενος.* If these classes, now, are not *officers* of the church, it would seem probable that *ὁ προΐστάμενος* does not here stand for one. That *ὁ ἐλεῶν* cannot be made to mean an *officer* of the church, the silence of most commentators concerning it would seem pretty strongly to indicate. Accordingly, Vitranga does not hesitate to say: *Quicquid enim adversae opinionis auctores statuunt, fieri non potest, ut per τὸν ἐλεῶντα describantur aliqui ecclesiae officiarū* [officers].

It does seem most probable, therefore, that δ *προϊστάμενος*, is of the like tenor with η *προστάτις* in Rom. 16: 2, which there means, *one who receives and entertains strangers*, i. e. a helper of Christian brethren coming from abroad; for such a helper (*προστάτις*) was Phebe. And this seems the more probable, inasmuch as the duty of *hospitality*, so often and so urgently insisted on by the apostles, has no specific mention among the special charities here, unless it be included in this word; although it is touched on, as it respects the church in general, in v. 13. But a comparison with Rom. 16: 2, as I must think, renders the sense now given to δ *προϊστάμενος*, quite probable.

But Tholuck and others appeal to *κυβερνήσεις* in 1 Cor. 12: 28, and say, that as *κυβερνήσεις* means there a special gift or office bestowed by the influence of the Spirit, so δ *προϊστάμενος* must be considered as corresponding with it. But what is *κυβερνήσεις*? A question difficult to be answered, inasmuch as this word in 1 Cor. 12: 28 is a *ἄπαξ λεγόμενον*. In classic Greek it means *guidance, direction, steering*; and is especially (as also the verb *κυβερνάω*) applied to designate the *steering* or *guiding* of a ship by the pilot. Hence many critics understand it here (1 Cor. 12: 28), as designating the *office* of a ruler in the church. But how can such an office be placed the *seventh* in rank, (for the apostle here seems to make an enumeration according to the order of precedence), and have but one or two offices reckoned below it? This seems to be exceedingly incongruous. The *governor* and *guide* of a Christian church would seem, in the order of nature, to stand at its *head*.

I ask, in the next place, how it should happen, that *κυβερνήσεις* stands here in such a position, having in order before it *ἀντιλήψεις, opitulatores, curatores*, (i. q. *διάκονοι*), and after it *γένη γλωσσῶν*? Why does it not stand next before or after *προφήτις* or *διδασκάλους*, where we should almost of necessity expect to find it, if it mean *presidents* or *governors* of the church?

Moved by such difficulties, I feel constrained to seek another than a *classical* meaning for *κυβερνήσεις*. But as, in the New Test., the word is not elsewhere to be found, we must resort to the Septuagint; and here the word is *uniformly* employed, as the rendering of the Hebrew כִּוְנָה , *skilful dexterity, wise foresight, power of prudent or skilful management*. In this very sense *κυβερνήσεις* is plainly employed in Prov. 1: 5. 11: 14. 24: 6, *μετὰ κυβερνήσεως γίνεται πόλεμος*: and these are all the instances in which the word occurs in the Septuagint. In accordance with this meaning is the Lex. Cyrilli: *κυβερνήσεις, φρόνησεις*. So the Glossae ineditae in Prov. Salom.: *κυβερνήσεις, ἐπιστήμη τῶν πραττομένων*. So also Hesychius: *κυβερνήσεις, προνοητικαὶ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ φρονήσεις, considerate knowledge and understanding*.

In view of all this, we may now venture to translate *κυβερνήσεις, skilful discernment or insight*. But in what respect? To answer this, we must let the apostle explain himself. Let us go back, then, to 1 Cor. 12: 8—10, and there we shall find nearly if not quite the same reckoning of spiritual gifts as in vs. 28—30. But there, before *γένη γλωσσῶν*, stands *διακρίσεις τῶν πνευμάτων* which does not at all appear in vs. 28—30, unless it be designated by *κυβερνήσεις*. That it should not in fact be in-

cluded in this latter passage, distinguished as such a gift must be, and important as it was in the then state of the church, would be singular. Now as in 1 Cor. 12: 28, *γένη γλωσσῶν* comes immediately after *κυβερνήσεις*, and in v. 10 immediately after *διακρίσεις πνευμάτων*, so it is natural to conclude, that the apostle means to designate the same thing by *κυβερνήσεις* as he does by *διακρίσεις πνευμάτων*. For as *peculiar skill* and *insight* would be appropriate and necessary to the *discerning of spirits*, so the qualifications for such a duty may be used to designate the persons who are to perform it. Philology allows this; but above all, the order, concinnity, and consistency of the apostle's discourse here, seem to render it necessary, or at least quite probable. This being conceded, it would follow that no argument from *κυβερνήσεις* can be adduced, in order to show that *ὁ προϊστάμενος* in Rom. 12: 8 means a ruler in the Christian church.

I am the more satisfied with this view of the subject, as I find it was fully embraced by Lightfoot and Vitringa, "quos [in re criticâ] facile principes nominarem." See Vitringa, De Vet. Synag. II. 3. p. 507, seq.

It remains only that I notice one objection more, to the meaning which I have assigned to *ὁ προϊστάμενος*. This is, that in 1 Thess. 5: 12 and 1 Tim. 3: 4, 12, it means *governors, overseers* of the church; and consequently that this is the most probable meaning in Rom. 12: 8.

On this allegation I must be very brief, as I have already put the patience of the reader to a trial. In 1 Thess. 5: 12, the apostle says to the church: 'Affectionately regard *τοὺς κοπιῶντας ἐν ὑμῖν, καὶ προϊστάμενους ὑμῶν ἐν κυρίῳ, καὶ δουλοῦντας ὑμᾶς*. The question is, whether he means here *different classes* of officers; or *one and the same class*, in the exercise of divers gifts. I know of no way in which this question can be definitely and certainly decided. The insertion of the article before *κοπιῶντας* (the *first* participial noun in the series), and the omission of it before the other like nouns *προϊσταμένους* and *δουλοῦντας*, will not prove, as has sometimes been assumed, that all belong to one class; nor will it prove the contrary; for (1) The article is usually *omitted*, even where the meaning of the nouns employed is plainly diverse, provided they are of the same gender and case; e. g. Mark 15: 1, *μετὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων καὶ γραμματέων* (the latter without *τῶν*); and so Col. 2: 8, 19. 2 Thess. 3: 2. Rom. 1: 20. Phil. 2: 17, et saepe alibi; see Winer's N. Test. Gramm. § 18: 3—5. (2) The article is often *inserted*, where each noun indicates a separate subject; e. g. Mark 2: 16, *οἱ γραμματεῖς καὶ οἱ φαρισαῖοι*: so Luke 8: 24. 11: 39. 1 Thess. 3: 11. Phil. 3: 10, et alibi saepe; comp. Winer ut. sup. Of course, as usage is both ways, the *omission* of the article here can prove nothing. Nor,

(2) Will the context enable us to decide the point under consideration; as there seems to be nothing in it which has a direct bearing on this point. We are left, therefore, to the simple nature of the case. What can be gathered from this? I answer, (a) That *τοὺς κοπιῶντας* is evidently a *generic* (not a *specific*) term, and may indicate any kind of labour performed in behalf of the church. (b) The words *προϊσταμένους* and *δουλοῦντας* appear to be *specific* here, i. e. to designate particular (and probably different) classes of persons. The most probable

interpretation then is, that *προϊστάμενους* and *ρουθροτοῦντας* designate the *specific* classes, comprehended under the genus *κοπιῶντας*. This being admitted, (and certainly no one will say this is an improbable exegesis), it would seem altogether probable, that *προϊστάμενους* here has the like sense as in Rom. 12: 8, viz. those who applied themselves to the *external* temporal business or concerns of the church, while *ρουθροτοῦντας* designates all the various kinds of teachers. The exhortation of the apostle then is, to regard with kindly feelings, those who laboured in any respect, whether temporal or spiritual, for the good of the church. This determines nothing, therefore, against our interpretation of *ὁ προϊστάμενος* in Rom. 12: 8.

From what has now been said, it is easy to explain 1 Tim. 5: 17, "Let the elders *καλῶς προσετώτες*, *managing well* [the concerns of the church], be accounted worthy of double honour [i. e. of ample maintenance], specially those who labour in word and doctrine." There were then two kinds of elders, or (to speak more accurately) there were two departments in which the *πρεσβύτεροι* might labour; they might be *προσετώτες*, i. e. *standing over, taking care of, serving* the temporal concerns and business, etc., of the church; or they might be specially devoted to preaching and teaching, *λόγῳ καὶ διδασκαλίᾳ*: or perhaps this latter means, that they might perform the duties of a *προσετώτης*, and also teach and preach in addition to this. That the government of the church, in the ordinary sense of *presiding over* and *making rules for* the church, is not here meant, at least that it is not necessarily meant, seems to me quite plain, from comparing *προΐστημι* and its derivatives in other places. E. g. in this same epistle, 3: 13, deacons are spoken of who *τέκνων καλῶς προϊστάμενοι καὶ τῶν ἰδίων οἰκῶν*, *manage their own children and households well*, i. e. take good care of them; for so v. 13 explains it, *οἱ γὰρ καλῶς διακονήσαντες = καλῶς προϊστάμενοι*. I cannot refrain from adding, that this last passage throws great light on what has been before said about *ὁ προϊστάμενος*, and serves very much to confirm it.

So then, *προϊστάμενοι* and *προσετώτες* may mean, the performers of any service or services which pertain to the *external* welfare and management of the church. That the *πρεσβύτεροι* sometimes did such services, is clear from 1 Tim. 5: 17. But that others might perform them, is equally clear from Rom. 12: 8. 1 Cor. 12: 28. Rom. 16: 2, etc.

We can now account for it, that the apostle says, in Rom 12: 8, 'Let *ὁ προϊστάμενος* do his duty *ἐν σπουδῇ*, *with diligence*, i. e. with active, watchful attention and effort.' But how *ἐν σπουδῇ* can be applied to *ruling*, in the common sense of this word, has been a difficulty which has perplexed not a few, who have undertaken to expound this passage. We might exhort a *ruler* to perform the duties of his office with *impartiality*, with a due regard to *justice* and *equity*, etc.; but to exhort him *to govern ἐν σπουδῇ*, seems hardly congruous.

On the whole, I am brought by a kind of philological necessity to the conclusion, that church *offices*, in the appropriate sense of this word, are not designated by *ὁ μεταδιδούς*, *ὁ προϊστάμενος*, and *ὁ ἐλεῶν* in Rom. 12: 8, but that the apostle refers to individuals in the church, conspicuous for their attention to the duties respectively indicated by these words;

which duties were, the giving of money or sustenance, the management of the external temporal affairs and business and interests of the church, and the succouring of the sick and unfortunate by personal attention and effort.

(9) Ἡ ἀγάπη, ἀνυπόκριτος, *let benevolence be sincere*. I render ἀγάπη *benevolence* here, because it seems to indicate *kind feeling* toward men in general. *The love of the brethren* is specified in v. 10. The apostle here enjoins on Christians, to cherish a sincere and real, and not merely a pretended and apparent, feeling of kindness toward all men.

Ἀποστρυφῶντες, i. e. ἔστε, which would make the Imper.; and this the nature of the case evidently demands. So κολλώμενοι, sc. ἔστε. In the connection in which τὸ πονηρόν and τῷ ἀγαθῷ here stand, the meaning is limited to *malice* and *kindness*. So πονηρόν means, even in the classics, *malicious, mischievous*; and ἀγαθός is the converse of this, *kind, benevolent*. These two phrases, therefore, are merely an epegesis of ἀγάπη in the preceding clause.

(10) Τῷ φιλαδελφίᾳ, εἰς ἀλλήλους φιλόστοργοι, *in respect to brotherly love, kindly affectionate one toward another*. Τῷ φιλαδελφίᾳ is the *Dative of relation*; i. e. in connection with adjectives or verbs, the Dative is used where the question arises, *wherein, or in respect to what?* which for convenience' sake may be called *the Dative of relation*. So often in the New Testament; e. g. νωθροὶ ταῖς ἀκοαῖς, Heb. 5: 11; ἀγνοούμενος τῷ προσώπῳ, Gal. 1: 22; so Matt. 11: 29. Heb. 12: 3. Eph. 4: 18, et saepe alibi. Φιλόστοργοι means *affectionate*, in such a manner as one is toward his own near relatives; στοργή meaning *natural affection*.

Τῷ τιμῇ, ἀλλήλους προηγούμενοι, *in respect to honour, anticipating each other*; i. e. let each one, in paying the proper tribute of respect to others, strive to anticipate his Christian brother. Προηγέομαι means, *to take the lead, to go before, to set the example*. The meaning is, that so far from being averse to pay that respect which is due to others, each should strive to excel the other in the performance of this duty. Christianity, therefore, is so far from banishing all civility and good manners from society, that it enjoins the greatest attention to this subject.

(11) Τῷ σπουδῇ, μὴ ὀκνηροί, *as to diligence, not remiss*. Τῷ σπουδῇ is evidently the same *Dative of relation* as before. Σπουδῇ here seems to be taken in the *general* sense; and so the passage accords with Ecc. 9: 10: "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it

with thy might." So the next phrase explains the whole expression, by presenting the antithesis of it, viz. τῷ πνεύματι ζέοντες, *ferventes animo, warmly engaged* (as we say), *fervid, active in serious earnest*; comp. Acts 18: 25, where the same expression is used to designate the fervid spirit of Apollos.—Some apply τῷ πνεύματι here to the Divine Spirit; but I think without any good reason.

Τῷ κυρίῳ δουλεύοντες, (which Griesbach reads τῷ καιρῷ δουλεύοντες), is supported by the more important testimony of external witnesses. Griesbach has rejected it on the ground, that 'the less usual reading is to be preferred;' a ground which, to say the least, has many slippery places. Knapp, Morus, Bengel, and Beza, preserve κυρίῳ, and I think with good reason. I take the whole expression to mean, that all our *diligence* is to be consecrated to God, to be made subservient to the cause of Christ. That κυρίῳ here means *the Lord Christ*, the *usus loquendi* of Paul leaves no good room to doubt. Inasmuch as δουλεύω governs the Dative, we need not insist here on the *Dative of relation*. But in fact, all of the Datives in this whole paragraph are of this nature; so that exactly rendered it would be, *as to the Lord, obedient, engaged in his service*.

(12) Τῇ ἐλπίδι, χαίροντες, *as to hope, joyful*; i. e. rejoicing in the blessed hope of glory which the gospel inspires; and this, amid all the troubles and sorrows of life.—Τῇ θλίψει, ὑπομένοντες, *as to affliction, patiently enduring*; i. e. since you are animated with a joyful hope, you may well be called upon to endure the troubles and sorrows of life with patience. Bretschneider, not adverting to the fact that all the Datives here are those of *relation*, has noticed that ὑπομένω here governs the Dative, "quod prorsus insolens est," Lex. sub ὑπομένω. It is indeed *prorsus insolens*; or rather, it is not at all; for θλίψει is not governed by ὑπομένοντες, and should be separated from it by a comma, like the example above, τῇ φιλαδέλφειᾳ, . . . φιλόστοργοι. This example of τῇ θλίψει ὑπομένοντες, I may add, sufficiently confirms what is said above, respecting the *Dative of relation* in this whole paragraph.

Τῇ προσευχῇ προσκαρτεροῦντες, *as to prayer, be persevering*; i. e. the way to maintain a joyful hope, and to be patient under afflictions, is to cherish the spirit of prayer and to live near to God.

(13) Ταῖς . . . κοινωνοῦντες, *in respect to the wants of the saints, be communicative*; i. e. be ready to impart, be liberal, be free to give. With all these participles, ἔστε is implied. While Christians were to be kind towards all others, they were to be specially so towards their

brethren of the church.—*Τὴν φιλοξενίαν διώκοντες*, *readily practising hospitality*. Here the construction is changed, and the Accusative after *διώκοντες* is employed. Comp. 1 Tim. 5: 10. Heb. 13: 2. 1 Pet. 4: 9. 3 John vs. 5—8. In a particular manner was this virtue necessary, in the primitive times, when Christian teachers had no regular support, and when the missionaries of the cross were labouring to diffuse the knowledge of salvation.

(14) *Εὐλογεῖτε . . . καταρᾶσθε*, *bless those who persecute you, bless and curse not*. Comp. Matt. 5: 44. Luke 6: 28.

(15) *Χαίρειν . . . κλαιόντων*, *rejoice with those who rejoice, and weep with those who weep*; i. e. sympathize with your fellow Christians, both in joy and grief; shew that you enter with feeling into the consideration of their joys and sorrows, so as to be glad when they are glad, and sorrowful when they are in heaviness. The Infinitive *χαίρειν*, *κλαίειν*, stands (as frequently in the Greek classics) for the Imperative. Strictly speaking, *δεῖ* is understood in such cases, q. d. *you must rejoice—weep, etc.*

(16) *Τὸ αὐτὸ εἰς ἀλλήλους φρονοῦντες*, sc. *ἔστε*, *mutually think the same thing*, i. e. be agreed in your opinions and views. Whether this relates to matters that concerned spiritual or temporal affairs, the words themselves do not shew; but the nature of the case would seem to indicate, that the expression is designed to have a general bearing on all their concerns and articles of belief. Origen, Theodoret, Chrysostom, and Ambrose, have interpreted the passage as meaning: 'Enter into each other's circumstances, in order to see how you would yourself feel;' and so it parallelizes with the preceding expression. But the *usus loquendi* of Paul does not seem to admit of this exposition; comp. 2 Cor. 13: 11. Phil. 2: 2; comp. Rom. 15: 14. *Εἰς ἀλλήλους* is not, indeed, the usual mode of expression in the New Testament, but *ἐν ἀλλήλοις*; comp. Mark 9: 50. John 13: 35. Rom. 15: 5. But the exchange of *εἰς* with the Accusative and *ἐν* with the Dative, in the New Testament (and indeed elsewhere), is very frequent.

Μὴ τὰ . . . συναπαγόμενοι, *mind not high things, but be led away by humble ones*. So, *literally*, must I translate the words. The sentiment is: 'Shun pride, and cultivate humility.' That *ἀλλὰ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς*, κ. τ. λ., is the antithesis of *τὰ ὑψηλά*, κ. τ. λ., seems to me very obvious. Of course I must construe *ταπεινοῖς* as being in the neuter gender, as *ὑψηλά* evidently is. But Koppe, Schleusner, and Stolz, construe *ταπεινοῖς* as being of the masculine gender, and

represent the sentiment of the phrase to be : ‘Suffer yourselves to be led away, viz., to the judgment seat of magistrates, with the *despised* Christians.’ Others, viz., Grotius, Limborch, C. Schmidt, etc., construe it thus : ‘Suffer yourselves to be led away by the humble, i. e. conform to them.’ This agrees in *sentiment* with the above exposition ; but it has the disadvantage of sacrificing the direct antithesis of the words *ύψηλά* and *ταπεινοίς*.—*Συναπάγομαι* is commonly used in a bad sense, viz. to suffer one’s self to be led away by temptation, etc. ; see Gal. 2: 13. 2 Pet. 3: 17. But here it seems to have the generic sense only, *to be led away*. Such a sense does Passow assign to the word, viz. *mitführen*. We may translate *ad sensum* : *Be influenced by humble things*.

Μη . . . *εαυτοῖς*, *be not wise in your own conceit* ; i. e. do not, trusting in your own superior skill and understanding, refuse to confer with others, or to hearken to their suggestions ; a subject intimately connected with the preceding one.

(17) *Μηδενὶ* . . . *ἀποδιδόντες*, *not rendering evil for evil* ; comp. 1 Pet. 3: 9. Matt. 5: 43—48. This is, no doubt, one of the most difficult of all the precepts which the gospel enjoins ; I mean, one which most thwarts our natural inclinations and desires. “The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit.”—*Προνοούμενοι* . . . *ἀνθρώπων*, *seek after that which is good in the sight of all men* ; i. e. be studiously attentive to those duties, which are commended by all, and which all therefore admit to be of the highest obligation. The expression seems to be taken, with some abridgement, from Prov. 3: 4, *καὶ προνοῶ κυλὰ ἐνώπιον κυρίου καὶ ἀνθρώπων*.

(18) *Εἰ δύνατον* . . . *εἰρηνεύοντες*, *if it be possible, so far as you are able, be at peace with all men*. The limitations *εἰ δύνατον* and *τὸ ἐξ ὑμῶν*, shew that the apostle did not deem this possible in all cases ; and beyond all question it is not. The world hate the truths of the gospel, and will be at enmity with those who boldly and faithfully urge them on their consciences. Apostles and martyrs did thus urge them ; and their sufferings prove the truth of what has now been alleged.—*Τὸ ἐξ ὑμῶν*, i. e. *κατὰ τὸ ἐξ ὑμῶν*. *Ἐξ* is used here in the sense of *belonging to*. The whole phrase means, in proportion to that which belongs to you, i. e. according to your ability ; like the French *votre possible*.

(19) *Μη* *εαυτοὺς* . . . *ὀργῆ*, *avenge not yourselves, beloved, but give place to [divine] indignation*. *Δίδοναι τόπον* means *to allow, to give place to* (as we say in English). So Eph. 4: 27, *μη* *δίδοτε*

τόπον τῆ διαβόλω, *give no place to the devil*; and Luke 14: 9, Δὸς τοῦτω τόπον, *resign your place to this person, or make room for him*. Josephus (Antiq. xvi. ii. § 6) says: τῷ ἐνδοιασμῷ τόπον διδόναι, *to give place to doubt*; Plutarch says: δεῖ δὲ μήτε παίζοντας αὐτῇ [ὀργῇ] διδόναι τόπον, *we must, without jesting, give place to it [anger]*, De Ira cohibenda, chap. 14; and Marcus Antoninus says: χάσαν διδόναι ὀδυρμοῖς, *to give place to weeping*, Lib. iii. 6. The meaning above given to δότε τόπον τῇ ὀργῇ, thus plainly according with the usual sense of the phrase δούναί τόπον, is rendered nearly certain by the quotation which immediately follows: Ἐμοὶ κ. τ. λ. This quotation would be wholly inapposite, if we suppose that ὀργῇ here means *the wrath of our enemy*, and δότε τόπον to mean, *go out of the way of, get out of the way of, etc.*, as Pelagius, Ambrose, Basil, Schoettgen, Ammon and others have done. In Rabbinic Hebrew, it is true indeed, that נָתַן מָקוֹם (give place) means *to go out of the way of*; but we need not resort to Hebrew idiom here.

Another method of interpreting ὀργῇ, is, to assign to it the meaning, *one's own indignation*, and then to construe δότε τόπον as meaning *spatium date*, i. e. *put off, defer*. The sense of this would be good; and Wisd. 12: 20 would help to justify the *usus loquendi*; but the want of congruity with what follows, would be a decisive objection against this exegesis here.

We come to the full conclusion, then, that the sentiment of δότε τόπον τῇ ὀργῇ here is: 'Give up the retribution of yourself for evil done to you; leave your enemy to the righteous displeasure of God; seek not to avenge yourselves, for this belongs not to you, but to God.' So the sequel:

Ἐμοὶ . . . κύριος, *retribution is mine, I will make it, saith the Lord*; or, *vengeance is mine, I will render it, saith the Lord*. The passage is taken from Deut. 32: 35, לַיהוָה נִקְמָה וְשִׂפּוּת. *Αἴγει κύριος* are the apostle's own words, for they are not in the Hebrew. The meaning is: 'God will render righteous judgment or retribution for acts of wickedness; Christians are not to claim for themselves the doing of that which it is his sovereign prerogative to do.'

(20) Ἐὰν οὖν . . . αὐτόν, *if thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink*. Food and drink here stand as a part for the whole, and signify our obligation to meet an enemy with beneficence or kindness. The meaning is: 'Do good to thine enemy, instead of evil; shew him kindness, instead of taking revenge.'

Τούτο γὰρ . . . αὐτοῦ, *for in so doing, thou shalt heap coals of*

fire on his head. This is quoted from Prov. 25: 21, 22. In Ps. 18: 8, 12, 13, אֵשׁ בְּחַיָּתָי, *coals of fire* are emblematical of *consuming* or *destruction*. The Arabians say, *he roasted my heart*, or *he kindled a fire in my heart*, to designate the idea of *giving* or *inflicting pain*. So in 4 Ezra, 16: 54, "Coals of fire shall burn on the head of him, who denies that he has sinned against God." There can be no doubt, then, that *pain* is meant to be designated by this expression. But is it the pain of shame or contrition for misconduct, or that of *punishment*? More probably the former here; for so v. 21 would almost necessarily lead us to conclude. It is a noble sentiment when thus understood. 'Take not revenge,' says the apostle: 'overcome your adversary with kindness and beneficence. These will bring him to shame and sorrow for his misconduct.'

(21) *Μὴ νικῶ . . . τὸ κακόν*, *be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good*; i. e. be not led to the indulgence of a spirit of revenge on account of injuries; but subdue the evil temper which leads to the infliction of injury, by beneficence and kindness.

CHAP. XIII. 1—14.

At the time when Paul wrote this epistle, the civil power was every where in the hands of heathen men, who were idolaters and polytheists. In Palestine, there was indeed, a partial commitment of power to the hands of Jews; but this was principally of an *ecclesiastical* nature, and the Romans uniformly reserved to themselves the right of confirming or reversing any sentence, which should affect the life or liberty of their subjects. In general, the heathen magistracy were hostile to Christianity; although the Roman civil power, as such, had not begun to persecute Christians when the epistle to the Romans was written, or even to tolerate persecution in others. But the civil magistrates of the Romans, who were polytheists and idolaters, could not but look with indignation or scorn on those who denied the *religio licita* of the empire, and who without hesitation condemned all religion but their own as false and injurious. There were some superstitious men, moreover, among these magistrates; and there were multitudes of superstitious priests, who were peculiarly hostile to Christianity, and who urged the common people, and magistrates also, to testify their displeasure against it. Gradually this feeling ripened towards development; until at last, under Nero, it burst forth like a volcano, and swept before its fiery streams all the disciples of Jesus who were within its reach.

On the other hand, the Jews, before they were converted to Christianity, looked on their masters, the Romans, with such feelings as a sense of oppression and injured dignity and rights trampled on always inspire. As the chosen people of God, they considered themselves entitled to preëminence above the nations of the earth. They looked down, with scorn and hatred, upon the worshippers of stocks and stones, the גוֹיִם whom they had been uniformly instructed to abhor. The idea that the Romans claimed the right to dispose of their persons and property, was insufferable. They fortified themselves in this opinion, by an appeal to Deut. 17: 15: "Thou shalt in any wise set him king

over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall choose; one from among thy brethren shalt thou set king over thee; thou mayest *not* set a stranger over thee, who is not thy brother." Willing subjection to the Romans, then, was in their view disobedience to this injunction of Moses. Hence nothing but the fear of immediate and summary punishment restrained them, for many years, from rising up against the Roman power in Palestine; and even in other countries, where they were numerous, they made no small tumult, whenever occasion offered.

When individuals passed over from the Jewish community to that of the Christians, they could not, or did not, divest themselves at once of all these feelings and views. Christianity introduced them to a new citizenship, new rights, new privileges, new spiritual rulers, new fellow-citizens. Could they then have any regard for heathen citizenship? It was natural to ask this question; and above all, it was easy to do so, since the heathen magistracy were well known to be hostile in their feelings toward Christians, and since, as to some things, Christians were required to yield up life rather than to obey the civil magistrate.

It is easy to see that while things stood thus, there was great danger that private Christians, instigated by their own private views of heathen superstition, and by a sense of duty in some cases where they were called upon to renounce obedience to the magistrate, would be exposed to judge wrongly, and to go too far in justifying a principle of insubordination to the civil power. Paul felt a deep solicitude in regard to this subject, which was evidently encompassed with many difficulties. For on the one hand, it was clear that in some cases life itself was to be sacrificed, rather than to obey the civil power; and the apostle himself was a most eminent pattern of high and holy independence, in cases of this nature. On the other, private individuals, with all their prejudices and scorn of heathenism, might greatly abuse the proper liberty of a Christian, and extend it to things to which Christianity did not allow them to extend it.

That there was a disposition to do so among the Christians at Rome, seems evident from the tenor of chap. XIII. The cautions here are salutary for the church in all ages; but they were peculiarly needed in the age of the apostles.

I would add only, that the extension of the principles enjoined by chap. XIII., so as to make them imply implicit subjection to the magistrate in cases of a *moral* nature, where he enjoins what God has plainly forbidden, would be a gross violation of the true principles of Christianity, which demands of us in all such cases, "to obey God rather than man." The apostle himself was a most eminent example of exception to such a sweeping general principle of civil obedience. It is only when magistrates keep within the bounds of *moral* prescription, that obedience is a duty. So long as they do so, it is better for Christians, who live under despotic governments such as the Roman was, to submit even when they suffer oppression, than to revolt and be seditious. Under an elective government like our own, it is their duty to assist in displacing wicked rulers, and to do this quietly and orderly, in the way which the law has pointed out. But under such a government as the Roman, where the citizen has no elective franchise, there is no remedy, (after appeal to the reason of the magistrate, such as Justin, Tertullian, and others made), but to suffer, in case of oppression, committing our cause to God, and appealing to him to vindicate the oppressed.

Nothing can be plainer, than that the *subjection* urged in chap. XIII., cannot be extended to cases where the commission of a *moral evil* is demanded. But with the exception of this, the principles here enjoined are altogether of such a nature as our holy religion demands. Certainly these do not demand, that we should neglect any remedy for evils of a civil nature, which is proper. By no means; we are bound to make use of the proper remedy, if in our power, by a regard to the public good. But where the government is despotic, and there is no remedy but rebellion, and this may be a hazardous and bloody measure, it is better to suffer, than to excite tumult. So thought Paul, comp. Tit. 3: 1; and so did Peter teach, 1 Pet. 2: 13, 17. But let not the advocates

of despotic power urge subjection in cases where the gospel will not allow it, under cover of the general expressions here used. Every precept of this nature is to be interpreted, with a proper regard to the time and circumstances in which it was uttered. What these were in the case before us, we have seen. What the example of the apostle and the Saviour himself was, we know. We know too, that Christianity in its very nature, is *love to God and man*; that it makes all men a *brotherhood*; it places them on the same ground as to rights and privileges; it pays real deference to *moral* worth, and to this only. It acknowledges no right in one to oppress another; admits of no "Jew or Greek, Barbarian or Scythian, bond or free;" for it teaches that "all are one in Christ Jesus." It teaches true equality of rights, true spiritual and civil freedom. It does not, indeed, abolish all distinctions among men; nor does it abolish civil governments. Far from this; but then it decides, in its very nature, that all governments, and all civil orders and distinctions, should be only for the public good. It admits no *divine right* of one man to be lord over another; it is at open and eternal war with all the mere claims of birth, and pride, and oppression. The universal good, the equal rights, the peaceful state of man, is the object at which it aims; and whatever is incompatible with these, is incompatible with the fundamental principles of the great "law of liberty and love."

But all this may be allowed, (and contradicted it cannot be with reason), and yet it may be true at the same time, that Christians, situated as the Romans were in Paul's time, are required to yield peaceful submission to magistrates, whether Christian or heathen, in all things where the command of God does not directly forbid it. What the world ought to be, what it would be if all men were Christians indeed, is one thing; what the world is, and what is the present duty of Christians in such circumstances, is another and different thing.

In a word, the *spirit* of the precepts in Rom. XIII. is to be regarded as a rule for all ages and nations, so long as circumstances shall be like those which then existed. And even when these circumstances alter, and magistrates become really Christian, it must then be true in a still more eminent degree, that quiet and peaceful obedience in all lawful things, will be a duty.

(1) Πᾶσα . . . ὑποτασσέσθω, *let every soul be subject to the supreme magistracies.* Πᾶσα ψυχὴ is Hebraism, like שָׂרָא לְכָל־אֶחָד, *every one, each one*:—Υπερεχούσαις means, *pre-eminent, supreme*; i. e. in this case, the Roman magistracy or imperial sway.

Ὅν γὰρ . . . εἶδ'ιν, *for there is no magistracy, unless by divine permission; and the existing [magistracies] are of God's appointment.* The apostle intends, by this, to reconcile Christians to the idea of civil obedience, on the ground that obeying the magistrate is in accordance with the command of God. All magistrates are by his permission; and even when they are oppressive, the Christian is bound to regard them, (so he should regard other evils), as existing by divine permission, and to bow submissive in all cases where disobedience to God is not demanded by them. Such a view of the subject is greatly adapted to satisfy the mind of a Christian, when he feels galled with the yoke of oppression. "The powers that be are ordained of God," i. e. they exist by the wise and holy arrangements of his providence, even when they are oppressive; and like other evils in the world, they should be submitted to on the same ground as that

which we take, when we urge acquiescence in the afflictive dispensations of an overruling Power.

(2) Ὡστε . . . ἀνθέστηκεν, so that he who resists the magistracy, resists the commandment of God. The reason of this is, that as God has required obedience to the magistrate (in the sense before stated), so he who refuses to yield this, is disobedient to the divine command.

Οἱ δὲ . . . λήγονται, and they who resist, shall receive punishment for themselves. Κρίμα is often used in the sense of punishment; e. g. Rom. 3: 8. 1 Cor. 11: 29. Gal. 5: 10. 1 Tim. 5: 12, et alibi.—Ἐαυτοῖς is here the *Dativus incommodi*, as the grammarians say: see Winer's Grammar, § 31. 2. edit. 3. The meaning is, that those who are seditious, i. e. make resistance against the civil government, will be brought to punishment, and that deservedly.

(3) Οἱ γὰρ . . . κακῶν, for rulers are not a terror to good works, but to evil. This clause shows what sort of rulers Paul expected Christians to obey, and how far obedience was a duty, viz. such rulers as protect the good, and repress the evil; and while they do this, there can be no question as to the duty of obeying them. But suppose the reverse, i. e. suppose that they protect evil doings, and forbid good works; then Paul's own conduct shews what other Christians ought to do.—Φόβος here is *abstract for concrete*, i. e. φόβος for φοβεροί.

Θέλεις δὲ . . . ἐξουσίαν; and wilt thou not fear the magistracy? That is, since the ruler is terrible to evil doers, wilt thou not be afraid to do evil!—Τὸ ἀγαθὸν . . . αὐτῆς, do good, and thou shalt have praise for it; i. e. yield obedience to the civil power, and you shall obtain from it the commendation of being a peaceful and obedient citizen.

(4) Θεοῦ γὰρ . . . ἀγαθόν, for it is an instrument in the hands of God, to promote thy good. That is, civil government is of divine appointment, and it is designed to be an instrument of good to those who do well. Σοὶ εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν, for thy good, where σοὶ is the *Dativus commodi*.

Ἐὰν δὲ . . . φοβοῦ, but if thou doest evil, fear; i. e. if thou art refractory and disobedient to the civil magistracy, thou hast reason to fear the consequences.—Ὁὐ γὰρ . . . πράσσοντι, for he beareth the sword not in vain; but he is God's minister, punishing the evil-doer. The sword is here the emblem of punishment. Θεοῦ διάκονος, a minister or instrument of God's appointment, or one whom

his providence has raised up or permitted to exist. "Ἐκδικῶς εἰς ὀργήν, *exercens judicium ad poenam, judging, condemning to punishment.*—Τῷ πράσσοντι, the Dative of "the person *to* or *for* whom any thing is, or is done."

(5) Διὰ . . . συνείδησιν, *therefore we ought to yield subjection, not only because of punishment, but also for conscience' sake; i. e. we should do our duty not merely in order to shun the evils of a different course, but we ought to do it from a conscientious regard to the obligation under which we are.*

(6) Διὰ τοῦτο . . . τελεῖτε, *on this account, we should also pay tribute.* Διὰ τοῦτο, *i. e. for the sake of conscience, as well as to avoid civil penalties.* Ἰάρο *illustrantis*, standing in a clause added for the sake of further illustrating and confirming the subject under consideration. Καί, *also*, denoting not only an additional circumstance, but also being *affirmative*, καὶ φόρους τελεῖτε, *ye should even pay tribute*, or ye should pay tribute as well as yield obedience in other things.

Διουνογοὶ . . . προσκαρτεροῦντες, *for they are ministers of God, who attend to this matter; i. e. they are God's ministers or instruments*, in the same sense as the magistracy above mentioned. God who has ordained that there should be a civil magistracy, has also ordained, as a means of supporting it, that there should be *tribute, custom, taxes.* Let the Christian pay these cheerfully; and even when they are oppressive, let him submit on the same ground as he does to other evils, *i. e. until a proper and lawful remedy for them can be found.*

(7) Ἀπόδοτε κ. τ. λ., *render to all men what is due on the ground of these precepts.*—Φόρον means properly, *a tax*, either on persons, or on land; or rather, in the present case, both of these together. Τέλος answers to our present term *custom*, *i. e. a tax on goods, wares, merchandize, etc.* In respect to φόβον, *comp. v. 4 above.* The meaning of the apostle is, that we should stand in awe of those who wear the sword of civil justice, *viz. that we should fear them in such a sense as to deter us from sedition and civil disobedience.* Τιμὴ commonly means, *the respect* which one pays to his equals in rank. But here it means the respect to be paid to the magistracy; compare 1 Pet. 2: 17, τὸν βασιλέα τιμᾶτε.

(8) From these precepts with respect to magistrates, and the rendering to them of what is due on the ground of our civil obligations, the apostle makes an easy transition to our duty in general with respect

to the subject of debts. *Μηδενὶ . . . ἀγαπᾶν, owe no man any thing, except to love one another*; i. e. scrupulously pay off all debts, of whatever nature, and to whomsoever they may be due; except, as I may say, the debt of love, which is such that it can never be paid off, for it will always remain due, however much may be paid in the discharge of it. An animated and very expressive description of the extent to which the obligation of *benevolence* reaches! A debt of this nature is not like a pecuniary one, which by the payment of a certain sum is fully and finally extinguished. The debt of love is only renewed by payments ever so ample. In its own nature it is inextinguishable; for, as Augustine says: *Nec cum redditur amittitur, sed potius reddendo multiplicatur*; Ep. 62, ad Coelest.

Ὁ γὰρ ἀγαπῶν . . . πεπλήρωκε, *for he who loves another, fulfils the law. Γὰρ illustrantis*, i. e. it stands here in a clause designed to shew that *the debt of love* is one which is always due. But how does the apostle intend to illustrate this? The answer is, by shewing that the law of God demands love to our neighbour; and this is admitted to be of perpetual obligation; consequently the duty which it demands, must also be perpetual.

(9) He proceeds to shew, that the sum of the moral law is contained in the precept *to love our neighbour*.

Τὸ γὰρ introduces the proof, from the law, of the position which he had just laid down. Γὰρ therefore is prefixed here to a clause illustrative of the one which immediately precedes; as it stands in the preceding clause, because it is illustrative of another which goes before it. The τό here is the article prefixed before a quotation or citation, introduced as such; comp. Luke 9: 46, τὸ, τίς ἂν εἴη μείζων αὐτῶν; Luke 22: 2, τὸ, πῶς ἂν ἔλωσιν αὐτόν. See also Acts 4: 21, 22: 30, 27: 4, 9. Luke 1: 62. 1 Cor. 4: 6. Rom. 8: 26. 1 Thess. 4: 1. Mark 9: 23. Gal. 4: 25, τὸ γὰρ Ἁγὰρ Σινᾶ ὄρος ἐστὶ, *for the or this Hagar means mount Sinai*. See Winer's Gramm. § 20. 3. edit. 3.

Οὐ μοιχεύσεις κ. τ. λ. All these commands proceed from the law of love. By committing any one of the crimes here named, a man sins against the good of his neighbour, and therefore against the precept which requires him to love his neighbour as himself.—Οὐ ψευδομαρτυροῦήσεις is of doubtful authority, or rather, it is probably adjectitious. It is not important to the general meaning of the passage, whether it be inserted or omitted.—Καὶ εἴ τις is not meant to express a doubt whether there be any other commandment, but only to say: 'Whatever other commandment there may be,' viz. whatever command respecting our *relative* duties.

⁹ *Ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, in this saying or declaration.*—*Ἐν τῷ, viz. ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, i. e. in the declaration which follows.*—*Ἀγαπήσεις* *κ. τ. λ.* seems to be quoted from Lev. 19: 18, *אָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעִי כְּאֹהֶבְתָּ לְעַצְמְךָ, thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.* In this one sentence, the apostle affirms the whole essence of the moral law to be contained; and it is indeed so. Suppose now that every man on earth, really and truly and as highly, regarded his neighbour's happiness as his own; all injustice, fraud, oppression, and injury of every kind, would at once cease, and a universal fulfilment of our obligation to others would be the consequence.—*Πλήσιον* is itself an *adverb*; but it is here employed as an indeclinable *noun* in the Acc. case, and having the masc. article before it. So the Greeks frequently employ adverbs.

(10) *Ἡ ἀγάπη . . . ἡ ἀγάπη, love worketh no ill to its neighbour; love then is the fulfilling of the law.* That is, he who loves his neighbour as himself, will designedly do him no harm or injury. *Πλήρωμα* seems here to be of the same meaning as *πλήρωσις*; and so in Gal. 4: 4. Eph. 1: 10. So Philo de Abr. p. 387, *πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου*; so *πλήρωσις τῶν ἡμέρων*, Ezek. 5: 2. Dan. 10: 3. *The fulfilling of the law* is the completing what the law demands, the filling up the measure of its requisitions. The meaning plainly is, the fulfilling of the law which has respect to our relative duties; comp. Gal. 5: 14. James 2: 8. Matt. 22: 39, 40. 1 Tim. 1: 5. What the apostle designs to teach, is: 'Love, such as the law demands, will lead us always to seek our neighbour's good, and so to be always paying the debt of benevolence, yet never paying it off.'

(11) *Καὶ τοῦτο, i. e. καὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖτε, do this, viz. all which he had been exhorting them to do.* *Καὶ τοῦτο* is explained by Theodoret as meaning, *καὶ μάλιστα*; which gives the sense very well.

Εἰδότες τὸν καιρὸν, considering the time, or taking cognizance of the time; comp. *ἦδειν* in Acts 23: 5. *Καιρὸν* I understand to mean, *the gospel-time* which had already come. The apostle considers the commencement of this, which had already taken place, as the beginning of a glorious day, the dawning of the Sun of righteousness with healing in his beams. A state of sin and ignorance, is a state of darkness; and out of such a state Christians are brought, that they may see the light; comp. Eph. 5: 8, 11. John 3: 19—21. 1 Pet. 2: 9.

Ὅτι ὥρα . . . ἐπιστεύσαμεν, that it is now time to awake out of sleep, for now is our salvation nearer than when we believed. That is, the commencement of the Christian dispensation, and the beginning of light in your own souls, call for corresponding efforts and

activity. The image of awaking out of sleep is often used, in order to designate the rousing up from a state of comparative inaction, to one of strenuous effort; comp. Eph. 5: 14. 1 Cor. 15: 34. 1 Thess. 5: 6.

But what is the *σωνησία*, which is nearer than when Christians at Rome first believed? Tholuck, and most of the late commentators in Germany, suppose that the apostle expected the speedy advent of Christ upon earth a second time, when the day of glory to the church would commence. Accordingly, they represent him, here and elsewhere, as exhorting Christians to be on the alert, constantly expecting the approach of such a day. In support of this view, Tholuck appeals to Phil. 4: 5. 1 Thess. 5: 2, 6. Rev. 22: 12. Such views, and such a mode of representation, seem at present to be widely diffused in Germany, and to be held even by those who are strenuous defenders of the *inspiration* of the apostles. But how the words of the apostles, when thus construed, can be made consistent with themselves, (not to speak of other difficulties arising from the consideration that they were inspired), is more than I am able to see. The very passage referred to, in the first epistle to the church at Thessalonica, was understood by the Thessalonians in the same manner as Tholuck and others understand it; but this interpretation was formally and strenuously corrected in 2 Thess. II. Is it not enough that Paul has explained his own words? Who can safely venture to give them a meaning different from what he gives?—Then as to Rev. 22: 12; how is it possible, that the writer, who had just made an end of predicting a long series of events, that should happen before the *day of glory*, one of which is to occupy a thousand years, can be supposed to have believed that all this was to take place during that very generation in which he lived?

I only add here, (for this is not the place to enter into a long discussion), that it is incredible that the apostles, if enlightened by supernatural influence, should not have been taught better than to lead the whole Christian church to a vain and false hope about the appearance of Christ; which, when frustrated by time and experience, would lead of course to general distrust in all their declarations and hopes. As the *usus loquendi* does not demand such an exegesis, (see in Flattii *Opuscula*, Diss. de *παρουσία κυρίου*); as the nature of the apostle's knowledge and mission does not allow it; and as Paul has expressly contradicted it in 2 Thes. II.; so I cannot admit it here, without obtaining different views from those which I am now constrained to entertain.

I must, therefore, refer *σωτηρία* to the *spiritual salvation* which believers were to experience, when transferred to the world of everlasting light and glory. And so construed, the exhortation of Paul amounts to this: 'Christian Brethren, we have been brought out of darkness into marvellous light; let us act in a manner that corresponds with our condition. We are hastening to our retribution; every day brings us nearer to it; and in prospect of the reward which now almost appears in sight, as we approach the goal of human life, let us act with renewed effort as duty requires.' So Chrysostom.

(12) *Ἡ νύξ . . . ἤγγικε*, *the night is advanced, the day is at hand*; a repetition of a part of the idea contained in the preceding verse. *Νύξ* is the time of ignorance and darkness in which they had once been. The apostle says: 'This is nearly gone,' i. e. they had now come as it were to the confines of eternal day, or of a more perfect knowledge of divine things. It behoved them, therefore, to rouse up all their energies, and to act in a manner congruous with their condition and obligations.

Ἀποθώμεθα . . . φωτός, *let us put away then the works of darkness, and put on the armour of light*; i. e. let us reject such things as we were accustomed to do while in a state of darkness; and let us arise to combat all our spiritual foes, by girding on the armour of light, that is, by living and acting in such a manner as becomes those who are the sons of light.

(13) *Ὡς . . . περιπατήσωμεν*, *let us walk in a becoming manner, as by day*; i. e. let us live as it becomes those who enjoy the light, to whom the path of duty is made plain, and on whom the eyes of men are fixed in order to watch their demeanor. Let us carefully guard against their being able to discern in us any matter of reproach.

Μὴ κώμοις . . . ζήλω, *not in revelling and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and bitter envy*. The apostle here mentions some of those sins, which were most usually committed during the night season.

(14) *Ἄλλ' . . . Χριστόν*, *but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ*; i. e. imitate him, which is the usual sense of the Greek *ἐνδύσασθαι τινα* or perhaps it here means, like the Hebrew *שָׂבַח*, *to be filled with*, and so the idea is: Be filled with a Christian spirit, abound in it; "let Christ dwell in you richly."—*Καὶ τῆς σαρκὸς . . . ἐπιθυμίας*, *and make no provision for the flesh, in respect to its lusts*. *Τῆς σαρκὸς πρόνοιαν* means, *provision for the sake of the flesh*, i. e. in order to gratify its lusts, as *εἰς ἐπιθυμίας* explains it. Such a latitude in re-

gard to the use of the Genitive is illustrated by many examples in Winer's Gramm. § 30. 2. So Rom. 8: 32, *πρόβατα σαγῆς*, *sheep destined for the slaughter*; comp. Phil. 1: 22. John. 5: 29. 7: 35. Matt. 4: 15. 10: 5, etc.

CHAP. XIV. 1—23.

The apostle having given so many precepts for the sake of caution and restraint upon the Jewish part of the church at Rome, (on whom he doubtless had his eye when he was writing chap. XIII.), he now turns to the Gentile part, and gives them some salutary cautions with respect to their demeanor towards their Jewish brethren. The Jews, at this time, cherished a deep abhorrence of idolatry; and every thing which pertained to idol-worship they avoided with great solicitude. It is no wonder, therefore, that we find among them, even when transplanted into the Christian church, men who abstained from all flesh, lest they should eat that which had been offered to idols. It is to be remembered, that (holocausts excepted) only a part of the flesh of slain beasts was consumed by fire; the rest was reserved for the priest, or the offerer, and frequently came to the market for sale. Now a man who ate meats without distinction, that had been obtained at the market, might eat that which had been offered to idols. The Jew shuddered at this, lest he should be defiled; and the Christian Jew could not, at once, divest himself of such a feeling.

Clement of Alexandria and Augustine, however, interpret the chapter before us as having reference only to scrupulousness about meat that had actually been offered to idols, and not meat in general. But v. 2 seems to make against this opinion. Accordingly, Chrysostom, Origen, Theodoret, Jerome, and most modern commentators suppose, that the scrupulousness in question extended to all kinds of meat, or at least to all which was sold in the public markets. A comparison of the present chapter with 1 Cor. VIII., would seem to afford confirmation of this opinion. It would also seem to establish the idea, that the scruples in question (about the eating of meat) arose from the circumstance, that meats which had been presented at the temples of idols, often came into the markets for sale (1 Cor. 10: 25—28), and in consequence of this, it was so difficult to distinguish lawful meats from unlawful ones, that it was a duty rather to forego the use of meats, than to incur the danger of eating those which were polluted.

In regard to this last point, however, no less critics than Koppe and Eichhorn have maintained, that the Christians whom Paul has in view here, were a species of Essenes, such as the Greeks called *ἀσκήται*, *ascetics*, i. e. those who practised peculiar self-denial as to food and drink, and subjected themselves to various penances and mortifications of the flesh, in order that they might attain to a more pure and elevated state of devotion and piety. That a sect of this nature, viz. the Essenes, existed among the Jews at this time, is well known from the testimonies of Philo and Josephus. But besides the Essenes, there were others among the Jews who practised abstinence from meat. Josephus speaks of one Banus who lived in solitude on fruits and plants, and with whom he spent three years, living in the like manner. So also he mentions priests, who were accused of some slight fault in regard to the Roman government in Judea and were sent to Rome for trial, who lived on figs and nuts, *Vita Josephi*, §§ 2. 3. There were also, among the Greeks, many Pythagoreans of the newly reviving school of this philosopher, who pursued a like course of life with regard to food. Similar to these classes of men, in respect to their mode of sustenance, are some Christians mentioned by Origen (cont. Celsum, V. 48), who lived in his time. So in *Canones Apostol.* (L.), the like class of men is mentioned.

But although it is plain that there were classes of men, at the time when the apostle wrote, who practised the ascetic mode of life which Rom. xiv. contemplates; yet it does not seem probable that such ascetics as have just been mentioned, were the ones whom the apostle here intends to describe. Every one who reads the history of ascetics of this class, knows, that in every country where they have made their appearance, they have usually obtained for themselves great credit and influence, on the ground of their supposed extraordinary sanctity. As was very natural, they took to themselves great credit on this account, and looked down with pity or contempt on those, who declined to pursue the course of self-denial which they had adopted. Of course, we should expect the apostle, if he were here addressing men of this class, to attack their pride and vain glory, as he does very strenuously in Col. 2: 21—23. But instead of this, we find the ascetic party here to be the one which needs defending. It is the others who look down with contempt or disrespect on them, and who are prone to treat them with some degree of scorn or neglect on account of their weakness or superstition; and therefore the apostle chides the others, and exhorts them to a different demeanor. It is more probable, then, that the whole difficulty in question was one which arose from *Jewish* scruples about meats and drinks offered to idols, in which the Jewish Christians believed that they could not partake, except at the expense of associating themselves with the worshippers of idols and becoming polluted.

This is satisfactorily confirmed by v. 5, which speaks of the distinction that these same persons made between days, out of respect to the laws of Moses and the customs of the Jews; comp. Col. 2: 16. We cannot reasonably doubt, therefore, that the apostle is here speaking of such Jewish Christians, as still cherished the feelings and views which they had entertained before their conversion, in regard to the distinction of meats and drinks, and the observance of fast and feast days. The Gentile part of the church would naturally feel no scruple in respect to such matters; and it would not be unnatural for them to look at first with wonder, and afterwards with disdain, on the scrupulousness of their Jewish brethren respecting such external ordinances. It is easy to see, that the peace of the church would thus become endangered. And in order to prevent this, the apostle throws his shield over his brethren in a weaker state of belief, and insists upon it that others shall deal very tenderly and affectionately with scruples of such a nature, and not condemn or despise those who entertained them. This he could insist on with the more urgency, because their scruples were of a conscientious and sober nature, and not mere whims of superstition. Accordingly, the present chapter gives precepts and principles in regard to things of this nature, which must be of great value to the church of Christ, down to the end of time; and on this account, we can aver, in one sense, that we rejoice in the occasion which called forth the expression of such views and feelings on the part of Paul. The whole constitutes a rule of life in regard to weaker Christian brethren, and with regard to food, drink, manner of living, and observance of fasts and feasts of an extraordinary nature, which is a very important guide to scrupulous and tender consciences.

(1) *Τὸν . . . πίστει*, *him that is weak in his belief*; i. e. him who is not yet fully convinced or enlightened in regard to the true extent of Christian liberty, which pays little regard to ordinances of a mere external and physical nature. The article *τῆ* here is equivalent to the pronoun *his*; which is often the case elsewhere; or *τῆ* may be construed as referring to Christian belief or persuasion. *Πίστις* does not here mean *saving faith, faith in God*, in an appropriate and peculiar sense; but *belief or persuasion* in the more general sense of that term; comp. 1 Cor. 8: 11, 12.—*Προσλαμβάνεσθε*, *receive with*

kindness, admit to your society or friendship; so the verb προσλαμβάνομαι is used in the New Testament. It means literally to take to one's self; and so it is applied to taking a companion, Acts 17: 5; to receiving into one's house as a guest or a friend, Acts 18: 26. 28: 2. Philem. vs. 12, 17. Hence, in a sense somewhat more general, to receive kindly; comp. Rom. 14: 3. 15: 7. Calov objects here against his Lutheran brethren, for employing this text to prove that Calvinists should be treated with lenity. He says that 2 John v. 10 is the proper rule to be applied to them!

Μὴ εἰς διακρίσεις διαλογισμῶν, not so as to increase his scruples of conscience, or his doubting thoughts; i. e. do not take such a course with him, as will offend and wound his tender conscience, and be a stumbling block to him; do not make him so revolt from your belief, by shewing contempt of his, as will involve him in still more doubt and difficulty. So I understand this difficult phrase. Διακρίσεις, scruples, doubts; διαλογισμῶν, of the thoughts, i. e. of the mind. Εἰς indicates the object or end or tendency of a thing. 'Do not act in such a manner as will have a tendency to promote, rather than allay, scruples about meats, days,' etc.

(2) Ὅς μὲν . . . πάντα, one believes that he may eat every thing. Μέν here is a part of the peculiar Greek construction, by which one clause in a sentence is represented as corresponding to another of similar construction, which has δέ before it. So here ὅς μὲν . . . ὃ δέ. It does not always admit of translation; and this is the case here. We have no particles in English, which make out just such a construction as μὲν . . . δέ. We may translate, one indeed . . . but another; yet there seems to be nothing added to the sense of the English sentence here by indeed, unless we consider it as a concessive particle, thrown in to designate what might be expressed by saying: It will be granted, it is true that, etc.—Πάντα agrees with βρώματα understood, comp. v. 15, but βρώμα is not confined merely to the sense of meat; it means any thing eatable, any food. Φαγεῖν is the second Aorist here, from the obsolete φάγω, but usually ranged, in the lexicons, under the root ἐσθίω. The circumflex accent shews it to be the 2nd Aorist.

Ὁ δὲ . . . ἐσθίει, but he who is weak, eateth herbs; i. e. ὁ ἀσθενῶν ἐν πίστει, comp. v. 1, he who is scrupulous about distinction of meats, etc., refrains from meat sold in the markets lest he should eat that which is offered to idols. He prefers to live on vegetables (λάχανα), rather than subject himself to this danger.

(3) Ὁ ἐσθίων . . . κρινέτω, *let not him who eateth, despise him who eateth not; nor him who eateth not, condemn him who eateth.* Καί *nor*, like the Hebrew וְ before a second member of the sentence in which the first member has a negative particle. The English construction demands *not . . . nor*, in order to render the sense of the Greek. Κρίνειν, in the sense of *condemn*, is frequent in the New Testament; as any of the lexicons will shew. The sentiment is: 'He who is freed from any scruples about distinction of meats, should not exercise an uncharitable and condemning spirit, towards him who still entertains such scruples.' The reason is subjoined:

Ὁ θεὸς . . . προσελάβετο, *for God has accepted him*, i. e. received him into his redeemed family, and admitted him to its privileges; comp. προσλαμβάνεσθε in v. 1.

(4) Σὺ τίς . . . οἰκέτην; *Who art thou, that condemnest the servant of another?* That is, such an ἀσθενῶν ἐν πίστει, being favourably accepted of God, and being his servant and not yours, how can you claim the right of exercising severity towards him, in respect to his scruples of conscience? Σὺ is here properly the Nominative absolute. It may be constructed as Nominative after εἶ, but the other construction is the true one. It is like the Hebrew אֵלֹהִים תָּמִים דְּרָכָוּ, [as to] *God, his way is perfect.*

Τῷ ἰδίῳ . . . πίπτει, *by his own master he standeth or falleth.* The word στήκει here, has afforded no small room for discussion among critics. But those who give it the sense of *acting uprightly*, and πίπτειν the sense of *being delinquent*, do not seem to me to consult the context. The apostle says to those who were freed from scruples about food: 'Brethren, do not be severe in condemning those who differ from you in opinion with respect to this point. Yours is not the prerogative to judge in this case; it is God who will acquit or condemn; they are accountable to him only, in such a matter.' Στήκω is not a *classical* word, but is formed, by the later Greek, from the Perfect ἔστηκα, the εἶ being dropped. Its meaning here is, *to stand fast or firm* in a secondary sense, i. e. to hold good one's place at a time of trial, to remain firm and secure. So Ps. 1: 5, "The ungodly shall not *stand* in judgment;" i. e. shall not be able to remain firm and safe. So the opposite term (πίπτει) would also lead us to judge. *To fall* means, in this case, *to be condemned, to be insecure, to be subjected to condemnation or punishment*; exactly as we say in English, of a man on trial for a crime, and condemned, *he was cast at the trial, he failed*, ἔπεσε. The Dative τῷ ἰδίῳ κυρίῳ,

is here the Dative of *relation*; comp. 10: 10, seq. on this Dative, and Winer's Gramm. § 31. 3. edit. 3. The strict rendering would be: *In relation to his own master, he is subject to sentence of condemnation or acquittal*; i. e. before the tribunal of another he cannot be arraigned in respect to his scrupulous conscience, his own master only can call him to an account as to this matter.

Σταθήσεται . . . αὐτόν, and he shall be established, for God is able to establish him; i. e. he shall stand in the judgment of his conduct in reference to this matter, for God is able to acquit him, or God has the power and right of acquitting him, although you should condemn him.

(5) Ὁς μὲν . . . ἡμέραν, one esteemeth one day more than another; i. e. he makes a distinction between days, regarding one as more sacred than another. Ἐρίνει here has a very different sense from that which it conveys in the preceding verse; it means, *estimates, regards, deems*; comp. Acts 13: 46. 16: 15. 26: 8. Rom. 3: 7. 1 Cor. 2: 2. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. IV. 8. 2, κριθείητε εὐδαιμονέστατοι, ye shall be deemed most fortunate. In respect to παρὰ, more than, above, see lexicon.

Ὁς δὲ . . . ἡμέραν, but an other esteemeth every day, i. e. makes no distinction between days, regards all days alike.—Ἐκαστος . . . πληροφορήσθω, let every one be fully persuaded in his own mind; i. e. let each one act conscientiously in respect to this matter, according to the real persuasion or belief of his own mind, so as not to violate his conscience in observing, or neglecting to observe, particular days in a special manner.

Whether the apostle means to include the *Sabbath*, or rather the *Lord's day*, under what he says here of the special observance of particular days, has been called in question by not a few distinguished commentators and divines. It is well known, that in the early ages of the church a distinction was made between *Sabbath*, and *Lord's day*. The former was the Jewish weekly Sabbath, i. e. the seventh day of the week. It embraced also the occasional fasts and feasts prescribed by the Mosaic law; comp. Col. 2: 16. Gal. 4: 10. Such was the Jewish use of the word סַבְבָּת, *σάββατον*. But the early Christians, in order to distinguish this from the first day of the week, on which they held their religious assemblies of worship (1 Cor. 16: 2. Acts 20: 7), called the first day *ἡμέρα κυρίου* (*Lord's day*), Rev. 1: 10. Of this distinction there is clear evidence in the writings of the ecclesiastical fathers. That it was very early made, even in apos-

tolitic times, is sufficiently evident from comparing Col. 2: 16 and Rev. 1: 10.

The question whether Rom. 14: 5 has respect to the *ἡμέρα κυρίου* as well as the *σάββατα* of the Jews, is more difficult of decision than some may at first suppose; because there is nothing in the context, which furnishes any certain clue to the meaning of *ἡμέρα* here. But if we may venture to compare Col. 2: 16 and Gal. 4: 10 with the passage here, (and it does seem to me that the two passages manifestly have relation to the same usages and prejudices in the church), then we may draw the conclusion pretty clearly, that *ἡμέρα* here relates to days which the scruples of Jewish Christians deemed sacred, and has no relation to the *ἡμέραι κυρίου* which all agreed to keep holy.

(6) Ὁ φρονῶν . . . οὐ φρονεῖ, *he who regards the day, regards it to [the honouring of] the Lord; and he who regards not the day, for [the honouring of] the Lord he doth not regard it.* That is, he who makes the distinction in question between days, does so because he believes that God has required it, and he keeps such days sacred in order to honour him; but he who does not make these distinctions, refrains from doing it because he thinks that duty to God requires him to refrain, inasmuch as God does not require these days to be kept holy. *Κυρίῳ* is the *Dativus commodi*.

Καὶ ὁ ἐσθίων . . . θεῶ, *likewise he who eats, eats [to the honouring of] the Lord, for he gives God thanks; i. e. he who eats food without any scrupulous distinctions, does this with a regard to the commands of God, and is thankful to God for the blessings bestowed upon him, viz. the privilege of enjoying his food without the troublesome distinction of clean and unclean.*

Καὶ ὁ μὴ ἐσθίων . . . θεῶ, *and he who eats not, for [the honouring of] the Lord he eats not, and gives God thanks.* That is, he refrains from certain kinds of food, from a design to obey the commands of God; and for the light which is imparted to him (as he supposes) with respect to making such a distinction in food, he is grateful. Flatt thinks this should be turned thus: 'For the little which he does enjoy, he is thankful to God.' But then, this little would be *what he eats*; whereas he who does not eat, is here represented as thankful—for what? *The not eating*, must be the answer; and this, in the sense above given.

(7) Οὐδεὶς γὰρ . . . ζῆ, *for none of us lives to himself; i. e. none of us, who behaves as a Christian, can live only for his own*

pleasure, or to obey his own inclinations. I take it for granted, then, that those who make distinctions between food, and those who do not, aim to honour God by this, because they stand pledged to be entirely devoted to his service and glory. Ζῆν τιμι, *to live devoted to any person or thing*, to accommodate all our actions and desires to his wishes; comp. Luke 20: 38. Rom. 6: 10, 11. Gal. 2: 19.

Καὶ οὐδεὶς ἑαυτοῦ ἀποθνήσκει, *and none of us dieth to himself*; i. e. in life and death we are the Lord's, we are bound to glorify him in all that we do. That the phrase οὐδεὶς ἑαυτοῦ ἀποθνήσκει means, we are the Lord's, whether in life or in death, i. e. in the state of the dead, viz. in the present and future world, seems clear from comparing vs. 8, 9.

(8) Ἐάν τε . . . ἀποθνήσκωμεν, *for whether we live, we live to the Lord, and whether we die, we die to the Lord*; i. e. whether in a state of life or death (comp. v. 9), we belong to the Lord, we are bound to glorify him. The phrases ἔάν τε . . . ἔάν τε, shew the mutual connection of both, and their relation in common to something else; which here is τοῦ κυρίου ἔσμεν. In English we should say: "Both living and dying, we are the Lord's." The nicer shades of τέ . . . καὶ and τέ . . . τέ, it is impossible to imitate in our language.

Ἐάν τε . . . ἔσμεν, *whether we are living, then, or dead, we are the Lord's*; i. e. whether we exist in the present world, or in another, viz. the world of the dead, we belong to the Lord, i. e. to Christ. That Lord does mean Christ here, v. 9 makes certain. That the apostle means, moreover, by ζῶμεν and ἀποθνήσκωμεν, to describe not the *act* of living and dying, but the *state* of the living and the dead, there can be no reasonable doubt, after consulting v. 9. In other words: 'We, in the state of the living and in the state of the dead, i. e. we of the present or of the future world, are Christ's; he is our Lord, both here and hereafter.'

(9) Εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ . . . κρημύσθη, *for Christ both died and revived, for the very purpose that he might be Lord of the dead and the living*. The word ἀνέστη, *rose*, which is in the *textus receptus*, is rejected on good grounds by Dr. Knapp and all recent critics. It seems to have come from the margin, where it was written as a gloss or explanation of ἔζησε. In regard to ἔζησε, which here has the sense of *reviving, coming to life*, and not simply of living, (which has seemed to perplex some commentators), one needs for his satisfaction, only to compare Matt. 9: 18. John 5: 25. 11: 25. Acts 1: 3. 25: 19, et alibi. In relation to the sentiment here expressed, viz. that Christ

suffered and rose, or in other words, that he “took on him our nature and became obedient unto death,” in order that he might be Lord of all, the reader may compare Phil. 2: 5—11. John 17: 4, 5. Heb. 2: 9, 10. 12: 2. The apostle means to say, not that *universal dominion* was the principal object of Christ’s death, but that this was a fruit or consequence of it, and indeed one of the ends which the Saviour had in view, because it is necessary for the accomplishment of his benevolent purposes.

To be *Lord of the dead and of the living*, is that he should be supreme ruler over the present world and the world of spirits; for *the living and the dead* make up all the human race.

The supremacy of Christ, and his absolute property in all Christians, living or dead, is fully asserted and implied in vs. 6—9.

(10) Σὺ δὲ . . . σου; *and thou, why dost thou condemn thy brother?* Σὺ is the Nom. absol. as in v. 4 above. Ἄξ, *and, too, also*, “addit vim interrogationi;” Bretschneider in Lex. Ἴ κρινεῖς, *why dost thou censure thy brother for his weak and scrupulous conscience?*

Ἡ καὶ σὺ . . . σου, *or thou, why dost thou too despise thy brother?* Καὶ σὺ is much the same as σὺ δὲ, σὺ being again in the Nom. absol. *To despise* here means, to regard with feelings of contempt brethren who have scrupulous consciences, to look upon them as inferior.

Πάντες γὰρ Χριστοῦ, *for we must all stand before the judgment-seat of Christ;* i. e. such a brother is not amenable to you in a matter of this nature; Christ is his judge, who is the supreme judge of all. We must leave such matters to him; but should feel, at the same time, that we are accountable for all that we do or say, in respect to our Christian brethren.—*Ἰὰ* is prefixed to a reason given, why we ought not to despise a Christian brother for his weak conscience, viz. the fact that he is accountable to Christ himself and not to us; as we also are accountable, for our demeanour toward him.

(11) Γέγραπται γάρ, where γάρ is prefixed to a clause introduced in order to confirm what immediately precedes.—Ζῶ ἐγὼ . . . θεῶ, *as I live, saith the Lord, every knee shall bow to me, and every tongue shall confess to God;* i. e. all shall acknowledge subjection to me, and give to me an account of their actions; or, all are accountable to God as their supreme and final judge. The passage is quoted from Is. 45: 23 (45: 23, 24 Sept.), where the Hebrew for Ζῶ ἐγὼ is אֲנִי־יְהוָה , Sept. κατ’ ἐμαυτοῦ ὀμνύω, *by myself do I swear.* The

Ζῶ ἐγώ of the apostle is equivalent to the אֲנִי הֵנָּה of the Hebrew, which is altogether equivalent to $\text{אֲנִי הֵנָּה אֲנִי}$. So the apostle has translated *ad sensum*, not *ad verbum*. The ὅτι which follows, stands in the Septuagint after καὶ ἑμαυτοῦ ὁμνύω naturally; in the text of Paul, ζῶ ἐγώ . . . ὅτι, is a *constructio ad sensum*.

(12) That the doctrine of accountability to God is contained or implied, in this passage from the Old Testament, Paul now proceeds to assert. "Ἀρα οὖν . . . θεῶν, every one of us, therefore, must give an account respecting himself to God. For λόγος, in the sense here given, comp. Matt. 12: 36. Acts 19: 40. 1 Pet. 4: 5. Heb. 13: 17. 4: 13.

The apostle here reckons the appearing before the judgment-seat of Christ, as giving an account to God. So God is represented as judging the world by Christ, Acts 17: 31. Rom. 2: 16. "Deus et Christus arcissime conjuncti sunt, ita ut quod de hoc dicitur, dicitur etiam de illo."

(13) Μηκέτι . . . κρίνομεν, let us then no longer condemn one another; i. e. let us no longer do as we have done, in judging and condemning those who make a distinction of meats, days, etc. Since we are all accountable to God for every thing that we do, let us no more expose ourselves to his displeasure, by thus wronging a Christian brother.

Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο . . . σκάνδαλον, but rather come to this determination, not to put a stumbling-block, or an occasion of falling, in the way of a brother. Κρίνατε is here taken in a sense quite different from that which κρίνομεν conveys, in the preceding clause. Κρίνατε means, determine, decide; κρίνατε τοῦτο means, make or come to this determination; comp. Acts 16: 15. 20: 16. 1 Cor. 7: 37, et alibi. This is what the rhetoricians call *antanaclasis* (ἀντανάκλασις), which means, the repetition of the same word in the same sentence, or in one closely connected, in a sense different from that which the word when first mentioned conveyed. It is a species of *paronomasia*, or very nearly allied to some forms of *paronomasia*.

Τῷ ἀδελφῷ is *Dativus incommodi*, as the grammarians say. Πρόσομομα and σκάνδαλον are not materially different; both mean an occasion or cause of stumbling. Here they are to be understood, of course, in a moral sense; and the use of both words seems designed merely to indicate every kind of occasion for stumbling.

(14) Οἶδα . . . Ἰησοῦ, I know, and am persuaded by the Lord Jesus; i. e. I know, and know for certainty because the Lord Jesus

himself has taught me. *Ἐν κυρίῳ*, by the Lord, for so *ἐν* is very often construed before the Dative of cause, manner, instrument, etc.

Ὅτι . . . αὐτοῦ, that nothing is unclean of itself; i. e. no food or drink in its own nature, or as it is in itself, is unclean to the Christian. *Δι' αὐτοῦ*, by itself, through itself, on its own account.—*Εἰ μὴ . . . κοινόν*, but to him who deemeth any thing to be unclean, it is unclean; i. e. if a man believes any species of food or drink to be unlawful, and then partakes of it, he defiles himself, because he does that which he believes to be sinful.

(15) *Εἰ δὲ . . . λυπεῖται*, now if thy brother is grieved because of meat. *Δέ* continuative, now, further.—*Διὰ βρωμα*, because thou eatest meat which he regards as unclean.—*Οὐκέτι . . . περιπατεῖς*, thou walkest no longer according to what benevolence requires; i. e. thou dost violate the law of love, which would require thee to do unto others that which thou wouldest that others should do unto thee. But this thou dost not, when thou demeanest thyself in this manner.

Μὴ . . . ἀπέθανε, destroy not him by thy meat, for whom Christ died. That *ἀπόλλυε* means *destroy*, seems plain from comparing I Cor. 8: 11 and v. 20 below. The word *ἀπόλλυμι* was sometimes employed by the Greeks in the sense of *cruciarī*, to torment, vex; a sense which is possible here, but not probable. The meaning seems to be: 'Do not furnish an occasion of stumbling to thy brother, lest he fall, and come into condemnation.'—*Υπὲρ οὗ Χριστὸς ἀπέθανε* seems to be added in order to shew how very differently Christ himself acted and felt, with respect to Christians who are weak in faith; and thus to paint, in glowing colours, the criminality of those who refused to imitate his spirit.

(16) *Μὴ . . . ἀγαθόν*, let not your good, then, be evil spoken of. *Οὖν*, therefore, then, i. e. since such is the case, viz. that Christ died for sinners, and that you are under obligation to shew the spirit of similar benevolence toward your fellow Christians, you ought to demean yourselves in such a way, as that you will give no occasion for the religious liberty which you enjoy to be evil spoken of. That *ἀγαθόν* here means, freedom from the yoke of bondage which the ceremonial law imposed, I cannot well doubt; and so Origen, Theodoret, Bengel, Clarius, and others understood it. But Chrysostom, Theophylact, Erasmus, and others, understand by *ἀγαθόν*, the Christian religion in general. The sense would be good, if construed in this way; but less appropriate, however, than the meaning above given.

(17) *Οὐ γὰρ . . . ἅγιω, for the kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost.* Ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ here means, the *spiritual kingdom* of God or Christ; his reign within; his moral dominion over the hearts of men; in a word, true *Christianity*. This does not consist in refraining or not refraining from this or that food or drink; but *spiritual* life consists in holy conformity to God, peaceful and gentle demeanor, and joy such as is imparted by the influences of the Holy Spirit. A truly admirable description of the nature of real Christianity! *Εἰρήνη* here means *peace*, in opposition to discord and contention among brethren.—*Ἐν πνεύματι ἅγιω* may be applied, as a qualification, to *δικαιοσύνη* and *εἰρήνη* as well as to *χαρά*; but I prefer the construction which I have given.

(18) *Ὁ γὰρ . . . ἀνθρώποις, for he who serveth Christ in respect to these things, is acceptable to God, and approved by men.* Ἐν τοῦτοις means the things before mentioned, viz. *δικαιοσύνη*, *εἰρήνη*, and *χαρά ἐν πνεύματι ἅγιω*. *Δόκιμος, acceptus, gratus*; the apostle means, that men will speak well of such a demeanor as he had commended.

(19) *Ἄρα οὖν . . . ἀλλήλους, therefore let us strive after peace and mutual edification.* Τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης . . . τὰ τῆς οἰκοδομῆς, are, according to a very common usage of the Greek, a periphrasis for *τὰ εἰρηνικά*, etc., or for the simple *εἰρήνη, οἰκοδομή*.—*Τῆς εἰς ἀλλήλους*, i. e. *τῆς οἰκοδομῆς εἰς ἀλλήλους*.—The article is commonly supplied in this way, before adjectives that follow a noun in order to qualify it, or (which is the same thing) before nouns with prepositions, added merely to qualify the preceding and principal noun; Wiener's Gramm. § 19. 1. b.

The object of this verse is, to charge the church at Rome to demean themselves in such a way, with regard to the matters in dispute which he had touched upon, as would promote the peace of the church and the edification of both parties.

(20) *Μὴ . . . θεοῦ, destroy not the work of God, on account of food.* Τὸ ἔργον τοῦ θεοῦ, the same as *οἰκοδομὴ θεοῦ*, 1 Cor. 3: 9, and *οἰκοδομὴ*. . . *ἐν κυρίῳ* in Eph. 2: 21, and *οἰκοδομὴν ἑαυτοῦ* in Eph. 4: 16; i. e. Christians, or a Christian. Possibly the writer may refer here to the internal work of *faith*, which is called *ἔργον θεοῦ* in John 6: 29. I prefer the former sense. *Κατάλυε* is a verb accommodated to the figurative expression *ἔργον θεοῦ*, and means *to pull down, to destroy*. The meaning is: 'Do not so demean thyself, in respect to

this dispute about meats clean and unclean, as to cause thy weak brother to sin, and to fall into condemnation.

Πάντα μὲν καθαρὰ, *all [meats] are clean*; i. e. no distinction of food is to be made under the Christian dispensation. All the distinctions of the Levitical law are abolished.— Ἀλλὰ . . . ἐσθίοντι, *still they are hurtful to the man, who eats so as to stumble thereby*. Διὰ, before a noun, often designates *the manner in which a thing happens or is done*; so, for example, in Luke 8: 4, διὰ παραβολῆς, i. q. παραβολικῶς; Acts 15: 27, διὰ λόγου, *orally*; 2 Cor. 10: 11, δι' ἐπιστολῶν, *in the way of writing*; Heb. 13: 22, διὰ βραχείων, *briefly*, etc. See Bretschn. in διὰ, c. a.

(21) Καλὸν . . . ἀσθενεῖ, *it is good not to eat flesh, nor drink wine, nor [to do any thing] whereby thy brother stumbleth, or has ground of offence, or is made weak*. Μηδὲ ἐν ᾧ is elliptical; the full expression would be, μηδὲ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν τι ἐν ᾧ κ. τ. λ. The words ἢ σκανδαλίζεται ἢ ἀσθενεῖ, are omitted in Codd. A. C. 67, and in Syr. Arab. Copt. versions; also in Origen. They seem to be a gloss or repetition of προσκόπτει. The sense of ἀσθενεῖ is, *to render incompetent, viz. incompetent to walk safely or securely*.

(22) Σὺ . . . θεοῦ, *hast thou faith? keep it to thyself before God*; i. e. hast thou a belief that there is no difference in meats, (which is truly the case), yet deem it sufficient, in respect to this point, to regulate by it thy conduct in private, as seen only by the eye of God. Do not act this out in public, by which you may give needless and injurious offence.

Μακάριος . . . δοκιμάζει, *happy [is he], who does not condemn himself in respect to the thing which he allows*; i. e. we may congratulate that man, who does not so use his Christian liberty in respect to food, as to bring on himself condemnation or blame by an abuse of it, or by making use of it in an imprudent and inconsiderate manner.

(23) Ὁ δὲ . . . πίστεως, *but he who doubts, is condemned if he eat, because it is not of faith*; i. e. he who doubts whether it is lawful for him to eat a particular kind of food, and yet eats it, is worthy of condemnation; because he does this against his conscience or belief, or at least without an approving conscience.

Πᾶν δὲ . . . ἐστί, *and every thing that is not of faith, is sinful*; i. e. not only eating against one's conscience, or without an approving conscience, is deserving of condemnation, but any thing else done in like manner is sinful. No man should indulge in any demeanor or conduct, when the lawfulness of it is to him a matter of doubt. A

truly excellent maxim in Christian morals, and one which, if duly heeded by Christians, would prevent many a bitter hour of darkness and contrition.

CHAP. XV. 1—33.

Between the preceding verse and verse 1 of this chapter, the Cod. Alex. and 106 Codd. minusc., most of the Greek fathers, together with the Syriac and Arabic versions, insert vs. 25—27 of chap. xvi., i. e. the close of this epistle. Hence has arisen the controversy, whether the epistle properly closes with chap. xiv. On the side of the *textus receptus*, which places these verses at the end of the epistle, are the Cod. Vaticanus, 3 uncial Codd., several Codd. minusc., and the Latin fathers. For this arrangement, also, the internal evidence arising from the connection may be appealed to; for it seems to be quite plain, that chap. xv. is intimately connected with Chap xiv., in respect to the subject of which it treats. If Paul be the author of the whole epistle, (and the evidence appears to be very satisfactory that he is), then it would be somewhat singular that the passage in 16: 25—27 should be inserted here, where there seems to be no special call for a doxology, and where the connection is so close with the sequel as it stands in the *textus receptus*. Flatt appeals to Eph. 3: 20, in order to shew that Paul is accustomed to introduce doxologies into the body of his epistles. He might have appealed to several other instances of the like nature; e. g. Rom. 1: 25. 11: 36. 2 Cor. 11: 31. Gal. 1: 5. Phil. 4: 20. 1 Tim. 1: 17; but all these examples are in quite a different situation from that of the present one, for with one exception (1 Tim. 1: 17), God is the *immediately preceding* subject of the writer; and in 1 Tim. 1: 17, this is implied. But such is not the case in the instance under examination. The internal congruity of the passage, then, seems to be strongly against the insertion of 16: 25—27 in this place. And although Griesbach has inserted it, and Morus, Wetstein, Flatt, Tholuck and many other critics approve of this; yet I agree most cordially with Dr. Knapp, who has decided more conformably, as I apprehend, to the principles of true criticism, that the order of the *textus receptus* is the true one.

In the present chapter, Paul continues to exhort the church at Rome, to strive after unity and peace. He sets before them the self denial of Christ, vs. 3, 4. He beseeches God to give them the spirit of Christian unity and love, vs. 5, 6. He exhorts them to a mutual kind reception of each other, v. 7. He shews that the reception of the Gentiles into the Christian church, had been clearly and often predicted, vs. 8—12; and prays God to fill them all with joy and peace, v. 13. He apologizes, as it were, for writing to the church at Rome, by describing the nature of his office as an apostle to the Gentiles, the labours which he had performed while holding this office, and the affectionate desire which he had cherished of paying the church at Rome a visit, vs. 14—24. He describes to them the plan of his future journeys and labours, expresses his hope of yet visiting them, and begs an affectionate interest in their prayers to God for him, vs. 25—32. He then concludes with a benediction, v. 33.

(1) Ὁφείλομεν δὲ . . . βαστάζειν, *we, moreover, who are strong, ought to bear with the infirmities of the weak.* Δύνατοι, *the strong in faith*, i. e. those who had no scruples about meats and drinks, etc.—Ἀδυνατών, *those who were not δύνατοι*, i. e. who had scruples, etc.—*Βαστάζειν, to bear with, to endure patiently, to tolerate; comp. Gal. 6: 2. Rev. 2: 2.*

Καὶ μὴ ἑαυτοῖς ἀρέσκειν, and not to please ourselves; i. e. not to act merely in such a way as would gratify our own views and inclinations. See the example of Paul, in 1 Cor. 9: 22.

(2) *Ἐκαστος . . . οἰκοδομήν, let each one of us please his neighbour, in respect to that which is good, unto [his] edification*; i. e. let us act in such a manner as to please our neighbour, so far as we may do so and do what is good; let us act so as to edify him.

(3) *Καὶ γὰρ . . . ἤρσεεν, for Christ did not please himself*; i. e. Christ did not have respect merely to his own pleasure or pain, convenience or inconvenience; but did that which was grateful and useful to others, although he exposed himself to great suffering in consequence of acting thus. *Γὰρ* stands prefixed here to the reason why we ought to seek the good of others.

Ἀλλὰ . . . ἐπ' ἐμέ, but, as it is written, the reproaches of those who reproached thee, have fallen upon me. The passage is quoted from Ps. 69: 10 (69: 9). The general sentiment is here accommodated to a particular case; i. e. the same thing which this sentiment declares, was in fact exemplified in the treatment which Christ received. In other words, Christ suffered reproaches, rather than desist from his beneficence toward others; which is the sentiment of the passage quoted.

(4) *Ἄσα γὰρ . . . προεγράφη, whatsoever things, now, were written in ancient times, were written for our instruction.* The connection of this verse with the preceding is somewhat difficult. On the whole it must be regarded as a parenthesis. *Γὰρ confirmantis* seems to be a proper description of the *γὰρ* here; for it is prefixed to a circumstance designed to enforce what the apostle is saying, i. e. it is a kind of *γὰρ urgentis*, as one might say. *Προεγράφη*, lit. *were written before*, i. e. in former days, in ancient times, as I have rendered it above.

Ἴνα . . . ἔχωμεν, that through patience, and by the exhortation of the Scriptures, we might obtain hope. *ὑπομνήτης* refers to a patient endurance of the troubles and sorrows, to which the doing of good may expose us.—*Παρακλήσεως* seems here to mean *admonition* or *exhortation*; for it refers back to *διδασκαλίαν*, and if rendered *consolation* does not seem to be directly congruous with that word. The writer here refers to the exhortation of the Scriptures, to persevere meekly and patiently in doing good.

Patience of this nature will produce *hope*; comp. Rom. 5: 3—5. He who perseveres in thus doing good, amid the evils which may

come upon him, will be rewarded with "a hope that maketh not ashamed."

(5) 'Ο δὲ θεὸς . . . Ἰησοῦν, *now may the God of patience and admonition give mutual unity of sentiment to you, according to Christ Jesus.* 'Ο θεὸς τῆς ὑπομονῆς means, God who bestows patience, or God who is the author of patience; just as *the God of grace*, is the God who bestows grace. So ὁ θεὸς τῆς παρακλήσεως means, either God who is the author of exhortation or encouragement [viz. to persevere], or God who is the author of consolation. I understand παρακλήσεως here, in the sense of exciting, exhorting to acts of self-denial, i. e. to do those things which make for peace and for mutual Christian edification, although they may cost self-denial and mortification; which accords with the context above.

Κατὰ Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν means, in accordance with the Spirit of Christ or agreeably to what Christ or the Christian religion requires. The earnest supplication of the apostle, that the Romans may be led τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν ἐν ἀλλήλοις, shows how mistaken those are, who think that unity of sentiment among Christians is not desirable, even as to matters not essential to salvation; for surely the sentiment about distinction of meats was not essential in this sense. If now such unity in smaller matters was urged by the apostle, then of course he would urge it far more, in things essential to salvation.

The precepts of the apostle shew, also, that Christians may differ about externals, and things of minor importance, without hazarding their salvation; although not without endangering the peace and welfare of the Church. Such is the imperfection of human nature, that difference of opinion is apt to produce dispute; and dispute of course is apt to lead, more or less, to alienation of feeling.

(6) Ἰνα . . . Χριστοῦ, *that with one accord and with one voice you may glorify God, even the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.*—Ὁμοθυμαδὸν comes from ὁμός, *conjunctus*, and θύμος, *animus*. This characterizes the union of mind or sentiment, which the apostle desires should pervade the Christian church. Ἐν ἑνὶ στόματι characterizes the harmony of voices, in the song of praise which was to be sung by the church; i. e. they should not sing *discordant* notes, but *harmonious* ones. The meaning is not literal here, but figurative, viz., that with union in their praise to God they might offer him thanksgiving, that they might all accord in the same feeling and same worship.

Ἐν καὶ παρῶρα, καὶ is *explicative*, i. e. "et copulat et explicat;"

see Bretschn. Lex. καί, 2. b. Such is a very common idiom in the New Testament with respect to καί as *explicative*; comp. 1 Pet. 1: 3. 2 Pet. 1: 11. 2: 20. Phil. 4: 20. Ephes. 1: 3. Col. 3: 17. In these cases, viz. such as have καί *explicative* followed by a noun in apposition with the preceding noun and limiting or defining it, the article is usually *omitted* before the second noun, as here before πατέρα compare also, in this respect, the examples cited above.

(7) Αἰὸ . . . θεοῦ, therefore shew kindness to each other, as Christ also hath shewed kindness to you, unto the glory of God; i. e. in view of all that has been said, I beseech you to treat each other with brotherly kindness and affection; yea, with kindness like to that which Christ has shewn to you, in order that God may be glorified.

Αἰὸ refers to all which had been before said of Christian kindness and forbearance. As to προσλαμβάνετε, comp. 14: 3. Ἰμαῖς in the *textus receptus* is ἡμῶς. This latter is removed, because the Mss. A. B. C. D. E. F. G., read ὑμῶς.—Εἰς δόξαν θεοῦ, Tholuck interprets of *eternal happiness*, i. e. the glory which God bestows. The phrase is capable of this meaning, comp. Heb. 2: 10. Rom. 5: 2. 1 Pet. 5: 4; but vs. 8, 9 require a different sense here, viz. since Christ hath kindly received you, in order that God may be glorified.

(8) Λέγω δὲ κ. τ. λ. Λέ “*accuratius definit*,” i. e. it is added to a phrase or sentence, inserted for the sake of more full and entire explanation. The writer, having asserted that Christ has kindly received us in order that God may be glorified, goes on now to add some things which serve to shew, that Christ entered upon the duties of his mediatorial office, in order to propagate the truth and to bring Jew and Gentile nations to glorify God.

Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν . . . θεοῦ, Jesus Christ was a minister of the circumcision, on account of the truth of God; i. e. that Jesus Christ was a minister of the Jews, that he served the cause of divine truth among the Jews, in order to promote its true interests. Ἰπέρ, on account of, for the sake of.

Εἰς τὸ . . . πατέρων, in order to confirm the promises made to the fathers; i. e. in order to carry into execution the promises made to the ancient fathers, of spiritual blessings to be bestowed on their children.

(9) Τὰ δὲ . . . θεόν, [I say also] that the Gentiles are to glorify God for his mercy [in Christ]; i. e. the Gentiles, as well as the Jews, are to be brought into the church, that God may be all and in all, and thus be glorified by all men. Δοξάσαι is constructed with λέγω im-

plied, as the version shews. The present phrase discloses the meaning of εἰς δόξαν θεοῦ in v. 7.

Διὰ τοῦτο . . . ψαλῶ, *therefore will I praise thee among the Gentiles, yea, to thy name will I sing praise.* The quotation is from Ps. 18: 49. The design of it is to shew, that the Gentiles, as well as the people of Israel, would have the blessings of the gospel proffered to them, and be brought to glorify God.—Ἐξομολογήσομαι, *I will praise thee*, like the Hebrew הַרְבֵּינָה.—Τῷ ὀνόματί σου, *to thy name*, i. e. to thee, like the Hebrew הַרְבֵּינָה.

(10) Καὶ πάλιν λέγει, viz. in Deut. 32: 43.—Ἐνφρανθήτε . . . αἰ- τοῦ, *rejoice ye Gentiles with his people*; Hebrew הַרְבֵּינָה גוֹיִם עַמּוֹ. The design of the quotation is, to shew that the Gentiles are spoken of in the Old Testament Scriptures, as destined to be brought into the church of God, or as being made to praise him.

(11) Καὶ πάλιν, viz. in Ps. 117: 1 (Sept. 116: 1). The senti- ment is the same as before. The object in accumulating quotations, is additional confirmation of what the writer had advanced.

(12) Καὶ λέγει, viz. in Is. 11: 10. In the quotation, the apostle omits בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא, *in that day*. Also instead of the Hebrew אֲשֶׁר יִשְׂרָאֵל עָמְדָה לְפָנָיו כְּדָגֵל לְגוֹיִם, *who shall stand as a banner of the nations or Gentiles*, the apostle has, with the Septuagint, καὶ ὁ ἀνιστάμενος ἄρχσει ἐθνῶν, *one shall arise to be a leader of the Gentiles*; *ad sensum*, but not *ad literam*. For ἐλπιούσι, the Hebrew has יִדְרְשׁוּ. The whole quotation, therefore, is *ad sensum* only; but is truly so much. It is added to the others for the same purpose as before, viz. with the design of shewing that the Gentiles should belong to the Christian church, so that God might be glorified by them.

Thus far in confirmation of the latter clause of v. 7. The apostle now quits this subject, and resumes his supplications in behalf of the church at Rome, which were interrupted by v. 7, seq.

(13) Ὁ δὲ θεὸς . . . πιστεύειν, *now may the God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in believing*; i. e. may that God who is the author of all Christian hope, (comp. ἐλπιούσιν in v. 12), make your joy and peace, which result from faith in Christ, greatly to abound.—Ἐἰς τὸ . . . ἄγιον, *so that ye may abound in hope, through the power of the Holy Spirit*; i. e. so that, having much joy and peace in believing, you may also have a lively Christian hope of future glory, through the influence of the Holy Spirit who dwells in you, and who gives the earnest of future glory; comp. Eph. 1: 13, 14. Rom. 8: 23 with the notes upon it.

(14) Πέπεισμαι δέ, where δέ "orationi continuandae inseruit;" as also in v. 13 above.—Καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγώ, *even I myself*. Καὶ added to pronouns in this way, serves to make the expression more distinct and intense.—Περὶ ὑμῶν, *in respect to you*.—"Ὅτι . . . ἀγαθωσύνης, *that you yourselves (καὶ αὐτοί) are filled with kindness*. Καὶ αὐτοί indicates what I have expressed in the translation, as nearly as our language can express the value of the Greek phrase. Ἀγαθωσύνης I take here to refer to the kind feelings, which the apostle hoped and believed the Roman Christians would cherish towards each other.

Πεπληρωμένοι . . . νοουθετεῖν, *abounding in all knowledge, and able to give mutual admonition*. The meaning is: 'I am persuaded that ye possess in abundance such Christian knowledge, i. e. such a knowledge of Christian truths and principles, that ye will be able to give such advice and warning as you may mutually need.'

(15) Τολμηρότερον . . . ὑμᾶς, *I have written the more boldly to you, brethren, when reminding you with respect to some things*; i. e. I have written with more freedom than might have been expected from a stranger, when reminding you of the various things which I have urged upon you. Ἀπὸ μέρους means, in some parts of his epistle, i. e. as to some things.

Διὰ τὴν χάριν . . . θεοῦ, *on account of the favour which was bestowed upon me by God*; namely, the honour of the apostolic office (comp. Rom. 1: 5), which the sequel shews to be the meaning of χάριν here.

(16) Εἰς τὸ εἶναι . . . ἔθνη, *that I should be a minister of Jesus Christ to the Gentiles*. Because his office led him to preach the gospel to the Gentiles, and to exercise a spiritual watch over them, he had ventured to address the church at Rome with freedom.

Ἰεροουγοῦντα . . . θεοῦ, *performing the office of a priest [in respect to] the gospel of God*; i. e. acting a part in respect to the concerns of Christians, not unlike that of a priest among the Jews.—"ἵνα γένηται . . . ἅγιος, *that the offering of the Gentiles might be acceptable, being purified by the Holy Spirit*; i. e. that the Gentiles may be offered to God, whom as their λειτουργός I present, inasmuch as they have been rendered clean, pure, by the sanctifying influence of the Holy Spirit on their hearts.

(17) Ἐχω οὖν . . . θεόν, *I have, then, cause for glorying, through Jesus Christ, as to those things which pertain to God*; i. e. being a minister of Jesus Christ to the Gentiles, I have cause for rejoicing, that he has strengthened me and given me success among them, in

things pertaining to religion.—*Ὅν* “facit transitum orationis,” (Bretschn. Lex.); accordingly it may be rendered, in such cases, *then, moreover, further*, etc. Here it stands before a paragraph, which the apostle subjoins to the preceding declaration in order to exhibit the happy fruits of his ministry.—*Ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ* I understand to mean, *through the aid of Christ*. Paul had just averred, that he was *λειτουργὸς Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* and as such, he here intimates that Christ had afforded him aid, so as to ensure him success in his employment. That *ἐν* often has the meaning of *by* or *through*, in the sense of *ope, auxilio alicujus*, there can be no doubt; e. g. “He casts out demons *ἐν τῷ ἀρχόντι*, *by the aid of the prince of demons*,” Matt. 9: 34. In like manner *ἐν* is used in John 17: 10. Acts 4: 9. 15: 7. 17: 28, 31, et saepe alibi.

(18) *Ὁὐ γὰρ . . . ἐμοῦ*, *for I do not presume to mention any thing which Christ hath not wrought by me*; i. e. I do not, in saying this, intend to claim any praise by exaggerating my success, or taking to myself the credit of what others have done *εἰς ὑπακοήν ἔθνων*, *in order to bring the Gentiles to obey the gospel*.—*Δόγμα καὶ ἕργον* means, *by preaching and by other personal effort*. *Γὰρ explicantis*, i. e. preceding what serves to limit the declaration which goes before.

(19) *Ἐν δυνάμει . . . τεράτων*, *by the influence of signs and wonders*, or wonderful signs. In Hebrew, *וּמִתְקַדְּשֵׁי הַמִּצְוֹת*, (usually conjoined), means *wonders, signs, or miracles* adapted to persuade or enforce belief in the power, providence, veracity, etc., of God. The union of *σήμεια καὶ τέρατα* in the New Testament, is an imitation of this idiom. It may be rendered as a Hendiadys, and the latter noun made an adjective to qualify the former, agreeably to an idiom common both in the Old and New Testament. If rendered *signs and wonders*, then *signs* means *miraculous proofs*.

Ἐν δυνάμει . . . ἁγίου, *by the influence of the Holy Spirit*, may mean, signs and wonders performed by virtue of this influence; and so Chrysostom, Theodoret, Erasmus, and others, have understood it. But it may also mean, the internal influences of the Spirit, bestowing the gift of prophecy, the power of speaking in foreign languages, etc.; and so Beza, Grotius, Tholuck, and others, have explained it. In this case, it is *coordinate* with *δυνάμει σημείων καὶ τεράτων*, not *subordinate* to it, i. e. not used merely to qualify it.

Ὡστε με . . . Χριστοῦ, *so that from Jerusalem and its suburbs, even to Illyricum, I have spread abroad the gospel of Christ*. *Ὡστε με . . . πεπληρωμέναι* is the usual construction of the Infinitive with

ὥστε. Πιπληρωκένοι has here the sense of *diffusing, spreading abroad*; and comes from the sense of *filling up*, because, in order to do this, a *diffusion* into all parts is necessary. In the like sense the word is employed in Acts 5: 28. Col. 1: 25, comp. Sirach 24: 26.—Illyricum was a province bounded south by Macedonia, west by the Adriatic, east by a part of the river Danube, and north by a part of Italy and Germany. It corresponds with the modern Croatia and Dalmatia; and was the extreme boundary of what might be called the Grecian population. The circle of Paul's preaching, then, as here described, reaches from the extreme north-west of the land of the Greeks, to Jerusalem, i. e. it comprehends all Greece, in the widest sense of this term, Asia Minor, the Grecian islands, and the country between Asia Minor and Jerusalem. More might have been added; for the apostle had preached at Damascus, and probably in Arabia, before he came to Jerusalem, Acts 9: 20. Gal. 1: 16, 17.

(20) Οὕτω . . . οἰζοδομῶ, so, also, that I was strongly desirous to preach the gospel, not where Christ was named, lest I should build on another's foundation. Φιλοτιμούμενον is to be constructed with μέ, taken from the preceding verse. The word literally signifies, to covet or desire as an honour, to regard as honourable; hence the secondary sense, to desire strongly, earnestly to wish for or to covet.

(21) Ἀλλά . . . συνήσουσι, but, as it is written: They shall see, to whom no declaration was made respecting him; and they who have not heard, shall understand. The quotation is from Is. 52: 15; a passage which has respect to the Messiah's being made known to the heathen. The apostle quotes it here, in order to illustrate and to justify the principle which he had avowed, viz. that of preaching the gospel where it was entirely unknown before. The quotation says as much as to declare, that the gospel shall be thus proclaimed. Ὀψονται and συνήσουσι are to be understood as designating mental vision and perception, for this is what the writer intends to designate.

(22) Διὸ καὶ . . . ὑμᾶς, wherefore I was greatly hindered from coming to you. Διὸ, wherefore, means, on account of his many and urgent calls to preach elsewhere. Καὶ is here joined with ἐνεκοπτόμην τὰ πολλά as an *intensive*, i. e. "sensum intendit, augmentat." The apostle does not say simply, that he was often hindered or much hindered, ἐκοπτόμην τὰ πολλά, but καὶ ἐκοπτόμην τὰ πολλά, I was very much hindered, i. e. I had such frequent and urgent calls elsewhere, that it was impossible for me to visit Rome, as I desired to do. Passow is, so far as I know, the first lexicographer who has done any tolerable justice to the *Proteus καὶ* of the Greeks.

(23) *Νυνὶ δὲ . . . ἐτιῶν*, but now, having no longer any place in these regions, and being desirous for many years to pay you a visit. *Τόπον ἔχων*, i. e. having no longer any considerable place, where I have not proclaimed the gospel.

(24) *Ὡς ἐὰν . . . ὑμῶς*, whenever I may go into Spain, I hope, as I pass on, to see you; i. e. intending to visit Spain, he meant to take Rome in his way. In the *textus receptus*, *ἐλεύσομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς* follows *Σπανίαν* which Griesbach and Knapp have rejected, as they are not found in Codd. A. C. D. E. F. G., nor in the Syriac, Arabic, or Coptic versions, etc. Whether the apostle did in fact ever make a journey to Spain, is somewhat uncertain. The tradition of the church affirms this; but not on sure grounds. In case we allow that he was imprisoned a second time at Rome, such a journey is not improbable.

Καὶ . . . ἐξεῖ, and to be sent on my way thither by you. The apostle here refers to the usual custom of the churches, when the messengers of the gospel departed from them, of sending their elders, etc., to accompany them for some distance on their journey; comp. Acts 15: 3. 17: 14, 15. 20: 38. 21: 5.—*Ἐὰν . . . ἐμπλησθῶ*, when I am in part first satisfied with your company. Observe the delicacy of the expression. The apostle does not say *ἐμπλησθῶ*, satisfied, but *ὑπὸ μέρους ἐμπλησθῶ*, partly satisfied, as though he never could enjoy their society sufficiently to gratify all his desires.

(25) *Νυνὶ δὲ . . . ἁγίοις*, but now I go to Jerusalem to supply the wants of the saints. *Διακονέω* is often used, in the New Testament, to designate the supplying with food and other comforts of life. At present, says the apostle, I cannot visit you, as duty calls me in another direction.

(26) *Εὐδόκησαν γὰρ . . . Ἱερουσαλήμ*, for it has seemed good to Macedonia and Achaia, to make some contribution for indigent Christians at Jerusalem. *Κοινωνίαν*, contribution, *collatio beneficiorum*. Comp. 1 Cor. 16: 1—4. 2 Cor. viii. ix. Acts 24: 17.

(27) *Εὐδόκησαν γὰρ . . . εἶσι*, [I say] it has seemed good, for they are truly their debtors. *Γὰρ καὶ ὀφειλέται ἀντιῶν εἶσι*, assigns a reason why it seemed good. *Καὶ* is here an intensive, truly, really.

Εἰ γὰρ assigns a reason why they are debtors. *If the Gentiles have shared in their spiritual things, they ought surely to aid them in temporal things.* *Καὶ* intensive, in *καὶ ἐν τοῖς σαρκικοῖς*.

(28) *Τοῦτο . . . Σπανίαν*, now when this duty shall be discharged, and this fruit made sure to them, I shall pass through the midst of

you into Spain. Καρπὸν here means the *fruit* of the contribution in Macedonia and Achaia, the fruit which their benevolence had produced. Σφραγισμένος, applied to an instrument in writing, means *to authenticate it, to make it valid*, i. e. sure to answer the purpose for which it was intended. So here, the apostle would not stop short, in the performance of the duty with which he is entrusted as the almoner of the churches, until he had seen the actual distribution of their charity among the indigent saints at Jerusalem, a fidelity and an activity well worthy of all imitation.

(29) Οἶδα δὲ . . . ἐλεύσομαι, and *I know that when I come to you, I shall come with the full blessings of the gospel of Christ.* Ἐν πληρώματι εὐλογίας, *with an abundant blessing*; where the first of the two nouns constitutes the adjective; comp. Heb. Gramm. § 440. b.

(30) Παρακαλῶ δὲ . . . Χριστοῦ, *now I beseech you, brethren, by the Lord Jesus Christ.* Δέ continuative.—Διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, *for the sake of our Lord Jesus Christ*, i. e. out of love and regard for him.—Καὶ διὰ . . . πνεύματος, *and by the love of the Spirit*; i. e. by the affectionate Christian sympathy for the friends of Christ, which the Spirit has given you.—Συναγωνίσασθαι . . . θεόν, *that ye strive together for me, in your prayers to God in my behalf*; i. e. that you unite with me in my Christian warfare, helping me by your earnest supplications to God in my behalf.

(31) Ἴνα . . . Ἰουδαίᾳ, *that I may be delivered from unbelievers in Judea*; i. e. pray that I may be delivered from the enemies of the gospel in Judea, whither I am going; for I have reason to expect persecution and injury from them.

Καὶ ἵνα . . . ἁγίοις, *and that my service which is for Jerusalem, may be acceptable to the saints.* Διακονία means, his service in carrying and distributing the contributions of the Greek churches. It seems rather singular, at first, that he should doubt whether such a charity would be agreeable to indigent churches at Jerusalem. But when we call to mind the violent prejudices of the Jewish Christians, who were zealots for the law of Moses, we may well suppose that some of them would hesitate to come under obligations to Paul, the great champion of opposite opinions, and also to the charity of *Gentile* Christians, who disregarded the laws of Moses with respect to ceremonial observances.

(32) Ἴνα ἐν . . . ὑμῖν, [pray] *that I may come to you with joy, if God will, and may be refreshed among you.* Ἴνα here falls back upon προσευχᾶς κ. τ. λ., in v. 30.—Διὰ θελήματος θεοῦ, *Deo volente.*

(33) Ὁ δὲ θεὸς . . . ὑμῶν, *now the God of peace be with you all*; i. e. may God, the author of peace, who bestows happiness, true prosperity, εὐλογία, be with you, i. e. aid you, bless you. Ἀμήν, in the *textus receptus*, is of suspicious authority, and is so noted by Dr. Knapp.

CHAP. XVI.

The apostle concludes his epistle, by various affectionate greetings and commendations, 1—16. After which he warns the church against those who make divisions and give offence among them, i. e. such as practise the contrary of that which he had been enjoining, in the preceding part of his epistle, vs. 17, 18. He expresses his affectionate desire that they might be kind and simple-hearted, and his wish that the God of peace would give them the victory over the adversary of souls, the fomentor of discord among brethren, vs. 19, 20. He then expresses the salutations of several Christian friends and companions, who were with him, vs. 21—24; and concludes with a devout doxology, vs. 25—27.

(1) Συνίστημι δὲ . . . Κεχρηαῖς, *now I commend to you Phebe our sister, who is a deaconess of the church at Cenchrea*. Δέ continuative.—Διάκονον, i. e. τὴν διάκονον, for the Greeks used both ὁ et ἡ διάκονος. It should be remembered, that in the East, women were not permitted to mix in the society of men, as in the western world they are at present. They were kept secluded, for the most part, in a retired room or γυναικείον, to which no stranger could have access. Consequently, it became highly important for the church to have αἱ διάκονοι as well as οἱ διάκονοι, in order that the former might look to females who were indigent or sick. Accordingly we find the female deacons more than once adverted to, in the epistles of Paul; comp. 1 Tim. 5: 10. Tit. 2: 4.

Κεχρηαῖς, *Cenchrea*, was the *eastern* port of Corinth; for Corinth itself lay not upon the sea, but had two harbours at some distance from the city, viz. Cenchrea on the east, and Lechea on the west. It would seem that Phebe was about to sail from Cenchrea to Rome, when Paul wrote this epistle; and it is quite probable, that it was sent by her to the church at Rome. The word Κεχρηαῖ is used only in the plural, like Ἀθηναῖ.

(2) ἵνα . . . ἁγίων, *that ye may receive her as being in the Lord, in a manner worthy of the saints*. That the phrase ἐν κυρίῳ means, *being in the Lord*, i. e. being a member of his spiritual body, (comp. 1 Cor. 12: 27. Rom. 12: 5. 1 Cor. 10: 17. Eph. 1: 22, 23. 4: 12. 5: 30. Col. 1: 24), the various passages in which it occurs leave no good room for doubt. So the sentiment here is: 'Receive

Phebe who is a Christian, in such a manner as becomes Christians, i. e. with distinguished kindness and benevolence.

Καὶ παραστῆτε . . . ἐμοῦ, and render her assistance in any thing, where she may need it of you; for she herself has been a helper of many, and especially of me. For the words *παραστῆτε* and *προστιάτις*, see on *προϊστάμενος* in chap. 12: 8. This hint shews what the office of a deaconess was, i. e. what duties it led her to perform. A comparison of *προστιάτις* here will serve to cast light on *ὁ προϊστάμενος* in Rom 12: 8.

(3) *Πρίσκαν, Prisca*, the same as *Πρίσκιλλα* in Acts 18: 2, 26. 1 Cor. 16: 19. The latter is merely a *diminutive*, which was commonly applied to women in the way of courtesy or affection; as John says to Christians: "My *little* children." Both Priscilla and her husband Aquila are here called *συνεργούς* of the apostle.—*Ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*, i. e. in the Christian cause.

(4) *Οἴτινες . . . ὑπέθηκαν*, lit. *who exposed their own neck for my life*; i. e. who exposed their own neck to the sword, their own head to be cut off, in order to defend me from harm.—*Καὶ τὴν . . . ἐκκλησίαν*, and the church which is in their house, i. e. which habitually convenes there. Aquila and Priscilla are spoken of, also, as having a church in their house while at Ephesus, 1 Cor. 16: 19; from which some have drawn the conclusion, that only their family, which consisted of Christians, are meant by *ἐκκλησίαν*: a criticism which is destitute of support from the *usus loquendi* of the New Testament. On the contrary, nothing is more natural than the supposition, that these zealous advocates of the Christian cause, wherever they sojourned, were accustomed to hold assemblies at their own house, for the purposes of Christian worship and instruction. All the meetings of the primitive Christians must have been in this way, inasmuch as they had, at first, no churches or temples where they could convene.

(5) *ἘραINETUS*; this and other names which follow down to v. 15, designate persons otherwise unknown to us, but who, personally or otherwise, must have been known to the apostle.—*Ἀπορχὴ τῆς Ἀσίας*, one of the first who embraced Christianity under my preaching in *proconsular Asia*, i. e. Asia Minor, probably in the Roman sense of that word.—*Εἰς Χριστόν*, in respect to Christ.

(6, 7) It appears probable, that the persons here named had formerly been residents in Asia or Greece, where the apostle was acquainted with them, but had now removed to Rome.—*Ἐπίσημοι, of note, well-known, highly esteemed*; *ἐν τοῖς ἀποστόλοις*, among the apos-

ties.—Οἱ . . . Χριστιῶν, *who became Christians even earlier than myself*; where ἐν Χριστιῶν can hardly be mistaken.

(9) Ἀγαπητόν μου ἐν Κυρίῳ, *my beloved fellow Christian*.

(10) Τὸν δοκιμὸν ἐν Χριστῷ, *a tried and approved Christian*.—Τοὺς ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστοβούλου, i. e. τοὺς ὄντας ἐν Κυρίῳ ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων Ἀριστοβούλου· comp. the close of v. 11.

(13) Μητέρα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐμοῦ, *his mother and mine*; i. e. his mother in a literal sense, and mine in a figurative one.

(16) Ἀσπάσασθε . . . ἅγιον, *salute each other with a holy kiss*; i. e. greet each other after the affectionate manner of Christians; live together in the kind exchange of Christian salutations and tokens of friendship. This custom is extensively maintained, at present, on the continent of Europe, among Christian friends, and others also. In itself, it is like any *external* thing, not essential, but only a *res loci et temporis*, depending on the manners and customs of the time and place, like the wearing or not wearing of long hair at Corinth, etc.

Αἱ ἐκκλησίαι πᾶσαι, i. e. all the churches in the vicinity of the apostle, or those which he had recently visited. This shews the custom of the early Christian churches, as to sending expressions of brotherly affection for each other, although they were mutual strangers in respect to personal acquaintance.

(17) Σκοπεῖν, *to consider attentively, to beware of*.—Διχοστασίας, *divisions*, viz. in the church, among brethren.—Σκάνδαλα, *offences*, i. e. those who are the occasion of others stumbling and falling, by their uncharitableness or their superstition.—Παρά, *contrary to, against*; comp. Rom. 1: 26. 11: 24. Gal. 1: 8, 9. Heb. 11: 11.—Ἐκκλινάτε ἀπ' αὐτῶν, *stand off from them, avoid them*; i. e. give them no countenance or approbation.

(18) Τῷ κυρίῳ ἡμῶν Χριστῷ, i. e. the Christian cause, or him who is the author of Christianity.—Κοιλίᾳ, *their own appetite*; i. e. they do not labour for the good of the Christian cause, but merely for their own private interests, merely to obtain a maintenance.

The apostle seems, therefore, to refer here to certain teachers at Rome, at this time, who were the authors of division and offence there, and whose views extended no farther than the acquisition of a maintenance for themselves.

Καὶ διὰ . . . ἀπάκων, *and by flattery and fair speeches beguile the minds of the simple*. Theophylact: χρηστολογία, γολακεία, i. e.

flattery.—*Εὐλογία* is *eulogy, praise.*—*Καρδίας*, *minds*, like the Hebrew כִּלְיֹת.—*Ἀκάκων* means, those who are *destitute of suspicion, without guile, simple-hearted.*

(19) *Ἡ γὰρ . . . ἀφίκειο*, *for your obedient temper of mind is known among all [the churches];* i. e. the fame of your Christian temper, your readiness to obey the gospel, has been spread among all the churches. *Γὰρ* seems here to be used in connection with something implied, and which the mind of the reader is to furnish; e. g. [I exhort you to do all this], *γὰρ*, *because* I know that you will lend a listening ear. See Bretschn. Lex. on *γὰρ*.

Χαίρω οὖν . . . ὑμῖν, *I rejoice, therefore, in respect to you;* i. e. since your obedient disposition has procured you such a good name in the churches, I rejoice. *Τὸ ἐφ' ὑμῶν*, i. e. *κατὰ τὸ ἐφ' ὑμῶν.*—*Θέλω δὲ . . . καλόν*, *and I wish you to be wise in respect to that which is good, but simple in regard to that which is evil.* He means to say, that he desires the Roman Christians not to use their dexterity in order to accomplish selfish ends, like the false teachers among them; but to be willingly accounted *simple* or *simpletons*, in regard to doing evil.

(20) *Θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης*, *may God who is the author of peace, or who loves and approves it!*—*Συντριβῆι*, Fut. for Optative, like the Heb. Future.—*Σατανᾶν*, *Satan*, viz. the malignant accuser of the brethren, and who delights in exciting the evil-minded to discord and division. May God disappoint all his malignant purposes, and preserve your harmony and kindly affection! The language of this wish (*συντριβῆι*) refers to the prediction in Gen. 3: 15.

(21) *Χάρις* here means favour of every kind, like the כֶּסֶף וְחֵן of the Hebrews.—*Ἀμήν* seems to be spurious.

(21) Luke and Jason and Sosipater are classed together here, as *relatives* of Paul. If this be Luke the Evangelist, which seems altogether probable, then it would appear that he must have been of Hebrew descent, at least in part; for Paul was “a Hebrew of the Hebrews,” i. e. of pure Hebrew descent. Nevertheless, as *συγγενεῖς* does not mark the *degree* of relation, we can not argue from this expression with much confidence.

(22) *Τέστιος ὁ γράψας*, i. e. who was the amanuensis of Paul, on the occasion of writing this epistle.

(23) *Ὁ ξένος μου*, *my host;* i. e. who has received me into his house, and shewed me hospitality; and who shews an extensive hos-

pitality to all Christians.—*Οἰκονόμος τῆς πόλεως*, *the treasurer of the city*.—*Κούαρτος* shews the manner in which the Greeks represented the Latin *qu*, *Quartus*.

25. The whole now concludes with a general ascription of praise. *Τῷ δυναμένῳ*, sc. *ἡ ἡ δόξα*, as appears from the close of v. 27. The sentence is suspended, after the usual manner of Paul, until he resumes it in *μόνῳ σοφῷ θεῷ*.—*Στηρίξειαι*, *to establish*; viz. in the Christian faith and practice.—*Κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιόν μου*, *in accordance with the gospel which I preach*, agreeably to the principles of this.—*Καὶ τὸ κήρυγμα*, *even the gospel of Jesus Christ*, i. e. even the gospel of which Jesus is the author, or which has respect to him. *Κήρυγμα* is in apposition with *εὐαγγέλιον* and the object of Paul, by the whole declaration, is to shew that the gospel which he preached was the true one.

Κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν . . . σεσιγημένον, [may God establish you] *in accordance with the revelation of the mystery which was kept in silence during ancient ages*; i. e. agreeably to the gospel, which was not fully revealed in ancient times, but is now brought to light; comp. 1 Cor. 2: 7. Eph. 3: 5, 9. Col. 1: 26.

(26) *Φανερωθέντος δὲ . . . θεοῦ*, *but is now revealed by the Scriptures of the prophets, according to the commandment of the eternal God*. The apostle refers to the most ancient times, before any revelation was given as the *χρόνοι αἰώνιοι* next to the Messianic prophecies, contained in the Old Testament; and then speaks of God as *αἰώνιος*, who caused these revelations to be made, i. e. as being the same in times past and present.—*Εἰς ὑπακοὴν πίστεως*, *in order that obedience to the faith might be promoted*; i. e. the gospel was disclosed for this purpose; and this too, *εἰς πάντα τὰ ἔθνη*, *to all nations*, to Gentiles as well as Jews.

(27) The apostle now resumes his doxology, begun in v. 25 by *τῷ δυναμένῳ*, with *μόνῳ* &c. &c. The pronoun *ᾧ* here might relate grammatically to Jesus Christ, and would most naturally do so. But *θεῷ*, in order to complete the construction, requires to be joined either with *ἡ δόξα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας*, or else *δόξα* (or some equivalent) must be understood immediately after it. Following the first construction, we must refer *ᾧ* to *θεῷ*, and construe it as equivalent to *αὐτῷ* which wants precedent to confirm it. The second mode of construction seems rather hard; but I know not how we can philologically avoid it.

The *subscription*, like most of the others in the Pauline epistles, is adscititious. Chap. 16: 1 doubtless gave occasion to it; and the matter of it is in all probability correct. But we cannot regard it as coming from the hand of Paul; for surely he did not need to inform the church at Rome, by a subscription, who it was that conveyed the epistle to them, when he had once commended the same individual to their hospitality. Moreover, competent external evidence of genuineness is wanting.

EXCURSUS I.

On the appellation ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ in Rom. 1: 4. (p. 67.)

If a different principle of exegesis be assumed here, and we affirm that Christ, as being *divine*, is called *Son*, and is so called in order to designate his originating from the Father in his *divine* nature; then the objections which may be made, are of a very serious cast, and are too numerous to be all recounted, even in an Excursus. I can only glance at a few.

(1) If *Son of God* necessarily implies, *ex vi termini*, that Christ as to his *divine* nature is *derived*; how shall we construe such texts as the following; viz., "What and if ye shall see the *Son of Man* ascend up *where he was before*?" John 6: 62. "No man hath ascended to heaven, but *he that came down from heaven*, even the *Son of Man* who is in heaven," John 3: 13. Does *Son of Man* (*ex vi termini*) indicate the *divine* nature of Christ? This, I suppose, will not be affirmed; for plainly it indicates the *θεάνθρωπος*, the *θεὸς ἐν σαρκὶ φανερωθείς*, i. e. it has of itself a necessary reference to the *incarnate* condition of the Saviour. Yet when employed as a *proper name*, we see by the texts above, that it can be used to indicate the original and *divine* nature of the Messiah. If not, then these texts would prove, that the incarnate nature of Christ had existed in heaven, before he came down from that place; a fiction which we may well rank with the supposed rapture of Christ into heaven, and his subsequent descent from heaven, as maintained by Socinus.

Now as these texts, thus employed, will not prove that the *human* nature of Christ had a prior existence in heaven; so neither will the other texts above cited prove that the appellation, *Son of God*, means, *the divine nature of Christ as begotten of God*, merely because the Father is said to have loved him and to have sent him into the world. But,

(2) If the Son, as *God*, be *derived* or *begotten*, then it must follow, that, as *God*, he is neither self-existent nor independent. It is of no avail to say here, that his generation is *eternal*, and that the *method* of it is mysterious, super-human, and unlike to that of any created substance; for one may very readily allow all this, and still ask, whether the word *generation* (let the *manner* of the thing be what it may) does not of necessity, and by the usage of every language, imply *derivation*? And whether *derivation* does not of necessity imply *dependence*, and therefore negative the idea of *self-existence*? This the ancient Fathers acknowledged, almost with one voice, asserting that Christ is not *αὐτόθεος*, but derived from the Father, and *begotten of his substance*. The

Father only they regarded as self-existent ; not deeming it compatible at all with the idea of *generation*, that the Son could vindicate to himself this attribute of divinity. So the Nicene Fathers in their Symbol: *Θεός ἐκ Θεοῦ, φῶς ἐκ φωτός*. They did truly and really regard the Logos as an *emanation* from the Father ; many of them (most of the earlier ones), as an emanation from him which took place in time, or rather perhaps, as an emanation just before time began. Hence the familiar phrase among them, *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος*, i. e. the Logos *which was in God as his reason, wisdom, or understanding*, from eternity ; and *λόγος προφητικός*, i. e. *Logos prophetic, uttered, developed, viz. by words*. This development many of them suppose was made, when God said : " Let there be light ;" others suppose it to have been still earlier, viz. at the period when God formed the plan of the world, and thus gave development to his internal *λόγος*, by the operations of his wisdom and understanding.

Prof. Tholuck, in his recent commentary on the epistle to the Romans, appears fully to maintain (with the ancient Fathers) the *dependence*, and to deny the *self-existence*, of the Logos ; while, with them, he strenuously maintains that Christ is *Θεός*. But one who is so earnestly desirous of seeking after truth as he is, will not take it amiss, I trust, if the inquiry be here made : Whether the human mind can now conceive a being to be *truly* God, who is *neither self-existent nor independent* ? If the Son have neither of these attributes, then is he indeed, what some of the Fathers have called him, a *Θεός δεύτερος*, and nothing more. I will not aver that those are Arians and deny the divinity of Christ, who believe this ; but I must say, that for myself, if I admitted this, I could make no serious objection to the system of Arius. The whole dispute between him and those who maintain this creed, must turn on the difference between *being begotten* and *being made* ; both parties virtually acknowledge *derivation* and *dependence* ; they differ only as to the time and manner of these. Can such topics as these, which of course must be mere mysteries, be properly made a serious occasion of division or alienation among those who bear the Christian name ?

The philosophy of the Fathers permitted them to believe in a divine nature *derived*. Of course they could maintain the generation of the Son *as Logos*, without any difficulty. But that we can now admit a being to be *truly* God, and worship him as such, who as to his divine nature is *derived* and *dependent*, does seem to me quite impossible. The very elements of my own views (to say the least) respecting the divine nature must be changed, before I can admit such a proposition.

To say that the Son is *eternally begotten*, and yet is *self-existent* and *independent*, is merely to say, that the word *begotten* does not imply *derivation* ; it is to deny that the word has any such meaning, as all antiquity and common usage have always ascribed to it. It is, moreover, to give up the very doctrine which the ancient church strenuously maintained. Tholuck, who appears to maintain the views of the Nicene Creed, says (on Rom. 9: 5): " The Father is the original source of all being, 1 Cor. 8: 6. John 5: 26 ; the Son is only the *εἰκὼν* of his being,

Col. 1: 15. 2 Cor. 4: 4. Heb. 1: 3. But as the *image* of the divine Being, the Son is in no respect different from the Father, but fully expresses the Being of God. As the church is wont to say: The attribute of *ἀγεννησία* is possessed *only* by the Father." Much as I respect this excellent man and critic, how can I receive and accredit these declarations? "The Son is in *no respect* (in nichts) different from the Father, but fully (vollkommen, perfectly) resembles or expresses (ausdrückt) the being of God;" and yet to the Son belongs not *ἀγεννησία*, *self-existence*, *independence*, but "*ἀγεννησία* belongs *exclusively* to the Father!" What is this more or less than to say: The Son is perfectly like the Father in all respects; and yet, in regard to that very attribute, which beyond all others united makes God to be what he is, viz. true and very God, i. e. in respect to *self-existence* (and of course, *independence*), the Son has no participation at all in this, but it belongs *exclusively* to the Father. In other words: 'The Son is in *all respects* like the Father, with the simple exception that he is, in regard to the most essential of all his attributes, infinitely *unlike* him.' If this does not lie on the very face of Prof. Tholuck's statement, and on that of all who hold that the *Logos* is a *derived* Being, then I acknowledge myself incapable of understanding either their words or their arguments.

A mode of reasoning which involves such difficulties as these, should not be adopted without very imperious reasons. I know of no such ones, unless they be drawn from the expression *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ* understood in a *literal* sense, i. e. so far literal as can be possible in respect to spiritual beings. Now that one spiritual being can produce another, in some way or other, (of course not *more humano*), will not be denied. And if *Son* necessarily imports derivation, in the *divine* nature of the *Logos*, it necessarily imports, along with this, *dependence*; in other words, it necessarily denies *self-existence and independence*. If any one refuses to acknowledge this, then of course he must abandon the meaning of *generation*; no matter what the *modus* of generation may be, however mysterious or super-human; this makes no difference as to *dependence*, in case the generation is real and matter of fact. In such a case, the *diction* merely of the ancient Fathers is preserved, while the *doctrine* which they maintained, is clearly abandoned.

All such as cannot admit the *emanation philosophy* into their system of theology, (the ancient fathers did this), will not regard Christ as *θεὸς δεύτερος*, but as *ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων θεός, ἐὺλογητός εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, ἀμήν*. The *Logos*, "who created all things," "by whom all things were created in heaven and earth," bears at least the *highest* stamp of *DIVINITY UNDERIVED*. Who is *self-existent*, if not the *CREATOR*? And who is *God supreme*, if not *ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων θεός*? If there be any higher assertions of Godhead respecting the Father, than these, let those who ascribe *self-existence* only to him, point them out.

EXCURSUS II.

On Rom. 3: 28, λογίζομεθα γὰρ δικαιοῦσθαι πίστει ἄνθρωπον, χωρὶς ἔργων νόμου. (p. 172.)

It will be conceded, at once, that before we pronounce sentence respecting the agreement or disagreement of Paul and James, with respect to the doctrine of justification, it is necessary that we should understand the meaning of the words which they respectively employ, and the nature of the object which they respectively have in view.

First, then, *what does Paul assert?* He says, that "a man is justified by *faith*, χωρὶς ἔργων νόμου." The inquiry is fundamental, therefore, What does he mean by ἔργων νόμου?

I answer: He means *works which the law requires, works which the law makes it duty to perform.* That the Gen. case after ἔργων is sometimes employed to express such a relation, there can be no room for doubt; e. g. John 6: 28, 29, ἔργα θεοῦ, works which God requires; John 9: 4, τὰ ἔργα τοῦ πέμψαντός με, the works required by him who sent me; Acts 26: 20, μετανοίας ἔργα, works such as repentance demands; 1 Thess. 1: 3, τοῦ ἔργου τῆς πίστεως, the works which faith requires; and 2 Thess. 1: 11, ἔργων πίστεως, in the same sense.

In like manner, ἔργων νόμου and ἔργα νόμου mean, *work or works which the law demands.* So the phrase is plainly used in Rom. 2: 15. 3: 20, 28. 9: 32. Gal. 2: 16 (thrice). 3: 2, 5, 10. Sometimes νόμου is omitted, and ἔργων is used alone in the same sense, *breviloquentiae causâ*; e. g. Rom. 4: 6. 9: 12. 11: 6 (thrice). Ephes. 2: 9.

What works, then, does the law of God require? The answer is: It demands *perfect obedience.* "The soul that sinneth shall die." "Cursed is he, who continueth not in *all things written in the book of the law, to do them.*"

It is manifestly on this ground, that Paul argues the impossibility of justification by works of law. In Rom. 3: 19, when summing up his argument contained in the preceding part of his epistle, he says: "The whole world is guilty before God," i. e. all men are chargeable with the guilt of sin. What follows? The apostle tells us in v. 20: *Διότι ἡ. τ. λ., therefore, by works of law no flesh can be justified before God.*

Must not this be true? If the law of God demands *perfect obedience*, and its penalty is attached to *every sin*, then one sin ruins the hopes of man, and effectually debars him from justification before God, on the ground of merit or obedience.

The apostle Paul disputes with those who denied this, and who expected justification on the ground of their own meritorious obedience; comp. Rom. 9: 30, 31. 10: 3; also Gal. 2: 16. 3: 8—13. Rom. 4: 4, 5. To say, then, that *a man is not justified by works of law*, is (with him) the same as saying, that *he cannot be justified meritoriously*, i. e. on the ground of merit or obedience, Rom. 4: 5. But as *faith* in Jesus Christ, who died to procure mercy for sinners, so that they might be pardoned and accepted, does from its very nature involve the

renunciation of claims to merit, and the casting of ourselves on him for *gratuitous* justification; so the apostle opposes the *being justified by faith* to the *being justified by works of law*, the former meaning (with him) *gratuitous* justification, the latter *meritorious*. Let the reader, now, carefully and diligently compare Rom. 4: 4, 5, 14—16. 9: 6. Gal. 5: 4. 3: 11, 12, and he can entertain no doubt of the correctness of this representation.

We have then before us the object of Paul, in declaring that a man is not justified by works of law. It is the same thing as to say: 'No one is accepted with God on the ground of merit or perfect obedience to the law, for no one has ever done all which the law requires.'

But does this involve the idea, that Paul maintains *GOOD WORKS* (ἔργα ἀγαθὰ) to be unnecessary for a Christian? Nothing could be farther from his intention. Are not his epistles filled with the most urgent exhortations to Christians, that they should be fruitful in *good works*? Compare now, for a moment, Rom. 2: 7. 2 Cor. 9: 8. Eph. 2: 10. Col. 1: 10. 3: 17. 1 Thess. 5: 13. 2 Thess. 2: 17. 1 Tim. 2: 10. 5: 10 (twice). 5: 25. 6: 18. 2 Tim. 2: 21. 3: 17. Tit. 1: 16. 2: 7, 14. 3: 1, 8, 14, etc. Compare the strain of Paul's reasoning in Rom. VI—VIII.; and then say, Is it possible to doubt, for a moment, that Paul urged *good works* as strenuously as James, or as any other apostle?

Let the reader mark well, that ἔργα νόμου, and ἔργα ἀγαθὰ or ἔργον πίστεως (1 Thess. 1: 3. 2 Thess. 1: 11), are two very different things; different not so much in their own nature, strictly considered, as in the use which Paul makes of them in his writings. With him, ἔργα νόμου always designates the idea of *perfect* obedience, viz. doing all which the law requires. But ἔργα ἀγαθὰ or ἔργα πίστεως are the fruits of sanctification by the Spirit of God; the good works which Christians perform, and which are sincere, are therefore acceptable to God under a dispensation of grace, although they do not fulfil all the demands of the law. On the ground of the first, Paul earnestly contends, at length, in his epistles to the Romans and Galatians, that no one can be justified. The latter he every where treats as indispensable to the Christian character.

In a word, when Paul is contending with a *legalist*, i. e. one who expected justification on the ground of his own merit, he avers that justification by *works of law* or perfect obedience, is impossible. But when he is addressing Christians, he tells them that *good works* are absolutely essential to the Christian character.

2. Come we then, in the second place, to inquire what is the meaning and object of the apostle James, in chap. 2: 14—26.

He commences by asking: "Of what avail is it, my brethren, if a man say he have *faith*, and have not works?" It is, then, with those who make pretensions to Christian faith, and mere pretensions, that the apostle has to do. This is clear from the closing verse in the paragraph: "For as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is also dead."

The characters, then, which the apostle James has in view, are of a kind directly opposite to those with which Paul was concerned.

James is disputing with *Antinomians*, viz. such persons as held that mere speculative belief or faith, unaccompanied by works, was all which the gospel demands. He tells them that this is not the case, and cannot be. He appeals to the examples of Abraham and Rahab, in order to confirm the sentiment which he avows; and asks, whether the faith which they possessed, did not coöperate with works, when they were justified.

Observe now, that James does not once mention *ἔργα νόμου*. This is not the subject which he has in view. It is *ἔργα πίστεως*, and these only, of which he treats; comp. vs. 17, 22, 26.

Mark again, that James does not at all maintain, that faith is not essential to justification. He expressly admits, that 'Abraham's faith coöperated with his works, and was perfected by them,' v. 22. Nay he appeals to the very same passage of Scripture, in confirmation of this, which Paul appeals to in Rom. 4: 3, when establishing the doctrine of gratuitous justification. The *work* of Abraham which James mentions, is recorded in Gen. xxi.; and it took place some 30 years after the words were spoken to him, which are quoted in v. 22. By this work (viz. of offering up his son), Abraham "perfected his faith," and "fulfilled the Scripture which says: Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness," vs. 22, 23. In other words: 'The faith of Abraham was inseparable from good works. It shone out in the most conspicuous manner by them. And in like manner did the faith of Rahab exhibit itself.'

James then maintains, that no man has any good claim to the faith of a Christian, who does not, at the same time, exhibit good works; in other words, he avers that a mere speculative faith, is not a real Christian faith.

When thus understood and considered, how can he be regarded as contradicting what Paul has said? Paul maintains that men are justified gratuitously, in opposition to legal or meritorious justification. James maintains, that a man cannot be justified by a speculative and barren faith, but that he must have such a faith as will produce good works. Paul is so far from denying that Christian faith must produce good works, that he every where strenuously maintains the necessity of them. James insists upon it, that a man, in order to be justified, must exhibit good works as well as faith; and that these are essential, in order to complete and perfect his faith. Where then is the contradiction?

Luther, however, thought that he found it; and he rejected the epistle of James from the canon of the New Testament, on this ground, calling it *epistola straminea*. So did the Magdeburg Centuriators; and not a few recent commentators have alleged, that James contradicts what Paul teaches. But where has Paul taught, that a man is justified by faith *alone*; and that evangelical good works are not an essential condition of his justification before God? I cannot find this doctrine in his epistles, or in his sermons. To say that he has maintained the doctrine of justification *without the deeds* OF THE LAW, is saying nothing to the purpose; for the meaning of this, as above explained, contains nothing in opposition to what James has taught.

In a word: Paul has taught us, that justification is not on the ground of merit, but of grace; James has taught us, that a faith which will entitle one to hope for justification, must be accompanied with evangelical obedience. Both are true and faithful teachers; the doctrines of both are equally doctrines of the gospel. *Good works*, in the gospel sense of these words, are an essential condition of our acceptance with God; but on the ground of perfect obedience to the divine law, no one ever was or ever will be accepted.

EXCURSUS-III.

On Πάνατος in Rom. 5: 12. (p. 309.)

But here it may be said: 'If the miseries of the present life, and the death of the body, be a part of the penalty threatened to Adam, then the subject is implicated in difficulties like to those which have been already suggested; for if these be a part of the penalty of sin, how can that penalty be contrasted with the deliverance which Christ has effected, inasmuch as he has not effected a deliverance from the evils just named? Must not the miseries of the present life, then, and physical death, be wholly excluded from the penalty of sin as originally threatened?'

Some have been led to exclude them, by this train of reasoning; and especially because, as our context abundantly asserts, the blessings procured by Christ do greatly exceed the evils occasioned by Adam's sin. Such being the case, they conclude that the death of Christ must remove, of course, the *very same* evils, in all respects, which were threatened in the original penalty; and as temporal evils and the death of the body still remain, and are universal, they can not suppose them to have been included in the death threatened to Adam. But it may be said, in reply to this, that it does by no means follow, that even those sinners who become the subjects of redemption, are to suffer *none* of the evils threatened against sin. The question, What would be the best means of training up men, who should be always sinless on earth, for the glory of the heavenly world? is something quite different from the question, How are *sinners* to be disciplined, in order that they may become fitted, and best fitted, for the happiness of heaven? A part of the discipline of the latter, (infinite Wisdom has so decided it), must now necessarily be *suffering* and *trial*; and as included in this, we may also count the death of the body. Paul himself has told us, in the very chapter under consideration, that the children of God have reason to rejoice in afflictions, inasmuch as they result in patience, approbation, and hope, vs. 3, 4; and again he says, that "our momentary [temporal] afflictions work out for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory," 2 Cor. 4: 17; and again, that "all things will work together for good, to those who love God," Rom. 8: 28. So far as bodily suffering is concerned, for the time being, Christians may suffer as severely as

others; and oftentimes they may be the subjects of severe mental, as well as bodily sorrows; but all this finally promotes their spiritual benefit. Here then is the immense difference which Christ has occasioned, between their sufferings and those of the wicked. So far as misery in the present life is concerned, Christians may indeed undergo, and do suffer, some portion of that which the penalty of the law threatens; they are truly made to taste, how bitter a thing it is to have sinned against God, and how dreadful the consequences of sin would be, if they should be subjected to them all. But still, this lesson is, by divine mercy, made highly salutary, both in weaning them from sin, and in preparing them for glory. To repeat the words of the apostle: "All things work together for their good." In a word, although a portion of the penalty of sin (in the modified way just described), is the necessary result, in every case, of having sinned; yet, as Christ redeems us from immeasurably the greater part of its penalty, and from all that properly pertains to the *second* death, no valid objection can be made against the declaration, that the blessings which the Redeemer procures, do not only exceed the evils introduced by the offence of Adam and consequent upon it, but also that the salvation which he has wrought, is an effectual antidote against the curse of the law. Even the small part of this, which the believer (as having once been a sinner) must necessarily undergo, i. e. the evils which in the present life he must suffer, are converted into a means of spiritual blessings to him. This is sufficient then, to justify the assertion, that *Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law*. It is not necessary, that all and every particular of this curse should be included in such an assertion; it is enough that the very sufferings which Christians undergo, i. e. so much of the curse as they do suffer, prove at last to be only "blessings in disguise."

But if *temporal death merely* constitutes the *whole* of the threatening to Adam, or the main part of it, then has the death of Christ failed to accomplish the end which Paul asserts it to have accomplished, inasmuch as all men without distinction are still subjected to it. Viewing this death, however, as only a very subordinate and inferior part of the evil threatened to our first parents; and reflecting that even this is made the occasion of discipline, which ends in good; we may without any serious embarrassment maintain, that the death of Christ has been the cause of blessings which greatly superabound over the miseries occasioned by the fall.

I am well aware, that the passage in 1 Cor. 15: 22, "For as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive," has often been adduced, in order to shew that *θάνατος* in the passage before us means only the death of the body. But with Toellner and Koppe I may venture to say, that because, in discussing the subject of the resurrection (the resurrection of Christians only), the apostle represents Adam as having introduced the death of the body, it does not follow, that in another place, when treating of quite a different topic, and intending to shew the *full extent* of the benefits procured by the death of Christ, he could not employ *θάνατος* in its most extensive latitude. Above all, I would also add, this does not follow, when it is quite certain, that in

the context of this same epistle, and elsewhere, Paul does, beyond all doubt, employ *θάνατος* in its most enlarged sense. It lies, moreover, on the face of the whole antithesis which he makes in vs. 12—19, that his object is to exalt the *δικαίωμα* of Christ, by shewing the greatness of the *κατάκριμα* from which he delivers us, and which was occasioned by Adam. But how is this object effected in any important measure, in case *θάνατος* means no more than the dissolution of our mortal bodies; a thing, by the way, from which none are at all delivered?

Among recent commentators, Schott (Opusc. p. 323, seq.), and Flatt (Comment. über Rom. 5: 12), incline to the opinion that *temporal death* is meant, in the passage before us; but Tholuck (Comm. in loc.) is of the same opinion as has been given above, and he has defended it with great ability. Among other grounds of illustration, he has cited passages from the Rabbins to show that *מָוֶת* means, *to die* in a *spiritual* as well as *temporal* sense. But this is well known among all who have attended to their sentiments and idiom; and the Scripture itself contains such ample means of illustration, that no appeal to any other source is at all necessary.

The deeply interesting nature of the subject, the difficulties attending it, and the efforts of numerous commentators, among whom are some highly respected ones, to establish that interpretation of *θάνατος* which assigns to it the meaning of *temporal death only*, are my apology for dwelling so long on the topics which this word suggests.

EXCURSUS IV.

Οπ τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος ἰν Rom. 5: 14. (p. 226.)

In making additional remarks upon *τύπος*, I observe, (1) That the comparison from its very nature and design, is, as has been stated (p. 224), *antithetic*. It may, with more propriety still, be called *CONTRAST*. *Adam was the cause of sin and death; Christ of righteousness and life*; these are the simple elements of the contrast. The apostle himself gives notice, immediately after he says that Adam was a *τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος*, that he does not mean a type of something *the same in kind*, but an *antithetic* type, or one in the way of contrast; for he immediately subjoins: Ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς τὸ παράπτωμα, κ. τ. λ. He means, no doubt, to suggest more than this by vs. 15—17. He designs not only to shew that the *τύπος* was to be understood in the way of *contrast*, (which indeed lies on the very face of the whole matter, *sin* and *death* being the objects of comparison on the one side, and *righteousness* and *life* on the other); but,

(2) The same *measure* or *degree* of influence in bringing evil upon men, is not to be attributed to the first Adam, as is to be attributed to the second in respect to bringing grace and salvation; ἡ χάρις . . . ἐπερίσσειε.—Τὸ κρίμα ἐξ ἑνὸς [παράπτωματος] εἰς κατάκριμα, τὸ δὲ χάρισμα ἐκ πολλῶν παραπτωμάτων εἰς δικαίωμα· and this last sentiment is vir-

tually repeated again in v. 17. Nothing can be clearer than this makes it, that the blessings of redemption predominate over the mischiefs occasioned by the fall, yea, greatly *superabound*. The *measure* or *degree* then of mischief and of benefit, are not what constitutes the *τύπος* in the case under consideration. This is the more plain and certain, because the apostle has so explicitly avowed it, in vs. 15—17.

(3) Is it the *extent* of the evil on the one side, and of good on the other, which is a point of resemblance held up by the apostle? That is, does he insist that the mischiefs of the fall on the one side, and the blessings of redemption on the other, pertain to our whole race without exception? A deeply interesting question, and one on which hang some very important deductions. In answer to it, I would observe,

(a) That all of Adam's race do suffer more or less evil in consequence of the fall; all have at least lost the original state of righteousness of their first parents, and are subjected more or less to evil of some kind or other, even without their concurrence and before any voluntary transgression. All come into the world in such a state, as makes it certain that their appetites which lead to sin will prevail, and that they will never have any holiness, until they are born again. Others would go still further, and say, that all are born with a positively evil disposition, which is itself sin, and the greatest of all sins, inasmuch as it is the parent of all transgression; that men have by the fall lost their freedom to do good, but not to do evil; and that all men, antecedent to any choice or action of their own, are condemned to everlasting death, on the ground that they inherit both Adam's guilt and punishment. But without entering now into a discussion of these last points, (for which the present is not the appropriate place), I would merely observe, that in *some way or other, and in a way which has respect to the character and miseries of the human race, Adam's offence has affected them all.*

(b) As the counter-part of this, it may with equal truth be said, that *the blessings procured by Christ, affect all the human race without exception, in some important respects.* The suspension of the execution of the original sentence upon Adam, saved our race from immediate destruction. All the good that comes to sinners, the blessings of providence and of grace, the light of truth, the forbearance of God to punish—in a word, all the means of grace and the offers of mercy, the new dispensation under which “God can be just and yet the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus”—are all the fruit of Christ's great and glorious work. Most of these blessings are common to all; and the whole of them are proffered to all, without distinction. So far, then, we may truly say, the mischiefs on the one side, and the blessings on the other, are co-extensive with the human race; and this antecedent to, or independently of, any acts which are properly their own.

(c) But it is important also to note, that there are spiritual blessings i. e. *actual* pardon and justification, which do not come upon all men without distinction, but only on those who believe. These blessings are indeed proffered to all; they are open to all; they are accessible to all. But they are not actually conferred on all; they are not actually possessed and enjoyed, except by *believers*: for *he who believeth, shall be*

saved ; and he who believeth not, shall be damned. It is necessary, then, in order to become an actual participator in these blessings, to *believe* ; i. e. the acts of penitence and faith, *acts which are our own*, are the conditions of enjoying these highest blessings of the gospel ; conditions, without which they cannot be enjoyed.

And now—the other part of the contrast ; which will not be so easily conceded, perhaps, by many of my readers. Does the *ultimate* and highest part of the sentence of death, the *second death*, i. e. future misery, which was threatened to Adam, come on all his posterity without any act of their own, or real and personal concurrence with the sin of their ancestor ? So the apostle does not say ; for he says that “ death passed through upon all men, *because that all have sinned*,” i. e. (as we have seen above) in their own persons. But you will say, that the apostle affirms in v. 19, that “ by the *disobedience* of Adam many, i. e. all, were constituted sinners.” I grant this ; I believe fully what this passage affirms. But to say, that Adam’s disobedience was an occasion, or ground, or instrumental cause of all men’s becoming sinners, and was thus an evil to them all ; and to say that his disobedience was *personally theirs* ; is saying two very different things. I see no way in which this last assertion can ever be made out by philology. But more of this, in the remarks on the text itself of v. 19.

Besides ; how utterly unlike in this last case, would be the points of comparison. It is plain that none can enjoy the higher blessings procured by Christ, without the personal and voluntary acts of repentance and faith ; does it not seem equally true, now, that none will suffer the higher penalties of the curse threatened to Adam, without their own voluntary transgression ? If this be not the true state of the case, how can the *superabounding* of grace, asserted so repeatedly in vs. 15—17, be in any way defended ? If we say, that sentence of eternal perdition in its highest sense, comes upon all men by the offence of Adam ; and this without any act on their part, or even any voluntary concurrence in their present state and condition of existence, then, in order to make grace *superabound* over all this, how can we avoid the conclusion, that justification in its highest sense comes upon all men without their concurrence ?

I am aware, indeed, that some commentators have made Adam here the representative of all the human race, and Christ the representative of only the elect. But this seems to me plainly to be forbidden by the nature and design of the contrast, as well as by the *πάντας ἀνθρώπων* in v. 19. Nor is there any need of resorting to this forced and unnatural construction, (for so I cannot help feeling it to be), if we take into view the suggestions above ; viz., that on the one hand, blessings are proffered to all, blessings much greater than the evils occasioned by the fall ; which blessings still can be actually enjoyed, only through repentance and faith : while, on the other hand, eternal death is before all, i. e. all are exposed to it from their condition and circumstances, but a personal act, i. e. actual sin, must necessarily precede it. I see not how to escape from this conclusion, unless I give up a part of the *superabounding* of the grace of the gospel, or else take the position that

Christ is here presented as merely the head of the elect. The first cannot be given up, because the apostle so often asserts it; the last cannot be received, without doing violence to the laws of interpretation, and to the nature of the contrast presented.

In regard to the *superabounding* of the grace of the gospel, it must be noted, in order to avoid mistake, that I do not construe it as appertaining to the *number of its subjects*, but to the *number of offences* forgiven by it, *the greatness of evil* removed by it. It is a point perfectly clear, that the *superabounding* cannot consist in the number of subjects to whom grace is extended; for the evils of Adam's fall extend to *all* his race without exception, and how can the grace of Christ extend to more than all? This makes it clear, that the *superabounding* has reference to the forgiveness of the *many* offences which men commit, and which expose them to far greater evils than the *one* offence of Adam does; as it is asserted by the apostle in v. 16.

There is one other point, also, which should not be omitted in this reference to the *superabounding* of the grace of the gospel. This is, that the gospel *places all men under a dispensation of grace*, where penitent sinners can be pardoned and accepted; while a dispensation of law, (such was that under which Adam was first placed), subjects them to its penalty without reprieve, for the first offence which they commit. It cannot escape notice, then, that we are now, notwithstanding the numerous and dreadful evils occasioned by the fall, under a far more favourable dispensation in respect to an opportunity for *making sure* our final happiness, than we should have been by being placed in the original condition of Adam. Pres. Edwards has taken great pains, in his book on Original Sin (p. 324, seq.), to justify God's dealings with Adam's posterity, in charging Adam's sin upon them, by endeavouring to shew, that mankind had a most favourable trial in Adam, and one which was much more likely, in the nature of things, to result in their good, than if each had stood upon his own trial. Now if there be any foundation for this, and indeed if we simply admit that each in a state of innocence must have been tried as Adam was, then the fact that he fell, and the conclusion thence to be deduced by analogy that they would fall, seems to render it pretty certain, that the whole of our race would have been involved in final and irretrievable ruin by being placed under a law dispensation, as Adam first was. Grace *superabounds*, then, above the evils of the fall, in that Adam lost for men only an innocent *legal* state—one in which men were on trial, and from which they might fall; while Christ has procured for them a *dispensation of grace*, under which many and aggravated offences are no bar to the salvation of the penitent.

I speak of a *legal* state in which men were to be on trial, because I am not able to find one text of Scripture, nor any good reason, to support the idea, that if Adam had obeyed, all his posterity would have been born in a state not only of perfect, but of *confirmed* holiness. Where is one sentence in the book of God of such an import? And where is any argument to be obtained from analogy? The angels have had their trial, and some of them "kept not their first estate." The first human pair had their trial, when directly from the hands of their

Maker ; and they fell. But supposing they had not fallen ; surely there is no ground to expect, that their posterity would have been born into a condition better than that in which the first pair were created. As far as we know any thing of the history of rational beings, so far it is clear, that it is the indispensable rule of divine moral government, that *all should be subject to a state of trial*. If then the views of Pres. Edwards and others on this subject, appear to be unsupported either by the Scriptures or by analogy, how can we admit them ? And is not this truly the case ?

I return from this partial digression, however, and observe, that in regard to *the extent* of mischief on the one hand, and of blessings on the other, in the case under examination, so much is clear ; viz., that a loss of an original state of holiness ; an imperfect state or condition of our nature, in which it is certain that the sensual passions will get the victory and lead us to sin, and certain that we shall never have any holiness without being born again ; and also a subjection to many temporal trials and distresses ; are evils brought upon all men by the fall—and on all without any distinction, and without any act or concurrence of their own. The antithesis to this is, that all men are placed by Christ under a dispensation in which they can be redeemed from the power and penalty of their sins, (with the exception that more or less of evil is, and as things now are must be, temporarily experienced in the present world) ; and that all men enjoy the bounties of Providence, the calls of mercy, and the offers of eternal life ; and thus much, without any act or concurrence of their own. This goes far towards satisfying all the demands which the nature of the apostle's comparison requires. Indeed, we might rest fully satisfied with this. All men have indeed experienced evil, in consequence of Adam's fall ; but all men are placed, on the whole, in a better situation at present, notwithstanding all the evils which they suffer, to secure their final happiness, than Adam was in his original state of trial, when the consequence of one offence was *irremediable death*.

If then the *τύπος* of the apostle is to be understood as having reference to evils and blessings that come on all Adam's posterity *without* their concurrence or act, we find sufficient here to answer all the demands of a *τύπος*. But if any insist that it shall be extended still farther, and be regarded as having respect to the highest penalty on the one hand, and the highest blessings on the other ; then neither is the one inflicted, nor the other bestowed, without the concurrence of each individual, who sins and suffers for himself, or repents and believes for himself in order to receive the highest blessings which Christ bestows. I do not object to extending the *τύπος* in such a way ; except that it must be understood, when thus extended, not of penalty in the higher sense as *actually* inflicted, nor of blessings in the higher sense as *actually* bestowed, but of *exposedness* to the penalty on the one hand, and *exposedness* (*sit venia verbo comparationis causâ*) to blessings on the other. Nothing more than this can indeed ever be made out ; for that everlasting death will actually be inflicted on all of Adam's race, of course can never be proved ; and as little, therefore, can it be made out, that everlasting life will actually be bestowed on all.

This subject, properly considered, will afford relief to the mind, which is struggling with difficulty arising from the assertions of the apostle, which represent the blessings procured by redemption as being coëxtensive with the mischiefs introduced by the fall. The evils and blessings in question are in many important respects coëxtensive; and in their highest sense, they are both suspended on something which is to be done on the part of man, in order either to suffer the one, or to enjoy the other. What hinders, then, that Adam in respect to the evils which he introduced, should be contrasted (as Paul has contrasted him) with Christ, in respect to the blessings introduced by the latter?

Will it be said, that I am not consistent with myself in some of these representations; for in my remarks on *θάνατος* in v. 12, I have laboured to shew that it means *evil of every kind*, both in this world and that which is to come; while in my remarks in the paragraphs immediately preceding, I have represented men as exposed to temporal evils only, on Adam's account? If this should be said, my reply is, that I have only done what the apostle had before done, viz. represented *all* men as subject to death in the sense above maintained, "because that all have sinned." Just so far as *personal* sin goes, so far death follows in its train, death spiritual and eternal. But it does not follow that the highest and immeasurably the greatest part of the penalty must of course be connected, in every instance, with the suffering of some temporary and inferior part of it in the present world; for the redeemed themselves all suffer this latter part; so that all the blessings which Christ has procured, do not remove the whole of temporal evil. And in regard to those who die in extreme infancy, or in the womb; they may in like manner undergo similar evils, without our being able to conclude from this, that they are subject to everlasting death independently of any act or choice of their own with respect to sin. There is, beyond all doubt, a sense in which all men without exception do suffer in consequence of Adam's sin; and this, as has been stated above: and so there is a sense in which all in like manner enjoy benefits procured by Christ, as has also been stated. These depend neither in the one case nor the other, on any act of ours. But there is a higher sense in which *θάνατος* is suffered and *δικαιωμα* enjoyed, and this as connected only with our own individual and voluntary actions. Are not the blessings, that come to us undeserved and without any concurrence or act of ours, equivalent to the evils to which the fall of Adam has subjected us? They are; nay, they are immeasurably greater. The single fact, that *we are now placed under* A DISPENSATION OF GRACE, proves this beyond all reasonable question. Why may not God, then, in consistency with his benevolence and his design of subjecting us to trial, bring us into existence in such a condition, that we are exposed to various trials and evils, especially when these are counterbalanced in the manner that has been intimated? And if we are now exposed to everlasting death, and bring sentence of this upon ourselves, so soon as we begin to act as moral agents, (which no doubt is our case); it is equally true, that even in this condition, everlasting life is accessible to us—yea, much more within our certain reach, than it was within that of Adam in his first estate. Is it not true, then, that "where sin abounds, grace superabounds?"

It is no contradiction, therefore, to say that *θάνατος* means *every kind of evil*, and that all have sinned and are subject to it, (for the meaning of course is, *all who were capable of sinning*); and yet to say, that such as are incapable of sinning for themselves, and such as are redeemed from the curse of the law, do still undergo a small portion, and no more, of the evils included under the curse. It is not the less true, that "Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law," because trial and sorrow and temporary suffering must be endured by all Christians, as the world now is. Mark well that Paul does not aver, that the blessings procured by Christ do in all respects stand directly opposed to the evils introduced by Adam, so as to prevent their occurrence at all, in any degree. He only avers that blessings *superabound*, and that they are of the like extent with the evils. We have seen that this is true; and we have abundant assurance, also, that all the sufferings and sorrows of this life will turn to good account in respect to those who love God. This does not shew that they are not evils in themselves; nor that they are not a part of the curse; but only that the curse itself may be converted into a blessing, by that infinite power and wisdom and benevolence which have redeemed man. It sets the redemption of Christ in a new and glorious light, that such are the effects of it; and in such a light it was the design of Paul to place it, in the paragraph before us. As I have before said, suffering and sorrow in some degree may be necessary (so infinite Wisdom has adjudged) to our discipline in our sinful and fallen state; but they can never detract from the superabounding of the blessings which the gospel has introduced. I observe,

(4) That the *τύπος* is not between the *person* of Adam as such, and that of Christ. The apostle does not undertake to compare the *personal* qualities of the one with those of the other; it is the *act* of one and its *consequences*, which is compared with the *act* of the other and its *consequences*. It is *παράπτωμα* and *κατάκριμα* on one side, and *ύπαικοή* and *δικαίωμα* on the other. Nor,

(5) Does the apostle any where declare Adam to be the *federal* head and representative of all his posterity; nor Christ to be the *federal* head of his spiritual children. It is indispensable, indeed, to the admission of this idea, that Christ be regarded as the federal head of the elect only. But we have seen, that the representations of the whole passage do not accord with such an exegesis. Indeed, the whole doctrine about *federal* head appears to have had its rise in the time of Augustine; it was variously modified and represented by the Schoolmen; but never fully developed in its present form, until the time of Cocceius, who gave occasion to it by his manner of considering the covenants of law and grace. Whatever may be correct or incorrect in the usual representations about federal head, it appears to be *superadded* to the Scriptures; there being nothing in the Old Testament or the New, that I can find, which contains any such declarations. At the most, the point in question can never prefer any higher claims to our reception, than that of being a *deduction* from what is said. It is a deduction which seems, in some respects, to present nothing inconsistent with biblical doctrine;

but I may safely add, that *this particular form of theology* does not seem to be essential, either to the Christian doctrine of depravity or of redemption.

But I must not dismiss the subject of *τύπος*, or comparison between Adam and Christ, without noting,

(6) That Calvin points out two other exceptions to resemblance, i. e. two points of dissimilitude, between Adam and Christ, which he says the apostle did not think unworthy of notice, but which he omitted to notice, merely because the turn of his discourse did not allow him to do it. These are, (a) "*Quod peccato Adae non per solam imputationem damnatur, acsi alieni peccati exigeretur a nobis poena; sed ideo ejus poenam sustinemus, quia et culpae sumus rei, quatenus scilicet natura nostra in ipso vitata, iniquitatis reatu obstringitur apud Deum.*"

"At per Christi justitiam alio modo in salutem restituimur; neque enim id nobis accepta fertur, quia intra nos sit, sed quod Christum ipsum cum bonis suis omnibus, Patris largitate nobis donatum possidemus." Calvin then adds, (which let those note well, who hold that Christ's righteousness does in a proper sense become our own): "*Itaque donum justitiae non qualitatem qua nos Deus imbuat, sed gratuitam justitiae imputationem significat.*"

(b) "*Altera [differentia] est, quod non ad omnes homines pervenit Christi beneficium, quemadmodum universum suum genus damnatione Adam involvit.*" He then goes on to state that the ground of this is, that 'our corruption comes in the course of nature, (he means that it is transmitted by natural generation), and so pervades the *whole mass*; but we must possess faith in order to participate in the blessings proffered by Christ. To be depraved it is necessary only to be a man; to participate in the righteousness of Christ, one must be a believer. The infants of believers have by covenant a right of adoption, by which they come into communion with Christ; other infants are not at all exempt from the common lot.' Comm. on Rom. 5: 17.

But here one is led spontaneously to ask: How can it be shewn, that such as have never voluntarily done good or evil, do, merely by the possession of a human nature, become obnoxious to death in the higher and more dreadful sense of this word; and especially, after consulting Rom. 9: 11, and meditating deliberately upon the sentiment which it involves, how can one affirm this of infants? In regard to the *extent* of evils and of blessings through Adam and Christ respectively, I have said all which I deem requisite in the paragraphs above. In the sense in which one is suffered or liable to be suffered, so the other is enjoyed or is accessible. I feel no need of exempting *extent* from the *τύπος* or comparison.

With regard to another point, namely, how or why Adam's posterity become liable, like himself, to sentence of death, Calvin, like most of the leading and distinguished divines of the Reformation, held that Adam's sin or guilt is transferred from him to us, by natural descent; and that it is because we are one with him in respect to crime, that we become one with him in respect to punishment. The same sentiment he inculcates in his Comm. on Rom. 5: 12.

It is time to bring these remarks to a close. Before I do this, however, I shall take the liberty once more to present very briefly the sum of them.

I. POINTS OF DISSIMILITUDE. (1) The whole is *contrast*; the nature of the things presented on each part, is dissimilar and opposite; sin and misery are on the one side, righteousness and happiness on the other. (2) The *degree* or *measure* of evil occasioned by Adam, is greatly exceeded by the blessings which Christ procures. (3) It is not the *person* of Adam as such, nor of Christ as such, which is the object of the *τύπος*: it is *παράπτωμα* and *κατάκριμα* as connected with the one, and *ὑπακοή* and *δικαίωμα* as connected with the other. (4) There is nothing in our text, or in the meaning of *τύπος*, which asserts, or obliges us to receive, the usual doctrine of *federal head* in Adam and in Christ; although there are certain things taught, which would not seem to disagree, in a certain sense, with such a construction.

II. POINTS OF ACTUAL SIMILITUDE. (1) Sin and misery were introduced by the *one*; pardon and happiness by the *other*. The similitude here respects the one individual, as being the cause or occasion of so many important consequences; in other words, Adam and Christ were each authors of what affected the whole human race. (2) All men are, without exception, affected by Adam's fall, so as to subject them to many evils here, and to expose them to death in the highest sense; while all men, on the other hand, do receive blessings in this world which are more than a counter-balance of the evils that Adam occasioned, and they enjoy access to eternal life in a surer and more certain way than that which was first enjoyed by Adam.

Let the reader now fix his thoughts on the real similitudes designed, and he will then find the remainder of the text immediately before us comparatively easy.

EXCURSUS V.

On Rom. 5: 19, διὰ τῆς παρακοῆς τοῦ ἐνός ἀνθρώπου ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν οἱ πολλοί. (p. 243.)

Having said so much in my Commentary, in order to make some explanations with regard to this subject, I now feel compelled to say still more, in order to prevent any misunderstanding of what I have said. I design also to propose some additional considerations to reflecting minds, relative to the interesting, embarrassing, and much disputed topic of *original sin*. All the questions which may easily be asked relative to it, never have been answered, and probably never will be, in the present world; but free and full discussion may contribute to cast some light on the most important and interesting of them. I cannot expect, indeed, as matters now are in respect to theological sentiment, that every reader will approve of all my views; but I may ask, and I do hope that each one will cheerfully grant me permission, ἀληθεύειν ἐν ἀγάπῃ.

In what I have to say, (which of course must here be only in the way of mere hints), I shall begin by a brief review of the various theories which have been proposed and defended, in regard to the influence of Adam's sin upon his posterity.

I. The common theory of the Symbols or Creeds of the Reformed Churches, and of the leading divines in them of earlier times, is as follows: viz. Original sin consists, (1) In the want of original righteousness, (2) In the positive and entire corruption of our nature, i. e. in the existence of forbidden lusts and desires *connate* with us, which are positive evil in themselves, and deserving of damnation; and are also the root and ground of all other evil in us. (3) Not only have men lost original righteousness, and become by natural generation the subjects of desires and affections positively bad, but they have lost their freedom to do good, and are now free only to do evil, and *in rebus civilibus*. (4) All these evils, i. e. the whole of this state and condition, is propagated from one man to another by natural generation. (5) Hereditary depravity, still, is not a part of our concreated *substance*; it is not one of the *pura naturalia*;* but it is an invariable *accident* of the same. (6) The prevailing sentiment has been, that the sin of Adam is charged to us; and that on account of this, as well as of hereditary depravity, independently of all *actual* sin, we are justly subjected to the penalty of the second death. Melancthon called this *impia opinio*, at first; but he seems gradually to have given way to it; Bretschn. Dogmatik, II. p. 36. 2d edit. (7) The prevailing sentiment has been, that original sin, as thus defined, is fixed, constant, invariable, unaffected by time or circumstances, and uniform in all ages, in all nations, and among all individuals. Pres. Edwards labours abundantly to establish this idea, for substance, in Part I. Chap. I. § 2, of his Treatise on Original Sin.

The detail of evidence which would establish the correctness of this statement, is of course excluded from such a work as the present. I must content myself with referring to the Protestant Symbols, and to the leading divines, especially the older ones, among Protestants. Some discrepancies have indeed existed, in respect to more or less of the particulars stated; but of the more rigid school, nearly all, among the older writers, have concurred in the substantial part of the statement as given above.

The difficulties that are suggested to the mind, by an attentive examination of this theory of doctrine, are somewhat appalling. I proceed summarily to state a few of them.

(1) It is common for almost all the writers who advocate the natural propagation of Adam's sin and condemnation, to compare it with the propagation of certain tastes, defects, peculiarities of temperament, inclinations to certain vices, etc., which are often and every where developing themselves among our race. But it is unfortunate for this

* So the old school divines call those qualities which are *essential to human nature*, as such. What makes a *good* man or a *bad* one, is one of the *accidentia*, and not essence; what is necessary to make a man or human being, belongs to the *pura naturalia*.

reference, that the propagation in question has nothing of the *uniformity* or extent which they assign to original sin. The son of a man who has one eye or one leg, is not born defective. The children of *mutes* have perfect senses. The offspring of almost brutalized parents, are sometimes remarkable for opposite qualities. Nothing can be more variable, inconstant, and diversified, than every thing of this nature is.

(2) If the descent of original sin is to be explained on such grounds, viz. the common law of parents propagating their own qualities; then why are not the children of pious parents also pious? At least, why is not original sin greatly modified and diminished in the children of such parents? Pelagius urged this question on Augustine; to which the latter replied: 'The children of Jews are born uncircumcised.' Pelagius might have rejoined: 'The children of parents with one eye, are born with two;' and then the balance would have been again poised. In reply, however, to the suggestion just made, we are told,

(3) 'That the law of propagation depends not on our immediate ancestor, but on our connection with Adam.' On this it may be remarked, first, that if the propagation is in the manner contended for as above, i. e. agreeably to the *common* laws of our nature, then why must it not depend on our *immediate* ancestor? Take now the favourite representation of Pres. Edwards, viz. the root and branches of a tree: I ask then, does the topmost branch derive its sap from the one next to it, or immediately from the root? But secondly; if the law of propagation depends solely on our connection with Adam, then is the difficulty still not diminished. Adam became penitent after his fall; at least so the promises made to him, and the mercy shown him, would seem to imply; and so most divines have admitted. Then, as this happened before the procreation of his children, why did he not propagate to them his penitence, as well as his sin, his reward as well as his punishment? These considerations serve to shew, that if it be true that Adam's sin is *propagated*, it will not do to appeal to any of the *common* and *usual* laws of our nature in propagation, in order to support this idea. But,

(4) There are other difficulties. 'Original sin,' it is said, 'is uniform and invariable, in all circumstances, ages, and individuals.' It is, then, not capable either of increase, diminution, or modification. The most ardent piety diminishes it not; the highest profligacy does not add to it. The children of the most eminent saint, and of the veriest fiend, are on the footing of entire equality in this respect.

How can one help asking, now, whether there is indeed any sin among men, in their present state, (if perhaps what is called the unpardonable sin be excepted), which is incapable of all diminution, increase, or modification, by any actions whatever on the part of the individual who is the subject of it? Does the Bible reveal to us a sin, which is incapable of diminution by the sanctifying grace of God, by penitence, self-denial, and a holy life? Or which is incapable of increase by abandoned wickedness? What would any man say to this, who had simply read the Scriptures, and never been trained to *system* in theology?

And here the pressure is so great, that inconsistency usually comes in to the relief of such palpable difficulties. The divines of the Refor-

mation hold, beyond all question, that regenerating and sanctifying grace do diminish the power of sin—of *all* sin. Admitting this now, as we surely must, then we may be permitted to ask: Why should original sin be still *propagated* in its *full* strength? Is it Adam that begets us, or our immediate ancestor?

(5) 'Original sin,' they say, 'is not *concreated*; it is not one of the *pura naturalia*; it is *accidence*, not *substance*;' and yet it is 'invariable, uniform, always and every where.' Now logicians tell us, that only *substantial* and *essential* qualities have such predicates as these last. Is it not a contradiction, then, to assign to original sin a nature uniform and invariable, and yet to deny that it is an essential part of the human constitution?

(6) We are told, that 'original sin is the cause and ground of all actual sin.' Yet we are also told, that 'original sin is equal, uniform, and invariable in all.' Of course, then, all must originally be equally depraved; and under the like temptations, all must exhibit the very same degrees of wickedness. The same cause, in the same degree, must produce the same effect, whenever there are no special counteracting causes. But this is contrary to *fact*. Not only do men in a natural state, who belong to the same neighborhood, but those of the same family, differ widely from each other as to the degree of their wickedness. How then can a cause exist, *uniform in degree* as well as nature, which does not produce uniform effects in the same circumstances?

(7) If Adam's sin be propagated in the way of natural generation, then why were not his other sins (as well as his first one) committed before the procreation of his children, propagated to his descendants? And why, as before asked, are not his penitence and pardon propagated, as well as his sin and punishment?

(8) If propagation be the ground of transmitting sin, then why are not all the sins of all our ancestors, from Adam down to ourselves, brought down upon us, and propagated to us? In this way, why must not the sins of Adam's posterity forever go on, in the way of an arithmetical progression?

The idea of *propagating* sin, then, is liable to some appalling objections; at all events it is so, if we include the *manner* in which it has usually been stated and defended. Other remarks, which might be made on the theory of original sin as above stated, will find a place in the sequel.

II. Another theory is, that Adam's sin becomes ours merely as to the punishment due to it; i. e. his sin is ours simply and purely by imputation or putatively, while the consequences of his offence are really and truly ours.

This theory of course abandons the ground that Adam's personal sin is propagated to us; I mean that it must do so, if consistent with itself. In respect to the sentiment which constitutes the basis of it, I have already said enough in my commentary on Rom. 5: 12—19. I merely remark here, that this ground is clearly not the ground of the Creeds of the Reformation, and of the leading reformed divines. That it is encompassed with more formidable difficulties, in respect to moral

justice, and even moral possibility, than the first theory above examined, must be apparent, one would think, to every man who will well and thoroughly examine it.

Those who hold this theory usually maintain, that our depravity is not only *connate* and *innate*, but that, being such, it is also the *punishment* of Adam's sin which is imputed to us. There are, however, some very formidable difficulties in the way of this. For, (1) The sin, in this case, of Adam's posterity, i. e. their *original sin*, is, by the very ground of the theory, *merely putative*, not real and actual. But what is the punishment? *Actual*, to be sure, according to the statement of those who advocate this theory; and actual, indeed, in a tremendous degree. The punishment begins with our being; it is connate and innate, and contains within itself not only the commencement of a misery which is naturally without end, but is, at the same time, the root and ground of all other sins which we commit, and which serve unspeakably to augment our condemnation and misery. Now can the human mind well conceive, that perfect justice would punish with actual and everlasting and inevitable corruption and misery, beings who are sinners only *putatively*, i. e. in mere supposition and not in fact? For myself, I can only say, that all the elements of my moral nature set themselves spontaneously in array against such a representation as this. It is one of those cases, which make it necessary for me to be made over again, and have new and different faculties, before I can admit its truth. Nor,

(2) Can it be brought, in any tolerable measure, to accord with the views which the Bible gives of divine justice. How can we make it harmonize with the declarations in Ezek. xviii.? Or with many other parts of the Bible of the same tenor? But this is not all; for,

(3) The supposition contains a *ὑστερον προτερον* within itself. According to the tenor of it, punishment begins *before* the crime. It is co-etaneous with the original elements of our being. It begins before distinct perception, and understanding, and reason, and moral sense, are developed. It begins antecedent to all sense of duty, and antecedent to all knowledge of moral rule. Such punishment, therefore, *precedes* transgression, for "where there is no law, there is no transgression;" and surely there is no law, where there is no moral sense, nor reason, nor understanding, nor perception. But how can justice make punishment *precede* transgression? "The soul that sinneth shall die," is the order in which Heaven has placed the matter. Sin comes first; punishment is the fruit or consequence. By the theory before us, the reverse is the case. Punishment precedes all personal demerit; and sin follows on as the result of our punishment!

Nor is this at all relieved, by saying that 'sin does precede punishment, in this case, inasmuch as it is Adam's sin for which we are punished;' for this is only affirming, that *putative* or *supposititious* guilt, is followed by *real* and *actual* punishment. How does this diminish the difficulty of the case?

'But after all,' it will doubtless be said, 'you have repeatedly admitted the idea, that all of Adam's posterity are affected by his offence, and have sustained great losses thereby, and are subjected to many evils.

Why should you now decry the very sentiment which you have so often admitted ?

That I have admitted thus much, in regard to the present world, and sufferings in our present state, and also the moral degradation of our nature, in consequence of Adam's fall, I readily concede. I do fully believe all this. But this is, after all, something very different from *proper punishment*. The fall of Adam brought our race into a new state of probation, one exceedingly different in several respects, from that in which he himself first was. The whole race are now heirs by nature of a frail and dying state; they are no longer in that state or condition, in which they are inclined to holiness. And this comes on all, without any concurrence of their own. But all this too, may still be regarded in another light than that of simple punishment. It is trial; it is discipline; it is probation, *sui generis*. Adam has brought us into this state, I freely concede. But Christ has more than made good all its apparent or real disadvantages. "Grace superabounds." If evils come on our race because of Adam's sin, more, far more, than an equivalent is rendered for them, by the grace of the gospel. On the whole, then, our present condition is not to be viewed in the simple light of punishment for Adam's sin; but in that of trial or probation *sui generis*, adapted to our fallen nature, and adapted to restore us to the original image of God in which man was created. Not that in itself alone, our condition would be such as I have now described; but viewed in relation to what Christ has done for us, it has become such. What would be proper to preserve beings perpetually holy, in their pure and happy state, may be quite different, in some respects, from that which is necessary to restore beings to holiness, who now possess a fallen nature. All evil, or suffering and trial in the present world, is not punishment; and all which we have not brought on ourselves by our own sin and folly, may be well regarded in the light of *discipline*, which is adapted to our present condition.

There is, also, an inexpressible difference between our temporary evils here, and the endless miseries of a future world. The theory which I am opposing, makes all our race the heirs of the latter, antecedent to any voluntary exercise of their own, and merely on the ground of Adam's offence. If this were true, then would it follow, that Rom. V. 12—19 establishes a redemption from future misery as wide as the mischief of Adam's sin has spread; and this without any act on the part of the sinner. But as such a redemption would be a contradiction of the first principles of the New Testament; so its corresponding antithesis, i. e. the mischiefs occasioned by Adam, cannot, in themselves, be the direct, efficient, and universal cause or ground of the eternal damnation of all men. If so, the whole comparison must be destroyed, i. e. the actual resemblance of the two cases be virtually denied; for men by their own repentance and faith, and only on this condition, become partakers of the highest blessings of the gospel; their own acts, then, must make them the final heirs of eternal damnation.

For these reasons, while I admit that many things, which in and by themselves are *evils*, were brought on all our race by our original pro-

genitor, yet I hold, at the same time, that there is more than a balance for them, conferred on all, or proffered to all, by Christ. But in regard to the *second death*, my belief is, that it must be an act strictly our own, which subjects us to this; as really and truly as it must be an act of our own, viz. that of repenting and believing, in order to secure an interest in the salvation proffered to us.

I cannot admit, therefore, the theory above exhibited; nor can I persuade myself, that the same objections may be justly made against the views which I have admitted above, as may be made against the theory under consideration. This theory seems, in fact, to be much more exceptionable than the opinion of the Reformers in general, which has been examined under No. I., and which professes to make our own actual guilt precede our punishment.

III. Another explanation of the meaning of Rom. 5: 12—19 has been, that Adam first set the example of sinning, and his posterity have only followed his bad example.

This explanation denies the degenerate condition of Adam's posterity, and places them, in effect, on the same ground with him in his original state of holiness. But this is not only contrary to the numerous declarations of the Scriptures, but irrelevant to the subject which the apostle is labouring to illustrate. For if only the force of Adam's *example* has led his posterity to sin, how can we account for the sins of such of his posterity, as never knew any thing of his example? Or if example be the principal or leading cause of all sin, then whose example did Adam follow, when he committed the *first sin*? And why charge the occasion of our sins upon Adam, if example be the principal ground of them, when they should with much more propriety be charged upon those of Adam's posterity, who are *immediately* connected with each individual that sins? On the whole, this theory is palpably unsatisfactory, and insufficient to remove the difficulties in question. Especially must it be so considered, when we take into view the *expiatory death* of Christ as the ground of justification. For if, as the theory in question represents, the example of Adam was the occasion of the sin and death of all men; then must it follow, that the example of Christ is the cause of obedience and life to all men. This is, indeed, a doctrine which has been taught by some; but clearly not by the Apostle Paul, nor by any of his colleagues in office.

We come, then,

IV. To the simple facts and declarations of Paul, and of the Scriptures, relative to the subject before us. These are,

1. That Adam's first sin was connected with the sin and consequent condemnation of all his posterity. It was, in some sense or other, a preparatory or occasional cause. Setting aside the implied affirmation of this in v. 12 (εἰσῆλθε . . . διῆλθε), it is expressly asserted in v. 15, that τῷ τοῦ ἐνός παραπτώματι οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον in v. 16, we have τὸ μὲν γὰρ κρίμα ἐξ ἐνός εἰς κατάκριμα in v. 17, τῷ τοῦ ἐνός παραπτώματι ὁ θάνατος ἐβασίλευσε διὰ τοῦ ἐνός in v. 18, δι' ἐνός παραπτώματος, εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους εἰς κατάκριμα and in v. 19, διὰ τῆς παρακοῆς τοῦ ἐνός ἀνθρώπου ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν οἱ πολλοί. It seems to me to be im-

possible, without doing violence to the Scriptures, to deny that Adam's first offence is here asserted to have a connection with, or an influence upon, the sin and consequent condemnation of all his posterity. *But how, is not said.* Let the reader mark this well. Paul neither asserts that Adam's sin is propagated; nor that it is imputed to us without any act of our own; nor that it is ours merely by the force of example. Nor does he say, that *hereditary* depravity is the ground and cause of all sin, (how could he say this, when Adam sinned without it?) nor that we are condemned without being *actual* sinners. All this has been often said for him, and in his name; but he does not once say this for himself. Why now should we attribute to him our own theories, and then insist on their being a part of Scripture? At all events, if we can make out any theory, as to the *modus* of original sin, it must be merely by *deductions* from what the apostle has here said, or from other declarations of the Scriptures, which we can find elsewhere. How much can be made out in this latter way, we shall have further occasion to inquire in the sequel.

2. We may justly gather from Rom. V. 12—19, that the evil consequences of Adam's act, may be placed in antithesis to the good which Christ has procured for the human race. The apostle goes no farther, in this passage, than to declare that on the one hand sin and death were occasioned by Adam; on the other, righteousness and life are introduced by Christ. But from other parts of his writings we learn, that men in a state of nature, i. e. before regeneration, are all destitute of any holiness; and that all who can sin, have sinned. Of course we necessarily draw the inference, that men are born destitute of such a disposition to holiness as Adam had in his primitive state; and this from the fact that they never, before regeneration, do any thing which is truly good and holy, but always sin in all their actions of a moral nature. This makes a wide difference between their present natural state, and the original condition of Adam. And into this natural state they are born, as we have reason to conclude, in consequence of Adam's fall. Although the apostle does not specificate the particular point in which the fall injured all men, yet as he so often asserts the *fact* itself that it did injure them, it must of course be allowed, that in some way or other the truth of this fact is developed. In what way, then, is this developed, if not in the manner just stated, viz. by our being born into a state destitute of all disposition to holiness, and with passions and appetites, which, situated as we are, will *certainly* lead us to sin, and *always* lead us to sin, in all our actions of a moral nature? The fact that we now have such a nature, and that such is the result in respect to our passions and appetites, the Scripture testifies, and the experience of all ages and nations testifies. *How this came about*, Paul seems to me to declare, in the passage under consideration.

I must add here, however, in order to guard against all misunderstanding, that our sinning is not to be regarded as *necessary*, in the sense of being *compulsive*. The *faculties to sin* do not make men sinners; otherwise Adam and the fallen angels were sinners, before their first transgression. *Temptation to sin* does not make men sinners, even

when they feel its power; for our Saviour was tempted "in all points as we are," yet without sin. The possession of desires and appetites which are *pura naturalia* does not make men sinners; for they are essential to men as human beings, and our Saviour possessed them: as did Adam before his fall. It may also be said with truth, that moral sense, conscience, reason, judgment, are all attributes of the natural man; that they are *pura naturalia*: and all these are designed to contend against passions and desires that would lead us to evil, to restrain them, to control them, and keep them within their proper bounds. God has not left men, therefore, even in their fallen and degraded state, in a condition in which they have any excuse for their sin; as any one may see and must feel, who will attentively read Rom. 1: 19—32. 2: 14, 15. 3: 9—23. It is impossible to overlook the fact here, that the apostle considers the abuse of reason and conscience by the heathen, in virtue of which they ought to have resisted their sinful inclinations, as rendering them altogether inexcusable before God.

Whatever then may be the degradation in which we are now born, (degradation compared with the original state of Adam), we are still born moral agents; free agents; with *faculties* to do good, yea, all the faculties that are needed. If we are born with passions and affections attached to our natures which may lead us to sin, we are also born having a *moral* man within us to remonstrate against the abuse of our passions.

The fact that the degradation of our whole race is connected with the first sin of Adam, is, I acknowledge, a matter of divine sovereignty, altogether beyond our power to fathom. We can speculate and reason about it, and wonder; but it becomes us to bow in humble submission. More than we have lost, the gospel assures us has been given to us by Christ. We see enough to know, that even in our fallen state our sins cannot be charged upon the Author of our nature. They are strictly our own. That Adam was in some sense the cause or occasion of our degradation, is clearly taught; but that his sin was our sin—where is this taught? I cannot find it. I can find only, (what appears to be the sum of all that Paul has taught relative to this subject), that such was our connection with Adam, that his fall has occasioned more or less of evil to all his race without exception; that all are despoiled of that holiness which belonged to him in his original state; and that all are in a condition in which ruin will ensue, unless there be some deliverer. On the other hand; it is made equally apparent, that such a deliverer has appeared; that he has by his wonderful grace and mercy, made such an arrangement as that the evils, which come on all without exception through the act of Adam, may be made the means of *spiritual* good; he has placed all men, destitute of righteousness such as Adam had in his original state, under a *dispensation of mercy and pardon*, where salvation is more accessible and certain to the penitent, than it was in paradise to Adam, while under a mere law dispensation; and to all those who bring on themselves the higher penalty of the divine law by their own personal ill-desert, he has procured eternal redemption, if they will accept it. Is it not true, then, that "grace superabounds?" Are we

obliged to reject the doctrine of our fall in Adam, as either improbable, or as dishonourable to God?

But I must leave a multitude of interesting questions, because of my limits; remembering that my main design is *commentary*, not *didactic theology*. A few miscellaneous remarks, however, all of which pertain to topics of importance, (but which, from the nature of the present case, cannot be arranged in the order of a regular dissertation), I cannot, out of justice to myself and my subject, refrain from making.

I. There are serious difficulties in the way of those, who maintain that original sin consists in a disposition or inclination that is *connate* with us, is antecedent to all sinful choice and volition, and is in itself not only sinful, but the basis and ground of all subsequent sin. For, (a) Adam sinned without this. (b) The apostle appears to contradict this in Rom. 9: 11, "The children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil." If it be said, that *done good or evil* here means only the *external actions*; Pres. Edwards and others who maintain the above theory, have precluded themselves from such a reply, by averring that "nothing is good or bad, except as it proceeds from a *good or bad principle* or *disposition* of the mind;" which principle, with them, is *antecedent* to all choice and action. Consequently, when the apostle denies that the children had done either good or evil, he must deny that there was any principle of good or evil in them, if this theory be true. Nor is this all. *Bad deeds* and good ones, *evil done* or *good done*, every one should know, means, in the language of the Bible, *every kind of evil and good*, whether internal or external. When it is said that "God will reward every man according to his *works*," the meaning surely is not 'according to merely his external actions.' The account of infants in Is. 7: 15, 16; in Jonah 4: 11; and in Deut. 1: 39; compared with Rom. 4: 15. 1 John 3: 4. James 4: 17. Luke 12: 47, 48. John 9: 41. 15: 22—24. Rom. 1: 20, 21, 32, casts strong light on the explicit declaration of Paul in Rom. 9: 11. For the substance of these declarations of the Scriptures, is, that "to him who knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, it is sin;" that where there is no such knowledge, i. e. "where there is no law, there is no transgression," for "sin is *ἄνομια*," i. e. want of conformity to law; of course a *voluntary non-conformity* must be meant, *the voluntary non-conformity of an intelligent, rational, moral, free agent*; for no other is capable of sin, unless we would maintain that inanimate substances, and brutes, and idiots, and madmen, are sinners. Thus one class of texts above cited, teaches. Another class as clearly shews, that our sins bear an exact proportion, in respect to their heinousness, to the degree of light which we have, and the motives to holy obedience by which we are urged; all which of course implies, that if we were in a state in which we had no light, and were incapable of perceiving or feeling the force of any motives, then we should not be sinners. Another class, moreover, develops to us very clearly, that infants are incapable of the knowledge in question. Even of the child *Immanuel* is this explicitly asserted; and the assertion is made, moreover, concerning him *after* his birth, Is. 7: 15: 16. The very same thing is explicitly affirmed also by Moses, concerning all the very young children of the

Israelites: "Your children, which in that day had no knowledge between good and evil," Deut. 1: 39. To the same purpose is the text in Jonah 4: 11. It is the like view of little children, which the Saviour presents, when he says to his disciples: "Except ye be converted and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven," Matt. 18: 3. Again: "Suffer little children to come unto me, for of such is the kingdom of heaven," Matt. 19: 14. Mark 10: 13. Luke 18: 15, 16. So likewise the apostle Paul: "Howbeit, in malice be ye children," 1 Cor. 14: 20. These comparisons do not imply, that little children are positively holy. I know of no declaration in the Bible of such import. But they do seem to imply, that they are *innocent*, (*innocuous*), i. e. that they are not the subjects of positively sinful passions and affections, such as malice, ambition, etc.; for on any other ground, how could they be made the objects of such a comparison as they here are?

And now what says conscience, to such declarations of the divine word as these? Can these declarations accord with the view of *connate* depravity held up by Pres. Edwards and the Symbols of the Reformation? According to them, sin exists antecedent to all volition, choice, or action; it is *connate* and *innate*; it is invariable and invincible; for it is propagated uniformly by natural generation; the children of the highest saint have just as much of it as the children of the vilest profligate; and what is more than all, it is this very sin, as Edwards most explicitly maintains, which is not only the ground and root of all *actual* sin, but it does itself include all the guilt which a man can have, in as much as all virtuous or vicious choice is no further virtuous or vicious, except as it proceeds from a virtuous temper or disposition of mind which *preceded* it; Edwards on *Orig. Sin*, p. 149 seq. How Adam could have sinned, on this ground, remains, I must think, a problem incapable of solution; for he surely had, according to the same writer, a *holy* disposition, antecedently to the first act of sin. But dismissing this, I remark, that the theory of Pres. Edwards on this point, and that of most of the older Reformers along with him, (not to speak of Augustine and many others), does seem to me to be plainly at variance with the explicit declarations of the Scriptures, to which I have adverted above, and equally at variance with the first dictates of our unbiassed feelings and our reason. All men pronounce infants to be *innocent*, until theory bids them contradict this. The spontaneous conclusion of every moral feeling and of conscience, is, that "where there is no law, there is no transgression." Nay, I may say, that the distinction every where admitted, among the very divines themselves who defend the Symbols of the Reformation—the distinction made in respect to *original* and *actual* sin, does of itself shew that their minds, after all, struggled to get away from the repulsive parts of their theory. Pres. Edwards, indeed, goes deeper into this matter; and doing away *actual* sin, resolves all sin into the *antecedent* disposition, i. e. into original sin or *connate* depravity, p. 150. Thus, before children have any knowledge at all, yea, while they are in the womb, they are not only sinners, but all the sin which is ever to be committed by them, is in them in embryo. Gerhard, the δ $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\upsilon$ of the older Lutheran divines, who has written a

system of theology in twenty two quarto volumes, says, explicitly: "*Semen, ex quo formamur, est immundum, et peccato infectum,*" Vol. IV. p. 326; an assertion which, extravagant as it may seem, is as capable of defence, as that an infant in the womb is an actual sinner; which the apostle Paul explicitly denies, Rom. 9: 11.

Much then and sincerely as I reverence the immortal men who fought the battles of the Reformation, and those who have followed in their steps, and illustrated and defended what they wrote; much as I reverence that most eminent man of God, Pres. Edwards, one of the deepest thinkers, clearest reasoners, and most pious ministers that has lived in any age or country; yet I feel bound to reverence what I must regard as the decisions of the Bible still more. Those decisions relative to the point in question, do seem to me, after long and painful examination, to be plainly and explicitly against them; and my creed as a Protestant is, that *the Scriptures are the SUFFICIENT and ONLY rule of faith and practice.*

Of course it cannot for a moment be supposed, that such men as the Reformers and their followers would have defended the doctrine that has been questioned above, unless they apprehended that the Scriptures could be justly appealed to as defending it. Accordingly they have appealed to many texts for this purpose. Such are John 3: 6. 1 Cor. 2: 14, 15. Rom. 3: 9—24. 5: 6—10. Eph. 2: 1, 3, 5. Rom. 5: 12—19. Gen. 6: 5. 8: 21. Job 15: 14—16. Prov. 22: 15, and others of a similar tenor; all of which prove that the natural unregenerate state of man, is a state of alienation from God, and one which needs the regenerating and sanctifying influence of the Spirit of God; and no more. But *when* this state of alienation *begins*, is not decided by these, or by any such texts. Whether it be, as Gerhard maintains, *in semine*; or whether it belongs to the infant in the womb, as Edwards and the Reformers maintain; the sacred writers do not declare, by any or all of such texts. Gerhard, however, appeals to Ps. 51: 5, in support of his assertion; so also, the Reformers and their advocates in respect to this point, appeal to the same text in support of the like assertion. And generally this text is the object of direct and special appeal, on the part of those who maintain the *connate* and *innate* depravity of infants. Ps. 51: 5, literally translated, runs thus: "Behold, I was born in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me." To whom then does the iniquity spoken of in this place belong? To the mother or the child? I venture to say, that exegetical considerations alone considered, must leave this case doubtful. It may be, that David means to say here; 'I am sinful and descended from a transgressor!' i. e. I am the degenerate plant of a strange vine. Rosenmüller however, and after him Bretschneider (*Dogmatik* II. p. 47), maintain, as most others had before done, that the words must be applied to the *child*. And why? Because, say they, 'it is *ratio misericordiae* which David makes use of;' i. e. David urges his *native* depravity as an appeal to compassion, and *as an apology for his sin*. A singular reason enough, in a Psalm of such humbling confession as this contains!

But I will allow, for the sake of argument, that the passage applies

to David, and not to his mother. Then comes the question: Are the words to be *literally* understood? If you maintain this, (and this is maintained by those who defend the usual doctrine of original sin), then I ask, how is Ps. 58: 3 to be explained: "The wicked are estranged from the womb; they go astray as soon as they are born, *speaking lies*." Now when this latter affirmation, in its *literal sense*, can be made out, then may we take the former part of the verse in its literal sense—and then also we may take Ps. 51: 5 in its literal sense. But we cannot with propriety do this, until the exegesis in question is made out.

Nor is it a singular thing that the expression here is to be taken in a *modified* sense. God says of Jeremiah: "Before thou camest forth out of the womb, I sanctified thee," i. e. set thee apart as a prophet, Jer. 1: 5. So Gal. 1: 15, 16. Such an expression is a strong one, which is intended to designate the earlier period of one's life. But what kind of life is intended in Ps. 51: 5, *moral* or *physical* life? The nature of the case is a sufficient answer. At all events, if the exegesis which is put on this passage by the advocates for the usual views of original sin, be correct, then does it appear to contradict the explicit declaration of Paul in Rom. 9: 11. Consequently this exegesis cannot be consistently urged; for the sense of the latter passage is clear, and is made so by the exigency of the place and the nature of the apostle's reasoning.

To maintain that infants may have *original sin*, which is the cause and ground of all other sins, and comprises the guilt of them all; and yet to maintain with Paul, that "the children who are not yet born have done neither good nor evil;" is impossible, unless we can shew that the Bible sets forth two sorts of sin, the one *connate*, and the other the result of choice and action. But where are these to be found? Nay—supposing such a distinction to be made—how could Paul affirm of children not born, that *they have done neither good nor evil*, provided they have the ground and cause of all evil in them, and that which renders all their subsequent actions criminal? How could he do this, when *actions, doing, ἔργα*, are in the Scriptures predicated of the *internal* as well as the *external* man?

Fully to vindicate all that I have said in the few paragraphs above, would demand a book, instead of a few pages. I have only to add, therefore, that so strongly does this view of Paul and of common moral feeling impress itself on the mind, that Pres. Edwards, although his book is mainly built on entirely an opposite theory, viz. the usual one in respect to positive sinfulness antecedent to all choice and action, not only intimates that a different view is reasonable, but occupies a whole chapter in order to establish it. In p. 28 he says: "It is agreeable to the sentiments of the best divines, that all sin originally comes from a *defective* or *privative cause*." In Part IV. chap. 2, p. 307, seq., he has argued at length against the idea of "any evil quality being *infused, implanted*, or wrought into our nature by any *positive* cause or influence whatever, *either of God or the creature*; or of supposing that man is conceived and born with a *fountain of evil* in his heart, such as is any thing properly *positive*." He goes on to aver, that "the absence of positive good principles," and "the withholding of special divine influ-

ence," and the "leaving of the common natural principles of self-love, natural appetite, etc., *which were in man in INNOCENCE*," is sufficient to account for all the corruption that appears among men. A signal instance, indeed, of the triumph of the spontaneous feelings of our moral nature over the power of *system*! For in his whole book, he has gone directly counter to this; assuming the common theory of the Protestant creeds, viz. that there is a *positive* unholy principle, *connate* with man, which is itself a sin worthy of eternal death, and is the basis of all other sins. But here, supposing man "to have only the common natural principles *which were in him in a state of INNOCENCE*," he finds no difficulty in accounting for it, that he becomes altogether corrupt. What is this, but to bear spontaneous testimony to the views of Paul, in Rom. 9: 11, and to the first and simple dictates of moral feeling?

II. It is more important that we should know our lost condition in our natural state, than it is that we should know *how* it came about. Accordingly, there is nothing in all the Old Testament, not even in Gen. III. which gives a history of the fall of man, that turns our attention to the connection of Adam with his posterity, or represents him as their federal head, or shews the influence which his sin has had upon them. There is nothing in the New Testament which does this, excepting Rom. 5: 12—19. 1 Cor. 15: 22. I am aware that many other texts have, by *construction*, been made to speak so; but I cannot help the conviction that it is not voluntary testimony. And now, when Paul brings up the subject, in both instances it is solely for the sake of contrasting the evils occasioned by Adam with the good occasioned by Christ, in order to set off the latter to the best advantage. Why should we make so much of this subject, as some do, while the Scriptures have thus treated it? That we are in a ruinous state; that we must perish without redemption; that we deserve to perish; are plain, incontrovertible facts. That we must be born again in order to see the kingdom of God, and that we are "by nature," i. e. in our natural unregenerate state, "children of wrath," is clear. That the sin of Adam was connected with all our evils in some way, is certain. More than this, i. e. the *manner* in which this connection is occasioned, we may dispense with knowing, until we can find it taught in the Scriptures.

Is it not a matter of surprise, in case the sacred writers did really estimate the comparative importance of the subject of our connection with Adam as some modern divines have done, that such a deep silence should pervade the Old Testament concerning it, and that in the New Testament only Paul should break this silence in two instances merely, and in each of these, merely for the sake of presenting a contrast, which is designed to magnify the work of Christ?

III. Which now of the two principal views taken of the natural state of man, presents the most cogent reasons for penitence and humility? Which inculcates the deepest sense of our need of a Saviour?

Can there be any doubt as to the answer? If man, fallen as he is, has still in his fallen state all the faculties necessary to do good, and has a moral sense, conscience, judgment, reason; if, "not being yet born,

he has not done any good or evil" (Rom. 9: 11), and he sins altogether of his own free will and choice whenever he does sin; then it is indeed true, that he "is guilty of death;" then is punishment not only threatened, but altogether *deserved*; then is he justly exposed to the condemnation of "those, who have known their master's will and done it not;" then has he incurred the awful penalty of those, who "know to do good but do it not." Can any but an almighty Saviour deliver sinners of such a character as this?

But supposing now, on the other hand, that men are born with a positively evil disposition, which is itself sin, and incurs eternal death antecedent to all choice and action; supposing them to have, (as Pres. Edwards asserts, p. 27) "a propensity [to sin] that is *invincible*, or a tendency which really amounts to fixed, constant, unfailing *necessity*;" and supposing this propensity, thus implanted in their natures and antecedent to all choice and action, is the basis or ground of all subsequent sins: then indeed men may need redemption; they are truly in a ruinous state; they are indeed objects of our pity and of overwhelming misfortune; but where is the aggravated measure of their voluntary guilt, which the Bible charges upon them as agents altogether free? Where is the deep sense of accountability for faculties and moral sense and reason abused? Can there for a moment be any hesitation here, as to the question: Which system presents the greater guilt of men, the more urgent need of redemption, the more awful exposure of sinners, and the unspeakable greatness of their salvation? How little then of justice in averring, as has often been done, that such views (as I have been giving above) of our natural state, tend to diminish a sense of our need of a Saviour! Nothing can be further from correctness than this. The sinner's guilt is rendered beyond description more aggravated, by this method of viewing his condition.

IV. What system agrees best with proper views of God's justice and our own accountability?

What is our own act, we feel accountable for; not for that which was done by another, without any concurrence on our part. This is an immutable law of our moral sense. *Justice* keeps pace with desert; retributive and perfect justice *punishes* only for *personal* desert. These are, I had almost said, self evident principles; and can it be that such principles leave any doubt how to answer the above question? But,

V. I still readily concede, that no theory in regard to the original condition of our nature, can entirely clear up *all* the difficulties of the case. *The permission of sin* lies at the bottom of all the real difficulty; and this, as it is a matter of *fact*, can never be removed, in our present imperfect state. Now whether I say that men are born sinners, and are thus chargeable with Adam's sin; or whether I say that they are born destitute of original holiness, and with passions which they will abuse, and certainly abuse; the main difficulty is not fully explained. The latter is, in some sense surely, an arrangement of an overruling providence; for who placed men in their present condition? There can be but one answer. If then we go, as in this case, a little further round before we come to the main difficulty, we are still unable to shun it al-

together. Even if we say merely, that all men imitate Adam's example, and so are ruined in this way; one might ask: Who then arranged the condition of men, so that this example would come before them? There is no end to such questions, and in the same way we may object, if we feel disposed so to do, to all other theories that have ever been proposed. The difficulty at the bottom, is an arrangement which admits of sin. The main thing which can be said in explanation of this, as it seems to me, is, that *probation* implies power and opportunity to sin. Without these probation is a mere name, and not a thing. The question being decided, whether an intelligent being shall be put on *probation*, it is of course decided that he *can* sin.

So far now as this difficulty is concerned, there is no system of explaining our present condition as sinners, which can wholly avoid it; although it does not press equally hard on all systems; at least, the mode of presenting it in some, is less obnoxious than in others. After all, however, on account of other difficulties pertaining to other points, such as have been already adverted to above, I feel myself compelled to reject the predominant theory of Pres. Edwards, in respect to original sin, and to regard his subordinate one, (if I may so call it), as being the most consonant with the Scriptures, and with our moral sense and judgment. It is certain, that many appalling difficulties which lie in the way of the former theory, do not stand in the way of the latter. This is enough, as it seems to me, to determine our choice. But in making this choice, we need not keep out of sight the idea, that some difficulties, and, if you please to insist on it, some great ones too, are common to all the theories. But these may be summed up in one single thing, viz. the admission of sin into the moral world; which is a problem of no easy solution by any system; and which, after all the circuitous routes that are or have been taken to avoid it, comes in some measure into our path at last, and presents an obstacle in whatever part of the way it meets us.

VI. The view which has been given above of Rom. 5: 12—19, if correct, serves to shew that this passage cannot be justly regarded as asserting the doctrine of *universal salvation*. We have seen, that as there are some evils which come upon all men without any concurrence of their own, so there are blessings and privileges, (i. e. the common blessings of providence, the means of grace, and above all a dispensation of grace), which are bestowed on all without their concurrence. But although, on the one hand, evils do indeed come on all without distinction; yet on the other, so far as it respects *these* evils, they are all capable of being made blessings to the penitent; and they do indeed become so. So much is true, in regard to the present world. In respect to a future world, the higher penalty of sin, or the second death, comes only on those who do themselves sin; their own *personal* act must consummate their destruction: and so in the opposite case, eternal redemption, though freely proffered to all, and although all are under a dispensation of grace, is actually bestowed only on such as repent and believe. The comparison of Paul between evils on the one hand, and blessings on the other, does not permit us to go farther than this. The "super-

abounding" of grace has no respect to the *number of persons*, (how can this be the case since the evils of Adam's transgression extend to all without exception?) but to the *number of offences*; see Rom. 5: 16. The use which has often been made of the passage in question for the purpose of establishing the doctrine of universal salvation, seems therefore to have no good foundation.

VII. But, on the ground of the above explanation, how shall the question be answered: Whether infants need a Saviour, and whether they are saved by Christ?

These questions have often been produced, as an overwhelming objection against such an explanation as I have given. I cannot so consider them. At least, if there be any embarrassment in the case, it is one which strikes other important parts of Christian doctrine with equal force. For example: "He that believeth, shall be saved; he that believeth not, shall be damned." I ask now: Do infants *believe*? I suppose this will not be asserted. Can they be saved? This will not be denied. Calvin himself allowed this of the children of saints. Is the above declaration of the Saviour, then, contradicted by the salvation of infants? No, not at all. Why? Because, when Christ says: "He that believeth shall be saved," etc., he obviously means to speak only of such as are *capable of believing*.

Just so in another respect. "Except we repent we shall all perish." But are infants capable of repentance? No more so than they are of belief. When it is said, that Christ "came not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance," this is said, of course, of all who in the nature of things are capable of repentance.

It may be true, then, that Christ is the Saviour of infants, who neither actually believe, nor actually repent. 'But how can this be?' says the objector. 'You say that none fall under the sentence of the second death, without *actual sin*? What need then of a Saviour for infants, who have not committed this? Or how can Christ save them, if they are not really sinners?'

Just as well as he can save them, I answer, without faith and repentance. Let it be remembered, that the views given above uniformly recognize the fact, that we are born destitute of that original disposition to holiness, which Adam before his fall possessed. Now "without holiness none shall see the Lord." To enter heaven, and to enjoy the sacred pleasures of that blessed place, there must be a *positive* taste for them, and a special preparation for satisfaction in them. If now infants are saved, (which I do hope and trust is the case), then they must have such a relish implanted in their souls for the holy joys of heaven, as will fit them to be the happy subjects of such joys. Is there nothing, then, which Christ by his Spirit can do for them, in imparting such a taste? Is there no *imperfection* of nature to be removed? Is there no *positive* blessing to be bestowed? It surely is not difficult to see, that much is to be done for infants, in order to fit them for heaven; and if so, and if Christ does all for them which the nature of their case admits or demands, is not he their Saviour? Is he not, in such a case, a real and true Saviour? Does it follow, because his "blood cleanseth from all

iniquity," that he may not be a Saviour to those who die before they can contract *actual* guilt in their own persons, but who still need a new heart and a right spirit?

After all; if any one is still disposed to urge the objection, made above, I would ask him to account for the apostle's declaration, that the "children who are not born, have done neither good nor evil," Rom. 9: 11. On the objector's ground, how can Christ *save* those who have done no evil? We see therefore, that the objection lies not only against the views which I have defended, but against the assertion of Paul himself.

VIII. I cannot help the feeling, that there is an extravagance in the assertion so often made, and so strenuously defended in relation to sufferings in the present world. It has often been asserted, that the fact that all the human race are sufferers, proves that all without exception are sinners in such a sense as to have incurred the full penalty of the divine law. That all who actually become moral agents do sin, and thus incur the penalty, I fully believe, and have every where maintained. But that we can conclude, that infants are accounted sinners in such a sense as to be worthy of the second death, from the mere fact of their present sufferings, seems to me more doubtful. Multitudes of infants perish before birth. What then are we to do with the assertion of Paul, Rom. 9: 11, relative to the innocence of infants before they are born? I see no way in which this can be contravened. I feel constrained to believe him, on the credit of his word; and *a fortiori* we may credit him, when this word accords with the spontaneous and simple dictates of our moral nature.

Then again; the sufferings of the present life are, as has already been often said, capable of becoming blessings; they are in fact made so to the children of God. Who can conclude now from *disciplinary* suffering, that the subject of it lies of course under final condemnation? Will the suffering of the apostles, after they were devoted to the cause of Christ, prove that they still lay under the curse of the law? If you say, 'They had once incurred this curse;' I grant it: but it was removed; it had been annulled as to them. Why then did their sufferings still continue? The answer is: They continued as part of the necessary discipline of men, in their present imperfect state. If there were no trial, there would be no brightening of the Christian graces, and comparatively but little reward. Comp. James 1: 2—4. Rom. 5: 3—5. 8: 28. 2 Tim. 2: 11, 12.

Now when any one will show me, that the sufferings of Christians prove them still to be under the curse, then may I admit that the sufferings of infants will furnish decisive proof that they are under the same. Until then, I may be allowed to hesitate; for suffering and *punishment* are not always the same thing. If it could be shown that the sufferings of infants are other than *disciplinary*, and if it were fact that no good could result from them, the argument might then, perhaps, be more cogent.

On the whole, nothing can be plainer than that suffering and sin, in the present world, are not coextensive. What can we say of the

multiplied and aggravated sufferings of the brute creation? Are they *sinner*s? I do not compare their case with that of infants, except for one purpose, viz. to show that the connection between suffering simply considered and sin, is not always so imperious as it is represented to be, nor, in our present state, so conclusive in reasoning as some deem it to be. There is plainly much suffering in the universe, which does not arise from sin. But in respect to human beings, I acknowledge very fully and freely, that all their sufferings are connected with sin, either in themselves or in others. By reason of Adam's sin, our original holiness is lost; and now suffering has become a necessary part of discipline, in order to effect our restoration. In this sense it is a part of the penalty of death originally threatened, viz. that it is suffering or evil; but it is a *subordinate* part of this threatening; a very small part of it; and one which (such is the wonderful grace of the gospel) is capable, by God's mercy, of being converted into a blessing as to its consequences, although to be deemed an evil when considered merely in itself. How then can such confident reliance be placed on an argument, drawn merely from the evils of the present life?

IX. I remark at the close, (for to a close I must now come unless I would write a book on the subject), that Christians can have very little apology for bitter disputes with each other, about the details of speculation in regard to original sin, and for becoming divided in affection on this account. We have seen that Paul enters into no particulars; he indulges in no speculations. He only asserts the fact, that Adam's first sin had a connection with, and influence upon, the sin and death of all men. There he leaves it. We gather his views about the particular nature of the facts to which he alludes, only from other parts of his writings; and even here we meet with mere matters of fact, and with nothing of speculation. This is all so clear, that I need not stop to fortify it. Why then should Christians dispute and divide, by reason of their own speculations, which are superadded to what Paul has taught? I may view with apprehension the consequences of some speculations on the subject under consideration, because I may think they intrench on other very important principles. But if my brother, who indulges in these speculations, does not in fact intrench on those principles, but fully admits them, is it not criminal in me to charge him with purposely endeavoring to overturn them? The ruined and hopeless state of man by nature, i. e. of unsanctified man, whether adult or infant, I do most fully and amply believe, although the ground and reason and extent of this in adults and infants is very diverse; the absolute necessity of renewing grace, of special sanctification by the Spirit, and of mercy bought by the redeeming blood of Christ, I do most fully and amply admit. I regard the views developed above, as representing the case of sinners to be far more aggravated and awful, than the usual sentiments of the Reformers represent it. In consequence of this, the need of a Saviour becomes more conspicuous, and his help a matter of higher gratitude; for who will be most grateful, he who was so unfortunate as to fall under sentence of everlasting death, antecedently to all choice and action of his own, and is delivered from it:

or he, who having of his own choice and free will incurred the penalty, and this by awful aggravations of his guilt, is still delivered from its just sentence by the mercy of a Saviour? All that is practically important as to the lost condition of man, the sentiments which I have advocated surely maintain. All that is essential in the doctrines of the Reformation relative to original sin, is received and defended; while, in my view, deeper guilt and danger are attached to the state of the natural man, than the Reformers themselves attached; and of course, higher need of Jesus and his salvation is exhibited. Is this to deny the doctrines of the Reformation? Or is it endeavouring to dissipate mists which have in some respects hovered around some of them, in order that they may shine forth in all their true glory? Speak, conscience—Christian kindness—God's holy word—and I ask for no more.

X. I did intend to give a brief sketch of the *history of the doctrine* under consideration; but I must suppress it for want of room. I shall conclude this protracted Excursus, by referring the reader to some select sources of reading, on the various topics that have been discussed.

For a view of the doctrines of the Reformed Symbols, he may consult Augusti, *Corpus Lib. Symbol. Reformatorum*, 1 Vol. 8vo, 1827; containing a very full and ample exhibition of the originals, with literary notices, etc. Also Winer, *Comparative Darstellung des Lehrbegriffs der verschied. Christl. Kirchenpartien*, 4to, 1824; an exceedingly convenient book, which deserves to be reprinted in this country, as it might be at a moderate expense. The author has given short critical notes, which display great acuteness.

On the interpretation of Rom. 5: 12—19, besides the commentaries, the reader should peruse J. G. Toellner, *Theolog. Untersuchungen*, I. No. 2. Flatt's *Magazin*, St. 13. p. 68, seq. Schottii *Opuscula*, I. p. 213, seq. Keilii *Opuscula*, p. 16, seq. *Beiträge zur Beford. des vernünft. Denkens*, Th. 12. p. 45, seq. Bretschneider, *Dogmatik*, § 124. II. p. 47, seq. Edwards on *Original Sin*, Part II. chap. IV. § 2. J. Taylor's *Scripture doctrine of Orig. Sin*, and his *Key to the Apostolic Writings*. All the systems of divinity, Calvin, Turretin, Pictet, Gerhard, Quenstedt, Hollaz, Storr, Bretschneider, Knapp, Hahn, Reinhard, Doederlein, Episcopius, Limborch, Markius, Van Mastricht, Ridgeley, Doddridge, Hopkins, and all others, of course discuss this passage of Scripture more or less.

The history of the doctrine of Original Sin, may be found in a very compressed, but very instructive form, in Bretschneider's *Dogmatik*, § 128; also in Hahn's *Lehrbuch des Christl. Glaubens*, § 80. See also, Walchii *Historia doctrinae de Peccato Originis*, 1738. 4to. Id. *de Pelagianismo ante Pelagium*, 1738. 4to. Augusti, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, p. 301—310. Horn *de Peccato Originali*, Goett. 1801. Muencher, *Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte* II. p. 89, seq. IV. p. 143, seq. Wiggers, *Pragm. Darstellung des Augustinismus und Pelagianismus*, Berl. 1821. Vossii *Historia Pelagianismi*. J. Geffhen, *Historia Semipelagianismi*, Goett. 1826. The result of extensive and candid reading, in regard to the history of the doctrine in question, will be, as I must think, a full persuasion, that in the form and shape in which this doctrine was main-

tained by most of the Reformers, it was first introduced by Augustine, in his dispute with Pelagius; from whose works, and those of his friends and followers, it came into the creeds of the Reformation; and thence it has come down to us. The whole subject needs, in this country, an investigation and review *de novo*, such as it has not yet received.

EXCURSUS VI.

On Romans 7: 5—25. (p. 310.)

It is not my design here, to repeat at large what has been already sufficiently explained in the body of the commentary. But in order to make out a view in some good measure complete, as to its essential parts, I shall simply recapitulate in order the leading considerations already suggested in favour of the exegesis above given, without dilating at all upon them; while other considerations not yet suggested, will be more fully stated; after which the leading objections to the exegesis adopted will be discussed.

Before proceeding to execute the task here undertaken, I must beg the liberty of making a few remarks on the nature of the case; and also on the nature of the proof which is requisite, in order to establish any particular interpretation of the whole passage.

First, it is a just principle of interpretation, that we should understand every writer, when this can be done in consonance with the laws of language, as speaking to the purpose which he has immediately before him. There are very many truths of the gospel, and many plain and important truths, which are not taught in this or that passage of Scripture. The question concerning chap. 7: 5—25, is not whether it be true that there is a contest in the breast of Christians, which might (at least for the most part) be well described by the words there found; but whether such a view of the subject is congruous with the present design and argument of the apostle.

Secondly, no theory of interpretation can, in the present case, be duly and satisfactorily supported, by appealing merely to the form and intensity of particular expressions. If this can be allowed here, then are we certain that two opposite theories may be established, viz. that the individual whose experience is represented, is a saint, and is not one. That he is one, may be made out by such expressions as the following: viz. *σύμφημι τῷ νόμῳ*, v. 16; *τὸ γὰρ θέλειν* [sc. *τὸ κακόν*] *παράκειται μοι*, v. 18; *τῷ θέλοντι ἐμοὶ ποιεῖν τὸ κακόν*, v. 21; *συνήδομαι γὰρ τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἕσω ἄνθρωπον*, v. 22; and *τῇ μὲν νοῦ δουλεύω νόμῳ θεοῦ*, v. 25;—while with equal certainty and by the same reasoning, we may prove that he is not a saint, from *ἐγὼ δὲ σαρκικός ἐμι, πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*, v. 14; *ὁ μισῶ τοῦτο πρᾶσσω*, v. 15; *οὐκ οἶκῃ ἐν ἐμοί, τοῦτ' ἔστι ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου, ἀγαθόν*, v. 18; *τὸ δὲ κατεργάζεσθαι τὸ καλόν, οὐχ εὗρισκα*, v. 18; *ὃ οὐ θέλω κακόν, τοῦτο πρᾶσσω*, v. 19; *ἐμοὶ τὸ κακόν πα-*

οράκεται, v. 21; βλέπω ἕτερον νόμον ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι . . . ἀγκυλωτίζοντά με τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, v. 23; τῇ δὲ σαρκὶ [δουλεύω] νόμῳ ἁμαρτίας, v. 25. Stronger language than this, viz. "I am σαρκικός, and sold under sin," i. e. a bond slave to sin, and wholly devoted to its service and obedient to its orders, cannot well be found in the New Testament.

Whoever insists, then, that the passage before us must be applied to the Christian, because of some strong expressions in it which seem to indicate true moral good, should also take notice, that by the very same principles of interpretation, he will of course be obliged to concede, that a carnal state and entire devotedness to the passions and appetites is described. To avoid this conclusion, he considers these last expressions as used in a *qualified* or *moderated* sense, and accounts for them by the fervour of the writer's feelings, and the nature of the contrast. But who does not see, that the very same rule, when applied to the passages which seem to indicate moral good or holiness, will so modify them, as to make the application of them to true Christians altogether unnecessary? The *reason* and *conscience* of the unsanctified, especially when they are awakened by the terrors of the divine law, present sufficient ground to justify the use of the language here employed, in such a modified sense as that now supposed.

In fact, it appears a very plain case, that neither class of commentators, that is, neither those who apply chap. 7: 7—25 to Christians, nor those who apply it to the unregenerate, can find satisfactory ground for so doing, merely in the phraseology or modes of expression employed. Either party who adopts this ground, must deny his opponent the same liberties which he himself takes; or else involve himself in inextricable difficulties, by admitting that the same grounds of explanation may be taken by others, which he takes for himself. But he can do neither of these: not the first, because the common sense of all men would cry out against him; not the last, because this would prove the very contrary of what he holds, or else prove that the apostle has really contradicted himself.

In truth, it is only when men come to the study of the Scriptures, without bringing along with them *a priori* doctrines and conclusions, that they are willing to admit the force of philological considerations, such as have now been suggested. These once admitted, it follows as a matter of course, that a *modified sense* is to be given to such particular forms of expression, as seem to stand in the way of the argument and the object of the writer. This we always give, in *fairly* construing the language of men, on all occasions, whether it be written or spoken. The *literal* interpretation of all expressions, in an animated contrast, drawn by a man of such powerful feeling as Paul, would hardly be contended for, in any case in which polemic theology was not concerned. Is it proper then to insist on such a sense, in passages which involve sentiments that are controverted by critics and theologians?

Suppose, now, that one should rigorously insist upon it, that all the words of our Saviour must be interpreted, without any modification, as meaning what they seem obviously to mean on the first view of them. Take for example the declarations, that "it is easier for a camel to go

through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God;" also that "if he had not come and spoken to the Jews, they would not have had sin;" will any one insist that these declarations are to be *literally* interpreted, *ad amussim* and not *ad rationem*? If so, then it is of no use to argue with him in respect to the laws of interpretation; and one had better abandon, at once, the hope of gaining from him a listening ear. But if any considerate inquirer is disposed to admit, that *hyperbole* occasionally exists in the language of the Bible, (as also in that of all other books which in any way express the feelings of men), then may it be easy for him to see and feel, that the language in Rom. VII. is capable of modification. Nay, most men, however violent their party feelings, do, after all, in fact admit this principle; for they actually modify that which stands opposed to their own views of this passage. This is a practical confession, therefore, of the necessity of modification. And this being agreed upon, either impliedly or expressly, the inquiry which then presents itself, is: In what way is any part of the passage in question to be modified? Must it be so modified as to agree with the context, and the scope of reasoning which the writer is aiming at? Or shall it be so modified, as to agree with our *a priori* views of what the writer ought to have said? As an interpreter and philologist, I can see but one answer to these questions; and this is so plain, that it needs not to be repeated.

If the reader will now look back, he will see that I have not, in any case, laid any particular stress on the form or intensity of expression, in my remarks on 7: 5—25; and the reason of this is evident enough from what has already been said above. At the same time, I have supposed that the expressions *σύμφημι τῷ νόμῳ*, *συνήδομαι τῷ νόμῳ*, *δουλεύω τῷ νόμῳ*, etc., are those which the writer intended should be specially modified by the reader; and this, because *the object of his discourse* requires them to be modified. This is the ground on which I rest my interpretation; and not on the form or strength of single words or phrases, on either side of the contrast.

With these remarks in view, I proceed to offer, in a summary way, my reasons for adopting the exegesis which the commentary presents.

1. The object of the apostle in 7: 7—8: 17, is to illustrate and confirm what he had said in 7: 5, 6; and which he had before intimated in 6: 14. Chap. 7: 7—25 is as plainly a comment on 7: 5, as chap. 8: 1—17 is on 7: 6; and antithesis between 7: 7—25 and 8: 1—25, seems to be plain and certain. As this is a fundamental point in the interpretation of the whole, the reader will allow me to be full and explicit in the discussion of it.

At the beginning of chap. VIII., we find a distinction made, and a transition of the discourse marked by *ἄρτι νῦν*, *now then*, i. e. in our *present* state, in the *present* condition of Christians, viz. as contradistinguished from their *former* state. What was this former state? It was a carnal state, *ἐν σαρκί*, v. 5; *σαρκικός*, v. 14; one in which they were subjected to the law of sin, v. 23. What makes this transition the more striking is, that in v. 6, the antithesis between the two conditions described, is pointed out by the very same word as here, viz. by *νῦν*.

If now we examine *particulars* in these two discourses (7: 7—25 and 8: 1—17), we shall find them in direct *antithesis* to each other. E. g. the complaint in 7: 24 of miserable subjection to the influence of carnal desires, stands opposed to the thanks in 7: 25, uttered in reference to the deliverance which the writer is about to describe. In 7: 23, the person described is a *captive* to sin, i. e. altogether subject to the influence of sinful passions and desires; in 8: 2, he is represented as delivered from the law of sin and death. In 7: 14, an incessant and irreconcilable opposition is represented as existing between the law of God and the person there described; in 8: 4, he is represented as possessing the ability and the disposition to keep, at least in some good measure, the precepts of the law. In 7: 18, the person described is represented as having no good thing *ἐν τῇ σαρκί* [αὐτοῦ], and as finding no power to effect what is good, even when his mind or conscience approves it, or would prefer it; in 8: 3, 4, this disability is represented as removed. In 7: 5, 14, 18, the person described is represented as being *ἐν σαρκί, σαρκικός*; in 8: 9, he is declared to be *οὐκ ἐν σαρκί*. In 7: 14 he is represented as the *bond-slave* of sin, (*πεπραμένον ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*), i. e. as altogether under the power of sin; in 8: 11, 14, he is represented as having the Spirit of God to dwell in him, and as being led, i. e. influenced or guided by that Spirit.

In a word, the whole tenor of the two discourses is such, as is adapted to make the impression that they are in antithesis to each other, and that they are designed by the writer to be so. This lies on the face of them. It is only the difficulties which can be raised, in regard to *subordinate* parts, that can occasion or sustain any doubts in respect to this subject.

Indeed, I may well express my convictions derived from a general view of the antithetic nature of the two passages in question, the connection in which they stand, and the design of the writer, in the words of Tholuck: "Truly if one has respect only to the *connection* of the latter part of Rom. vii., with what goes before and what follows after, it is impossible to explain this [the latter part of Rom. vii.] of any one, except of him who is still under the law."

2. The object of the writer (which is to shew that the law is insufficient for the sanctification of sinners), would not be effectually promoted, by supposing that he represents the experience of Christians in chap. vii. For if Christians, who are of course under grace and are dead to the law (6: 14. 7: 6), are actually in the state here represented, then would it follow, that neither grace nor law hinders them from being the servants of sin. But to aver that *grace* does not effect this, is to contradict 8: 1—17.

3. The *tout ensemble* of the representation in chap. vii. seems to render it certain, that a true Christian cannot be here described. What is the result of the whole? It is, that notwithstanding all the opposition which the law of God and the law of the mind make to sin, yet the person in question practises it, and habitually practises it, on all occasions and under all circumstances. In every contest here, the sinful carnal mind comes off victorious. Is "this overcoming the world?"

Is this to be 'born of God so as not to sin?' Is this 'loving Christ so as to keep his commandments?' Is this 'doing no iniquity?' Is this "walking not after the flesh, but after the Spirit?" In a word, is it possible to make this accord with chap. VIII. 1—17?

4. If chap. VII. represents the *Christian* struggle with sin, then what is the state into which the Christian goes, as represented in chap. VIII.? The answer must be: One in which there is no more struggle. But when—where—was ever such a state on earth? It has often been imagined and asserted; but not proved. But if now the transition is from a state in which sin was altogether predominant, into one in which grace on the whole reigns and triumphs, then all is easy and intelligible. On any other ground it is inexplicable; at least, it is so to me.

It were easy to add more reasons; but if these are well-grounded, they are sufficient. It is proper, now, briefly to pass in review some of the exegesis and the allegations of those, who maintain that a regenerate person is described in 7: 7—25.

(1) Their interpretation (viz. that which most of them give) of 7: 9 leads, (as may be seen in the commentary on 7: 9), to inextricable difficulty, and contradiction of the context. It is equally opposed to the *usus loquendi*, and to those parts of the discourse which precede and which follow.

(2) It is alleged, that the contest described in Rom. 7: 14—25, is one which accords with the feelings and experience of every Christian; and that he is thus conscious that the interpretation given to it by those who apply it to Christians, must be correct.

This consideration is, in fact, the main dependence of those who support the exegesis just named; I mean, that by such an appeal to feeling, they produce more conviction on the mind of Christians, than is produced by all their other arguments. After all, however, this is far from determining the case. Let us look at the subject in all its bearings.

I concede, in the first place, that Christians have a contest with sin; and that this is as plain and certain, as it is that they are not wholly sanctified in the present life. It is developed by almost every page of Scripture, and every day's experience. That this contest is often a vehement one; that the passions rage, yea, that they do sometimes even gain the victory; is equally plain and certain. It follows now, of course, that as the language of Rom. 7: 14—25 is intended to describe a contest between the good principle and the bad one in men, and also a contest in which the evil principle comes off victorious; so this language can hardly fail of being appropriate to describe all those cases in a Christian's experience, in which sin triumphs. Every Christian at once recognizes and feels, that such cases may be described in language like that which the apostle employs.

Here is the advantage which the patrons of this opinion enjoy, and which they have not failed to push even to its utmost extent. After all, however, the ground is unfairly taken, and unfairly maintained. For, first, it is *only a part* of the case. While Christians have many a contest in which they are overcome by sin, yet they must be victors in far

the greater number of cases, if the whole be collectively taken. If this be not true, then it cannot be true that 'he who loveth Christ, keepeth his commandments;' it cannot be true that 'they who love the law of God, do no iniquity;' nor true, that "he who is born of God sinneth not;" nor that faith enables him who cherishes it, to "overcome the world." As, however, there is no denying the truth of these and the like declarations, and no receding from them, nor explaining them away as meaning less than *habitual victory* over sin; so it follows, that when verses 14—25 are applied to Christian experience, they are wrongly applied. The person represented in these verses, *succumbs to sin IN EVERY INSTANCE of contest*. The Christian must not—cannot—does not, so fight against sin. To assert this would be to contradict the whole tenor of the Scriptures; it would be abrogating, at once, all which is declared in so pointed a manner, in chap. VIII. 1—17.

Secondly, as I have already noted, there stands in the way of this interpretation the fact, that a great transition is marked by the commencement of chap. VIII., one of which no satisfactory account can be given, if 7: 14—25 is to be interpreted as belonging to those who are under grace.

Thirdly, I repeat the remark, that the question is not, whether what is here said *might be* applied to Christians; but whether, from the tenor of the context, it appears to be the intention of the writer that it *should be* so applied. This principle cannot fail to settle the question concerning such an application.

In a word; how can it be just reasoning to say, that because vs. 14—25 may be applied to describe those contests of the Christian with sin in which the latter is victorious, therefore it does describe Christian experience *considered as a whole*, and is intended by the writer so to do? What can be more certain, than that *Christian* experience is not here to the writer's purpose, *when his object is, to represent the truly desperate condition of him who is merely under the law?*

(3) So far as reasoning or argument is concerned, the main allegation of those who apply vs. 14—25 to Christian experience, remains yet to be considered. It is this, viz. that 'the declarations made in these verses respecting the *internal man*, are such as comport only with the state or condition of a regenerate man; and if this be not admitted, then we must concede that the unregenerate are subjects of moral good.' But,

First, this allegation takes for granted, that the phrases *σύμφημι τῷ νόμῳ, συνήδομαι τῷ νόμῳ*, etc., are to be taken in their full strength, without any modification. I must ask the reader, now, instead of repeating here what I have before said, to look back upon the commentary on v. 22, and also what is said near the beginning of the present Excursus, on the subject of deducing arguments in this case merely from the forms of expression, without a special reference to the context and the object which the writer has in view. When the whole of this is weighed, I would inquire, whether he who interprets chap. 7: 5—25, as having respect to one who is under law, has not just as good a claim to insist that *σαρκικός, πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, αἰχμαλωτί-*

ζορτά με τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, etc., shall be taken without abatement or modification? And now, what is to be the result? Plainly this, viz. that the writer has described an impossible state, one in which a man is *under law* and *under grace* at one and the same time; one in which sin has a power predominant in all cases, and grace a power on the whole predominant, at one and the same time. As this cannot be admitted, which set of terms in the description must be modified? for one of them certainly must be. The answer to this question may be found, in the considerations which have been suggested above.

But secondly, the whole of the allegation which I am discussing, appears to me to rest on ground entirely unsafe and unsatisfactory. It will be admitted by those who are conversant with the dispute about the meaning of the passage before us, and are well read in the history of Christian doctrine, that Augustine was the first who suggested the idea, that it must be applied to Christian experience. This he did, however, in the heat of dispute with Pelagius. At an earlier period of his life, he held to the common exegesis of the church; as is certain from Prop. XLV. in Epist. ad Rom.: *Intelligitur hinc ille homo describi, qui nondum sub gratia.* So in Confess. VII. 21. VIII. 5. Ad Simplic. I. But Pelagius, who denied the fallen state of man, urged upon him the declarations above referred to, viz., *delighting in the law of God after the inner man, serving the law of God with the mind*, etc. Augustine felt himself pressed by them, and made his escape, by protesting against the exegesis of his antagonist. He recanted his former opinion respecting vs. 14—25, and became a strenuous advocate for an interpretation, which through him has gained extensive ground among Christians, and maintains its footing among many down to the present hour.

It is difficult to say how far men, and even good men, will sometimes go in matters of interpretation and criticism, in order to relieve themselves from the straits occasioned by warm dispute, in which their antagonists make galling attacks upon them. It was, in all probability, the dispute of the church at Rome with the Montanists, which first occasioned it to doubt, and then to deny, the Pauline origin of the epistle to the Hebrews. Luther's dispute with the Roman Catholics, on the subject of *justification by faith alone*, led him to discard the epistle of James, and to call it, by way of contempt, *epistola straminea*. And the like have many others done, for similar reasons. Such seems to have been the ground of Augustine's new exegesis.

But when we come, now, seriously and calmly to inquire whether there is any cause of alarm in respect to the doctrine of the natural man's depravity, because Rom. 7: 7—25 is interpreted as having respect to him; we can see that this is so far from being the case, that the very opposite is true; I mean, that his depravity is rendered much more conspicuous and aggravated by this exegesis. Let us see if this be not palpable and certain.

That men are *moral* beings, does not make them sinners or saints. That they have faculties which can distinguish between good and evil, only shews that they are capable of doing good or evil, of being righteous or wicked. *Conscience* and *reason* belong to the *pura naturalia*

of the human race. Man, in the full and proper sense of this word, cannot exist without them. It is no more an evidence, then, that a man is holy or good in the Scripture sense of the word, because his reason and conscience distinguish good from evil, and testify in behalf of the good, than it is that he is holy because he has a moral nature. Such a distinction and such an approbation are inseparable from the essential nature of reason and conscience.

Consider, moreover, that the guilt of a sinner, who continues to yield to the solicitations of his carnal desires, is proportioned entirely to the measure of light which he has, and to the inducements set before him to act in a different manner. "Where there is no law, there is no transgression." "To him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin." Then, of course, the sinner, with reason and conscience and the law of God all remonstrating against his course, is involved in guilt of the deepest dye; while an offender (if I may so call him) without any of these checks, would be no offender at all. "He that knoweth his master's will, and doeth it not, shall be beaten with many stripes." And so it ought to be. What then can render the person's case more aggravated, who is described in vs. 14—25, than the fact that he resists so much light and such powerful motives to pursue a different course?

Is it, then, denying the depravity of the unregenerate, when we assign to them faculties to do good, and light as to their duty, and strong excitement to perform it, and represent them as after all refusing to do good, and uniformly hearkening to the voice of sin? I appeal to the reason and conscience of all men, whether such an accusation against the exegesis in question, is not in a high degree unjust and unfounded. Nay, I might go farther; I might say, it is the contrary exegesis which is pressed with the very difficulty it urges against the other. For if the sinner is born without reason and conscience, and is without light; or if he is born with reason and conscience that are incapable of distinguishing good from evil, or of giving the preference to the former; then his depravity and desperate guilt can in no way be made out, consistently with the first principles of a moral sense. Of all the charges, then, brought against the exegesis which I have defended, that of its diminishing the guilt of unregenerate men, is the most unfounded and unjust.

I have discussed the principal arguments, so far as I am acquainted with them, of those who interpret vs. 14—25 as having relation to Christian experience. In regard to the allegation, that Paul here speaks in the first person singular, and must therefore be relating his own experience, I have already remarked upon it, p. 296, seq. There is no objection to allowing it to be Paul's experience; but *when* had he such experience? And why does he speak of himself? These are the questions to be answered; and these I have endeavoured to answer in my remarks at the close of 7: 12.

I cannot conclude this already protracted Excursus, without advertising, for a moment, to the history of the exegesis introduced by Augustine.

As has already been stated, the most ancient Fathers of the church, without a dissenting voice, so far as we have any means of ascertaining their views, were united in the belief, that an *unregenerate, un sanctified* person is described in 7: 5—25. So Origen, Tertullian, Chrysostom, and Theodoret. In this state did the views of the church remain down to the time of Augustine, whose first opinion, and whose change of it, have already been described. How unnecessary such an evasion was, on his part, of the argument of Pelagius, we have already seen. For surely the more light the mind of a natural man has, the more his conscience approves the divine law, and sides with it; the deeper and more dreadful is his guilt, when he sins against all these. And as the person described by the apostle is one over whom sin, in every case of contest presented, does actually obtain the victory; he must of course be a person of much deeper and more desperate depravity than any one can be, whose natural faculties are all degraded and depraved in their very origin; as Augustine held the faculties of men to be, after his dispute with Pelagius.

The exegesis of Augustine, however, found favour in the churches where his sentiments respecting original sin were received; and prevailed very extensively and for a long time. In like manner with him, have Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Cornelius a Lapide, Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, Beza, Spener, Buddaeus, Koppe, and many others, explained the passage in question; and most commentators among evangelical Christians, in Great Britain and in this country, have followed the same opinion.

On the other hand, besides all the ancient Greek, and some of the Latin Fathers, there are many distinguished men who have defended the sentiment which has been above exhibited. Such are Erasmus, Raphel, Episcopus, Limborch, Turretin, Le Clerc, Heumann, Bucer, Schomer, Franke, G. Arnold, Bengel, Reinhard, Storr, Flatt, Knapp, Tholuck, and (so far as I know) all the evangelical commentators of the present time, on the continent of Europe. Most of the English episcopal church, also, for many years, and not a few of the Scotch, Dutch, and English Presbyterian and Congregational divines, have adopted the same interpretation. I cannot but believe, that the time is not far distant, when there will be but one opinion among intelligent Christians, about the passage in question; as there was but one, before the dispute of Augustine with Pelagius. In this respect there is ground of trust, that the ancient and modern churches will yet fully harmonize.

From the above brief historical sketch, it would seem, that in general those who have admitted Augustine's view of the doctrine of original sin, have also admitted his exegesis of Rom. 7: 5—25. To this, however, there are exceptions; and of late, not a few exceptions. More thorough, impartial, and unbiassed examination, will probably make an entire change in the views of Christians in general, even of those who have been educated in the belief of the Augustinian exegesis. This was my own lot; and for some time after I began the critical study of the Scriptures, I continued to advocate this method of interpretation. But an often repeated and more attentive study of the epistle to the Romans,

has brought me to believe, that such an exegesis is forbidden by the nature of the case, the *usus loquendi*, and the object of the writer; and that it is impossible to maintain it, on any impartial and critical grounds.

I am fully aware of the strength of feeling which exists relative to this subject, in the minds of many. I am sorry to add, that the manner in which it is defended, can never contribute to advance the interests of simple truth. When will it be believed, that scorn is not critical acumen, and that calling men heretics, is not an argument that will convince such as take the liberty to think and examine for themselves? When will such appeals cease? And when shall we have reasons instead of assertions, criticism in the place of denunciation, and a full practical exhibition of the truth, that the simple testimony of the divine word stands immeasurably higher than all human authority?

EXCURSUS VII.

On Rom. 8: 28, τοῖς κατὰ πρόθεσιν κλητοῖς οὐσι. (p. 353.)

The difficulty arising from this passage, and the temptation to deny or obscure what I must believe to be its plain and inevitable meaning, are both suggested by the following question: 'How can God have had an *eternal* purpose as to those who are to be saved, and yet men be free agents, free even in the matter of their own repentance and conversion?' It will not be expected, of course, that I should here discuss at length a metaphysical question, which the disputes and contentions of more than 4000 years have not settled; for in every age and nation, where religious inquiries have been pursued, the difficulty before us has for substance presented itself to the minds of thinking men. One may say that three parties exist, and perhaps have in every age existed, in respect to it; viz. (1) Those who embrace the doctrine of *fatality*, and therefore deny the proper free agency of man. (2) Those who deny the divine decrees or *eternal purposes* of God, and make in effect a kind of independent agency of man. (3) Those who believe both in the divine foreknowledge, purpose, or decree, (for the difference between these is in *name* only, not in reality), and also in the entire free agency of man. Among this latter class, I would choose my lot. The Scriptures seem to me plainly to hold forth both of these doctrines. Yea, so far are the sacred writers from apprehending any inconsistency in them, that they bring them both forward, (i. e. divine agency and purpose, and human agency and purpose), at one and the same time, not seeming even to apprehend that any one will speculate on them so as to make out any contradiction. For example; Acts 2: 23, "Him, being delivered *by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God*, ye have taken, and *by wicked hands* have crucified and slain;" i. e. the determinate counsel (*ἄρισμὴν βουλή*) and foreknowledge of God, did not render the hands of the Jews less wicked, who crucified the Saviour. Of course, they must have acted in a *voluntary* manner, as agents altogether free; for a *sin*

involuntary, i. e. without consent of the will, is a contradiction in terms, so far as moral turpitude is concerned.

Again; Phil. 2: 12, 13, "*Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God who worketh in you both to will and to do, of his good pleasure;*" i. e. the very ground on which I urge diligence in the matter of your Christian duties, is, that God helps you *both to will and to do*.

These are a specimen of the philosophy (if I may so speak) of the sacred writers. And of such philosophy, the Bible is full. The attributes of an *omniscient* God, his designs, his very nature, prove that he must have *purposes*; and such as will not be frustrated. *Prediction* or *prophecy* proves this, and puts it beyond all rational contradiction. Is it *uncertain*, whether what the prophets of God have foretold, will come to pass? Yet are not the men, by whom the things foretold are brought to pass, free agents in all cases of this nature, just as they were in the crucifixion of the Lord of glory?

But you will ask: '*How is this?*' To which I answer at once: I do not know. The *manner* in which God's purposes are consistent with free agency, I do not pretend to know. The *fact* that they are consistent, I do know; because I am conscious of being a free agent; I am as certain of it as I am of my own existence. I am equally certain that God is omniscient, and has always been so; and therefore he must have always perfectly known every thing that will take place. If he knew it with *certainly*, (and if he did not, then he did not *know* it at all); then is it *uncertain*, whether it will take place? And if it is certain, then how does this differ from what is said to be *decreed*? The name *decree*, indeed, seems to have carried along with it a kind of terror to many minds; but, so far as I can see, it implies neither more nor less than *divine purpose* or *divine will*. And can it be, that sober-minded Christians will, on reflection, maintain that there is no divine purpose or will?

To all the arguments adduced from such a statement of *facts*, which can be alleged in order to prove the doctrine of *fatalism*, I have only to reply, that fact itself *disproves* this; for we are conscious of being *free agents*. The Scriptures disprove this; for they every where treat men as *free agents*. And this is enough; for these are the two highest possible sources of proof, and with these we ought to rest satisfied. To what can we make a convincing appeal, if not to these?

As to the question: *How* is our free agency made to consist with God's eternal purposes? I have said, nothing; for I know nothing. And as to the question, *how* ten thousand thousand other things, which I believe, and which all men believe, can be true or take place, no one in the present world knows, or ever will know, any thing; e. g. *how* do heat, moisture, and earth make one plant green and another red, one nutritive and another poisonous, in the very same bed of earth? yet we all believe the fact that they do.

Who can shew it to be absurd, now, that God should have had an *eternal purpose*, and yet man be a *free agent*?

Does the certain knowledge we now have of a *past event*, destroy

the free agency of those who were concerned in bringing about that event? Did any *previous* knowledge of the same, necessarily interfere with their free-agency? And as to free-agency itself; cannot God make a creature *in his own image*, free like himself, rational like himself, the originator of thoughts and volitions like himself? Can this be disproved? The fact that we are *dependent* beings, will not prove that we may not be *free agents* as to the exercise of the powers with which we are endowed,—free in a sense like to that in which God himself, as a rational being, is free. Nor will this establish any *contingency* or *uncertainty* of events, in the universe. Could not God as well foresee what would be the free and voluntary thoughts of men, in consequence of the powers which he should give them, as he could foresee thoughts and volitions which would proceed from the operation of external causes upon them? Until this can be denied on the ground of reason and argument, the sentiment in question is not justly liable to the charge of introducing the doctrine of *contingency* or *uncertainty* into the plans of the divine Mind.

I only add, that when we say: ‘God has had an *eternal purpose* in respect to those who are called,’ (and the apostle does say this, Eph. 3: 11. 2 Tim. 1: 9), we speak *ἀνθρωποπάθως*. With God there is no time. “A thousand years are as one day, and one day as a thousand years.” With him it is *an eternal now*; as it has often and forcibly been expressed. So the expressions, *pre-destination*, *fore-ordination*, etc., strictly speaking, are *anthropopathic*. “*Non prae-videntia, sed providentia potius dicitur,*” says Boethius, *De consol. Philos.* 1. 5. prop. 6.

If God has any purposes, they are *eternal*. We must, then, either deny that he has any purposes, or else admit their eternal existence; and this being admitted, the *κλητοὶ κατὰ πρόθεσιν*, are truly such as the apostle describes them to be, in the sequel of chap. VIII.

EXCURSUS VIII.

On Rom. 8: 28—30. (p. 359.)

On the disputes which have arisen from the paragraph in vs. 28—30, I shall not comment at large in this place; but I cannot pass by the subject, without making a few remarks.

That man should be *entirely dependent* on God, and yet be a *free agent* at the same time, presents, it has been often asserted, an impossibility, an absurdity, a contradiction of terms, a scheme of fatalism, etc. After all, however, the mere disciple of Naturalism, who sets *Revelation* entirely aside, but allows the natural perfections of the Godhead (among which are omniscience and omnipotence), falls into the very same difficulties inevitably, which he puts solely to the account of Revelation. If there be a God, a creator, almighty and omniscient, then we are perfectly and entirely dependent on him; from everlasting, moreover, he has known all that we are and shall be; he has known this with *absol-*

lute certainty; and if so, then what we are and shall be, is not *fortuitous*. This the disciple of nature can no more deny, than the disciple of revelation. And this involves at once all the real difficulties which are charged to the account of those, who believe in the plain and simple allegations of the passage before us.

Once admit the idea of an omniscient and omnipotent Creator, and the difficulty of reconciling dependence and free-agency comes up of course; and it bears equally, moreover, on every system which admits this truth. It is wonderful that this should not be more extensively seen and felt, by writers who are in the habit of charging all difficulties of this nature, to the opinions of those who favour the sentiments of Calvin.

After all, if there be any force in the objections made against the doctrine in question, *it arises only from reasoning analogically in respect to the laws and qualities of matter, and those of mind*. In a piece of physical machinery, every motion will be in accordance with the laws of motion and mechanical power, and all necessarily according to the contrivance of the mechanist; i. e. the laws of matter and motion remaining the same, the result which is calculated upon is necessary; and it is always the *same*, for there is no volition in the machine, nothing to resist, alter, or modify the influence to which it is subjected.

Not so in the world of immaterial and *spiritual* being. Man is made *in the image of God*; therefore he has a free-agency like to that of his Maker. From its very nature, this free-agency is incapable of *mechanical* control. Motives, arguments, inducements may move, convince, persuade; but they cannot control by a necessity like that in the world of matter. That they cannot, is owing to the very nature itself of a free agent; who is no longer free, if he have no *ultimate* choice and power of his own. The Bible every where ascribes such a power to man. He resists light, knowledge, persuasion; he remains unmoved (at least undetermined), by all the motives drawn from heaven and earth and hell; he resists and grieves the Spirit of God himself: such are the representations of the Scripture. Is this representation truth, or fiction? Which is the same as to ask: Are men in *fact* free agents, or only so in *name* and *appearance*?

That they are in fact free, is what I believe. Nor can I be persuaded, that illustrations of free agency drawn from the material world, are in any tolerable measure apposite to our subject. Our souls are *spirit*, not matter. They are like the God who made them; not like the dust on which we tread. All arguments, then, drawn from cause or causation and effect in the *material* world, and applied to the subject of *spiritual agency and influence*, are wrongly applied, and cannot serve to cast any thing but darkness on this deeply interesting subject.

All the deductions in respect to *fatalism*, moreover, which are made out and charged upon those who hold the doctrine of God's foreknowledge and eternal purposes, are made out by a process of reasoning which has its basis in material analogies. A regular, necessitous, mechanical concatenation of cause and effect, altogether like that in the world of nature, is predicated of the doctrine of the divine purposes or

decrees; and then the charge of fatalism and absurdity of course follows. Let those who would avoid this, take good care, then, not to reason about *spirit* in the same way as they do about matter.

Who now can prove, that the Spirit of God may not influence the human mind, in a manner perfectly consistent with its entire free-agency—influence it to accept the offers of salvation and become *σύμμορφος τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ*? No one. He can no more do this, than he can prove that one man cannot influence another, without impairing his freedom of action; an event which takes place every hour, and in all parts of this lower world. Above all, who can shew that truth may influence men, and yet men may remain free; but that the Spirit, who is the author of all truth, can not operate as effectually, and with as little interference with free agency, as the truth which he has revealed? So little foundation is there, for the charge of fatalism, against the doctrine of divine influence upon the souls of men!

Those who are saved, *freely* repent, *freely* believe, *freely* accept the terms of salvation. Why can they not be as free under the influence of the Spirit, as they are under the influence of the truth which he has revealed? And none but penitents will be saved. There is no room then to say, that a belief in the divine eternal purposes, makes it a matter of indifference whether a man lives a virtuous and holy life or not, and that if he is to be saved, he will be saved let him do what he may. The plain and certain truth is, that he 'is not to be saved,' unless he become *conformed to the image of Christ*, and that *without holiness no man shall see the Lord*. This is God's everlasting purpose, his eternal decree; and sooner than this can be violated, heaven and earth shall pass away. All accusations of such a nature, then, against the doctrine in question properly understood, are ungrounded and unjust.

In regard to the dispute, whether God *προώρῳσε τοὺς κλητοὺς*, from his *mere good pleasure*, or from a *foresight of their faith and good works*; it is easy to see, that the paragraph of the epistle, which is under consideration, does not decide on this. So far the question seems to be fully settled, by other texts of Scripture, viz. that the *merit or obedience* of the *κλητοί*, was not the ground or reason of their regeneration and sanctification. This would be assuming, that holiness existed before it did exist; that it was the *ground* of that, which it followed only as a *consequence*.

On the other hand; as to the *decretum absolutum*, as it has been called, viz., the determination that the *κλητοί* should be saved, irrespectively of their character and actions, one cannot well see how this is to be made out. So much must be true, viz., that they are not regenerated, sanctified, or saved, on account of *merit*; all is of *grace, pure grace*. If this be all that any one means by the *decretum absolutum*, there can be no reasonable objection made to it. But on the other hand; as God is *omniscient*, and therefore must know every part of every man's character, through all stages of his being; as all things, in their fullest extent, must have always been naked and open to his view; so we cannot once imagine, that any decree or purpose in respect to the *κλητοί* can have been made *irrespectively* of their *whole* character. Such an *irrespection*

(if I may use the word) is impossible. God has never determined, and from his holy nature never can determine, to save any except such as are *conformed to the image of his Son*. All stands or falls together. A *decretum absolutum*, i. e. a decree which should separate these, or have no regard to these, would be a different one from that which the apostle has stated; and I may add, different from what we can even imagine to be possible.

To what purpose, then, can disputes on such a question be raised or fostered? Happy would it be for the church, had there been no occasion in times past to mourn over them! It is truly important to distinguish that which is revealed, from that which is not; and to content ourselves with the one, and dismiss the other. "Secret things belong to the Lord our God; but things revealed to us and our children."

I will only add, that the phrase, *God out of his mere good pleasure*, is very liable to be misunderstood, and perverted; as it often has been. My own apprehension is, that most of those who employ it, use it merely to signify, *without regard to merit, without being induced by considerations of meritorious obedience*. In this sense, as applied to God in respect to his purposes of renewing and sanctifying sinners, it is strictly true. Merit they have not; obedience they exhibit not, while in their unrenewed and unsanctified state. But then the phrase is often understood, as conveying the idea, that God, in a way *merely arbitrary*, i. e. without any good reasons whatever, did choose some to everlasting life. This can never be true at all; no, not in any sense whatever. All that can ever be true is, that *God has done this, while the reasons are entirely unknown to us*. He surely never did, and never will, determine or do any thing, without the *highest* and *best* reasons; although he may not unfold them to us.

On the whole, it is to be regretted that a phrase so easily misunderstood and perverted, as that in question, should have been introduced into the technology of religion. It would have been much better to have avoided the disputes it has occasioned, by phraseology more explicit and unambiguous.

One remark more, and I dismiss the whole subject. If I do not greatly err, the principal objections which serious and candid minds feel to the doctrine of *predestination* (as it is called), i. e. of foreknowledge and eternal purpose on the part of God, arises from what I must think to be a mistaken application of the principles of analogical reasoning. 'How,' it is asked, 'can God have determined from eternity who are to be saved, i. e. whom he will effectually call, and justify, and sanctify, and bring to glory, and yet men be free to choose or refuse salvation?' And the difficulty in all this is, that they suppose a regular concatenation of causes and influence must be arranged in the spiritual world, which will just as mechanically and certainly bring about the end, as that gravitation will make a stone fall to the earth. They join, with all this transfer of *physical* causation and effect over to spiritual things, the idea, that regard to the character or efforts of those who are saved, is to be left out of the question; and then they make out, in their own minds, the idea of *fatalism*, an undistinguishing fatal-

ism, which acts thus and so, merely because it chooses to do this or that, without any good and sufficient reason whatever. And taking such a view of the doctrine of predestination, of course they think it very reasonable to reject it.

In answer to all this, it may be said, (1) That it is impossible even to imagine a case, in which God can be supposed not to have before him *the whole* of every individual character of those who belong to the *αλητοι*. (2) All that the Scripture teaches in regard to the ground or reason of his purpose of mercy towards these, is, that it is *not* on account of *merit* or *desert* in them; they are regenerated and sanctified and saved through *grace*, grace only; “not of works, lest any man should boast.” Farther than this *negative* assertion, the Scripture does not go; and who knows any thing more than what is *revealed* concerning it? (3) The Bible and experience and reason all unite, in giving testimony of the highest kind which the human mind can receive, that whatever may be the purposes of God, *men in fact* are *free agents*; free in all their spiritual exercises, as well as any others: and what is thus *in fact* conciliated or harmonized, cannot in its own nature be contradictory or absurd. (4) The *eternal* purpose of God is no more in the way of free agency, than his *present* purpose; for his present purpose is neither more nor less than his eternal one, and his eternal one neither more nor less than his present one. With him there is one *eternal now*; and all ideas of causation and concatenation of causes and influence, drawn from sensible objects that are *temporary* and *successive*, only serve to mislead the mind in regard to God, when they are applied to him. (5) All the difficulties which ever have been, or ever can be raised in regard to the *fore-ordination* or *decree* of God, concenter at last in one single point, viz., How can a creature be perfectly dependent, entirely under the control and within the power of another, and yet be *free*? And all the difficulty here, comes at last upon the *how*; it lies not in the *fact*; for the fact that such is the case, is put beyond all doubt by the testimony of Scripture and experience.

Now as this *how* lies equally in the way of all who admit the existence of an *omniscient* and omnipotent Creator—I say *equally* in the way of all such, for this is plainly the case unless they are fatalists—and since, moreover, this question is plainly beyond the boundaries of human knowledge; it does not seem to me reasonable to declaim against those who admit that the doctrine of divine foreknowledge implies of course divine purpose; and that divine purpose must have been *always* the same, inasmuch as God is immutable, “the same yesterday, to day, and forever.” At any rate, no arguments of an *a priori* nature can serve to set aside the plain, direct, inevitable meaning of the passage in Rom. 8: 28, seq. Nor, if it presents a difficulty, can we free ourselves from this, even if we reject revelation. A God almighty and omniscient, and a creature frail and entirely dependent and yet free, always and every where present the same paradox to the human understanding. The Jew, the Mohammedan, and the Theist, are obliged to encounter it, in common with the Christian of strict creed and principles.

EXCURSUS IX.

On Rom. 9: 17, εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐξήγειρά σε. (p. 394.)

But what is the *meaning* of the entire assertion, the *words* of which we have thus considered? Does it mean, that God did *actively*, and by his *immediate* influence on the heart or mind of Pharaoh, *excite* him or *rouse* him up to do evil, i. e. to continue obstinate and rebellious against himself? Or, that God had excited or roused him up, by the various plagues sent on him and his people, so that his opposition to letting the people of Israel go, had become more active and bitter? The first of these meanings is the one which some writers have ventured to give; or, at least, they say what seems to imply it. E. g. Augustine, (*De Gratia et lib. Arbit. c. 21*): *His et talibus testimoniis Scripturarum satis manifestatur operari Deum in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluptates quocumque voluerit, sive ad bona pro sua misericordia, sive ad mala pro meritis eorum, etc.* So Gomar: "Not unjustly does God condemn the sinner; for he has ordained the means of condemnation [i. e. sin]; so that he condemns no one, without having first plunged him into sin," Halesii Opp., ed. Mosheim, p. 753. Augustine says, more expressly and fully than above, on the verse before us: *Excitavi te ut contumacius resisteres, non tantum permittendo, sed multa etiam tam INTUS quam foris operando.* So Anselm: *Cum malus esses, prodigiis quasi sopitum excitavi, ut in malitia persisteres atque deterior fieres.* After quoting this passage, Tholuck exclaims: "Is it God or the devil, who speaks thus?" And on the other passages just quoted he says: "Can God say thus to men? [viz. what these comments represent him as saying]; then wo to us! for we are mere dwarfs in the hands of an irresistible Cyclops, created and dashed in pieces at his pleasure." And again: "Then have Satan and God exchanged offices. God goeth about as a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour; and Satan exults that the Almighty, from whose hand none can escape, places at his disposal the victims of his vengeance." He then goes on to say, that this is just what pantheism would exult in, viz. that pantheism which abolishes all distinction between good and evil.

These expressions, it must be admitted, bear very hardly on such men as Augustine, Anselm, Calvin, Beza, P. Martyr, Paraeus, Gomar, and many others. Yet so much we must concede, viz., that the Scriptures not only teach us God's entire abhorrence of sin, and the freedom of man in sinning, but they do also, in so many words, assert that "God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man; but every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed," James 1: 13, 14. With this direct and unequivocal assertion of an apostle before our eyes, an assertion bearing on the specific point of *internal excitement* to do evil, how can we take the position of the writers above named, and maintain that *God operated DIRECTLY on the heart and mind of Pharaoh*, in order to harden him and make him more desperate?

God does not permit wicked men to say truly that such is the case,

in respect to his dealings with them. Thus he says to the Jews: "Will ye steal, murder, and commit adultery, and swear falsely, and burn incense to Baal, and walk after other gods whom ye know not; and come and stand before me in this house . . . and say: *We are delivered* [נִצְּרָנוּ, *we are reserved*] to do all these abominations?" Jer. 7: 9, 10. Nay, the Scripture directly decides, that there may be a "determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God" respecting a thing which is exceedingly sinful, and yet that those who are agents in bringing it about may be altogether voluntary and guilty, Acts 2: 23. *Guilty or wicked* they could not be, unless they were *voluntary* agents.

But having advanced thus far, we must go still farther in order to obtain satisfaction as to the point in question. This can be obtained, only by a considerate and extensive survey of the *usus loquendi* in the Scriptures, with reference to God as *the author of all things*. There is a sense, in which he is the author of all things, yea of all actions. He has created all things. Under his control and by his direction and power, they come into existence. None but atheists will deny this. He continues to hold them all under his control, i. e. he governs the universe; and in him "we live and move and have our being." He "directs all things after the counsel of his own will;" i. e. he so guides and controls all things, all events, all creatures and their actions, as finally to accomplish his own blessed and glorious purposes, both of mercy and of justice.

The moment we admit him to be an *omniscient* and *omnipotent* God, that moment we admit that he must have *foreseen* from eternity *all* the actions of his creatures, all their thoughts and affections and wishes and desires. We cannot deny, that, foreseeing all these with all their consequences, he brought them into being, and placed them (for surely it was *he* who ordered their lot) in circumstances, where *he knew* they would act as he had foreseen they would. It is impossible to deny this, without denying the *omniscience* of God, and his *immutability*.

Now the Scripture most evidently admits and inculcates all these truths. Such being the fact, there is plainly a sense in which all things and events may be ascribed to God. He *foreknew* them; and his creating and governing and controlling power renders it *certain* that they will come to pass; for how could he *foreknow* what is *uncertain*? Accordingly, the Bible declares that "we live and move and have our being in God." Nay it goes farther than this; however we may stumble at the expressions, or revolt at the sentiment. It ascribes *evil*, yea *moral evil*, to God in some sense or other; an assertion which must not be hazarded without proof, and which shall be supported by an overwhelming mass of examples. Let the reader now turn to the following passages and attentively consider them; viz. 2 Sam. 12: 11. 16: 10. 1 K. 22: 22. Josh. 11: 20. Ps. 105: 25. 1 K. 11: 23. 2 Sam. 24: 1. Let him next examine the texts, which declare that God hardened the heart of one and another; e. g. of Pharaoh, Ex. 7: 13. 9: 12. 10: 1, 20, 27. 11: 10. 14: 8. Rom. 9: 18; of Sihon king of the Amorites, Deut. 2: 30; of the Israelites, Is. 63: 17. John 12: 40. Who can read such texts as these, and so many, and yet aver that the Scripture teaches us, that there is *no* sense in which it is true, that God hardens the hearts of men?

But the great question yet remains. Does God do this in such a way, i. e. is he so concerned in it, and only so concerned, that man's free agency is still left entire, and so that all the moral blame of his sins is to be attributed *solely* to him? This question we may answer in the *affirmative*. The Bible does indeed speak of God as hardening the hearts of men, in some sense or other. In what sense, is not specifically said, although it is very plainly implied. That he does this in the way of *direct* influence on the heart or mind, seems to be unequivocally denied in James 1: 13, 14. That what we are allowed to attribute to him, in respect to the hardening of the heart, can not be any thing which takes away the criminality and guilt of men, nor any thing which in any measure abridges the entire freedom of their own actions, is clear from the fact, that *the sacred writers often and every where ascribe the hardening of the heart to the wicked themselves*. So, expressly, in respect to Pharaoh, Ex. 8: 15, 32. 9: 34. 1 Sam. 6: 6; in respect to others, 2 Chron. 36: 13. Ps. 95: 8. Prov. 28: 14. Job 9: 4; and so of *hardening the neck*, which for substance has the same meaning, 2 K. 17: 14. Jer. 7: 26. 19: 15. Prov. 29: 1. Neh. 9: 16, 17, 29. In other expressions, the *passive* voice only is made use of, without designating any agent; e. g. Ex. 7: 22. 8: 19. 9: 7, 35, et alibi.

With these texts may be compared Is. 6: 10, where the prophet is bid to go and *make the heart of the people stupid*, their ears heavy, and to close up their eyes. Read now the comments on this, in Matt. 13: 15. Mark 4: 12. John 12: 40. Acts 28: 26, 27. A comparison of these is replete with instruction; for in Is. 6: 10 the *prophet* is represented as hardening the Jews, because he declares to them the divine word, and they, hearing and rejecting it, become more hardened. In John 12: 40, *God* is represented as *hardening their heart*, (which seems also to be implied in Mark 4: 12); while in Matt. 13: 15 and Acts 28: 26, 27, the plain and necessary implication is, that the Jews hardened their own hearts. Here then is one and the same case, which is represented in three different ways. (1) The prophet hardens the Jews. (2) God does the same thing. (3) The Jewish people do it themselves. Is all this true; or is one part contradictory to another? We may safely answer: It is *all* true. The prophet is said to *harden the hearts* of the Jews, merely because he is the instrument of delivering messages to them; while they, in consequence of abusing these, become more hardened and guilty. God hardens their hearts, in that by his providence he sustains them in life, upholds the use of all their powers, causes the prophets to warn and reprove them, and places them in circumstances where they must receive these warnings and reproofs. Under this arrangement of his providence, they become more hardened and wicked. In this sense, and in this only, do the Scriptures seem to affirm that he is concerned with the hardening of men's hearts.

The Jews hardened their own hearts, inasmuch as they freely and voluntarily abused all the blessings and privileges which the providence and mercy of God had bestowed upon them, and thus became more stupid and corrupt.

Surely no one will say, that the prophet (Is. 6: 10) hardens the

hearts of the Jews, by *direct* and *positive* influence upon them. It is *not* necessary, then, when it is declared that *God hardened the heart of Pharaoh*, to draw the conclusion that this was done *by direct and positive influence*. That it is not necessary, can be made clear from the following illustration of Scripture usage. In 2 Sam. 24: 1 it is said: *The Lord moved* (הִנְיָוָה) *David to go and number Israel*, etc.; which, under the circumstances then existing and with the views that David had, was a great sin in the sight of heaven, and was punished by a signal judgment of God. Here observe, that הִנְיָוָה is applied directly to Jehovah, without any intimation of a *secondary* agent or instrument; and so one might argue, (as some do in regard to other expressions of the like nature in the Scriptures), that God is here asserted to be the *direct* exciting cause, which occasioned David to number Israel, etc. Yet in 1 Chron. 21: 1, the very same thing is ascribed to Satan: *And Satan moved* (הִנְיָוָה) *David to go and number Israel*, etc. Observe that the *very same verb* is employed in the second case, as in the first. Now as Satan is the *tempter* of men to sin, and as "*God tempteth no man,*" we must say: Here is a clear case, in which that is ascribed to God, which he permits or suffers to be brought about under his superintendence or government of the universe, by agents of an inferior character. This seems, at least, to be a clear case; and it is one which has a very important bearing on the subject before us.

It is true, that God *roused up* Pharaoh, so that he was the occasion of the divine power and glory being displayed in all the land of Egypt. But was this done by *direct* and *immediate* operation in hardening his heart; or was it through the signs and wonders, which the power and providence of God performed before the eyes and in the country of this contumacious monarch? In the latter way, we may safely answer; inasmuch as Pharaoh and others are said, in the Scriptures, *to harden their own hearts*. There was *another agency* here, then, besides that of Jehovah; just as in the case stated above. God in his providence did send Moses and Aaron with a commission to make demands on the king of Egypt in behalf of the oppressed Hebrews; he sent plagues upon Egypt by his miraculous power; and all these things under the arrangements of his providence, being brought to act upon Pharaoh, he became worse and worse. The Lord hardened his heart, because the Lord was the author of commands and messages and miracles, which were the occasion of Pharaoh's hardening his own heart. In just such a way, Paul says that *our sinful passions are by the law*, τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου, Rom. 7: 5; which he afterwards explains by saying, ἢ γὰρ ἁμαρτία ἀφορμὴν λαβοῦσα κ.τ.λ., Rom. 7: 11.

That God was the author of the commands and messages delivered by Moses and Aaron to Pharaoh, is clear; that he was the author of the judgments inflicted on the land of Egypt, is clear; that he knew what effect these would produce on the heart of Pharaoh, is equally certain; and that he designed to turn all this into ultimate good, and to glorify himself, the Bible often asserts or implies. There is no difficulty then in saying, with reference to all this, and in the sense stated above, that God hardened Pharaoh's heart, or that *he roused him up*, viz.

by his messages and the miracles which he wrought. It is a clear case, that the active and bitter indignation and contumacy of Pharaoh was greatly increased or excited by these doings of divine providence; and therefore the sentiment of our text remains true; while, at the same time, God is not the author of Pharaoh's sin, (in the common sense of this expression), any more than he is the author of our sin, because he has given us powers and faculties by which we may sin, and with full knowledge that we should sin, has placed us in a world where we are of course surrounded by temptations and enticements to sin. After all this, we are *free agents*, we sin *voluntarily*, and we are therefore accountable for it; all which was equally true of Pharaoh.

To all that has now been said to illustrate and vindicate the true sense of ἐξήγειρα, it may be added, that the conclusion drawn by the apostle in v. 18, clearly implies that he gave such a sense to vs. 16, 17 as has been given above: "Therefore he hath mercy on whom he will, and *whom he will he hardeneth.*" Now if ἐξήγειρα does not imply some kind of agency, something done on the part of God which has a connection with the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, how can the apostle deduce the conclusion in v. 18 from the assertion in v. 17? This consideration alone seems fully and finally to decide the point, in regard to the exegesis put upon ἐξήγειρα by Tholuck, who follows the διετηρήθη of the Seventy, and construes it of *preserving Pharaoh*, i. e. upholding him in life, during the continuance of the plagues in Egypt. Six of these had already been inflicted, when the words in verse 17 were spoken. Tholuck says, that Pharaoh might have easily been taken off by these, and therefore ἐξήγειρα relates, as he maintains, to Pharaoh's having been preserved in life. And in the same way many others have construed the word ἐξήγειρα. But this will hardly satisfy the demands of critical exegesis. The six plagues already inflicted, were, the turning of the waters of the Nile into blood, Ex. 7: 14, seq.; the sending of the frogs, Ex. 8: 1, seq.; of the lice, Ex. 8: 16, seq.; of the flies, Ex. 8: 20, seq.; the murrain of beasts, Ex. 9: 1, seq.; and the plague of boils and blains, Ex. 9: 8, seq. Now as all these plagues were *temporary*; and as we have no intimation in the sacred records, that they occasioned the loss of human life among the Egyptians; so there seems to be no special reason, for putting this sense on יִרְדְּךָ בַחַיִּים, viz., *I have preserved thee or kept thee alive.*

And then, if this be adopted, how does the conclusion of the apostle in v. 18 follow, viz. ὃν δὲ θέλει, σκληρύνει? Does *preserving in life*, or *making one to keep his standing*, necessarily import a τὸ σκληρύνειν or σκληρώμα? I am altogether unable to see, how Paul could deduce such a conclusion from such premises.

I must therefore accede to what seems to be the plain and evident meaning of ἐξήγειρα, viz. that God in his providence did so direct things, viz. the warnings to Pharaoh, the commands addressed to him, and the signs and wonders in his land, that he was excited to more vehement resistance and contumely, which ended in his signal overthrow and destruction. In all this, Pharaoh was entirely voluntary and free. The case differs not, in principle, from what happens every day. As has been before remarked, God creates men; he endows them with powers

and faculties which enable them to sin ; and places them in a world surrounded by temptation ; and all this, knowing certainly that they will sin. Every one must agree to this. But are not men free agents still ? Do they not sin *voluntarily* ? Does not the blame of this attach entirely to themselves ? Can any part of it be justly charged upon God ? Surely not ; and if not, then there is a sense in which he may say, that *he roused up Pharaoh, in order that he might shew forth his power and glory in all the earth* ; and this, without making himself the proper author of sin. *In one sense*, God does all that takes place under his providence and government of the world ; for he preserves all creatures, and all worlds, and gives them all their powers, faculties, and opportunities of action. *In another sense*, God is *not* the author of sin : “ God tempteth no man.” Man is the proper author of his own sin ; “ every man is tempted, when “ he is drawn away by his own lust, and enticed to sin.” In one sense, God hath made all things for himself, yea, *the wicked for the day of evil*,” Prov. 16: 4 ; and in the like sense he *roused up Pharaoh*. So far as he is concerned with all this, it is in a way that is perfectly consistent with the freedom of men in action ; and all his designs are, to bring good out of evil, and thus to promote the glory of his own name ; as is intimated in the verse before us.

All the difficulty, which is involved in these declarations in their full extent, is involved in the principle (which even Theism admits) that *God is omniscient, omnipotent, and immutable*. The Deist has, in reality, the very same difficulties to cope with here, so far as the free agency and the sinfulness of men are concerned, as the evangelical Christian. The *nodus* of the whole, is our ignorance of the *manner* in which free agency and entire dependence, foreknowledge and voluntary action, consist together and are harmonized. But as *fact* only is known to us, viz. the fact that they do coexist ; and as the *manner* of their coexistence or consistency is beyond the boundaries of human knowledge ; so I do not see how those, who are stumbled at the subject under consideration, can ever satisfy themselves so long as they insist on first knowing the *manner* of the consistency, before they admit the *fact*.

In the apostle’s time, the very same objection was made to his doctrine, which has been made ever since, and is still every day repeated. So the verses in the sequel plainly shew us. They show, moreover, that the apostle was understood in the same way, as his words seem obviously to mean. If not, what ground was there for the objection which is raised.

The difficulty of this subject, the manner in which it has so often been misunderstood and abused, and a wish to contribute, if possible, something to remove some of its perplexities from the minds of readers who may peruse these pages, are my apology for dwelling so long upon it. That there are difficulties still, which remain unexplained, and which ever must remain so, while “ we know in part,” i. e. while we continue in the present world, I do not feel disposed at all to deny. But this is confessedly the case, in regard to a multitude of other things, which all admit without hesitation ; and this too, even when the *modus* of them remains utterly inexplicable.

APPENDIX.

[The object of this Appendix is, to present a brief view of the most distinguished commentators, ancient and modern, upon the epistle to the Romans.]

Origen (†253*), Comm. in Ep. ad Rom., in Vol. IV. ed. de la Rue; extant only in the Latin translation of Rufinus, by whom it was abridged in some places, and enlarged in others. Like all of Origen's expositions, it contains not a little that is fanciful or arbitrary; but it also contains some good hints.

Chrysostom (†407), Homil. XXXII. in Ep. ad Rom., Vol. IX. ed. Montf.; distinguished by much sound interpretation, simplicity of representation, elegance of language, and a glowing ardor of piety. The master-piece of ancient commentary.

Augustine (†430), Inchoata Expos. Ep. ad Rom., also Expos. quarundam Proposit. ex Ep. ad Rom., in Vol. II. Opp., ed. Benedict.; dogmatic rather than philological, yet not without acuteness.

Theodoret († circa 450); whose commentary is contained in Vol. III., ed. Halle. His interpretations are, for the most part, brief, plain, grammatical, and direct. But they are not always well studied, nor very weighty. He is inferior to Chrysostom, in his remarks on this epistle.

Oecumenius (cent. 10), Comm. in Ep. Pauli, Paris. 1631; contains excerpts from Chrysostom, Photius, Basil, etc., with remarks of his own. They are highly valued by critics.

Theophylact (cent. 11), Comm. in Ep. Pauli, Lond. 1630; contains an abridgement of Chrysostom, which is very acceptable to the beginner in the reading of Greek commentary; even more so than the original, as it is exceedingly easy and plain.

Besides these, there is a Comm. of Pelagius, printed in Hieron. Opp., Tom. V. ed. Mart., abridged and augmented by Cassiodorus, so that what is genuine can no longer be certainly ascertained. Also Hilary (commonly named *Ambrosiaster*) published a Comm. on the 13 Epist. of Paul. It is of little value. Who this Hilary was, is unknown.

Thomas Aquinas (†1274), Comm. in Ep. Pauli, Ant. 1591; contains some very acute *theological* commentary; *philological*, is not to be expected from him.

Erasmus (†1536), Paraphrasis in Ep. ad Rom., in Crit. Sac. Tom. VII.; fine Latin, and many good remarks. The main object of the epistle he does not seem to have rightly apprehended.

Calvin, Comm. etc., in Opp., Tom. VII.; fundamental investigation of the logic and course of thought contained in the epistle; very little verbal criticism. Many a difficulty is solved, without any appearance of effort, or any show of learning. Calvin is by far the most distinguished of all the commentators of his times.

Melancthon and Zuingle wrote *Scholia* merely, on the Ep. to the Romans. Both exhibit good hints, but not much philology. Their *Notes* are contained in their respective *Works*.

* The obelisk (†) means, *obit.*

Beza (†1605), Nov. Test., 1598. His Notes on Rom. are valuable in a grammatical and philological point of view. He was an excellent Greek scholar; and his notes are almost always worth consulting.

Bucer (†1551), *Metaphrases et Enarrationes Ep. Pauli*, 1536; distinguished for natural and artless interpretation, and a good talent for this department of labour.

Grotius (†1645), *Comm. in Opp.*; also separately, Par. 1644, 2 Vol. Remarks philological, grammatical, historical, antiquarian, etc., distinguish all the exegetical works of Grotius, beyond those of any writer before him, or in his day. "The *shell* he takes off with wonderful dexterity; but the *nut* he seldom tastes, and still more seldom relishes."

Hunnius, Justinian, Cornelius a Lapide, Baldwin, Cocceius, Seb. Schmidt, Limborch, S. J. Baumgarten, J. B. Carpzov, Wolf, Heumann, C. Schmid, have all written commentaries, more or less, on the Ep. to the Romans. Some good things may be found in most of them; but hardly enough to repay the trouble of reading, at the present day.

In the *Critici Sacri* (Amstelod.), are contained the Comm. of Vala, Revius, Erasmus, Vatablus, Castalio, Clarius, Zegerus, Drusius, Casaubonus, Gaultrierius, Cameronius, Jac. and Ludov. Capellus, and Grotius. Of these, Drusius, Erasmus, Clarius, Grotius, Cameronius, and J. Capellus, are especially worth consulting.


J. A. Turretin (†1737), *Praelectiones in Ep. ad Romanos*, (in *Opp.*); of distinguished exegetical talent; for the most part, his interpretation is simple and natural, and adorned with some admirable references to the classics. A truly *multum in parvo* book.

Koppe (†1791), in *Novo Test. Koppiano*. The *manner* of the interpretation is good, being simple and philological. But Koppe had not deeply studied the epistle; nor does he seem to have imbibed the true spirit of it.

Besides the commentators in form, already named, there are several important *subsidiary* works; e. g. Schöttgen, *Horae Talmudicae*, Tom. II. Elsner, *Observat. Sacrae*, Tom. II. Kypke, *Observat. Sac.* Tom. II. Bauer, *Philol. Thucyd. Paulina*. Raphel, *Annot. Philol. in N. Test. ex Xenophonte*, etc., Vol. II. Palaret, *Observ. Philol. Crit. in N. Test.* Krebs, *Observat. e Josepho*. Lösner, *Observat. e Philone*. Münthe, *Observ. e Diodoro*. Rambach, *Introduct. histor. theol. in Ep. Pauli ad Romanos*.

The most recent works on the epistle to the Romans, from the continent of Europe, are those of Flatt and Tholuck; both of them excellent; but especially the latter. Tholuck has much the advantage as a philologist. The latest work, by W. Benecke, has not yet come to hand.

The English works on the epistle to the Romans, are too well known to need recommending here. Henry, Whitby, Doddridge, Guise, John Taylor, Macknight, Scott, A. Clark, and many others, have written more or less upon this epistle.





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
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